POLAVARAM DAM FAILURE KILLS 45 LAKHS OF PEOPLE – 3


Prof.T.Shivaji Rao,

Director, Centre for Environmental Studies, GITAM  UNIVERSITY,   VISAKHAPATAM,  INDIA .Visakhapatnam

For Bio-data,      

http://www.eoearth.org/contributor/shivaji.rao 

http://www.gitam.edu/cos/env/shivajirao.html 


                    

Browse all the  6 (0 to 5) websites on Polavaram dam

http://profshivajirao.googlepages.com/polavaramdam-0 

http://profshivajirao.googlepages.com/polavaramdam-1 

http://profshivajirao.googlepages.com/polavaramdam-2

http://profshivajirao.googlepages.com/polavaramdam-3

http://profshivajirao.googlepages.com/polavaramdamimages-4

http://profshivajirao.googlepages.com/polavaramdam-5

http://www.usbr.gov/gp/ecao/horsetooth/horsetooth_safety_dams/mod/chapter1.htm 

(See other chapters  1 to 8 of the above website)          

PART –III

21.EXTRACTS FROM REPORT  ON KRISHNA-GODAVARI WATERS OPTIMUM ECONOMIC UTILISATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, 1961 (PART-II PAGES 13 to 15)In examining the possibilities of diversion of water from Godavari into Krishna river the A.P. State Government stated that Maharashtra Government suggested  a scheme of diversion as follows.A dam was suggested near Muknur (Inchampalli) with FRL 425ft and 144 mile long canal plus14mile tunnel to divert 400 TMC from Godavari into Krishna for irrigating the command under Nagarjunasagar left bank canal.  But Bhopalapatnam and 350 villages will be submerged and so  AP state rejected it. Under Paragraph 73 it is stated  that the only practical scheme for diversion of Godavari waters into Krishna is by construction of Inchampalli dam and Ramapada Sagar barrage. By this scheme it will be possible to divert waters at less cost than in the previous proposals as the tunnels are eliminated and the length of the canal reduced. But the scheme is considered as  very costly according to technical committees who stated that with a small quantity of water for diversion the economics of the proposal becomes problematic.  Annexure-I

River Godavari is the second largest in India.  Pronounced interest for a multipurpose project on Godavari was felt during early forties and investigation of Rampadasagar project was finalized in 1951.  This contemplated a 130 m high dam near Polavaram with canals on either side and a Power House to develop 150MW and costing about Rs.129 crores.  The scheme did not however materialize because of the non-availability of sound rock for foundation at reasonable depths and also financial constraints.

Floods in 1953 and urgent water requirement for Visakhapatnam Steel plant warranted a re-thinking in investigating a barrage. After re-organisation of states in 1956, no amicable settlement could be made for sharing the waters and the Godavari waters disputes Tribunal was constituted by Government of India in 1969.  This paved the way for the present proposal of Polavaram Barrage with FRL of +150ft. (+45.72 m).  Investigation was started in 1976.  The scheme report for head works and left main canal only was presented in 1982 for Rs.884 crores and for Right main canal separately for Rs.396 crores in 1984.  Finally, the consolidated project report was presented in 1987 at a cost of Rs.2,665 crores incorporating the various suggestions of Central Water Commission from time to time. The estimate is updated again and the modified report was sent to Central Water Commission for clearance at a cost of Rs.3,030 crores in July 1990.

 

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE PROJECT

 

Main works:

i) Earth-cum-rock fill dam                                 : 2310 M long (7579 ft)

ii)Spillway in right flank                                     : 906.50 M long (2974 ft.)

iii) Power House in left flank                              : 9 Units of 80 MW each

iv) Left Main canal                                            : 181.50 KM (113 Miles)

v) Right Main canal                                           : 174.00 KM (108 Miles)

Hydrology:

i) Catchment area at head work site                  :

     a) Gross                                                      :3,06,643 sq. km

                                                                         (1,18,446 sq. miles)

     b) Un-intercepted (between                         : 2,15,957 sq. km

         Pochampadu and Polavaram                      (83,417 sq. miles)

ii) Flood

  

Frequency (years)

Magnitude

(cumecs)

Magnitude

(Lakh cusecs)

a.

