Shane Sanders

Associate Professor of Sport Analytics
Falk College
Syracuse University


Survey of Economics

Statistics I





Chapter 1 

Chapter 2, Part 1 

Chapter 2, Part 2 

 Chapter 3, Part 1 

Chapter 3, Part 2 


Chapter 4  

 Chapter 5

statstudyguide2 (UPDATED)

Chapter 6 

 Chapter 7




HW 1

HW 2

Practice Problem 1

HW 3

HW 4


ECON 3050




Chapter 1 

 Chapter 2, Part 1

Chapter 2, Part 2 

 Chapter 3 

StudyGuide 1

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6



Chapter 7 







HW 1

Essay 1 

HW 2 (for practice):  Critical Thinking questions from Ch. 3 notes.  

HW 3: CT questions in Ch 5 and 6 notes.

 HW 4: CT questions

 Ch 7, #1,3,5



About Me 

        As you probably already know (from the large heading), my name is Shane Sanders. I am an associate professor of sport analytics at Syracuse University.  My main interests lie in researching and writing about sports economics and other areas of microeconomics.  Below, you will find a summary of my education and work.  My sports economics work has been cited in a Supreme Court document (#08-661), on the Marginal Revolution blog,,,, and  Work in other areas has been cited by the Temple University Center on Innovations in Learning, as well as in popular books (Why Popcorn Costs so Much at the Movies: And Other Pricing Puzzles by Richard McKenzie and Principles of Conflict Economics by Anderton and Carter) and a popular business education magazine (BizEd Magazine, November/December 2009 issue).

Co-authors (in order of first appearance; latest affiliation listed):  

Yang-Ming Chang (2007), Kansas State
Joel Potter (2007), North Georgia
Dennis Weisman (2008), Kansas State
Dong Li (2008), UT Dallas
R. Morris Coats (2010), Nicholls State
Gary Pecquet (2010), Central Michigan
Bhavneet Walia (2010), Western Illinois
Damian S. Damianov (2011), Durham (England)
Kenneth Linna (2011), Auburn Montgomery
Daniel Kuester (2011), Kansas State 
Michael Makowsky (2013), Clemson
James Boudreau (2014), UT Rio Grande Valley
Justin Ehrlich (2014), Western Illinois
Adam Winn (2014), All-State 
Abhinav Alakshendra (2014), Florida
Christopher Boudreaux (2015), Texas A&M Int'l


33. Chang, Yang-Ming, Thomas R. Sadler, and Shane Sanders. "Financial issues in the sporting industry," Managerial Finance (2016): 850-851.

32. "A Natural Experiment to Determine the Crowd Effect upon Home Court Advantage," Journal of Sports Economics. Forthcoming 2015 (with Christopher Boudreaux and Bhavneet Walia).

31. Boudreau, J. W., & Sanders, S. (2015). Choosing “Flawed” aggregation rules: The benefit of social choice violations in a league that values competitive balance. Economics Letters137, 106-108.

30. Walia, B., & Sanders, S. (2016). Teaching Preparation and Placement in “Non‐top‐tier” Ph. D. Programs. Southern Economic Journal.

29. Pecquet, G. M., Karahan, G. R., Luccasen, R. A., Boudreaux, C. J., & Sanders, S. (2016). In memoriam: R. Morris Coats, a second wave public choice scholar in camouflage. Public Choice166(3-4), 379-387.

28. Social Choice Violations in Rank Sum Scoring: A Formalization of Conditions and Corrective Probability Computations,” Mathematical Social Sciences. 2015. (with James Boudreau, Justin Ehrlich, and Adam Winn). 


27. "The Costs of Conflict: A Choice-Theoretic, Equilibrium Analysis,"

Economics Letters. June 2015 (with Yang-Ming Chang and Bhavneet Walia).

26. “Political Costs and Fiscal Benefits: The Political Economy of Residential Property Value Assessment,” Economics Letters . September 2013 (with Michael Makowsky).

25. R. Sadler, T., R. Sadler, T., Sanders, S., & Sanders, S. (2016). The 2011-2021 NBA collective bargaining agreement: Asymmetric information, bargaining power and the principal agency problem. Managerial Finance42(9), 891-901.


24. “Endogenous Destruction in a Model of Armed Conflict: Implications for Conflict Intensity, Welfare, and Third-party Intervention.” Journal of Public Economic Theory, forthcoming 2013 (with Bhavneet Walia).  


23. “Shirking and “Choking” under Incentive-based Pressure: A Behavioral Economic Theory of Performance Production.” Economics Letters. 2012 (with Bhavneet Walia).


22. “War and Peace: Third-party Intervention in Conflict.” European Journal of Political Economy. 2007. (with Yang-Ming Chang and Joel Potter).  


21. “Do Economists Understand an Opportunity Cost when they See One?”

Southern Economic Journal . 2012 (with Joel Potter).


20. “Child Safety Seats on Commercial Airliners: A Demonstration of Cross-Price Elasticities.”

Journal of Economic Education , 2008. (with D. Weisman and D. Li).  

