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 Scott Soames

東吳國際哲學講座:大師系列

 

2009年講座教授

Professor Scott Soames 

2009年講題

"What Is Meaning?" 

 

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首創講座線上導讀

導讀內容

Selected Papers

by Soctt Soames

 

請點選以下檔案

內容包含Professor Soames建議之文章的中文譯述

“Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content,” Philosophical Topics, 15, 1987, 47-87; reprinted in Soames, Philosophical Essays, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, 2009.

導讀人: 王文方陽明大學心智哲學研究所教授

 

 

“Why Propositions Can’t be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37, 2008, 267-276; reprinted in Soames, Philosophical Essays, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, 2009.

導讀人: 林景銘陽明大學心智哲學研究所博士後

 

 

“Truth and Meaning: In Perspective,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume 32, French and Wettstei

導讀人:祖旭華Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu(澳洲國立大學哲學博士後選人)

 

 

“Actually,” The Aristotelian Socitey, Supplementary Volume 81, 2007, 251-277; reprinted in Soames, Philosophical Essays, Volume 1, Princeton University Press, 2009.

導讀人: 康立孝(東吳大學哲學系研究生)

 

 

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現場講座導讀課程

 
主講人:王文方老師(國立陽明大學心智哲學研究所教授)
講  題:Scott Soames on Two Conceptions of Semantic Content 
時  間:2009.05.20(三)13:30~15:20 
地  點:外雙溪校區 第二教研大樓 D0825研討室
 
主講人:鄭光明(淡江大學通識與核心課程中心副教授)
講  題:Scott Soames on Truth and Meaning
時  間:2009.05.21(四)13:30~15:20 
地  點:外雙溪校區 第二教研大樓 D0825研討室

 

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有關講座教授之個人著作與學術履歷

請連結到以下之個人網址

Materials contained in the following website might be useful background reading for students attending the lectures: 

                      http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~soames/

 

 

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 講座前言

Soochow Lectures 2009  -  Scott Soames

Preface to the Set of Lectures

The following preview sketches the contents of the three lectures, and shows how they are linked together.

 

I take it for granted (i) that words, phrases, and sentences have meaning, (ii) that, for each meaningful expression, there are correct answers to the question “What does it mean?”, and (iii) that two expressions mean the same thing when the answer to this question is the same for both. The theories of meaning envisioned by philosophers attempt to answer questions of this sort in a systematic way.  The targets of such theories include formal languages of logic and mathematics, extensions of these languages incorporating philosophically important intensional and hyperintensional notions, fragments of natural language, and fully-fledged natural languages. Although much progress has been made with these theories, much remains to be done.

 

             To some extent, this is as it should be.  It’s not the job of philosophers to inventory all the semantically significant structure of English, or to note how it differs from that of Urdu. It is their job to articulate theoretical frameworks in which such investigations can profitably proceed. Happily, these foundational efforts have not been wasted.  Much of the progress so far achieved has occurred in frameworks descended from Frege, Russell, Tarski, Carnap, Kripke, Montague, Lewis, Stalnaker, Davidson, and Kaplan.  However, the picture is not entirely rosy.  There is, I shall argue, an unsolved problem at the heart of our conception of what meaning is, and what we want from a theory of meaning.  In these lectures, I will state the problem, indicate why it has proved difficult to solve, and sketch the outline of what I hope will prove to be a solution.