25

63,600

      22

b

50

72,300

      26

c

100

81,400

      29

d

200

89,800

      32

e

500

1,01,000

      36

f

1000

1,09,400

      39

 

iii) Design Flood (cumecs)

     a)  Dam                                                       : 0.102 M.cumecs (36 lakh  cusecs)

     b) Construction diversion                             : 0.072 M.cumecs (25 lakh cusecs)

 

iv) Maximum flood discharge observed at          : 85,000 cumecs

      Dowlaiswaram (1953)                                : (30 lakhs cusecs)

v) Annual rain fall                                              : 1022.95 mm

vi) Yield proposed to be utilized by the              : 9.52 TM Cum

      project                                                       (336.57 TM Cft)

vii) Duty                                                           : 750 Ha/cum.

 

Dam and Appurtenant works:

Water levels:

i) Full Reservoir level                                        : + 45.72 m (+150.00 ft)

ii) Low water level (MDDL)                             : + 41.15 m (+ 135.00 ft)

iii) Maximum tail water level                              : + 30.48 m (+ 100.00 ft)

iv) Minimum tail water level                               : + 13.64 m (+  44.75 ft.)         

 

 

Reservoir:

i) Gross storage at FRL (145.72m)                   : 5.111 TMCum (194.60 TMC)

ii) Storage at MDDL ( +41.15 m)                     : 3.381 TM Cum (119.40 TMC)

iii) Live Storage above MDDL (+41.15 m)       : 2.100 TM Cum (75.20 TMC)

iv) Land under fore shore submergence:

     a) Andhra Pradesh                                       : 44,513 Ha. (1,09,992 acres)

     b) Madhya Pradesh                                      :   1,504 Ha. (     3,716 acres)

     c) Orissa                                                     :   1,026 Ha. (     2,535 acres)

            Total                                                    -----------------------------------

                                                                          47,043 Ha. (1,16,243 acres)

                                                                         -----------------------------------

v) Number of villages coming under submergence:

Motu is located at about +150 ft above MSLhttp://malkangiri.nic.in/Tourism.htm

     a) Andhra Pradesh                                       : 233 Nos

     b) Madhya Pradesh                                      :   10 * Nos

     c) Orissa                                                     :    7 * Nos

            Total                                                      -----------

                                                                          250 Nos

 * Revised estimates by Orissa include 12 villages and Chattisgarh anticipates 18 villages due to revised peak floods

** READ BELOW WHY RESETLEMENT & REHABILITRATION SCHEMES ARE NOT CORRECT

DETAILS OF SUBMERSION

 

State

Submersible land

No. of villages Affected

Families affected

Persons affected

Hectares

Acres

Andhra Pradesh

44,513

1,09,992

233

15,235

1,21,260

Madhya Pradesh

1,504

3,716

10

680

2,717

Orissa

1,026

2,535

7

292

1,170

Total

47,043

1,16,243

250

16,207

1,25,147

 

 

EXTENT OF LAND ACQUISITION RESERVOIR, CANALS  AND INFRASTRUCTURE

S.No.

Land Acquisition for

Extent (ha)

% in Total

1.

Reservoir Submergence

44763.84

58.94

2.

Main canals and Distributaries

9489.31

12.50

3.

Township

 

 

 

a) Housing plots @ 150 sq.mts per house for 44,574 households

668.61

0.88

 

b) Infrastructure and civic amenities including schools, roads, etc @ 125 percent  of (a)

835.76

1.10

4.

Green belt

133.72

0.18

5.

Land to land compensation of ST households

20050.58

26.40

 

Total

75941.82

100

 

According to Resettlement and Rehabilitation report under Chapter-8 of EIA (Volume-2) there is a submergence of about 44,764ha. of land in addition to acquisition of 53,838 ha. of land for development f irrigation infrastructure, rehabilitation colonies and greenbelts making a grand total of 98,600 ha. of land.

