About
Czech philosopher. Currently assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy and Patrology, Sts Cyril and Methodius Faculty of Theology, Palacký University Olomouc (Czech Republic). Also teacher of ethics and sociology and the guarantor for education in social work at Caritas College Olomouc.
Areas of philosophical research
Epistemology: modal, moral, religious.
Ethics: principles of minimal beneficence, meaning of life.
Axiological ethics: Dietrich von Hildebrand and related moral philosophers.
The bottom line frame questions of lasting interest, to me
How to avoid hell (understood broadly, as intense long-term misery) and attain heaven (intense long-term happiness)?
How to best help others in doing so?
In those contexts, how big difference does it make whether one sees oneself either as Aristotle or as Buddha suggested: i.e., either as a substance or as a process? Or also, either as predominantly free or as predominantly determined?
How to decide whether there is a God? In what ways is he perfect? And what, if anything, does he want from us?
How to decide whether there is an afterlife and what is it like?
Favourite philosophical traditions
Analytic
Aristotelian
Nietzschean
Existentialist
Realist phenomenological
Favourite non-living philosophers
Aristotle
John Duns Scotus
Blaise Pascal
John Locke
Joseph Butler
Arthur Schopenhauer
Friedrich Nietzsche
Søren Kierkegaard
Bernard Bolzano
Franz Brentano
Edmund Husserl
Adolf Reinach
Dietrich von Hildebrand
William David Ross
Rudolf Carnap
Donald Cary Williams
Mary Midgley
John Corcoran
Quentin Smith
Fritz Wenisch
Favourite living philosophers
Richard Swinburne
Timothy J. McGrew
Lydia McGrew
Joshua L. Rasmussen
Nevin Climenhaga
William Lane Craig
Hud Hudson
Peter van Inwagen
James Franklin
Mike W. Martin
Patrick Maher
Tim Maudlin
Bob Fischer
Michael Huemer
Magnus Vinding
Hilary Greaves
William MacAskill
Michael Slote
William F. Vallicella
Stephen D. Schwarz
Iddo Landau
Jason Marsh
Lukáš Novák
Jan Votava
Bronze Age Pervert
Zero HP Lovecraft
Preferred philosophical positions (as inquired by the PhilPapers Survey 2009)
A priori knowledge: yes or no? Yes.
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? Nominalism.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? Objective.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? Yes.
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? Internalism.
External world: idealism, scepticism, or non-sceptical realism? Non-sceptical realism.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? Libertarianism.
God: theism or atheism? Theism.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? Invariantism.
Knowledge claims: empiricism or rationalism? Rationalism.
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? Non-Humean.
Logic: classical or non-classical? Classical.
Mental content: internalism or externalism? Internalism.
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? Moral realism.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? Non-naturalism.
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? Non-physicalism.
Moral judgement: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? Cognitivism.
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? Internalism.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? Two boxes.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? Deontology.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? Disjunctivism.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-further fact view? Further-fact view.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? Libertarianism.
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? Other.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? Scientific realism.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? Survival.
Time: A-theory or B-theory? A-theory.
Trolley problem: switch or don't switch? Switch.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? Correspondence.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? Metaphysically possible.
Personal info
Married
Two sons, two daughters
Favorite music and writer, below