Accueil

Le séminaire se tient le lundi de 11h à midi, en général en salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée)
au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré,
11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème. 
Plan

Sur cette page, vous trouverez les titres et les abstracts des séminaires du mois à venir.

Les noms des speakers des mois à venir se trouvent sur l'agenda.

Les abstracts des séances précédentes peuvent être trouvé sur la page suivante Archives 2016-??.


Novembre 2018

Lundi 5 Novembre Penelope Hernandez (Université de Valencia)
    • Title: A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning (joint work with. J. Peris and J. Vidal-Puga)

      • Abstract : In the framework of minimum cost spanning tree problems, several algorithms provide us a way of finding a minimum cost spanning tree. We deal with the problem of finding a way to distribute this minimum cost between the users. This distribution is given by a rule that assigns a payoff to each user. The recently studied folk solution has many relevant properties from a normative point of view. In this paper, we present a non-cooperative game whose unique final subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocation coincides with the folk solution in expected terms. 

 Lundi 12 Novembre Joseph Abdou (Université Paris 1)

    • Title: A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise (joint work with Hans Keiding)

      • Abstract : We view political activity as an interaction between forces seeking to achieve a political agenda. The viability of a situation depends on the compatibility of such agendas. However even in a conflictual situation a compromise may be possible. Mathematically a political structure is modeled as a simplicial complex and a viable configuration as a simplex. A represented compromise is a viable configuration obtained by the withdrawal of some agents in favor of some friendly representatives. A delegated compromise is a sophisticated version of a compromise obtained by the iteration of the withdrawal process. Existence of such solutions depends on the discrete topology of the simplicial complex. In particular we prove that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex.

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Lundi 19 Novembre Gaëtan Fournier (Aix-Marseille School of Economics)
    • Title: Location games and differentiation of players.

      • Abstract : A location game is a competition between players who select a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. Buyers usually prefer when sellers are dispersed, but it is not always the case: during the talk I describe different games and show what are the important ingredients to observe differentiation between players.
Lundi 26 Novembre Chloé Jimenez (Université de Brest)
    • Title: A zero sum differential game with correlated information on the initial position. A case with a continuum of initial positions.

      • Abstract : We study a two player zero sum game where the initial position z_0 is not communicated to any player. The intial position is a function of a couple (x_0,y_0) where x_0 is communcated to player I while y_0 is communicated to player II.  The couple (x_0,y_0) is choosen according a probability measure dm(x,y)=h(x,y) d\mu(x) d\nu(y) where h is assumed to be continuous. We show that the game has a value and that the value is a solution of Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equation in a dual sense.








Séminaire des Thésards  (de 10h à 11h, même salle, sauf en cas de séminaire double)

Page web de Stefano Moretti recensant les événements de théorie des jeux à Paris : cliquer ici