応用ミクロ経済学C(一橋大学)2017年度
この講義は終了しました
最終更新: 2017年11月10日
担当教員: 多鹿 智哉
連絡先: tajika"at"ier.hit-u.ac.jp ("at"を@に置き換えてください) または 問い合わせ欄
時間: 秋学期, 月・木 1限
教室: 第2講義棟307
オフィスアワー: 月曜2限, 経済研究所A205
[授業科目の目的]
学部上級から大学院生向けに投票理論の基礎理論と(時間に余裕があれば)最近の研究について解説します。
[授業科目の到達目標]
投票理論について理解するだけでなく、受講者自身でモデルを立て、計算することができるようになることを目的とします。
[成績評価の方法]
課題 50%
講義内容に関連した練習問題を課します。日本語または英語で解答し、教員にメールまたは直接提出してください。メールの場合はファイル形式はPDFで、手書きまたは印刷の場合はA4用紙にてご提出ください。採点して返却する予定です。
レポート 50%
以下のうちいずれかの内容を日本語もしくは英語で10ページ以内にまとめて教員にメールにてPDFファイルで提出してください。
1. 投票理論に関する研究アイデア、モデルを作成する。
2. 投票理論に関する研究論文(教科書の一つの章でも可, 2017/10/26追加)を一つ選び、概要と結果をまとめ、論文についての批判、改善案を書く。
レポートの提出期限は2017/11/9(Thu)です。
宿題の最終提出期限も同じです。
宿題を返却してもらっていない方は研究室まで。
[授業内容]
予定(進捗,希望に応じて変更あり), 宿題は問題集の中から出題されます.
第1回 2017/9/21(Thu): ミクロ経済学の復習(選好関係について), 社会選択について
宿題1: 問題集の問題番号1.1--1.7の中から3問, 2.1--2.5の中から2問選んで解いてください. 提出目安: 2017/9/28.
問題1.2と1.7とに訂正箇所があります. 訂正箇所は青字で示してあります(2017/9/22)
第2回 2017/9/25(Mon): アローの不可能性定理
第3回 2017/9/28(Thu): 投票ルールと非循環性
宿題2: 問題集の問題番号 2.6--2.12の中から2問選んで解いてください. 提出目安: 2017/10/5
注意1: 本日の板書に誤りがあります. 中立性の定義を「 かつ ならば...」と書きましたが(これも違ってる?) ただしくは「
かつならば...」です. 講義ノートが正解です. 2017/9/29 (少々訂正しました)
注意2: 本日の板書ですが, 決定性について, 講義ノートでは「
ならば 」ですが, ただしくは 「ならば
」です. 板書が正解です. 9/28
第4回 2017/10/2(Mon): 単峰性選好, 中位投票者定理, 投票ルールのコア, 耐戦略性, ギバード=サタスウェイトの定理
宿題2に誤りがありましたので訂正しました 10/2
第5回 2017/10/5(Thu): 単峰性選好, 中位投票者ルール
宿題3: 問題集の問題番号3.1--3.6, 4.1, 4.2の中から1問以上選んで解いてください. 提出目安: 2017/10/12
第6回 2017/10/9(Mon): 中位投票者ルールの続き
第7回 2017/10/12(Thu): ゲーム理論の復習, 戦略的投票, コストのかかる投票
宿題4: 問題集の問題番号4.3--4.8 の中から1問以上選んで解いてください. ゲーム理論に不安がある方は5.1--5.4を解いてください. 提出目安: 2017/10/19, 2017/10/23 (電車遅延が発生しているようなので提出目安を順延します, 2017/10/19)
第8回 2017/10/16(Mon): コストのかかる投票のつづき
第9回 2017/10/19(Thu): 情報の集計, コンドルセ陪審員定理
宿題5: 問題集の問題番号5.5--5.10の中から1問以上を選んで解いてください. 提出目安:2017/10/26
第10回 2017/10/23(Mon): 台風接近に伴う休講措置について
第11回 2017/10/26(Thu): 選挙モデル, ダウンズモデル, 確率的投票
宿題6: 問題集の全範囲でまだ解いていない問題から1問以上. すべての宿題の提出期限は2017/11/9 です. それ以降は成績に入りません.
第12回 2017/10/30(Mon): 代議制
第13回 2017/11/2(Thu): 会議, 署名運動
[参考文献]
教科書など
Austin-Smith and Banks (1999) Positive Political Theory I, Michigan
Austin-Smith and Banks (2005) Positive Political Theory II, Michigan
Gehlbach (2013) Formal Models of Domestic Politics, Cambridge
Muller (2003) Public Choice III, Cambridge
Nitzan (2010) Collective Preference and Choice, Cambridge
Persson and Tabellini (2002) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, MIT
社会選択・メカニズムデザイン
Azevedo and Budish (2017) "Strategy-proofness in the large"
Azrieli and Kim (2014) "PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES," International Economic Review
Balasko and Crès (1997) "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory
Balinski and Laraki (2011) Majority Judgement, MIT Press
Barberá (2011) "Strategyproof social choice"
Barberá, Berga and Moreno (2010) "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?", Journal of Economic Theory
Barberá, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) "Voting by Committees", Econometrica
Caplin and Nalebuff (1988) "On 64%-majority rule," Econometrica
Ching (1997) "Strategy-Proofness and "Median Voters"", International Journal of Game Theory.
