I am a PhD student in economics at the Vienna Graduate School of Economics. My main research areas are (empirical) Industrial Organization and Game Theory. I am currently on the job market and will be available for interviews at the EJM in Naples and the ASSA meeting in Atlanta.
We study the effect of market transparency regulation by estimating a structural model of the German retail gasoline market. Fully transparent environments enable easy price comparison and match finding. Under restricted transparency where only the cheapest offers are shown, firms compete fiercely for attention, but matching is inefficient. Hence, the net effect of transparency restrictions on consumer welfare is unclear. According to our counter-factual simulations, Germany restricting transparency to showing only below-median prices decreases consumer expenditures by 1.1% and increases consumer welfare. Restricting transparency further decreases prices but also decreases consumer welfare due to low match quality.
When should one pay the ferryman? When should one pay for delivery of a good if there are no institutions or these are too costly to enforce contracts? We suggest to break up the transaction into many small rounds of investment and payment. We show that the efficient investment can be implemented in an ε-subgame perfect equilibrium for any given ε if there are sufficiently many rounds of investment. This shows that when the horizon is finite, the holdup problem that emerges from backwards induction is not robust. Equilibria with stable and robust strategies require more periods.