dblp, email: last_name(*at*)gmail(*dot*)com

Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction
Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis, Artem Tsikiridis. Theory of Computing Systems (2018).
Preliminary version in SAGT 2017.

Item Bidding for Combinatorial Public Projects
Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis. Theoretical Computer Science 678:40-55 (2017).
Preliminary version in AAAI 2014, follow-up work in
AAIM 2016

Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 53:721-744 (2015).
Preliminary version in AAMAS 2013, exposition in IJCAI 2015.

The Strong Price of Anarchy of Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games

Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schaefer, Orestis Telelis. Theory of Computing Systems 57(2):377-396 (2015).
Preliminary version in SAGT 2010.

Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency
Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis. Theory of Computing Systems 57(3):549-575 (2015).
Preliminary version in SAGT 2012, arXiv:1211.1860v4 [cs.GT]

Inefficiency of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions
Bart de Keijzer, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer and Orestis Telelis, ESA 2013.

Limited Supply Online Auctions for Revenue Maximization
Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, WINE 2012.

Externalities among Advertisers in Sponsored Search
Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, SAGT 2011.

Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions and their Inefficiency for Locally Aware Bidders
Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis, WINE 2010.