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2013) A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare
Gibbard (1973) "Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result", Econometrica
Gibbard (1977) "Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica
Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981) "A further characterization of Borda ranking method," Public Choice
May (1952) "Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision", Econometrica
Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness", Journal of Economic Theory
Reny (2001) "Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach", Economic Letters
Satterthwaite (1975) "Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions", Journal of Economic Theory
Sen (1970, 2017) Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Harvard University Press
Wilson (1972) "Social Choice Theory without the Pareto Principal", Journal of Economic Theory
Young (1995) "Optimal voting rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives
選挙モデル
Besley and Coate (1997) "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Economics
Besley and Coate (2008) “Issue unbundling via citizens’ initiatives,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Callander (2008) "Political Motivation," Review of Economic Studies
Carvert (1985) "Robustness of the multi-dimensional voting model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence," American Journal of Political Science.
Downs (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row
Duggan and Martinelli (2015) Political Economy of Dynamic Elections
Forand (2014) "Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies", Journal of Economic Theory
Gerber (1996) “Legislative response to the threat of popular initiatives,” American Journal of Political Science
Hotelling (1929) "Stability in competition," Economic Journal.
Kamada and Kojima (2013) “The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models,” Games and Economic Behavior
Kamada and Kojima (2014) "Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) “Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition, Public Choice
Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) "Political resource allocation: Benefits and costs of voter initiatives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
Osborne (1995) "Spatial models of political competition under plurality rule: A survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and positions they take," Canadian Journal of Economics
Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) "Meeting with costly participation," American Economic Review
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Quarterly Journal of Economics
Persson and Tabellini (1999) “The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians,” European Economic Review
Smithies (1941) "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," Journal of Political Economy
Van Weelden (2013) "Candidates, Credibility, and Re-election Incentives," Review of Economic Studies
Wittman (1973) "Parties as Utility Maximisers," American Political Science Review
Wittman (1977) "Candidate with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model," Journal of Economic Theory
Wittman (1983) "Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternative theories," American Political Science Review
投票のベイジアンモデル, 情報の集計
Ali, Mihm and Siga (2017) "The Perverse Politics of Polarization"
Bhattacharya (2013) "PREFERENCE MONOTONICITY AND INFORMATION AGGREGATION IN ELECTIONS", Econometrica
Bouton and Gratton (2015) "Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger’s hypothesis," Theoretical Economics
Börgers (2000) "Is Internet Voting a Good Thing?", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Börgers (2004) "Costly voting", American Economic Review
Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) "Aggregation and social choice: A mean voter theorem," Econometrica.
Chamberlain and Rothchild (1981) "A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote," Journal of Economic Theory
Duggan and Martinelli (2001) "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries", Games and Economic Behavior.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) "The Swing Voter's Curse", American Economic Review
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting", American Political Science Review
Ginzburg (2017) "Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences," Economic Letters
Goeree and Großer (2007) "Welfare reducing polls," Economic Theory
Kim and Fey (2007) "The swing voter’s curse with adversarial preferences," Journal of Economic Theory
Krishna and Morgan (2015) "Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
Ledyard (1984) "The pure theory of large two-candidate elections", Public Choice.
Mandler (2012) "The fragility of information aggregation in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior
Martinelli (2006) "Would rational voters acquire costly information?," Journal of Economic Theory
McMurray (2013) "Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses", Review of Economic Studies
McMurray (2017) "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Myatt (2007) "On the theory of strategic voting," Review of Economic Studies
Myerson (1998) “Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games”, International Journal of Game Theory.
Myerson (2000) “Large Poisson Games”, Journal of Economic Theory.
Taylor and Yildirim (2010) "Public information and electoral bias", Games and Economic Behavior
行動経済学, 非期待効用的意思決定に基づく投票モデル(投票への応用を紹介している論文も含む)
Ali and Lin (2013) "Why People Vote: Ethical Motives and Social Incentives," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Ashworth and Mesquita (2014) "Is voter competence good for voters?: Information, rationality, and democratic performance," American Political Science Review
Aragonès and Postlewaite (2002) "Ambiguity in election games," Review of Economic Design
Bade (2013) "Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Ellis (2016) "Condorset meets Ellsberg", Theoretical Economics.
Eyster and Rabin (2005) "Cursed equilibrium," Econometrica
Levy and Razin (2015) "Correlation neglect, voting behavior, and information aggregation". The American Economic Review
Lockwood (2017) "Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability," Quarterly Journal of Political Science"
Millner, Olliver and Simon (2017) "Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections"