Véronique Thelen

CREM- University of Rennes 1

Work in progress:

 Did the Aid Boom Pacify Sub-Saharan Africa? (with Jean-Paul Azam) 

The incidence of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa since the turn of the century is less than half what it was on average in the last quarter of the 20th century. This paper shows that the aid boom triggered by 9/11 played a key role in achieving purposefully this result using panel data for 46 African countries over four decades. The duly instrumented estimated linear probability model predicts that the observed fall in the probability of a civil war occurring in a typical Sub-Saharan African country/year could have been achieved by increasing foreign aid by 25% on average, had the commodity price shocks of the 2000s not stacked the odds against peace.

• “Where to Spend Foreign Aid to Counter Terrorism” (with Jean-Paul Azam).

A simple game-theoretic model is first presented to bring out the conditions for terrorist organizations to choose to perpetrate their attacks in a host country other than at home. This emphasizes the diluted impact of counter-terrorism measures implemented in the host-country on the number of attacks taking place there. These measures might attract more imported attacks and mainly impact the number of attacks exported by the domestic terrorists without affecting much the overall level of terrorist activity in the host country. The empirical results presented provide some support to this prediction, by contrasting the econometric equations that explain the number of attacks per country of origin vs. per host country. A dyadic analysis is also presented. Although foreign aid is confirmed as an effective tool for reducing the total number of attacks produced by the recipient countries, it affects the venue of these terrorist attacks in a counter-productive way. Military interventions are mostly counter-productive, as they seem to be a strong attraction factor for terrorists. 

• “Can Foreign Aid Protect Minorities at Risk?”.

This paper analyses econometrically the determinants of the violence that some governments inflict on some minorities within their own countries. It first discusses the domestic-level diversionary theory of war of Tir and Jasinski (2008). It argues that their econometric results do not allow them to draw the conclusions that they present, and offers a more satisfactory approach. Using the same data set, but a more satisfactory approach, we show that the domestic-level diversionary theory of war is strongly rejected by the data. The paper then presents a more satisfactory approach, suggesting that foreign aid has some influence on this type of violence, which it reduces marginally.

Foreign Aid and International Migrations (with Claire Naiditch)

 Food prices and Conflicts (with Isabelle Cadoret and Marie-Hélène Hubert


•  “The Geo-Politics of Foreign Aid and Transnational Terrorism" (with Jean-Paul Azam), Revue d'Economie du développement 4/2013, vol. 27, p. 165-192.

• “Foreign Aid vs. Military Intervention in the War on Terror” (with Jean-Paul Azam), Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54 (2), 237-261, April 2010. 
• “Optimal Expansion of the Power Transmission Grid: Why not?” (with Thomas-Olivier Léautier), Journal of Regulatory Economics, 36, 127-153, 2009.

•  “The Roles of Foreign Aid and Education in the War on Terror” (with Jean-Paul Azam), Public Choice, 135 (3-4), 375-397, June 2008. 
Version- working paper (attached below)

Book Chapter:

•  “Dilemmas of Foreign Aid in Post-Conflict Areas” (with Claude Berrebi) RAND MG-1119- OSD, In Dilemmas of Intervention: Social Science for Stabilization and Reconstruction, Paul K. Davis, eds. 2011

Véronique Thelen,
Sep 2, 2010, 7:14 AM
Véronique Thelen,
Sep 2, 2010, 7:13 AM