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SCOTT BARKOWSKI
John E. Walker Department of Economics Clemson University
Faculty Scholar School of Health Research Clemson University
Fields of research interest
- Health economics
- Labor economics
- Econometrics
- Industrial Organization
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Working Papers
A Reevaluation of the Effects of State and Federal Dependent Coverage Mandates on Health Insurance Coverage (Under Review)
ABSTRACT: State governments have been passing laws mandating insurers to allow young adults to stay on their parents' health insurance plans past the age of 19 since the 1970s. These laws were intended to increase coverage, but research has been inconclusive on whether they were successful. We reconsider the issue with an improved approach featuring three key elements: a new, accurate dataset on state mandates; recognition that effects could differ greatly by age due to take up rate differences; and avoidance of endogenous characteristics when identifying mandate eligible young adults. We find the impact of the state mandates was concentrated among the 19 to 22 age group, for which dependent coverage increased sharply by about 6 percentage points. Overall coverage increased by almost 3 percentage points, with the difference explained by crowd out of public insurance. Crowd out of coverage through young adults own jobs was negligible. For those above age 22, we find little evidence of changes in coverage. We incorporate these insights into analysis of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) dependent coverage mandate, showing its effects were focused among those whom were previously ineligible for state mandates, or were eligible but older than 22. We argue the ACA's impact was broader because it had fewer eligibility conditions that implied parental dependence; young adults could be on their parents' insurance but still be relatively independent.
In Sickness and in Health: The Influence of State and Federal Health Insurance Coverage Mandates on Marriage of Young Adults in the USA (Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Human Resources)
ABSTRACT: We study the effects of state and federal dependent health insurance mandates on marriage rates of young adults, ages 19 to 25. Motivated by low rates of coverage among this age group, state governments began mandating health insurers in the 1970s to allow adult children to stay on their parents’ insurance plans. These state level efforts successfully increased insurance coverage rates, but also came with unintended implications for the marriage decisions of young adults. Almost all state mandates explicitly prohibited marriage as a condition of eligibility, thereby directly discouraging marriage. Additionally, by making access to health insurance through parents easier, the mandates made access through spouses’ employers relatively less attractive. To the extent that young adults were altering their marriage plans to gain access through potential spouses, they no longer needed to do so under the mandates, thereby implicitly discouraging marriage. When the dependent coverage mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted, it effectively ended the state-based marriage restrictions, thereby encouraging marriage among young adults previously eligible for state mandates. On the other hand, for those who were not eligible for state mandates, the ACA represented an attractive new path to obtain coverage, thereby discouraging marriage for these young adults, just as the state mandates had implicitly done previously for others. Thus, the separate efforts at the state and federal level to address low coverage rates for young adults ended up interacting and influencing incentives for marriage in opposite directions. We study these interaction effects on marriage empirically using a new dataset we compiled on state-level dependent coverage mandates. Consistent with theoretical arguments, we find that, before the implementation of the ACA, state mandates lowered marriage rates by about 2 percentage points, but this pattern reversed upon the passage of the ACA. We also find that state mandates increased the probability of out-of-wedlock births among state-mandate-eligible women as compared to ineligible ones, but the ACA reversed this trend as well. Our study provides an important example where fundamental understanding of the effects of the ACA dependent coverage mandate can only be had with full consideration of the pre-existing state laws.
The Effect of Specialist Cost Information on Primary Care Physician Referral Patterns
- Contact me for early draft
ABSTRACT: I examine the importance of cost information in the physician referral process. I partner with a group of physician medical practices -- an Independent Practice Association ("IPA'') -- to perform a field experiment testing whether providing information on the costliness of specialist physicians to primary care physicians (PCPs) alters the PCPs' referral behavior. The IPA's primary care practices were assigned randomly to treatment or control groups, and the treatment group practices were provided a list of average costs for several ophthalmologists that are affiliated with the IPA. Using data collected by the IPA, I compare differences in referral rates to the ophthalmologists of interest between the treatment and control groups. My results suggest that, during the first two months following the distribution of the cost list, the treatment group PCPs reallocated referrals towards the least expensive ophthalmology practice by 112% when the patients were the type where the costs incurred by the IPA for the referral depend on the treatment choices of the specialist. This large effect dissipated significantly, though not completely, over the following four months. For patients where specialist treatment choices have little impact on the costs the IPA incurs for referrals, I find no response to the treatment. This contrast in results suggests that PCP responses were influenced by cost reduction motives.
Does Government Health Insurance Reduce Job Lock and Job Push? (Revise & Resubmit, Southern Economic Journal)
ABSTRACT: I study job lock and job push, the twin phenomena believed to be caused by employment-contingent health insurance (ECHI). Using variation in Medicaid eligibility among household members of male workers as a proxy for shifts in workers’ dependence on employment for health insurance, I estimate large job lock and job push effects. For married workers, Medicaid eligibility for one household member results in an increase in the likelihood of a voluntary job exit over a four-month period by approximately 34%. For job push, the transition rate into jobs with ECHI among all workers falls on average by 26%.
Publications
Does Regulation of Physicians Reduce Health Care Spending?
- Southern Economic Journal, April 2017.
- Winner of the 2017 Georgescu-Roegen Prize: awarded annually by the Southern Economic Association to the best academic article in the Southern Economic Journal.
- For those without access to the published version, contact me for a pre-print version.
- Replication kit
- The working paper draft of this article was circulated under the title "Does Defensive Medicine Reduce Health Care Spending?" (February 2015 version.)
ABSTRACT: The medical community argues that physician fear of legal liability increases health care spending. Theoretically, though, the effect could be positive or negative, and empirical evidence has supported both cases. Previous studies, however, have ignored the fact that physicians face risk from industry oversight groups like state-level medical licensing boards in addition to civil litigation risk. This paper addresses this omission by incorporating previously unused data on punishments by oversight groups against physicians, known as adverse actions, along with malpractice payments data to study state-level health care spending. My analysis suggests that, contrary to conventional wisdom, spending does not rise in response to increased risk. An increase in adverse actions of 16 (the year-to-year average) is associated with statistically significant, annual decreases in state spending on hospital care of approximately $22 million, and on prescription drugs of nearly $10 million. Malpractice payments are estimated to have smaller, statistically insignificant effects.
ABSTRACT: Employment-contingent
health insurance may create incentives for ill workers to remain
employed at a sufficient level (usually full-time) to maintain access to
health insurance coverage. We study employed married women, comparing
the labor supply responses to new breast cancer diagnoses of women
dependent on their own employment for health insurance with the
responses of women who are less dependent on their own employment for
health insurance, because of actual or potential access to health
insurance through their spouse’s employer. We find evidence that women
who depend on their own job for health insurance reduce their labor
supply by less after a diagnosis of breast cancer. In the estimates that
best control for unobservables associated with health insurance status,
the hours reduction for women who continue to work is 8 to 11 percent
smaller. Women’s subjective responses to questions about working more to
maintain health insurance are consistent with the conclusions from
observed behavior.
Economics Conference Bingo ABSTRACT: We describe a bingo-style game intended to be played at economics conferences. Early results from implementation of the game by economists at conferences suggest that fun increases more than a full standard deviation. Further study of the effects of the game is ongoing.
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