 

 

Earth-cum rockfill dam across the river:

i) Length ( in gap gg’)                                        : 1,750M (5,742 ft)                                                     

ii) Length ( in gap g’d)                                       :  560 M (1,837 ft)

iii) TBL                                                             : +53.32 M (+175ft)

iv) Top width                                                    : 12.50 M (41ft.)

v) Average bed level                                         : 15.00 M (+49 ft)

vi) Deep bed level                                             : +3.00 M (10ft)

vii) Height above deep bed level                        : 50 M (164 ft)

 

Spillway in right flank:

i) Design flood discharge                                   : 1.02 lakh cumecs (36 lakhs cusecs)

ii) Top level of gates                                          : 45.72 m (+150ft)

iii) Crest level                                                    : +25.72M (+84.40ft)

iv) Size of gates                                                : 16M x 20M (52.50 x 65.60ft)

v) No of gates                                                   : 44

vi) Foundation level at deep portion                   : (-) 6.10M (-20ft)

vii)Road level                                                    :+51.82M (+170.00ft)

viii)Bucket level                                                : + 5.00 M ( +16.40ft)

ix) Length of spillway between abutments          : 906.50 M (2,974 ft.)

Canals:

Left Main Canal(liend):

i) Length of main canal                                      : 181.50km (113 miles)

ii) Length of water supply canal                         : 10.85 Km (6.74 miles)

iii) Full supply discharge at head                        : 230 cumecs (8,122 cusecs)

iv) Full supply level at start                                :  + 40.54M ( +133.0ft)

v) Bed width                                                     : 51.50 M (169ft)

vi) Full supply depth                                          : 4.27 M (14ft)

vii) Bed fall                                                       :1 in 20,000

viii) Proposed ayacut                                        : 1.62 lakh ha.(4.0 lakh acres)

Right main canal:

i) Length of the canal                                         : 174.00 (108 miles)

ii) Full supply discharge at head                          : 397 cumecs (14,020 cusecs)

iii) Full supply level at start                                :  + 40.232M ( +132.00 ft)

iv) Bed width                                                    : 68.50 M (224.70ft)

v) Full supply depth                                          : 5.00 M (16.40ft)

vi) Bed fall                                                        :1 in 20,000

vii) Proposed ayacut                                         : 1.29 lakh ha.(3.20 lakh acres)

 

 

 

Annexure-II

INDIAN DAMS THAT COLLAPSED

Dam

Type

Ht(m)

Years

Causes

Tigra (MP)

Masonry

26

1914 - 1917

Overtopping

Kundali  (Mah)

Masonry

45

1924–1925

Structural

Pagara (MP)

Composite

27

1927 - 1943

Overtopping

L.Khajauri(UP)

Composite

16

1949 – 1949

Piping

Ahraura (UP)

Earth

22.4

1954- 1955

Piping

Kaddam (A.P.)

Composite

22.5

1957 – 1958

Overtopping

Kaila (Guj)

Earth

26

1954 – 1959

Piping

Panshet (Maha)

Earth

53.8

1961 – 1961

Piping

Kharagpur (Bih)

Earth

24

         - 1961

Overtopping

Kadakvasla (Maha)

Masonry

40

1875 - 1961

Overtopping

Kedarnala (MP)

Earth

21.3

1964 – 1964

Piping

Nanaksagar (UP)

Earth

16.5

1962  -1967

Piping

Chikhole(Kar)

Masonry

36.8

1969 -1972

Structural

Kodagnar (Tam)

Earth

17.7

1977 – 1977

Overtopping

Machchu (Guj)

Earth

24.7

1972 – 1979

Overtopping

Mitti (Guj)

Earth

16

1982 – 1988

Overtopping

Jamunia (MP)

 

10

           2002

 

Lawa-Ka-bas (Raj)

 

 

           2003

 

 

Annexure-III

SEISMIC RISKS TO POLAVARAM DAM

Risks  due to  location in a highly earthquake prone rift zone of Bhadrachalam:   

Polavaram dam and its reservoir are located close to highly earthquake prone areas like Bhadrachalam which has been rated seismically as one of the 10 dangerous rift zones and it has faced hazardous earthquakes for some time.  Koyna reservoir located under similar earthquake danger zone has experienced major earthquakes due to Reservoir Induced Seismicity [RIS] and experienced cracks in the dam resulting in serious damage in 1967. The higher the height of  the dam, greater will be the damage due to earthquakes in the rift zones

The Godavari river valley is within the NW-SE trending faults. These faults still show moderate seismicity occasionally. The Godavari graben area is in seismic Zone III of the seismic zoning map of Bureau of Indian Standard. In this zone an earthquake of magnitude 6 or intensity VIII may be expected. The earthquake of magnitude 5.7 was measured at Bhadrachalam in 1969. In terms of the risks of an earthquake with damage potential, the most active zones in  A.P  State are the Eastern Ghat belt and the Godavari valley. The minor risk areas are Hyderabad, Vinukonda-Ongole, Chittoor and Vizianagaram,.

