Le séminaire se tient le lundi de 11h à midi, en général en salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée)
au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré,
11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème. 

Les abstracts des séances précédentes peuvent être trouvé sur la page suivante Archives 2016-??.

Mars 2018  - Séminaires
  • Lundi 5 Mars  Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen (IST Austria)
    • Title: How to play the Big Match (with Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Michal Koucký and Abraham Neyman)

      • Abstract:  Odd and Even is a very simple game that has been played at least since ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. First, Player 1 hides a number of small objects and then Player 2 guesses whether the number of items was odd or even. If Player 2 is correct, he wins a point from Player 1 and otherwise loses one. The Big Match is a variant of playing Odd and Even repeatedly. The variant is such that the players must play the same as in the last round if the number of items hidden in that round was even. It is one of the simplest games illustrating the difficulty in balancing short and long term gains.
        It is possible for each player to ensure that the average per round increase in their number of points is above -epsilon, for any epsilon>0, if the number of repetitions of the game is sufficiently large or infinite, even if the duration of the game is unknown to the players. However, the classical strategies for Player 1 that ensures such requires using log T bits of memory for the first T rounds against some strategies for Player 2. The talk will give strategies ensuring such for which log log T bits of memory for the first T rounds suffice whp. and even some where 1 bit suffice if the current round number is known to Player 1. Both results generalizes to various classes of games (stochastic and absorbing games respectively). Also, both results requires randomizing the update of memory and as will be argued in the talk, this is necessary.

  • Lundi 12 Mars Johannes Hörner (Yale University & TSE (CNRS) )
    • Title :  Blackwell equilibria  (joint with C. Cavounidis, S. Ghosh, E. Solan and S. Takahashi)

      • Abstract: We introduce the notion of Blackwell equilibria in repeated games. A Blackwell equilibrium is a strategy profile that is an equilibrium for any large discount factor. We characterize the set of Blackwell equilibrium payoffs under perfect monitoring as well as under imperfect monitoring with or without public randomization devices.

  • Lundi 19 Mars Francesco Nava (LSE)
    • Title : Differentiated Durable Goods: Competition as Market Power

      • Abstract: The paper establishes why market-entry and competition can increase the profit of an incumbent when the products sold by the entrant are differentiated. The results are developed for Markovian equilibria and do not rely on collusive strategies as in the seminal paper by Gul 1987. Instead, the result shows that the presence of a competitor may actually diminish the undercutting motive of the incumbent when product are suitably differentiated. We the apply these insights to Hotelling spatial competition model and show why durability may reduce product differentiation and increase efficiency to some extent.

  • Lundi 27 Mars Daniel Garrett (TSE)
    • Title : TBA
      • Abstract:  TBA

Séminaire des Thésards  (de 10h à 11h, même salle, sauf en cas de séminaire double)

Page web de Stefano Moretti recensant les événements de théorie des jeux à Paris : cliquer ici