Assistant Professor at the New Economic School
Curriculum Vitae, skovbasyuk [at] gmail.com
Economics of Information, Finance, FinTech.
Summary: Information intermediary should not disclose all past records about market participants. Positive and negative records play different roles, and welfare is maximized for short positive records and long but bounded negative records.
Summary: Active arbitrageurs that publicize new information about their targets optimally concentrate their portfolios and advertising on one target. Multiple arbitrageurs also focus on a single target. This concentration may be inefficient.
Summary: The rating agency is paid by the issuer. When payments are non-transparent the equilibrium partition of information into ratings is coarse. When payments are transparent perfect ratings are feasible and optimal.
- Is There Skill in the Game? Institutional IPO Allocations joint with David C. Brown and Tamara Nefedova
Summary: We statistically identify key investors that participate in the IPOs with abnormal initial returns in a given year. We show that key investors are persistent and keep participating in IPOs with abnormal initial returns in subsequent years. Key investors appear to be informed, while relationships with underwriters do not seem to explain their performance.
- Limited Records and Credit Cycles joint with Artem Larinsky and Giancarlo Spagnolo (preliminary draft available upon request)
Summary: Credit history in almost all countries is limited and some borrowers have empty credit history. Limited credit history can cause endogenous transitions between phases of "lending" and "no lending" to borrowers with empty credit history and generate large fluctuations in aggregate lending in the absence of aggregate shocks.