since 1800, a total of 80 earthquakes of magnitude 3.5 to 5.7 have struck different parts of the  Andhra Pradesh State. The strongest of them was the April 1969 Bhadrachalam earthquake, which measured 5.7 on the Richter scale.   The earthquakes are known to be triggered by reservoir loading in area of moderate seismicity. However, magnitude of the triggered earthquake, is not anticipated to exceed the magnitude of the largest earthquake expected in the area. In the present case, earthquake may be triggered after reservoir loading and the largest expected earthquake in the area will be in the magnitude of 6.  If this magnitude exceeds, then the peak ground accelerations may cause damage to the dams

Annexure-IV

SELECTED DAM FAILURE CASES IN THE WORLD

For details on the details modes of failure, time parameters, breach parameters and other hydraulic characteristics of failure of 108 dams that collapsed in different countries of the world including India and USA can be seen from pages 56 to 60 pages of the website:

http://www.azwater.gov/dwr/Content/Find_by_Program/Dam_Safety_and_Flood_Mitigation/Dam_Safety_Docs/1998_prediction_of_embankment_dam_breach_parameters.pdf

To get this website in a simple way use the google search engine and insert the following words “Prediction of Embankment Dam Breach Parameters”

 

Annexure-V

Data on case studies of dam failures

For obtaining the breach parameters, times of failure, mechanics of embankment erosion during overtopping, breach prediction models, prediction of peak breach outflow  flood discharges please look into pages 10 to 16 and 37 to 42 pages of the website under Annexure-IV  and pages 7 to 14 of the websites:1). http://www.usbr.gov/pmts/hydraulics_lab/pubs/pap/PAP-0876.pdf  

2))http://www.azwater.gov/dwr/Content/Find_by_Program/Dam_Safety_and_Flood_Mitigation/

Dam_Safety_Docs/1998_prediction_of_embankment_dam_breach_parameters.pdf

 

ANNEXURE-VI

WHY CONFUSION AMONG ENGINEERS AND OFFICIALS OVER “DESIGN FLOODS” TO BE USED FOR SIZING THE  DAMS AND THEIR  SPILLWAYS:

For instance in designing the Polavaram dam and its spillways the Environmental Impact Assessment report contains highly contradictory statements relating to Probable Maximum Flood used for the design purposes and also for preparing the dam break analysis, the environmental management plan and the disaster management reports.  There are different views on what kinds and magnitudes of design flood should be used for design of dams and spillways.

  1. In Britan for instance the early period of 1930s spillway design for the dam was based upon the largest river flood observed upto that date at the location where the dam proposed to be located.  To the shock of many under-graduate students of Civil Engineering this most outdated procedure is followed even today by the engineers of the A.P. State Government  in the case of Polavaram dam.
  2. In the United States before 1912 there was not any worthwhile data on rainfall and river flow and hence they depended upon field surveys the high water marks on the buildings and structures in and around the river basin in the stream flow area to be dammed or in the nearby catchment areas.  The engineers used to estimate the maximum flood based upon the bench marks and some dams were designed on this basis and unexpected floods washed them away.  Consequently they began to use a factor of safety to multiply the previous historic maximum flood and used that larger flood for design purposes.
  3. After 1940 the engineers recognized that dams were frequently collapsed due to inadequate spillway provided as per the existing state of knowledge.  So from 1940 onwards meteorological factors like maximum intensity and duration of rainfalls due to cyclones was considered to estimate the maximum flood based upon the maximum possible precipitation (MPP).  In 1956 the PMP defined by the National Weather Service of USA was revised and the World Meteorological Organisation in 1986 redefined it as

“the greatest depth of precipitation for a given duration meteorologically possible for a given storm area at a particular location at a particular time of year, with no allowance made for long-term climatic trends”.

“the flood resulting from the most severe combination of meteorological and hydrological conditions that are considered reasonably possible for the drainage basin under study.  It is a flood created by the PMP over the basin assuming critical area and time rainfall distributions as well as other conservative assumptions pertaining to antecedent watershed conditions”

  1. Subsequently the United States Committee on Safety of Dams began to taken into consideration the height of the dam , the volume of storage in the reservoir, the hazard potential based upon the number of people and the economic value of the properties likely to be lost in case of hypothetical dam failure due to a maximum credible accident.
  2. In general the design criteria for dams it is stated that for high hazard dams the PMF is to be used where as for small dams with hazard potential the PMF may be reduced by 50 % and for low hazard dams the design flood capacity varies between 100 years return period flood and 0.25 PMF.

