August 12 - August 16, 2008
Derek Ball – Conceivability
orthodoxy has it that the conceivability of zombies and
David J. Chalmers and Frank Jackson, "Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation", Philosophical Review 2001
Colin McGinn, "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" Mind 1989
John Bengson – The Theory of Intuition
The main issues, arguments, and views in the theory of
intuition will be
Dan Bonevac – Reflective Equilibrium
A number of objections, often thought to be decisive, have been raised
Rawls 1989, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy"
Bonevac 2004, "Reflection Without Equilibrium"
Josh Dever – Steps Toward a Linguistic Idealism A Damn Sight Better Than Carnap's
Here is a metaphysical claim: a complete inventory of the contents of
Jeff King – Kinds of Analysis and Questions of Unity
In a famous (or is it infamous?) passage in Principles of Mathematics,
chapters 1, 2, and 7 of The Nature and Structure of Content
Optional reading: Scott Soames, ''The Unity of the Proposition', on his website
Dan Korman – Paraphrase in Metaphysics
Van Inwagen paraphrases claims about what there is
in terms of arrangements of mereological simples. Lewis paraphrases
claims about what there isn't in terms of what isn't in some restricted
domain of quantification. Kripke paraphrases claims about what could
have happened in terms of what our qualitative duplicates might have
truly said. Our topic will be (i) how one is to understand the relation
between these paraphrases and the contents of our utterances and
intuitions, and (ii) strategies for critically assessing paraphrases.
Marc Moffett – Epistemic Conservatism
Broadly speaking, the topic is epistemic conservatism. Other material that will crop up in the course of discussion includes:
(i) A discussion of the appropriate primary level of epistemic evaluation. I am pushing for the view that this is doxastic acts (e.g., belief formation, retention, etc.) and that this might shed some light on the discussion over the basing relation.
(ii) I will probably have some discussion concerning intuition and evidentialism. This is related to Mike Huemer's work on "phenomenal conservatism".
(iii) I will also probably touch on the issue of justification and "truth conduciveness".
(iv) Finally, if I have time, I will talk a bit about some issues concerning epistemic development (standard change) and meta-epistemology.
Roy Sorensen – What Makes Something Interesting
We'll take on the issue of what makes something interesting. It connects with trivialist results, the paradox of analysis, and a puzzle about academic hiring raised by David Lewis.
Reading: Sorensen, "Interestingly Dull Numbers" (manuscript)
Ernest Sosa – Intuitions in Philosophy
The session will take up (a) objections to the place of intuitions in
Ernest Sosa, "Rational Intuitions" (manuscript)
Ernest Sosa, "Hopeful Intuitions" (manuscript)
Ernest Sosa, "A Defense of Intuitions in Philosophy," forthcoming in
Stephen Stich, "Reply to Sosa," ibid.
Joshua Alexander, Jonathan M. Weinberg, “Analytic Epistemology and
Jonathan Weinberg, “How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy (XXXI (2007): 318-43.
Ernest Sosa, "Intuitions," Ch. 3 of A Virtue Epistemology (OUP,
Paul Boghossian, "Sosa on Intuitions," manuscript.