応用ミクロ経済学C（一橋大学）2017年度

この講義は終了しました

最終更新: 2017年11月10日

担当教員: 多鹿 智哉

連絡先: tajika"at"ier.hit-u.ac.jp ("at"を@に置き換えてください) または 問い合わせ欄

時間: 秋学期, 月・木 1限

教室: 第2講義棟307

オフィスアワー: 月曜2限, 経済研究所A205

[授業科目の目的]

学部上級から大学院生向けに投票理論の基礎理論と(時間に余裕があれば)最近の研究について解説します。

[授業科目の到達目標]

投票理論について理解するだけでなく、受講者自身でモデルを立て、計算することができるようになることを目的とします。

[成績評価の方法]

• 課題 50%

• 講義内容に関連した練習問題を課します。日本語または英語で解答し、教員にメールまたは直接提出してください。メールの場合はファイル形式はPDFで、手書きまたは印刷の場合はA4用紙にてご提出ください。採点して返却する予定です。

• レポート 50%

• 以下のうちいずれかの内容を日本語もしくは英語で10ページ以内にまとめて教員にメールにてPDFファイルで提出してください。

• 1. 投票理論に関する研究アイデア、モデルを作成する。

• 2. 投票理論に関する研究論文(教科書の一つの章でも可, 2017/10/26追加)を一つ選び、概要と結果をまとめ、論文についての批判、改善案を書く。

レポートの提出期限は2017/11/9(Thu)です。

宿題の最終提出期限も同じです。

宿題を返却してもらっていない方は研究室まで。

[授業内容]

予定(進捗,希望に応じて変更あり), 宿題は問題集の中から出題されます.

第1回 2017/9/21(Thu): ミクロ経済学の復習(選好関係について), 社会選択について

宿題1: 問題集の問題番号1.1--1.7の中から3問, 2.1--2.5の中から2問選んで解いてください. 提出目安: 2017/9/28.

問題1.2と1.7とに訂正箇所があります. 訂正箇所は青字で示してあります(2017/9/22)

第2回 2017/9/25(Mon): アローの不可能性定理

第3回 2017/9/28(Thu): 投票ルールと非循環性

宿題2: 問題集の問題番号 2.6--2.12の中から2問選んで解いてください. 提出目安: 2017/10/5

注意1: 本日の板書に誤りがあります. 中立性の定義を「 かつ ならば...」と書きましたが(これも違ってる?) ただしくは「

ならば 」ですが, ただしくは 「ならば

」です. 板書が正解です. 9/28

第4回 2017/10/2(Mon): 単峰性選好, 中位投票者定理, 投票ルールのコア, 耐戦略性, ギバード=サタスウェイトの定理

宿題２に誤りがありましたので訂正しました 10/2

第5回 2017/10/5(Thu): 単峰性選好, 中位投票者ルール

宿題3: 問題集の問題番号3.1--3.6, 4.1, 4.2の中から1問以上選んで解いてください. 提出目安: 2017/10/12

第6回 2017/10/9(Mon): 中位投票者ルールの続き

第7回 2017/10/12(Thu): ゲーム理論の復習, 戦略的投票, コストのかかる投票

宿題4: 問題集の問題番号4.3--4.8 の中から1問以上選んで解いてください. ゲーム理論に不安がある方は5.1--5.4を解いてください. 提出目安: 2017/10/19, 2017/10/23 (電車遅延が発生しているようなので提出目安を順延します, 2017/10/19)

第8回 2017/10/16(Mon): コストのかかる投票のつづき

第9回 2017/10/19(Thu): 情報の集計, コンドルセ陪審員定理

宿題5: 問題集の問題番号5.5--5.10の中から1問以上を選んで解いてください. 提出目安:2017/10/26

第10回 2017/10/23(Mon): 台風接近に伴う休講措置について

第11回 2017/10/26(Thu): 選挙モデル, ダウンズモデル, 確率的投票

宿題6: 問題集の全範囲でまだ解いていない問題から1問以上. すべての宿題の提出期限は2017/11/9 です. それ以降は成績に入りません.

第12回 2017/10/30(Mon): 代議制

第13回 2017/11/2(Thu): 会議, 署名運動

• 講義ノート (更新中, 日本語, 最終更新日2017.11.2.)

• 問題集 (更新中, 日本語, 解答は講義終了後にアップします, 最終更新日2017.10.2).

• 問題集解答例(全範囲)

[参考文献]

教科書など

• Austin-Smith and Banks (1999) Positive Political Theory I, Michigan

• Austin-Smith and Banks (2005) Positive Political Theory II, Michigan

• Gehlbach (2013) Formal Models of Domestic Politics, Cambridge

• Muller (2003) Public Choice III, Cambridge

• Nitzan (2010) Collective Preference and Choice, Cambridge

• Persson and Tabellini (2002) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, MIT

社会選択・メカニズムデザイン

• Azevedo and Budish (2017) "Strategy-proofness in the large"

• Azrieli and Kim (2014) "PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES," International Economic Review

• Balasko and Crès (1997) "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory

• Balinski and Laraki (2011) Majority Judgement, MIT Press

• Barberá (2011) "Strategyproof social choice"

• Barberá, Berga and Moreno (2010) "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?", Journal of Economic Theory

• Barberá, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) "Voting by Committees", Econometrica

• Caplin and Nalebuff (1988) "On 64%-majority rule," Econometrica

• Ching (1997) "Strategy-Proofness and "Median Voters"", International Journal of Game Theory.

• Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2013) A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare

• Gibbard (1973) "Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result", Econometrica

• Gibbard (1977) "Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica

• Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981) "A further characterization of Borda ranking method," Public Choice

• May (1952) "Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision", Econometrica

• Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness", Journal of Economic Theory

• Reny (2001) "Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach", Economic Letters

• Satterthwaite (1975) "Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions", Journal of Economic Theory

• Sen (1970, 2017) Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Harvard University Press

• Wilson (1972) "Social Choice Theory without the Pareto Principal", Journal of Economic Theory

• Young (1995) "Optimal voting rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives

選挙モデル

• Besley and Coate (1997) "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Economics

• Besley and Coate (2008) “Issue unbundling via citizens’ initiatives,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science

  • Callander (2008) "Political Motivation," Review of Economic Studies

• Carvert (1985) "Robustness of the multi-dimensional voting model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence," American Journal of Political Science.

• Downs (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row

• Duggan and Martinelli (2015) Political Economy of Dynamic Elections

• Forand (2014) "Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies", Journal of Economic Theory

• Gerber (1996) “Legislative response to the threat of popular initiatives,” American Journal of Political Science

• Hotelling (1929) "Stability in competition," Economic Journal.

• Kamada and Kojima (2013) “The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models,” Games and Economic Behavior

• Kamada and Kojima (2014) "Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

• Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) “Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition, Public Choice

• Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) "Political resource allocation: Benefits and costs of voter initiatives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization

• Osborne (1995) "Spatial models of political competition under plurality rule: A survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and positions they take," Canadian Journal of Economics

• Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) "Meeting with costly participation," American Economic Review

• Osborne and Slivinski (1996) "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Quarterly Journal of Economics

• Persson and Tabellini (1999) “The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians,” European Economic Review

• Smithies (1941) "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," Journal of Political Economy

• Van Weelden (2013) "Candidates, Credibility, and Re-election Incentives," Review of Economic Studies

• Wittman (1973) "Parties as Utility Maximisers," American Political Science Review

• Wittman (1977) "Candidate with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model," Journal of Economic Theory

• Wittman (1983) "Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternative theories," American Political Science Review

投票のベイジアンモデル, 情報の集計

• Ali, Mihm and Siga (2017) "The Perverse Politics of Polarization"

• Bhattacharya (2013) "PREFERENCE MONOTONICITY AND INFORMATION AGGREGATION IN ELECTIONS", Econometrica

• Bouton and Gratton (2015) "Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger’s hypothesis," Theoretical Economics

• Börgers (2000) "Is Internet Voting a Good Thing?", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

• Börgers (2004) "Costly voting", American Economic Review

• Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) "Aggregation and social choice: A mean voter theorem," Econometrica.

• Chamberlain and Rothchild (1981) "A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote," Journal of Economic Theory

• Duggan and Martinelli (2001) "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries", Games and Economic Behavior.

• Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) "The Swing Voter's Curse", American Economic Review

• Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting", American Political Science Review

• Ginzburg (2017) "Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences," Economic Letters

• Goeree and Großer (2007) "Welfare reducing polls," Economic Theory

• Kim and Fey (2007) "The swing voter’s curse with adversarial preferences," Journal of Economic Theory

• Krishna and Morgan (2015) "Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.

• Ledyard (1984) "The pure theory of large two-candidate elections", Public Choice.

• Mandler (2012) "The fragility of information aggregation in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior

• Martinelli (2006) "Would rational voters acquire costly information?," Journal of Economic Theory

• McMurray (2013) "Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses", Review of Economic Studies

• McMurray (2017) "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

• Myatt (2007) "On the theory of strategic voting," Review of Economic Studies

• Myerson (1998) “Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games”, International Journal of Game Theory.

• Myerson (2000) “Large Poisson Games”, Journal of Economic Theory.

• Taylor and Yildirim (2010) "Public information and electoral bias", Games and Economic Behavior

行動経済学, 非期待効用的意思決定に基づく投票モデル(投票への応用を紹介している論文も含む)

• Ali and Lin (2013) "Why People Vote: Ethical Motives and Social Incentives," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

• Ashworth and Mesquita (2014) "Is voter competence good for voters?: Information, rationality, and democratic performance," American Political Science Review

• Aragonès and Postlewaite (2002) "Ambiguity in election games," Review of Economic Design

• Bade (2013) "Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

• Ellis (2016) "Condorset meets Ellsberg", Theoretical Economics.

• Eyster and Rabin (2005) "Cursed equilibrium," Econometrica

• Levy and Razin (2015) "Correlation neglect, voting behavior, and information aggregation". The American Economic Review

• Lockwood (2017) "Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability," Quarterly Journal of Political Science"

• Millner, Olliver and Simon (2017) "Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections"