Information, Fake News, and Social Networks
Welcome to the site of the research project "Information, Fake News, and Social Networks", funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Over the last two decades, the digital revolution has fundamentally changed the way people consume news. These developments have facilitated the spreading of "fake news" and disinformation, in particular on social media. In this project, we thoroughly investigate strategic communication in uncertain environments to develop a comprehensive theory of fake news and disinformation.
Team
Manuel Foerster
Manuel Foerster is Assistant Professor at the Center for Mathematical Economics at Bielefeld University. His research interests are in microeconomic theory and game theory, in particular strategic communication, social and economic networks, and political economy. He is the PI of the research project "Information, Fake News, and Social Networks".
Fynn Louis Närmann
Fynn Louis Närmann is a Ph.D. student at the Center for Mathematical Economics at Bielefeld University. He works under the supervision of Manuel Foerster. His research interests are in microeconomic theory and game theory, in particular strategic communication and ambiguity.
Research
Working Papers
Strategic use of social media influencer marketing, Manuel Foerster, Tim Hellmann and Fernando Vega-Redondo. SSRN Working Paper, April 2024.
We build a model of social media influencer marketing and investigate the industrial organization of the influencer economy.
A theory of media bias and disinformation, Manuel Foerster. SSRN Working Paper, October 2023.
In a model of media bias that captures several stylized facts about today’s (digital) news industry, we investigate the effect of competition on disinformation and consumer behavior.
Publications
Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult. International Journal of Game Theory, 52, 1291-1316, 2023, doi:10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1.
We show that soft evidence is more prone to manipulation than one might think and provide a rationale for simple grade ratings.
Work in Progress
Sequential price discrimination in selling information goods, Manuel Foerster and Fynn Louis Närmann.
How an ambiguous distribution of receiver beliefs reduces disinformation, Fynn Louis Närmann.
Strategic communication of narratives, Manuel Foerster and Gerrit Bauch.
Featured in Deutschlandfunk - Systemfragen
This research project has been granted to Manuel Foerster by the German Research Foundation (DFG) via grant FO 1272/2-1 in 2020.