Vahid Saadi, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Finance
IE Business School
Research Affiliate at Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)

Maria de Molina 12,
4º Izda
28006, Madrid
P: +34917821706

Research interests: Empirical Banking, Financial Intermediation, Real Estate, Microeconometrics


Working Papers
  • Mortgage Supply and the US Housing Boom: The Role of the Community Reinvestment ActSAFE Working Paper No. 155 -- Revise and Resubmit at The Review of Financial Studies

    • Presented at: AFA 2017
    • This paper studies the role of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in the US housing boom-bust cycle. I find that the enhancement in CRA enforcement in 1998 increased the growth rate of mortgage lending by CRA-regulated banks to CRA-eligible census tracts. I show that during the boom period house price growth was higher in the eligible census tracts because of the shift in mortgage supply of regulated banks. Consequently, these census tracts experienced a worse housing bust. I find that CRA-induced mortgages went to borrowers with lower FICO scores and encountered more frequent delinquencies.            


  • Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiencyncy, with Reint Gropp and Andre Guettler, IWH Discussion Paper No 7/2015 -- Revise and Resubmit at The Journal of Monetary Economics

    • Presented at: EFA 2015*; EBC (Tilburg) 2015; ASSA Day-ahead 2016*; MFA 2016; FIRS 2016*; BoE, BHC, CEPR and CFM Workshop on Finance, Investment and Productivity 2016; Chicago Financial Institutions Conference 2017*; 25th Finance Forum (UPF)MIT Golub Center for Finance and Policy 4th Annual Conference* (* presented by co-authors)

    • We use a natural experiment and matched bank/firm data to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks’ portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks’ portfolios are less productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long and prevent their exit from the market.


  • The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises, with Reint Gropp, Steven Ongena, and Joerg Rocholl, (Draft available upon request)

    • Presented at: Arne Ryde Conference on Financial Intermediation (Lund, 2017)*; Joint BIS-IMF-OECD conference co-sponsored by the Global Forum on Productivity on WEAK PRODUCTIVITY: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL FACTORS AND POLICIES  (Paris, 2018); The Real Effects of Financial Crises: Past, Present, Future (Frankfurt, 2018)*; Chicago Financial Institutions Conference (2018)*; 1st Biennial Bank of Italy and Bocconi University conference on "Financial stability and Regulation" (Rome, 2018), 26th Finance Forum (Santander, 2018); III Madrid Barcelona Workshop on Banking and Corporate Finance (Madrid, 2018)*, FDIC/JFSR Banking Research Conference (Washington DC, 2018)  (* presented by co-authors)

    • Scheduled at: 6th Emerging Scholars in Banking and Finance Conference (London, 2018)

    • In this paper, we test the cleansing effects of banking crises. We show that in U.S. regions with higher levels of regulatory forbearance on distressed banks during the financial crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost if more distressed banks remain in business. Consistent with the cleansing hypothesis, regions with less regulatory forbearance during the crisis experience a better productivity growth path after the crisis with more establishment entries, job creation, employment and wage, patent, and output growth. Furthermore, we show that regulatory forbearance is larger for state-chartered banks, and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks. Finally, we find that recapitalization of distressed banks through TARP does not appear to be cleansing.


Work in Progress
  • Electoral Lending Cycles: The Case of German Savings Banks, with Reint Gropp
  • The Pope, Martin Luther and Banking Behavior: Does Local Denomination Affect Bank Risk Taking?, with Konstantin Kiesel