Le séminaire se tient le lundi de 11h à midi, en général en salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée)
au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré,
11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème. 
Octobre 2017  - Séminaires
  • Lundi 4 Décembre Bary Pradelski (ETH Zurich)
    • Efficient price discovery and information in the decentralized assignment game.
      • Abstract: We study the dynamics of price discovery in decentralized assignment games. There exist naive mechanisms that converge to the core in which agents' actions depend only on their current payoffs. However, we show that for any such mechanism the convergence time can grow exponentially in the population size. We present a natural mechanism in which a player's reservation value provides a summary of her past information, and show that this mechanism converges to the core in polynomial time. In addition, the strategies implied by the mechanism are incentive compatible in a broad class of markets.
  • Lundi 11 Décembre Olivier Gossner (CNRS, CREST, Ecole polytechnique, LSE)
    • An instrumental approach to the value of information (avec Michel De Lara)
      • Abstract: We consider an agent who acquires information on a state of nature from an in formation structure before facing a decision problem. How much information is worth depends jointly on the decision problem and on the information structure. We represent the decision problem by the set of possible payoffs indexed by states of nature. We establish and exploit the duality between this set on one hand and the value of information function, which maps beliefs to expected payoffs under optimal actions at these beliefs, on the other. We then derive global estimates of the value of information of any information structure from local properties of the value function and of the set of optimal actions taken at the prior belief only.

Séminaire des Thésards  (de 10h à 11h, même salle, sauf en cas de séminaire double)

Page web de Stefano Moretti recensant les événements de théorie des jeux à Paris : cliquer ici