PictureI'm currently working as a Lecturer in the Queen's University Management School in Belfast, Northern Ireland. I am working mostly in the fields of applied micro and econometrics, I invent models, quantify their predictions and test their consistency with the data.
Research supervision: I can help you with many things besides theoretical econometrics, but my specialty is in applied micro theory. If you have a research idea, write me, I try to reply all emails I get.

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Current Research (more)

Equilibrium Sovereign Default with Endogenous Exchange Rate Depreciation


With David Wiczer. Full text, presentation, data and estimation programs, under revision.

Sovereign default is often associated with major disturbances in a country's trade relations. With some regularity, the defaulter's currency depreciates and the volume of trade falls drastically. This paper develops a quantitative model to incorporate real depreciation along with the sovereign bankruptcy. The exchange rate is endogenously determined as an equilibrium price of imported goods in units of home country production. Our simulations demonstrate that a default episode can imply up to 30% real depreciation, depending upon parameterization and the scale of international exposure. This result is similar to depreciations in developing country crises. It suggests that much of the exchange rate movement can be explained as a market-clearing price adjustment in response to a real change in trade.

Learning to Love Money


With Tingwen Liu and Dennis O'Dea.

We study the persistence of money emergence in the learning framework based on Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). We find that the equilibrium with money is the only long-run equilibrium, even when both barter and money equilibria are locally stable, when benefits from trade are big enough. We find that refraining from using money might be suboptimal in the long-run, and that it might be optimal to accept money even in barter equilibrium, to promote universal acceptance.

Teamwork Efficiency and Firm Size


With Mikhail Galashin. Full text, currently under revision.

We study how ownership structure and management objectives interact in determining the company size without assuming informational shortcomings or explicit costs of management. For a general class of payoff functions, we characterize the optimal company size. To accomplish that, we show how the general effort aggregation function can be boiled down to the teamwork efficiency function. The shape of the teamwork efficiency function turns to be the key determinant of the optimal effort choice under various institutional settings, which in turn provides insights for the optimal size of the firm. We demonstrate the restrictiveness of the common assumptions on effort aggregation (i.e., constant elasticity of effort substitution), and we show that common intuition (i.e., that corporate companies are more efficient and therefore will be larger in size than equal-share partnerships) might not hold in general.