Accueil

Le séminaire se tient le lundi de 11h à midi, en général en salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée)
au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré,
11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème. 
Plan
Avril 2017  - Séminaires
  • Lundi 29 Mai Michel De Lara (École des Ponts ParisTech)
    • Game Theory with Information --- Introducing the Witsenhausen Intrinsic Model (joint with
      Benjamin Heymann)
      • Abstract: In a context of competition, information (who knows what and before whom) play a crucial role. Witsenhausen proposed a model to handle, in all generality, information in stochastic control problems. To our knowledge, this model has not been introduced until now in game theory. We propose to revisit concepts of game theory --- Nash equilibium, Bayesian Nash equilibium, repeated games, backward induction, subgame --- to grasp them in the Witsenhausen intrinsic model (WIM) framework. We outline how the WIM offers an intrinsic way to describe and classify classic specimen like Stackelberg leadership model, principal-agent models, moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling. We discuss a possible research program.


  • Lundi 5 Juin  Férié (Pentecôte)

  • Lundi 12 Juin Martin Gairing (University of Liverpool)
    • Cost-Sharing and Efficiency in Congestion Games
      • Abstract: During the last decade, the quantification of the inefficiency of game-theoretic equilibria has been a popular and successful line of research. The two most widely adopted measures for this inefficiency are the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS). In this talk I will summarise recent results on the PoA and PoS in different variations of congestion games and under different cost sharing methods.

        Both concepts compare the social cost in a Nash equilibrium to the optimum social cost that could be achieved via central control. The PoA is pessimistic and considers the worst-case such Nash equilibrium, while the PoS is optimistic and considers the best-case Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the PoA can be used as an absolute worst-case guarantee in a scenario where we have no control over equilibrium selection. On the other hand, the PoS gives an estimate of what is the best we can hope for in a Nash equilibrium; for example, if a trusted mediator suggest this solution to them.

Séminaire des Thésards  (de 10h à 11h, même salle, sauf en cas de séminaire double)

Page web de Stefano Moretti recensant les événements de théorie des jeux à Paris : cliquer ici