Research: Subhasish M. Chowdhury

My main research area is Applied Game Theory with specializations in Contest Theory, Industrial Organization and Behavioral Economics. Lists of my publications and working papers are given below. Several of the publications are open access and you can access them directly from here.


21.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Kim, S.H. (2017). "Small, yet Beautiful": Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests, Games and Economic Behavior, Conditionally Accepted.      (PDF

20.   Balart, P., Chowdhury, S.M., & Troumpounis, O. (2017). Linking Individual and Collective Contests through Noise Level and Sharing Rules, Economics Letters, Forthcoming.     (PDF 

19.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Wandschneider, F. (2017). Anti-trust and the ‘Beckerian Proposition’: the Effects of Investigation and Fines on Cartels, Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization, Forthcoming.    (PDF 

18.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Moffatt, P.G. (2017). Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments: A Comment on the Endowment Effect, Journal of Economic Surveys, 31(2), 572-576.  (PDF)

17.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Martin, S. (2017). Exclusivity and Exclusion in Platform MarketsJournal of Economics, 120 (2), 95-118.   (Lead Article)   (PDF)

16.    Brown, A., & Chowdhury, S.M. (2017). The Hidden Perils of Affirmative Action: Sabotage in Handicap Contests, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 133, 273-284.  (PDF 

15.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Topolyan, I. (2016). Best-shot Versus Weakest-link in Political Lobbying: An Application of Group All-pay Auction, Social Choice and Welfare, 47 (4), 959-971.   (PDF

14.   Chowdhury, S.M., Jeon, J. & Ramalingam, A. (2016). Identity and Group Conflict, European Economic Review, 90, 107-121.   (PDF)

13.   Choi, J.P, Chowdhury, S.M., & Kim, J. (2016). Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 118 (4), 816-840.   (PDF)

12.   Chowdhury, S.M., Lee, D., & Topolyan, I. (2016). The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-pay Auction, Southern Economic Journal, 83 (1), 105-125.    (PDF)

   Chowdhury, S.M., & Topolyan, I. (2016). The Attack-and-Defense Group Contests: Best-shot versus Weakest-linkEconomic Inquiry, 54 (1), 548-557.   (PDF)

10.   Chowdhury, S.M., & Gürtler, O. (2015). Sabotage in Contests: A Survey, Public Choice, 164 (1), 135-155.   (PDF)

9.     Chowdhury, S.M., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). Strategically Equivalent Contests, Theory and Decision, 78 (4), 587-601.   (PDF)

8.     Chowdhury, S.M., & Kim, S.H. (2014). A Note on Multi-winner Contest Mechanisms, Economics Letters, 125 (3), 357-359.   (PDF)

7.    Chowdhury, S.M., & Jeon, J. (2014). Impure Altruism or Inequality Aversion?: An Experimental Investigation Based on Income Effects, Journal of Public Economics, 118, 143-150.  (PDF)    This research was highlighted by the ESRC, UK.

6.     Chowdhury, S.M., Sheremeta, R.M., & Turocy, T.  (2014). Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rulesGames and Economic Behavior, 87, 224-238.   (PDF)
5.     Chowdhury, S.M., Lee, D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 92, 94-103.   (PDF)
4.     Chowdhury, S.M., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games, Economic Theory52 (3), 833-861.  (Lead Article),  (PDF)
3.    Chowdhury, S.M., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests, Economics Letters, 112 (2), 216-219. (PDF)
2.    Chowdhury, S.M., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). A Generalized Tullock ContestPublic Choice, 147 (3), 413-420. (PDF)
1.    Chowdhury, S.M., & Datta, D. (2009). Indian Telecom: Regulation, Spectrum Allocation and Dispute ManagementIIMB Management Review, 21(4), 287-296.  (Lead Article), (PDF)    This research was cited by the Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India 
Unpublished manuscripts
Contest theory
14.   The All-pay Auction with Non-monotonic Payoff   (PDF)  R&R

13.   Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-battle Contests   (w/ D. Kovenock, D. Rojo-Arjona, & N. Wilcox)   (PDF)

12.    A Combinatorial Multiple-winner Contest with Package Designer Preferences   (w/ D. Kovenock)   (PDF)
11.    Group Size and Matching Protocol in Contests   (w/ K.H. Baik, & A. Ramalingam)    (PDF)
10.    The Effects of Conflict Budget on the Intensity of Conflict: An Experimental Investigation    (w/ K.H. Baik, & A. Ramalingam)   (PDF  R&R

9.    Property Rights and Loss Aversion in Contests   (w/ J. Jeon, & A. Ramalingam)   (PDF)    R&R

8.    That’s the Ticket: Explicit Lottery Randomisation and Learning in Tullock Contests (w/ A. Mukherjee, & T. Turocy)    (PDF)
Behavioral Economics

7.    Altruism, Anticipation, and Gender   (w/ J. Jeon)   (PDF)

6.    Eye-image in Experiments: Social Cue or Experimenter Demand Effect?   (w/ J. Jeon, & B. Saha)   (PDF)

5.    Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game   (w/ J. Jeon, & B. Saha)   (PDF  R&R

Industrial Organization

4.    Innovation Races with the Possibility of Failure   (w/ S. Martin)   (PDF  and   Technical Appendix)

3.    Product Quality and Business Contracts: Intermediary Crude Oil Pricing in a Southwest-US Regional Market   (w/ O. De, J.Jeon & S. Martin)   (PDF
2.    An Experimental Analysis of Anti-trust Enforcement under Avoidance   (w/ F. Wandschneider)    (PDF)

1.    Post-Cartel Tacit Collusion: Determinants, Consequences, and Prevention   (w/ C. Crede)   (PDF  R&R
Selected research in progress (Titles are tentative)
4.   The Substitutability of the Magnitude and Likelihood of Anti-trust …Fines under Avoidance (w/ F. Wandschneider)

3.   The Causal Effect of ‘Winning by Chance’ (w/ A. Brown)

2.   Identity, Concession, and Punishment in Coordination Games   (w/ Z. Bett)

1.   Inequality and Behavior in Conflict   (w/ J. Jeon, & A. Ramalingam)