Vladyslav Nora
Assistant Professor
Nazarbayev University
Qabanbay Batyr Avenue 53,
Astana, Kazakhstan

vladyslav.nora@nu.edu.kz



Fields
Microeconomic theory, game theory, networks


Publications
"Saddle Functions and Robust Sets of Equilibria" (with Hiroshi UnoJournal of Economic Theory 150 (2014), 866-877.

We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (Econometrica, 1997)
, Morris and Ui (JET, 2005). The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best responses. In a game with a saddle function the set of correlated equilibria that induce an expectation of the saddle function greater or equal to its maximin value is robust to incomplete information.