Yishai Cohen


I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Liberal Studies at the University of Southern MaineI received my Ph.D. from Syracuse University and did my undergraduate work in philosophy at Southern Methodist University

My research focuses on agency, ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. I'm particularly interested in incompatibilism about freedom and determinism, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, and the Actualism/Possibilism debate in ethics. 


Here are links to my CVphilpapers page, and academia.edu page.


Papers

The Limits of Virtue Ethics, in the Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 10 (2020) (with Travis Timmerman)

Actualism, Possibilism, and the Nature of Consequentialism, in the Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism (2020) (with Travis Timmerman)

Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019) (with Travis Timmerman)

Deliberating in the Presence of Manipulation, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2018)

An Analysis of Recent Empirical Data on ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Philosophia (2018)

Atonement’s Axiological Boundaries, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion (2017)


Actualism Has Control Issues, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2016) (with Travis Timmerman)

Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2016) (with Travis Timmerman)

Counterfactuals of Divine Freedom, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (2016)

Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt‐Style Cases, Thought (2016)

Endless Future: A Persistent Thorn in the Kalām Cosmological Argument, Philosophical Papers (2015)

Reasons-Responsiveness and Time Travel, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2015)

Agential Settling Requires a Conscious Intention, Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics (2015)

Molinists (Still) Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (2015)

The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism, Philosophia (2015)

Don’t Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting, Res Publica (2014)

Skeptical Theism and the Threshold Problem, Forum Philosophicum (2013)