6. Further safe designs are based on current state-of-art-criteria which again based upon the detailed evaluation of the environmental impact of a  hypothetical failure of the dam.

7.The Inflow Design Flood  (IDF) is related to hazard potential classification and is result of incremental hazard evaluation due to transformation of the stored reservoir water into an aggravated flood that is considered as an additional quantity to the naturally occurring extreme flood during intense cyclonic storms.

8.This Inflow Design Flood defined as “the flood flow above which the incremental increase in downstream water surface elevation due to failure of a dam is no longer considered to present an unacceptable additional threat to life and property”

9.The Bulletin 82 of International Committee on Large Dams (Pages 161, 169 of 1992) advocated what is known as Safety Check Flood which is defined by Bulletin No 125, page 191 represents the most extreme flood conditions to which a dam could be subjected without failure but also with low safety margin it means a limited over topping will be permitted for concrete dams but not for embankment dams.  In China for the safety flood the water level for embankment dams is most often 0 to 1 meter under the dam crest.  However for this exceptional flood some limited extra costs and damages to waterways and loss of fuse devises have to be tolerated.

10.In the case of the Polavaram dam the engineers of the state Government are stating that they have considered the previous historic flood of 36 lakhs cusecs which occurred in August 1986 as per the above norms it has to be treated as a flood of 100 to 150 years of return period.  But the AP state engineers have considered this value as 500 year return flood and the same has been used for both the design of the dam and its spillway.  But in the light of the latest state-of-art-design-criteria used by all the advanced countries and almost all the states of North America Polavaram has to be designed for Probable Maximum Flood and since this International standards was not followed.  Polavaram dam is highly under-designed .  Hence it is bound to collapse during its life time resulting in the death of 45 lakhs of people of Godavari delta and economic ruination of the state and the nation. 

 Since Bachawat Tribunal being composed of only eminent lawyers they cannot be expected to comprehend properly neither the engineering design consideration nor the environmental impact aspects of the Polavaram dam and hence Bachawat Tribunal decision in the matter cannot be considered to be valid because it will be contradictory to the existing  rules and regulations under environmental protection Act 1986 for according a just environmental clearance for the project to really safeguard the health of the people and their right to livelihood as envisaged by the constitution of India.  It is necessary to remember that different agencies naturally work for  their own selfish interests. For instance the contractor will be interested in making money  at any cost within the shortest time and he will be interested to influence the engineers and officers of the Government to provide for larger reservoirs so that he can make more profits and the people at the tail end of the canals also support his stand. The regulating agencies of the Government will be interested to safeguard the dam structure and for the purpose demand for large sized spillway discharges.  But the people living downstream of the dam will be most interested in demanding for a drastic reduction in the risks to their life and properties by optimal water management which involves striking a right balance to provide for adequate reservoir storage and also adequate spillway structures so that the probable maximum flood is suitably accommodated by a proper combination of  the sizes of spillways as well as the sizes of the reservoirs behind the dams.    

The Central Water Commission must take into consideration the dam break analysis for the design of the dam as they have a responsibility to ensure public safety, safety of the dam  and avoid the causation of the economic ruination of the country.  The engineers of the A,P. State Government and the Secretaries to the Irrigation Department of Andhra Pradesh and the Union Ministry of Water Resources, the Central Water Commission and the Planning Commission must make a thorough study of the project and make a correct risk assessment, Environmental Management Plans, disaster management plans and include such costs in the budget estimates of the project and arrive at the just cost and benefit analysis. 

