I am a Post-Doctoral Researcher at Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf. I completed my PhD at the Vienna Graduate School of Economics in 2019. My main research areas are (empirical) Industrial Organization and Game Theory.
Building 24.31, Room 01.30
We study the effect of market transparency regulation by estimating a structural model of the German retail gasoline market. Fully transparent environments enable easy price comparison and match finding. Under restricted transparency where only the cheapest offers are shown, firms compete fiercely for attention, but matching is inefficient. Hence, the net effect of transparency restrictions on consumer welfare is unclear. According to our counter-factual simulations, Germany restricting transparency to showing only below-median prices decreases consumer expenditures by 1.1% and increases consumer welfare. Restricting transparency further decreases prices but also decreases consumer welfare due to low match quality.
Many allocations cannot be implemented as each of the parties involved has an incentive to deviate from what they need to contribute. Leading examples are sequential trade, provision of a public good or when to pay the ferryman when crossing river Styx. We show how to implement a desired allocation by breaking contributions into pieces, each party threatening to discontinue if others deviate. Contributions are typically designed to decrease over time. In the case of river Styx, the ferryman needs to be paid right before arrival. Our solution concept is epsilon-subgame perfect equilibrium where players only deviate when alternative choices lead to substantially higher payoffs.