Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar:

Capabilities and Related Policy Issues

On, 30 October 2003 an Information Operations Roadmap/mandate was published, and then declassified in 2006 - outlining the integration of Five Core Capabilities: Electronic Warfare, Computer Networks, Psychological Operations, Military Deception, Security Operations, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities. From this dictate, in the year 2006, Joint Operations Manuals were published (Joint Information Operations manuals JP3-13 Info Ops, jp3-13-1 Electronic Warfare, JP3-13-1 Psyops, jp3-13-4 Military Deception, jp3-10 Security Operations. - etc)

There was one problem; the joint forces ability to integrate these five core capabilities’ did not have sufficiently trained soldiers and/or private security contractors to fulfill the 2003 Information Operations Roadmap directive, and in 2006, another report, Developing Joint Operations Warriors (ksil461.pdf) was published. There was another problem, how to successfully operate in Denied Access locations?

Also, the public has recently been told that “INFORMATION OPERATIONS” has since been scrapped, thus giving the public relief that such clandestine operations have stopped, this is a fallacious lie, they simply altered the name to JOINT COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS SCHOOL (JC21OS) and their GRADUATE LEVELS COURSES are taught at the NAVAL POST GRADUATE SCHOOL (NPS) in Monterey, CA.

It can best be described via, “Developing Joint Information Operations Warriors” 15 MAR 2006 – author Lt Colonel James Pickle

“The Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized the importance of information operations (IO), particularly in light of continual technological improvements. Positive direction has been given by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff but the responsibility to organize, train, and equip remains with the Services and allows for different interpretation. Information is impacting the spectrum of conflict more than ever before. Information dominance has always been important but the speed and methods at which it can be sent, analyzed, and ACTED UPON is increasing exponentially.

This PROJECT focuses on the need for a dedicated INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAREER FORCE for the DoD to TRULY ACHIEVE INFORMATION DOMINANCE. The analysis begins with a quick review of joint IO doctrine. SERVICE APPROACHES to IO, and IO personnel management. Next IO education and training challenges are explored. Finally recommendations to improve joint IO are broached in an effort to ensure DoD IO WARRIORS can INFLUENCE, DISRUPT, DEGRADE OR DENY an ADVERSARIES ability to make a coherent decision at a time of our CHOOSING.”

One other directive – “DOMINATION OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM” be they communications I.E. computers, telephones, cell phone, social networks, to disruption and/or destruction of adversaries electronic devices, to the use of non-kinetic/non lethal electromagnetic, microwave, and acoustic weapons. To include, at reduced levels, can be used as a non lethal method for crowd control.

Excerpt of Report - Full PDF report below

CRS Report for Congress


Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar:

Capabilities and Related Policy Issues

Updated March 20, 2007


Clay Wilson Specialist in Technology and National Security Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues



Control of information has always been part of military operations, and the U.S. Strategic Command views information operations as a core military competency, with new emphasis on (1) use of electromagnetic energy, (2) cyber operations, and (3) use of psychological operations to manipulate an adversary’s perceptions. Department of Defense (DOD) officials now consider cyberspace to be a domain for warfare, similar to air, space, land, and sea.

The DOD views information itself as both a weapon and a target in warfare. In addition, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) provides the ability to rapidly disseminate persuasive information to directly influence the decision making of diverse audiences, and is seen as a means for deterring aggression, and important for undermining the leadership and popular support for terrorist organizations.

However, new technologies for military IO also create new national security policy issues, including (1) consideration of psychological operations used to affect friendly nations or domestic audiences; and (2) possible accusations against the U.S. of war crimes if offensive military computer operations or electronic warfare tools severely disrupt critical civilian computer systems, or the systems of non-combatant nations.

DOD Information Operations Core Capabilities

DOD identifies five core capabilities for conduct of information operations; (1) Psychological Operations, (2) Military Deception, (3) Operations Security, (4) Computer Network Operations, and (5) Electronic Warfare. These capabilities are interdependent, and increasingly are integrated to achieve desired effects.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) - THE RECRUITS

DOD defines PSYOP as planned operations to convey selected information to targeted foreign (AMERICAN) audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign (AMERICAN) governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.5                 

DOD policy prohibits the use of PSYOP for targeting American audiences. However, while military PSYOP products are intended for foreign targeted audiences, DOD also acknowledges that the global media may pick up some of these targeted messages, and replay them back to the U.S. domestic audience. Therefore, a sharp distinction between foreign and domestic audiences cannot be maintained.



Deception guides an enemy (Targeted Individual) into making mistakes by presenting false information, images, or statements. MILDEC is defined as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary (Targeted Individual) military decision makers with regard to friendly military capabilities, thereby causing the adversary (Targeted Individual)  to take (or fail to take) specific actions that will contribute to the success of the friendly military operation.

Operational Security (OPSEC)

OPSEC is defined as a process of identifying information that is critical to friendly operations and which could enable adversaries to attack operational vulnerabilities. For example, during OIF, U.S. forces were warned to remove certain information from DOD public websites, so that Iraqi forces could not exploit sensitive but unclassified information.