19. Chang, Y. M., Chang, Y. M., Potter, J. M., Potter, J. M., Sanders, S., & Sanders, S. (2016). Inelastic sports ticket pricing, marginal win revenue, and firm pricing strategy: A behavioral pricing model. Managerial Finance42(9), 922-927.

18. “A Model of the Relative Income Hypothesis.” Journal of Economic Education 2010.  41(3): 292-305. 

17. “Pool Revenue Sharing, Team Investments, and Competitive Balance in Professional Sports: A Theoretical Analysis.” Journal of Sports Economics, 2009. (with Yang-Ming Chang).


16. “A Constructive Comment on ‘Rematches in Boxing and Other Sporting Events.’”Journal of Sports Economics , 2008.

15. “Do More Online Instructional Ratings Lead to Better Prediction of Instructional Quality?” Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation. 2011. (with Bhavneet Walia, Joel Potter, and Kenneth W. Linna).  


14. “Does Administrative Location of an Academic Department Affect Educational Emphasis?  The Case of Economics.”Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management. 2009. 


13. “The Welfare Implications of Rent Control: A Contest Approach.” B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy , 2010. (with Yang-Ming Chang). 

12. “National Emissions Standards, Pollution Havens, and Global Greenhouse Gas   Emissions.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, forthcoming 2014 (with Abhinav Alakshendra and Bhavneet Walia).

11. “Raising the Cost of Rebellion: The Role of Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict,” Defence and Peace Economics. 2009. (with Yang-Ming Chang).  


10. “The Fate of Disputed Territories: An Economic Analysis.” Defence and Peace Economics. 2007. (with Yang-Ming Chang and Joel Potter).

9. “Status Spending Races, Cooperative Consumption, and Voluntary Public Income Disclosure,” International Review of Economics Education, 2011. (with Damian S. Damianov).

8. “Conflict Persistence and the Role of Third-Party Interventions,” Economics of Peace and Security Journal . 2010. (with Yang-Ming Chang and Bhavneet Walia).  


7. “Fallacies in the ANWR drilling debate: A Lesson on Scarcity Rents and Intertemporal Pricing under Different Market Structures.”  Journal of Industrial Organization Education. 2010. (with R. Morris Coats and Gary Pecquet).


6. “Regional Information and Market Efficiency:  The Case of Spread Betting in United States College Football.” Journal of Economics and Finance. 2011. (with Daniel Kuester).

5. “Corruption on the Court: The Causes and Social Consequences of Point-Shaving in NCAA Basketball.” Review of Law and Economics . 2009.  5(1): (with Yang-Ming Chang).


4. “An Instructional Exercise in Price Controls: Product Quality, Misallocation, and Public Policy.” Journal of Industrial Organization Education. 2013. (with D. Weisman and M. Moundigbaye).                    


3. “Why Don’t You Two Get a Room: A Puzzle and Pricing Model of Extra Services in Hotels.” Journal of Industrial Organization Education. 2013 (with Damian S. Damianov).  


2. “Theories of Choice and Conflict in Psychology and Economics Revisited:  A

Pedagogical Bridge.” Journal of Economics and Finance Education. 2012. (with R. Morris Coats).


1. “A Cheap Ticket to the Dance: Systematic Bias in College Basketball’s Ratings Percentage Index.”Economics Bulletin, 2007.

The Shane Sanders Working Paper Series (featuring working papers by Shane Sanders):

None at this time.   


Defense Success 


Some possible "nudges" and default designs:

Paper conservation:  

     Many employers want employees to waste less printing paper.  Such an employer might consider publicly presenting an end-of-the-year certificate to the employees who have printed the most pages (e.g., as gold, silver, and bronze medal certificates).  People are found to respond strongly to indications that they are less environmentally friendly or more wasteful relative to their peer group.  Further, this nudge would play upon individual uncertainty.  Even if I am, in fact, a low frequency user, the mere thought that I could be a high-frequency user might cause me to reduce my printing volume.  

Filtering the Chaos in Sports Bars:  

Sports bars often show multiple games at once.  As a result, they are unable to provide sound for any game (It would be a jumble of noises if they did).  This is a natural environment for closed captioning.  Yet, closed captioning is almost never provided, and managers seldom know how to turn it on.  The solution to this problem would be a television that automatically renders closed captioning when the volume is set to zero.  If a viewer is not receiving volume, it stands to reason that he or she would typically benefit from closed captioning as the default option.      

Financial (in)solvency among retired professional athletes:  

     A high proportion of retired professional athletes file personal bankruptcy. The response by some leagues is to teach basic personal finance to rookie players.  However, I believe that this problem has a lot to do with social pressure exerted on athletes to "spread the wealth."  There are jokes to the effect that an athletes number of cousins rises dramatically after he or she "goes pro."  To combat this phenomenon of social financial pressure, leagues could allow teams to segment salaries between current pay for a given player and pay into, e.g., an annuity account for that player.  The player could decide the split.  However, each dollar paid into annuity would only count against the team's (capped or luxury taxable) payroll, e.g., by half.  
     Each player would be free to choose his or her split between current pay and annuity pay as a component of his or her contract. However, a player who agrees to a higher annuity percentage would often be offered a higher salary by teams, ceteris paribus, as he or she could alleviate a team's luxury tax bill (salary cap problem).