Seung Han Yoo

 


Working Papers (reverse chronological order)



Optimal Design for an Informed Auctioneer, Feb 2017; This version: Oct 2018

Signaling with Two Correlated Characteristics, Sep 2016

Mechanism Design with Non-Contractible Information, Jan 2016; This version: Sep 2018

Bidding for Influence Peddling, Sep 2014

Competition, Corruption and Institutional Design, Apr 2014

Unobserved Investment, Signaling, and Welfare, (with Gea M. Lee), Mar 2013This version: Nov 2017


Published and forthcoming papers (SSCI-Listed)

Incentives for Discrimination (with Sue H. Mialon), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 136 (2017), 141-160

This paper supersedes Section 2 of the working paper:


Learning a Population Distribution, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 48 (2014), 188-201
 
An Alternative Proof for the Existence of Radner Equilibria, Mathematical Social Sciences, 66 (2013), 87-90

Strategic Analysis of Influence Peddling (with Mukul Majumdar), International Journal of Game Theory, 41 (2012), 737-762
 
Market Selection with Endogenous Information Revelation (with Scott Condie), International Journal of Economic Theory, 7 (2011), 201-215
 
Coordinating under Incomplete Information (with Geir Asheim), Review of Economic Design, 12 (2008), 293-313
 
Petty Corruption, Economic Theory, 37 (2008), 267-280
 



Last updated: December 2017

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