Research: Subhasish M. Chowdhury

My main research area is Applied Game Theory with specializations in Contest Theory, Industrial Organization and Behavioral Economics. Lists of my publications and working papers are given below. Note that several of the publications are open access and you can access them directly from here.


16.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Martin, S. (2016). Exclusivity and Exclusion in Platform MarketsJournal of Economics, Forthcoming    (PDF)

15.   Chowdhury, S.M., Jeon, J. & Ramalingam, A. (2016). Identity and Group Conflict, European Economic Review, Forthcoming   (PDF)

14.  Chowdhury, S.M., & Moffatt, P.G. (2016). Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments: A Comment on the Endowment Effect, Journal of Economic Surveys, Forthcoming.  (PDF)

13.   Chowdhury, S.M., Lee, D. & Topolyan, I. (2016). The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-pay Auction, Southern Economic Journal, Forthcoming   (PDF)

12.   Choi, J.P, Chowdhury, S.M., & Kim, J. (2016). Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Forthcoming.   (PDF)

11.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Topolyan, I. (2016). The Attack-and-Defense Group Contests: Best-shot versus Weakest-linkEconomic Inquiry, 54 (1), 548-557.   (PDF)

10.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Gürtler, O. (2015). Sabotage in Contests: A Survey, Public Choice, 164 (1), 135-155.   (PDF)

9.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). Strategically Equivalent Contests, Theory and Decision, 78 (4), 587-601.   (PDF)

8.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Kim, S.H. (2014). A Note on Multi-winner Contest Mechanisms, Economics Letters, 125, 357-359.   (PDF)

7.  Chowdhury, S.M., & Jeon, J. (2014). Impure Altruism or Inequality Aversion?: An Experimental Investigation Based on Income Effects, Journal of Public Economics, 118, 143-150  (PDF)    This research was highlighted by the ESRC, UK.

6.   Chowdhury, S.M., Sheremeta, R.M., & Turocy, T.  (2014). Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rulesGames and Economic Behavior, 87, 224-238   (PDF)
5.   Chowdhury, S.M., Lee, D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 92, 94-103   (PDF)
4.   Chowdhury, S.M., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games, Economic Theory52 (3), 833-861  (Lead Article),  (PDF)
3.  Chowdhury, S.M., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests, Economics Letters, 112, 216-219 (PDF)
2.  Chowdhury, S.M., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). A Generalized Tullock ContestPublic Choice, 147 (3), 413-420 (PDF)
1.  Chowdhury, S.M., & Datta, D. (2009). Indian Telecom: Regulation, Spectrum Allocation and Dispute ManagementIIMB Mgmt Review, 21(4), 287-296  (Lead Article), (PDF)          This research was cited by the Ministry of Finance, the Govt. of India 
Unpublished manuscripts
Contest theory
17.  The All-pay Auction with Non-monotonic Payoff   (PDF)
16.   A Combinatorial Multiple-winner Contest with Package Designer Preferences   (w/ D. Kovenock)   (PDF)
15.  The Group All-pay Auction with Heterogeneous Impact Functions   (w/ I. Topolyan)   (PDF)

14.   The Hidden Perils of Affirmative Action: Sabotage in Handicap Contests   (w/ A. Brown)   (PDF
13.   Group Size and Matching Protocol in Contests   (w/ K.H. Baik, & A. Ramalingam)    (PDF)
12.   The Effects of Conflict Budget on the Intensity of Conflict: An Experimental Investigation    (w/ K.H. Baik, & A. Ramalingam)   (PDF)
11.  Linking Individual and Collective Contests through Noise Level and Sharing Rules    (w/ Pau Balart and O. Troumpounis)   (PDF)

10. "Small, yet Beautiful": Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests   (w/ S.H. Kim)   (PDF 

9. That’s the Ticket: Explicit Lottery Randomisation and Learning in Tullock Contests (w/ A. Mukherjee, & T. Turocy)    (PDF)
Behavioral Economics

8.  Altruism, Anticipation, and Gender   (w/ J. Jeon)   (PDF)

7.  Eye-image in Experiments: Social Cue or Experimenter Demand Effect?   (w/ J. Jeon, & B. Saha)   (PDF)

6.  Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game   (w/ J. Jeon, & B. Saha)   (PDF)

Industrial Organization

5.  Innovation Races with the Possibility of Failure   (w/ S. Martin)   (PDF  and   Technical Appendix)

4.  Product Quality and Business Contracts: Intermediary Crude Oil Pricing in a Southwest-US Regional Market   (w/ O. De, & S. Martin)   (PDF
3.  Anti-trust and the ‘Beckerian Proposition’: the Effects of Investigation and Fines on Cartels   (w/ F. Wandschneider)    (PDF)
2.  An Experimental Analysis of Anti-trust Enforcement under Avoidance   (w/ F. Wandschneider)    (PDF)

1.  Post-Cartel Tacit Collusion: Determinants, Consequences, and Prevention   (w/ C. Crede)   (PDF)
Selected research in progress (Titles are tentative)

5.  Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-battle Contests   (w/ D. Kovenock, D. Rojo-Arjona, and N. Wilcox)
4.  Identity, Concession, and Punishment in Coordination Games   (w/ Z. Bett)

3.  Profitability, Multi-market Contact, and Collusion    (w/ S.W. Davies, J. Jeon, and F. Wandschneider)  

2.  Inequality and Behavior in Conflict   (w/ J. Jeon, & A. Ramalingam)

1.  Property Rights and Loss Aversion in Contests   (w/ J. Jeon, & A. Ramalingam)