Program 2018

Keynotes:

  • Dr. Roland Pfister (Würzburg University)
  • Dr. Judith Burkart (Zurich University)
  • Dr. Anna-Lisa Vollmer (Bielefeld University)
  • Dr. Katharina Rohlfing (Paderborn University - Universität Bielefeld)
  • Dr. Jordi Vallverdú (Autonomous University of Barcelona)

Program :

27th June : Morning

  • 08:30-09:00 Welcome
  • 09:00-09:30 Marc Godard (Université de Lille). Do manufactured and natural objects evoke similar motor information? Evidence from action priming
  • 09:30-10:00 Clara Gimenez (Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3). Understanding action carried out with tools: do not forget the hand
  • 10:00-11h10 Pfister, Roland (Würzburg University)

Towards an agent-centred perspective on cheating and rule-breaking

  • 11:10-11h30 Coffee break
  • 11:30-12h40 Burkart, Judith (Zurich University)

Human cognitive evolution – how cooperative breeding shaped our minds

  • 12:40-14h00 Lunch

27th June : Afternoon

  • 14:00-14:30 Ronan Guerineau (Université Paris Nanterre) Influence of the magnitude of anticipated perceptual effects in the emergence of potentiation effects
  • 14:30-15:00 Cynthia Colette (Université de Lille) Temporal dynamics for object Function and Manipulation knowledge access: an ERPs study
  • 15:00-16:10 Vollmer, Anna-Lisa (Bielefeld University)

Towards flexible interaction protocols for human-robot interaction

  • 16:10-16:30 Coffee break
  • 16:30-17:00 Diane Picard (Hôpitaux universitaires Pitié-Salpêtrière) Emotional contagion in peripheral facial palsy
  • 17:00-17:30 Thomas Gennen (Université Libre de Bruxelles) Conceptual blending and cultural normative imagination: the case study of Steiner teachers interpreting their pupils’ learning progression
  • 17:30-18:40 Rohlfing, Katharina (Paderborn University - Universität Bielefeld)

Pragmatic Frames—a multimodal and interpersonal alternative to mapping a word onto a concept in language acquisition


28th June : Morning

  • 09:00-09:30 Tyler Reigeluth (Université Libre de Bruxelles — UQAM) Is a learning machine a normal machine ?
  • 09:30-10:00 Guilherme Sanches De Oliveira (University of Cincinnati) Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: Compatibility and Normativity
  • 10:00-10:30 Corentin Chanet & David Eubelen (Université Libre de Bruxelles) Towards an activity-based model of autonomy
  • 10:30-10:50 Coffee break
  • 10:50-12:00 Vallverdú, Jordi (Autonomous University of Barcelona)

Ponzi Cognition and Epistemic Norms: Lessons from Ubiquitous Practices

Keynotes Abstract :

27th June :

Pfister, Roland (Würzburg University)

Towards an agent-centred perspective on cheating and rule-breaking

Rule violations are a ubiquitous in human societies, and they are studied from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives. Most prior research on deliberate rule violations has adopted a third-person perspective, asking whether or not agents decide to violate rules based on contextual factors and moral considerations. By contrast, little is known about the cognitive, affective, and motivational dynamics that occur in the rule-breaking agent right at the moment that he or she violates a rule. In order to approach such an agent-centred, first-person perspective on deliberate rule violations, I will present a series of behavioural experiments that show how committing a rule violation bears cognitive conflict for the rule breaker: Analyses of movement trajectories reveal that the rule representation seems to be continually active during the entire course of action, leaving a trace on observable behaviour. These findings open up a new theoretical approach to violation behaviour that shifts the focus from precursors and consequences of this ubiquitous behaviour to the actual cognitive processes that occur right at the moment a rule violation takes place.


Burkart, Judith (Zurich University)

Human cognitive evolution – how cooperative breeding shaped our minds

Humans have evolved from a great ape-like ancestor, who lived 5-7 mio years ago and from whom we have inherited big brains and impressive cognitive skills. During this time, however, we not only evolved our uniquely human cognitive abilities, but also started to systematically share offspring care in the social group (i.e. engage in cooperative breeding). Cooperative breeding is rare in primates and absent in extant great apes such as chimpanzees or gorillas. In fact, besides humans, it is only present in callitrichid monkeys. In these monkeys, shared infant care coevolved with high levels of social tolerance and proactive prosociality. These psychological adaptations not only scaffold behaviors necessary to share infant care, but also improve performance in a set of socio-cognitive tasks, including social learning or cooperative problem solving. We argue that during human evolution, the adoption of cooperative breeding was likewise accompanied by a suite of psychological adaptations. In contrast to callitrichids, however, these psychological adaptations were added to an already very powerful, great ape-like cognitive system, resulting in cascading effects on subsequent cognitive evolution. A situated and embodied cognition framework may be particularly useful for modelling this role of cooperative breeding for human cognitive evolution.

Vollmer, Anna-Lisa (Bielefeld University)

Towards flexible interaction protocols for human-robot interaction

Human-robot interaction (HRI) today largely suffers from a rigidity that requires the human user to learn and adapt to artificial protocols of interaction, preprogrammed into the robot system by the developers, within which the robot system can operate. Enabling the robot to flexibly adapt to the human and to co-construct patterns of interaction together with the individual human user would mean advances in system usability as interactions become more natural and efficient. In this talk, I will demonstrate this issue, which is especially important for robot learning, and present work towards rendering interaction protocols for HRI more flexible. HRI studies and studies with humans designed to model HRI, where humans learn to communicate when they do not share a protocol of interaction beforehand, shed light on the cognitive underpinnings of communication in humans that are missing in robots.

Rohlfing, Katharina (Paderborn University - Universität Bielefeld)

Pragmatic Frames—a multimodal and interpersonal alternative to mapping a word onto a concept in language acquisition

So far in the research, the problem of learning a word was presented mostly in an intrapersonal way: a child has to map a word onto a concept. In this presentation, I will present an alternative to this approach: Word learning is not only a matter of the learner. Instead, it is a joint and collaborative endeavor. Consequently, words are used for specific action goals—especially in early development. This view affords not only a change of theoretically conceptualizing word learning but also a change of methods. Departing from the theory summarized in Rohlfing et al., (2016), I will exemplify the methodological challenge on turn-taking, which – so far – was investigated mostly as unimodal but should be considered as a multimodal phenomenon. Analyzing a corpus of mother-child dyads applying Cross Recurrence Quantification Analysis and frequent pattern mining, solutions to the assessment of human sequential behavior will be presented with respect to the questions of (i) how multimodal turn-taking spreads across different modalities and (ii) how it is co-constructed with a partner.

28th June

Vallverdú, Jordi (Autonomous University of Barcelona)

Ponzi Cognition and Epistemic Norms: Lessons from Ubiquitous Practices

Western Sciences and Thinking has committed historically two big mistakes: first, and inspired by a dangerous naturalistic fallacy, to consider that humans share a similar and neutral nature (such as a tabula rasa, a soul, a brain…), which provides a fundamental way to deal with cognitive processes; and, secondly, to consider that when humans reason, they do it well and avoid biases thanks to specific epistemic-safe norms. My point is that both ideas are terribly wrong. In fact, there is a situated approach to cognition, as cultural psychologists and linguistic anthropologist have proved, as well as a real multiheuristic, opportunistic, biased, and completely blended way to manage epistemic responses to deal with that set of multimodal data or events, which we call “reality”. This is a brief but clear description of my idea of “Ponzi Cognition”, namely the acquisition (or imposition) of multiple meanings and norms under the belief of their epistemic (and social) correctness, but clearly biased and weakened by their several mutual inconsistencies.