Journal Articles
"Ockham on the Scope and Limits of Consciousness," Vivarium 15 (2014): 197-219.
Ockham holds what nowadays would be characterized as a “higher-order perception” theory of consciousness. Among the most common objections to such a theory is the charge that it gives rise to an infinite regress in higher-order states. In this paper, I examine Ockham’s various responses to the regress problem, focusing in particular on his attempts to restrict the scope of consciousness so as to avoid it. In his earlier writings, Ockham holds that we are conscious only of those states to which we explicitly attend. This view, I go on to argue, is inadequate on both phenomenological and philosophical grounds. Interestingly, and perhaps for this very reason, in later works, Ockham goes on to develop an alternative explanation for his account of the limited scope of consciousness.
"Olivi on Consciousness and Self-Knowledge: the Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Mind's Reflexivity" Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 1 (2013).
The theory of mind that medieval philosophers inherit from Augustine is predicated on the thesis that the human mind is essentially self-reflexive. This paper examines Peter John Olivi's (1248-1298) distinctive development of this traditional Augustinian thesis. The aim of the paper is three-fold. The first is to establish that Olivi's theory of reflexive awareness amounts to a theory of phenomenal consciousness. The second is to show that, despite appearances, Olivi rejects a higher-order analysis of consciousness in favor of a same-order theory. The third and final is to show that, on his view, consciousness is both self-intimating and infallible.
"Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton." Philosophers' Imprint 12 (2012): 1-29.
My aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of medieval approaches to consciousness by focusing on a particular but, as it seems to me, representative medieval debate. The debate in question is between William Ockham and Walter Chatton over the existence of what these two thinkers refer to as “reflexive intellective intuitive cognition”. Although framed in the technical terminology of late-medieval cognitive psychology, the basic question at issue between them is this: Does the mind (or “intellect”) cognize its own states via higher-order (or “reflexive”) representational states? Their debate is representative both because it highlights the central dialectical issues and alternatives at play in medieval discussions of consciousness generally and because it showcases the two main types of approach to consciousness one finds in the later medieval period, namely, those that explain consciousness in terms of intentionality (typically, higher-order intentionality), and those that understand consciousness as a non-intentional, sui-generis mode of awareness.
"Aquinas on Mental Representation: Intentionality and Concepts."(with Jeffrey E. Brower), The Philosophical Review 117 (2008): 193-243.
This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of this interpretation with the aim of correcting some persistent misunderstandings of the connection between Aquinas's views and those developed by contemporary philosophers of mind.
“Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (2007): 317-336.
In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, I claim that the causal thesis doesn’t square with Ockham’s account of supernaturally produced intuition and that the direct reference thesis sits uneasily with Ockham’s characterization of the intentional structure of intuitive states.
“Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007): 67-110.
In this paper I examine William Ockham’s theory of judgment and, in particular, his account of the nature and ontological status of its objects. Commentators, both past and present, habitually interpret Ockham as defending a kind of anti-realism about objects of judgment. My aim in this paper is two-fold. The first is to show that the traditional interpretation rests on a failure to appreciate the ways in which Ockham’s theory of judgment changes over the course of his career. The second, and larger, aim is to show that careful attention to these changes in Ockham’s account (and to the motivations for them) sheds new light on broader developments in his philosophy of mind—specifically, on his views about the nature of concepts and on his account of the nature and structure of intentionality itself.
"Facts vs. Things: Adam Wodeham and the Later Medieval Debate over Objects of Judgment.” The Review of Metaphysics 60 (2006): 597-642.
Commentators have long agreed that Wodeham’s account of objects of judgment is highly innovative, but they have continued to disagree about its proper interpretation. Some read him as introducing items that are merely supervenient on (and nothing in addition to) Aristotelian substances and accidents; others take him to be introducing a new type of entity in addition to substances and accidents—namely, abstract states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that both interpretations are mistaken: the entities Wodeham introduces are really distinct from substances and accidents, but, like substances and accidents, they are concrete (rather than abstract). Moreover, the key to understanding the significance of his theory, I contend, lies in a proper understanding of the theoretical role these entities play in his theory of judgment.
“Instantaneous Change and the Physics of Sanctification: Quasi-Aristotelianism in Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet XV q.13.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (2002): 19-46.
In Quodlibet XV q.13, Henry of Ghent considers whether the Virgin Mary was immaculately conceived. He argues that she was not, but rather possessed sin only at the first instant of her existence. Because Henry’s defense of this position involves an elaborate discussion of motion and mutation, his discussion marks an important contribution to medieval discussions of Aristotelian natural philosophy. In fact, a number of scholars have identified Henry’s discussion as the source of an unusual fourteenth-century theory of change referred to as “quasi-Aristotelianism” (so-called because the account purports to be Aristotelian but is not). My aim in the paper is two-fold: first, to show that Henry's position is not quasi-Aristotelian in the sense that scholars have supposed; second, to show that, even so, his discussion in q. 13 does involve a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s account of instantaneous change.
Book Chapters
“How Chatton Changed Ockham's Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment,” in Gyula Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy (Fordham University Press, 2014).
In this paper, I compare and contrast the views of William Ockham and Walter Chatton on the nature of judgment and its objects. It is well-known that Chatton is among the earliest and most vehement critics of Ockham’s theory of judgment, but scholars have overlooked the role Chatton’s criticisms play in shaping Ockham’s final theory of judgment. In this paper, I demonstrate that Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment not only contains revisions that resolve the problems Chatton identifies in Ockham’s earlier theories, but also that these revisions ultimately bring his final account of objects of judgment surprisingly close to Chatton’s own. Even so, I argue that, at the end of the day, there remain significant differences between their respective analyses of the structure and intentionality of judicative states.
“Can God Know More? A Case Study in the Later Medieval Debate about Propositions,” in Rondo Keele and Charles Bolyard(eds.), Essays in Late Medieval Metaphysics and Semantic Theory (Fordham University Press, 2013).
This paper traces a rather peculiar debate between William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Robert Holcot over whether it is possible for God to know more than he knows. Although the debate specifically addresses a theological question about divine knowledge, the central issue at stake in it is a purely philosophical question about the nature and ontological status of propositions. The theories of propositions that emerge from the discussion appear deeply puzzling, however. My aim in this paper is to show that there is a way of making sense of these views (and, by implication, of much of what is puzzling about medieval theories of propositions). The key, I argue, lies in getting clear about the precise theoretical roles these thinkers assign to propositions in their accounts of propositional attitudes.
Encyclopedia Article
“Walter Chatton,” in Henrik Laugerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy Between 500 and 1500 (Springer, 2011).
Book Reviews
Review of Gary Matthews, Augustine, in Faith and Philosophy 24:2 (2007): 229-231.
Review of John O’Callaghan, Thomistic Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2003.