 

Warning and Danger levels of Godavari at Different Stations

Station

River bed (m)

Warning Level

Danger Level

Feet

Meters

Feet

Meters

Kaleswaram

95.20

40.00

12.17

51.51

15.70

Eturunagaram

Inchampalli 75.6

27.90

8.50

36.10

11.00

Dummagudem

40.0

26.20

8.00

32.81

10.00

Bhadrachalam

--

43.00

13.11

53.00

16.15

Kunavaram

--

40.00

12.20

44.00

13.41

Sukma

Polavaram 13.7

36.10

11.00

39.37

12.00

Dowlaiswaram

9.15

11.75

3.58

16.86

5.14

 

SPILLWAY DESIGN FLOOD (SDF) FOR DAMS IN VIRGINIA,USA

(http://legis.state.va.us/codecomm/register/vol18/iss14/f4v5020.doc)

Class of Dam

Hazard Potential if dam fails

Size Classification

Spillway Design Flood (sdf)

Maximum capacity (Ac.ft

Height (ft)

I

Probable Loss of life, Excessive Economic Loss

Large  >  50,000

Medium   1,000 to  

                50,000

Small   50 to 1,000

>100

  40 to 100

 

 25 to 40

PMF

PMF

 

0.5 PMF to PMF

II

Possible Loss of Life; Appreciable Economic Loss

Large  >  50,000

Medium   1,000 to  

                 50,000

Small      50 to 1,000

>100

  40 to 100

 

  25 to 40

PMF

0.5 PMF to PMF

 

100-YR to 0.5 PMF

III

No Loss of Life Expected; Minimal Economic Loss

Large  >  50,000

Medium   1,000 to  

                50,000

Small      50 to 1,000

>100

  40 to 100

 

  25 to 40

0.5 PMF toPMF

100-YR to 0.5 PMF

50-YR to 100YR

IV

No Loss of Life Expected; No Economic Loss to Others

> 50 (non-agricultural)

> 100 (agricultural)

>25 (both)

50-YR to 100-YR

Statutory Authority:  § 10.1-605 of the Code of Virginia.

Effective Date:  July 1, 2002.

1)  PMF: Probable maximum flood. This means the flood that might be expected from the most severe combination of critical meteorologic and hydrologic conditions that are reasonably possible in the region. The PMF is derived from the current probable maximum precipitation (PMP) available from the National Weather Service, NOAA. In some cases local topography or meteorological conditions will cause changes from the generalized PMP values; therefore, it is advisable to contact local, state or federal agencies to obtain the prevailing practice in specific cases.

2)  50-Yr: 50-year flood. This means the flood magnitude expected to be equaled or exceeded on the average of once in 50 years. It may also be expressed as an exceedence probability with a 2.0% chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year.

3)  100-Yr: 100-year flood. This means the flood magnitude expected to be equaled or exceeded on the average of once in 100 years. It may also be expressed as an exceedence probability with a 1.0% chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year.

Polavaram project under CWC appraisal [May,2007]

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/bline/2007/05/09/stories/2007050903082100.htm

Hyderabad May 8 The Central Water Commission (CWC) is appraising various `ticklish' issues concerning the Polavaram project, which has got into controversy in the State.

Issues regarding :1] irrigation planning,2] hydel civil design,3]cost,4] backwaters and  5]inter-State aspects are being studied by the CWC, according to an official release. The project is to be executed in accordance with the Godavari Water Disputes Tribunal Award and Inter-State Agreement on the project between the State governments of Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.

As per the Resettlement and Rehabilitation Plan of October 2005 prepared by the Andhra Pradesh Government, an area of 587.77 hectares in Orissa was likely to be submerged. A population of 6,318 is likely to be affected, the release quoting the Minister of State for Water Resources, Mr Jai Prakash Narayan Yadav, said. The Minister said the figures need to be confirmed by conducting a joint survey by the two State governments at the earliest.

YSR seeks TAC clearance for Polavaram project   [Jan,2009]

New Delhi [UNI] http://www.newkerala.com/topstory-fullnews-77449.html

, Jan 19 : Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Y S Rajasekhara Reddy today called on Union Water Resources Minister Saifuddin Soz seeking technical clearance for the multi-purpose Polavaram project.

The project is intended to provide irrigation facility to 7.21 lakh acreas in upland areas of West Godavari, Krishna, East Godavari and Visakhapatnam Districts, besides taking care of drinking water and industrial needs.
The Chief Minister told Mr Soz that the project had obtained clearances from the Environment and Forests Ministry and Ministry of Tribal Affairs after a prolonged persuasion, but the clearance by the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) of the Ministry of Water Resources and the Investment Clearance of the Planning Commission werw yet to be given. The meeting between the two ministers come on the eve of TAC meeting.
He also informed that the Inter-State Agreement of April 1980 reached among the States of Orissa, the then Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh) and Andhra Pradesh had specified to design the spill-way for a maximum flow of 36 lakh cusecs at pond level of plus140 ft. This agreement was basically to limit the upstream submergence in the territories of Orissa and Chhattisgarh, he said.