Computer Network Operations (CNO)

CNO includes the capability to: (1) attack and disrupt enemy computer networks; (2) defend our own military information systems; and (3) exploit enemy computer networks through intelligence collection, usually done through use of computer code and computer applications. The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) and the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCCNW) are responsible for the evolving mission of Computer Network Attack.  The exact capabilities of the JIOWC and JFCCNW are highly classified, and DOD officials have reportedly never admitted to launching a cyber attack against an enemy, however many computer security officials believe the organization can destroy networks and penetrate enemy computers to steal or manipulate data, and take down enemy command-and-control systems. They also believe that the organization consists of personnel from the CIA, National Security Agency, FBI, the four military branches, and civilians and military representatives from allied nations.10

Electronic Warfare (EW)

EW is defined by DOD as any military action involving the direction or control of electromagnetic spectrum energy to deceive or attack the enemy. High power electromagnetic energy can be used as a tool to overload or disrupt the electrical circuitry of almost any equipment that uses transistors, micro-circuits, or metal wiring.   Directed energy weapons amplify, or disrupt, the power of an electromagnetic field by projecting enough energy to overheat and permanently damage circuitry, or jam, overpower, and misdirect the processing in computerized systems. The Electronic Warfare Division of the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office has responsibility for creating electronic warfare policy, and for supporting development of new electromagnetic spectrum concepts that can be translated into equipment and weapons.

Domination of the Electromagnetic Spectrum. DOD now emphasizes maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum, including the capability to disrupt all current and future communication systems, sensors, and weapons systems. This may include: (1) navigation warfare, including methods for offensive space operations where global positioning satellites may be disrupted; or, (2) methods to control adversary radio systems; and, (3) methods to place false images onto radar systems, block directed energy weapons, and misdirect unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or robots operated by adversaries.16

For example, recent military IO testing examined the capability to secretly enter an enemy computer network and monitor what their radar systems could detect. Further experiments tested the capability to take over enemy computers and manipulate their radar to show false images.17

Electromagnetic Non-Kinetic Weapons. Non-kinetic weapons emit directed electromagnetic energy that, in short pulses, may permanently disable enemy computer circuitry. For example, an electromagnetic non-kinetic weapon mounted in an aircraft, or on the ground, might disable an approaching enemy missile by directing a High Power Microwave (HPM) beam that burns out the circuitry, or that sends a false telemetry signal to misdirect the targeting computer.  Also, at reduced power, electromagnetic non-kinetic weapons can also be used as a non-lethal method for crowd control.

The Active Denial System (ADS), developed by the Air Force, is a vehicle- mounted nonlethal, counter-personnel directed energy weapon. Currently, most non-lethal weapons for crowd control, such as bean-bag rounds, utilize kinetic energy. However, the ADS projects a focused beam of millimeter energy waves to induce an intolerable burning sensation on an adversary’s skin, repelling the individual without causing injury. Proponents say the ADS is safe and effective at ranges between 50 and 1,600 feet. The nonlethal capabilities of the ADS are designed to protect the innocent, minimize fatalities, and limit collateral damage.19

The Pentagon reportedly has requested immediate deployment of at least 8 ADS devices to Iraq to assist Marines in guarding posts, countering insurgent snipers and protecting convoys. The ADS system would be the first operationally deployed directed-energy weapon for counter-personnel missions.20

Computer Network Defense (CND). CND is defined as defensive measures to protect information, computers, and networks from disruption or destruction. CND includes actions taken to monitor, detect, and respond to unauthorized computer activity. Responses to IO attack against U.S. forces may include use of passive information assurance tools, such as firewalls or data encryption, or may include more intrusive actions, such as monitoring adversary computers to determine their capabilities before they can attempt an IO attack against U.S. forces.

Computer Network Exploitation(CNE). CNE is an area of IO that is not yet clearly defined within DOD.  Before a crisis develops, DOD seeks to prepare the IO battlespace through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and through extensive planning activities. This involves intelligence collection, that in the case of IO, is usually performed through network tools that penetrate adversary systems to gain information about system vulnerabilities, or to make unauthorized copies of important files. Tools used for CNE are similar to those used for computer attack, but configured for intelligence collection rather than system disruption.

Computer Network Attack (CNA). CNA is defined as effects intended to disrupt or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks. As a distinguishing feature, CNA normally relies on a data stream used as a weapon to execute an attack. For example, sending a digital signal stream through a network to instruct a controller to shut off the power flow is CNA, while sending a high voltage surge through the electrical power cable to short out the power supply is considered Electronic Warfare (However, a digital stream of computer code or a pulse of electromagnetic power can both be used to also create false images in adversary computers).





False flag terrorism" occurs when elements within a government stage a secret operation whereby government forces pretend to be a targeted enemy while attacking their own forces or people.

The attack is then falsely blamed on the enemy in order to justify going to war against that enemy. Or as Wikipedia defines it:


False flag operations are covert operations conducted by governments, corporations, or other organizations, which are designed to deceive the public in such a way that the operations appear as if they are being carried out by other entities. The name is derived from the military concept of flying false colors; that is, flying the flag of a country other than one's own. False flag operations are not limited to war and counter-insurgency operations, and have been used in peace-time; for example, during Italy's strategy of tension.


(pdf file below)




Anderson Cooper 360 Interviews Michael Hasting and LT Colonel Michael Holmes Using PSYOPS on Visiting Senators for funding:


Bank Of America, US Chamber of Commerce, DoJ, Hunton and Williams, HBGary, Team Themis = Targeting Americans


HBGary CEO Also Suggested Tracking, Intimidating WikiLeaks' Donors


Spy games: Inside the convoluted plot to bring down WikiLeaks





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