Toshiyuki Hirai
Toshiyuki Hirai
Professor, Department of Economics, Hosei University
4342 Aihara-machi, Machida, Tokyo, Japan 1940298
E-mail address: hirai(at)hosei.ac.jp
Game Theory, Microeconomics, Public Economics.
Stable matching under inconsistent choice functions (with Keisuke Bando, Kenzo Imamura) UTMD Working Paper 75, 2025.
Substitutes for nonunitary many-to-many matching with contracts (with Keisuke Bando) SSRN Working Paper 4571538, 2024.
vNM stable sets and Aumann-Drèze-Shapley value in patent licensing of cost-reducing technologies: Asymptotic results in general Cournot markets (with Naoki Watanabe) 2024 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (BigData), 3847-3853, 2024.
Voluntary participation in a negotiation on providing public goods and renegotiation opportunities (with Ryusuke Shinohara) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 224, 1-19, 2024.
Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts (with Keisuke Bando, Jun Zhang) Games and Economic Behavior 129, 503-512, 2021.
Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching (with Keisuke Bando) Journal of Economic Theory 196, 105292, 2021.
This paper supercede our working paper "On stable outcomes of multilateral matching".
Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach (with Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto) Games and Economic Behavior 118, 141-160, 2019.
Corrigendum to `Multilateral matching' [J. Econ. Theory 156 (2015) 175–206] (with Keisuke Bando, John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers) Journal of Economic Theory 184, 104933, 2019. (online only)
Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies International Journal of Game Theory 47(4), 1087-1111, 2018.
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: The existence proof (with Naoki Watanabe) Mathematical Social Sciences 94, 1-12, 2018.
The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: Existence, uniqueness, and efficiency International Journal of Game Theory 46(1), 149-166, 2017.
The menu-induced core of an economy with an excludable public good Theoretical Economics Letters 4(4) (Special Issue on Public Economics), 289-295, 2014.
The core coincides with the nucleolus allocations in a public goods economy with taxation International Game Theory Review 9(2), 141-155, 2009.
von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies Economic Theory 37(1), 81-98, 2008.
Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads (with Takuya Masuzawa, Mikio Nakayama) Mathematical Social Sciences 51(2), 162-170, 2006.
Stable sets of a strategic public good provision game Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama, Working Paper No. 290, 2014.
Renegotiations and the diffusion of a technology with positive externalities Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama, Working Paper No. 277, 2012.
On the stability of the core in a public good economy Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama, Working Paper No. 270, 2012.