The Central Water Commission had assessed the inflow design for safety of the dam at Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) at 50 lakh cusecs and the dam was designed accordingly. However, CWC is insisting that operation schedule should also be modified before actual construction of the project in consultation with States of Orissa and Chattisgarh, he said, adding that the current regimes in these states were against the project and would like to scuttle it in legal tangles.

Dr Reddy also sought the approval of Dr B R Ambedkar Pranahita Chevella Sujala Sravanti to be brought under Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP) along with Polavaram projects to comply with the aspirations of the people of Telangana region, Andhra Pradesh, sources said. ---- UNI

Anti-Polavaram Movement Intensifies in Orissa :Monday, February 09, 2009

 The people who are likely to be displaced seems very much agitated over the project and are not ready to spare even an inch of their land to the A.P government. The Orissa Government is opposing the project right from the beginning. 

Once the project is completed, about 11 tribal dominated villages scattered in 12 sq.km area under Motu tehsil of the district will be submerged. As the real height of the proposed dam is yet to be decided by the A.P Government, the exact level of submergence has not yet been ascertained. 

 It appears from the  survey reports of Balimela based Potteru Irrigation Project Chief Construction Engineer, if the reservoir level of the proposed Polavaram project touches 200 feet height, nine villages like Motu, Baribanchha, Binayakpur, Alma, Muraliguda, Madiguru, Kattaguda, Petta and  Gorashpalli scattered over 6950 hectors under Motu tehsil in the district will be submerged.Besides,4826 tribal peoples  will be displaced. With 182 feet  contour,8 villages of  two Gram Panchyats  will get submerged and 4462 peoples scattered over 2052 hectares of land will be displaced.   The survey report reveals that, if the area of submergence is up to 150 feet contour, two villages namely Motu and Baribanchha with a population of 1328  over 537 hectares of  area will be submerged. However, more than 4000 people who are predominately tribal will be displaced due to the construction of the Polavaram Project. 

http://www.orissadiary.com/CurrentNews.asp?id=10696 e.mail. dpdash08@gmail.com


WHY RESETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION  PROGRAMMES ARE INHUMAN AND UNLAWFUL?

Only in September,2006,the Central water commission [CWC]Changed the maximum flood from 36 to 50 lakhs cusecs  for Polavaram spillway design and hence Orissa is objecting to Polavaram as the crucial conditions on peak flood changed and  hence Bachawat Tribunal Award becomes  out of date and illegal and void as the revised peak flood causes extensive flooding of villages and lands in Motu taluk of Orissa located in a highly fertile tribal belt.

Moreover, A.P. state has not revised the Back water Levels to correspond to the revision of peak floods from 36 to 50 lakhs. Central Water Commission is unknowingly denying the right to life of hundreds of tribals who will face avoidable submersion due to back water afflux from FRL/MWL of +150 ft. for Polavaram Dam project[If it is a Barrage with +100 ft., it is safe The Central water commission is unknowingly playing with the lives of tribals by not making Back Water afflux calculations as per standard norms fixed by Narmada Tribunal Award as in the case of Sardar Sarovar project . This mistake is committed by basin states and central Water Commissions is highly unacceptable to the victims. To illustrate this wrong being done by the CWC, one can see below two relevant proofs.
They consist of two parts. The first part deals with the directions given by the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal on Rehabilitation and Resettlement schemes to be prepared by the states on the basis of the Back water levels to be fixed by the central water commission on the basis of using the highest floods relevant to  the     maximum level of Water in the project Reservoir. This basic exercise is not done in time by CWC and it is correct to wink at such wrong calculations furnished by the project proponents of Gujarat based on under estimated floods.  Orissa state Government is preparing scientific arguments to protect the interests of tribals of Orissa from the avoidable submersion due to Polavaram project which can be redesigned  as a barrage for the good of the people of the state and the country at large.

