Vita
STEVEN G. MALLIARIS
Curriculum Vitae
Contact Information
University of Georgia, B336 Amos Hall
620 South Lumpkin Street
Athens, GA 30602
http://ssrn.com/author=966571
Academic Position
Assistant Professor of Finance, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, August 2017-present.
Education
Yale School of Management, New Haven, CT
Ph.D. in Finance, May 2016
· Dissertation: “Reputation and Expertise”
· Dissertation chair: Nicholas Barberis
M. Phil. in Finance, 2008
M.A. in Finance, 2007
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
S.B. in Mathematics, 2005
Research
Research Interests
· Asset pricing, delegated management, bounded rationality, reputation
Publications
· Malliaris, Steven, and Hongjun Yan (2021). Reputation concerns and slow moving capital. Review of Asset Pricing Studies, forthcoming.
· Malliaris, Steven, Daniel Rettl, and Ruchi Singh (2021). Is competition a cure for confusion? Evidence from the residential mortgage market. Real Estate Economics, forthcoming.
· Frederick, Shane, Amanda Levis, Steven Malliaris, and Andrew Meyer (2018). Valuing bets and hedges: Implications for the construct of risk preference. Judgment and Decision Making 13(6), 501-508. Lead article.
· Malliaris, Mary, and Steven Malliaris (2008). Forecasting inter-related energy product prices. European Journal of Finance 14(6), 453-468.
Working Papers
· Competition and career concerns
In this paper, I model an interdependence of fund managers' career concerns. My model contrasts with a theoretical literature where the threat of outflows arises from competition among managers (such that money leaving one fund would tend to flow in to other funds). Here, investors face uncertainty about the aggregate ability of hedge fund managers. Inferences from industry performance impact all managers, making the intensities of managers' career concerns correlated and time-varying. After the industry performs poorly, managers fly toward safer assets and risky asset prices fall. Price impacts are persistent. Asset price volatilities are non-monotonic in the level of reputation risk. Moderately risky assets have the most volatile prices; managers endogenously treat them as safe assets in good times, but as risky assets in bad times. Investors learn about their own manager's ability in part by looking at other managers' performance, so the motive to "share the blame" reverses. I find support for this predicted reversal in hedge fund flow data.
Work in Progress
Teaching
Teaching Interests
· Primary interests: behavioral finance, corporate finance, finance theory.
University of Georgia, Terry College of Business
· Applied Corporate Finance (FINA 4210, undergraduate), 2018-2021
· Corporate Finance Theory (FINA 9200, Ph.D.), 2020-2021
Quinnipiac University, Hamden, CT
· Adjunct for Principles of Microeconomics (EC111, undergraduate), Spring 2013
Yale School of Management
· Teaching Assistant for Financial Instruments and Contracts (MGT 543, MBA), 2006-2009
Conference Presentations
· “Reputation Concerns and Slow-Moving Capital.” American Finance Association annual meetings, Denver, CO, 2011
Honors and Fellowships
· Whitebox Advisors Doctoral Fellow, Yale International Center for Finance, 2010-2011
· Harry and Heesun You Doctoral Fellow, 2009-2010
· Yale International Center for Finance Graduate Fellowship, 2005-2010
· MIT Undergraduate Research Opportunity Grants, 2002, 2005
· Siemens-Westinghouse Competition, national team winner, 1999
Academic Service
· Yale Doctoral Behavioral Science Conference Committee, 2011
· Yale Graduate Student Assembly, 2007, 2009
· MIT Committee on the Library System, 2002
Other Professional Experience
· Advisory Board, American Pioneer Ventures, New York, NY, 2006-present
· Analyst Intern, Sterling Capital Partners, Northbrook, IL; Summer 2004
· Quantitative Analyst Intern, Nuveen Asset Management, Chicago, IL; Summer 2003
· Consultant, Cook County Treasurer's Office, Chicago, IL; Summer 2002
Membership
· American Finance Association
· Financial Management Association
Citizenship
United States