 PART-I:

 NARMADA WATER DISPUTE TRIBUNAL AWARD ON LAND ACQUISITION  for Rehabilitation & Resettlement of people likely to face Submersion   (Back Water Levels for submersible areas upstream to be fixed by CENTRAL WATER COMMISSION (CWC) based on Highest Floods due to MWL of SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT)

 http://www.sspa.gujarat.gov.in/nwdt.htm

Under the above web site,at the End,you have 3 menus for being clicked for more information and for the purpose ,click on the following item.
"Extracts related to R & R from NWDT award" and you will get the following web site

 www.sspa.gujarat.gov.in/NWDT%20Award.pdf

–[1979] which gives you the following details

CLAUSE XI. - Directions Regarding Submergence Land Acquisition  And Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons.

SUB-CLAUSE I. - Definitions.

1(1): "Land" The expression "land" shall have the same meaning as defined in the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894

1(2): "Oustee" An 'oustee' shall mean any person who since at least one year prior to the

date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act,

1(3): "Family"A family shall include husband, wife and minor children and other persons dependent on the head of the family, e.g. widowed mother.

.

SUB-CLAUSE II. - Lands Which Are To Be Compulsorily Acquired.

II(1) :All Lands below FRL: Madhya Pradesh [M.P]and Maharashtra shall acquire for under Land Acquisition Act, all lands below the FRL+138. m (455') of Sardar Sarovar

II(2) All Buildings Between FRL and BWL:: M.P.and Maharashtra shall also acquire under L.A.Act , all buildings between FRL + 138. m (455') and MWL + 141 m (460') as also those affected by the backwater effect resulting from MWL +141. M (460').

II (3) Back Water Levels for Highest Flood from MWL: The Backwater level at the highest flood level in Sardar Sarovar shall be worked out by the Central Water Commission in consultation with Madhya Pradesh

 PART-II  Expert Committee of Union Environment Ministry Faults R & R schemes Of Sardar Sarovar project as violative of Narmada Tribunal Directives:

http://www.thehindu.com/2009/04/29/stories/2009042955691300.htm TheHindu,Apr,2009.

http://indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/Official%20report.pdf

http://www.narmada.org/nba-press-releases/april-2009/24April.html

 

13 February 2009

INTERIM REPORT

Sub: ASSESSMENT OF SURVEY /STUDIES /PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLANS ON ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARD MEASURES FOR SARDAR SAROVAR & INDIRA SAGAR PROJECTS
The Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India vide O.M. No. 3-87/80-IA-I, dated 09.7.2008 superseded by O.M. of even number dated 02-09-2008 has constituted a Committee for assessment of survey/ studies/planning and implementation the plans on environmental safeguard measures for Sardar Sarovar & Indira Sagar Project. One of the time bound tasks is to assess the work relating to mitigation of impacts generated by raising of the piers and overhead bridge of Sardar Sarovar Project.
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE

(A) The Report on the revised Back Water Levels calculations as submitted by NCA is not acceptable as it violates the NWDTA on following accounts:
(i) Firstly, because the award directed that calculations of Back Water Levels be done resulting from the Maximum Water Level of 140.21 meter (460 feet) at Sardar Sarovar dam. However, the computation for Back Water Levels by the NCA (June 2008) has been done with the maximum level of 137.17 meter at the dam site.
(ii) Secondly, the Back Water Levels calculations are to be carried out by the Central Water Commission (CWC) as per the award and not by a sub-committee of the NCA even if one member in the sub-committee is from CWC as has been done in the instant case.
(iii) Thirdly, since the dam is already designed and constructed for discharging the highest flood (30.7 Lakh cusecs), calculations of Back Water Levels corresponding to the observed flood of 24.5 Lakh cusecs (reduced to 16.9 Lakh cusecs upon routing) are not applicable.

(iv) As per the award of NWDT and stipulations of clearances (environment, forests and investment) accorded to the project by the Central Government, the E & R planning needed a higher level of flood protection. Thus the use of outflow of moderated flood from ISP of 10 Lakh cusecs for determining of BWL by the NCA sub committee is unsafe for planning of R&R and environmental issues as the rehabilitation and environmental safeguard measures have to be complied with respect to submergence caused by Back Water of highest flood.


(B) The revised Back Water Levels calculations of NCA has many technical infirmities as indicated below:

(i) The report has used the highest flood at SSP to be 24 Lakh cusecs which is lower than 24.5 Lakh cusecs worked out for a return period of 100 Years. The highest flood for spillway design has to be the probable maximum flood for a dam of this size for a return of 10,000 years as specified under CWC guideline.