SRI LANKA
ROUGH WEATHER FOR INDIAN EXPANSIONISM
(Anon., Mass Line, June-July 1989)
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord is coming apart and bits and pieces are flying around. Officially, according to the Government of India, the Indian Army had occupied the Northern and Eastern provinces (now clubbed together) of Sri Lanka in order to fulfil the terms of the Accord and in response to the request of the Sri Lankan President. What really happened and how the Indian Army fulfilled its tasks are well known. Anyway, to follow the official line, the IPKF had succeeded in destroying the LTTE as a fighting force and created conditions for the devolution of powers to the newly elected council of the North-Eastern Province in Sri Lanka. The new president had in turn fulfilled Sri Lanka’s part of the Accord by passing legislations to give powers to the council. Everything was fine and the LTTE was nothing more than a nuisance increasingly marginalised by the EPRLF in power at the provincial level.
But now we hear a story which contradicts each and everything officially stated by the Rajiv government. The provincial council is still ineffective, sufficient powers have yet to be given to it. The situation in the North-Eastern Province is still highly unstable and if the IPKF is withdrawn, the ‘tamed’ tiger will swallow up the EPRLF. The reason for this turnaround is Premadasa’s call for withdrawing the IPKF by the end of July. Since the fig leaf of Sri Lanka’s invitation has been blown away by Premadasa’s request, the Government of India has obliged us by stating the truth: Sri Lanka has no right to order the withdrawal of IPKF (though it had the ‘unilateral’ right to invite it!) and the basic task of the IPKF is not the protection of Sri Lanka’s integrity but the safeguarding of Tamils (which is why the IPKF has been butchering them so long!). To support the insistence of India on retaining the IPKF in Sri Lanka, pro-Indian puppet organisations like EPRLF and TELO have been pressed into service. They have not only demanded that the IPKF should remain but have gone on to declare that an independent Tamil Eelam will be formed if the IPKF withdraws and that India should back it.
Premadasa has tried to emerge as a staunch defender of Sri Lankan sovereignty through his call for the withdrawal of the IPKF. In reply to Rajiv’s negative answer, he has even declared that the IPKF will be confined to barracks, if it is not withdrawn by the end of July. It is quite obvious that he will not be able to realise his demand and that he has hardly sufficient force to maintain his rule let alone take on the India army. It is reported that an influential section of the Sri Lankan army officers have strongly warned their commander against any rash action! While the main opposition like Mrs. Bandaranaike have expressed their view that the IPKF should go, they too have warned Premadasa against upsetting relations with India. Various imperialist powers are yet to comment officially on this new turn in Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Nevertheless, ‘unofficial’ views have already been expressed, which make it clear that a withdrawal of the IPKF would mean calamity for Sri Lanka. If this is the response of the ruling class and imperialist circles, the response of the masses is even more sharp. Premadasa has totally failed to convince anybody with his sovereign credentials. A huge strike movement is sweeping the country and the re-imposition of Emergency has proved a total flop. If Premadasa dares to carry out his threat of dismissing the striking employees, Sri Lanka’s administrative machinery will just stop functioning, making it even easier for the JVP to step up its struggle. Given this dismal outcome, that too an outcome easily predictable, Premadasa’s move appears to be an extreme case of delusion, if we take it that he really intended to get the IPKF out. The crux of the matter is that he wants the IPKF, but under different conditions and for a different purpose.
Two of Sri Lanka’s recent diplomatic initiatives indicate this. The first of these was the delivery of a draft ‘Indo-Sri Lankan Friendship Treaty,’ modelled on the ‘Indo-Soviet Treaty’ and meant to replace the present Accord. While Sri Lanka has been interested in getting this treaty signed as soon as possible, India has been dragging her feet. This may seem to be contradictory to accusations of Indian expansionist designs on Sri Lanka, but in fact this stance of India actually reveals those designs. The Treaty offers India all the gains it has made out of the Accord. The problem for the Indian rulers is that it will commit India to a number of responsibilities vis-à-vis protecting Sri Lanka’s integrity and internal stability and thereby limit its freedom of manoeuvring. The Indian Army’s presence in Sri Lanka, legitimised by the Accord, is related to a specific task: settling the Tamil Eelam insurgency by disarming the militants and resolving the dispute by guaranteeing the formation of the North-Eastern province and the devolution of provincial powers to an elected council. Strategic and economic gains which India has made out of its intervention are not part of the Accord. They are recorded only in letters exchanged between the Sri Lankan president and the Indian prime minister. Obviously this gives India a lot of laxity. Most importantly, it still leaves room for a possible splitting of Sri Lanka and the setting up of a puppet Tamil Eelam.
Though the Accord registers India’s commitment to protect Sri Lanka’s integrity, the Indian expansionists can back out of it by claiming that Sri Lanka has failed to fulfil its responsibilities. (This precisely is the threat raised by some Indian ruling class circles in reply to Premadasa’s demand.) Once the Treaty comes into force, the situation will change. The presence of Indian troops would be part of a total commitment to protect Sri Lankan integrity and no longer specifically related to the Tamil Eelam issue. Of course, this need not prevent the Indian rulers from enforcing their writ or splitting Sri Lanka with the help of a superior force, but it will be even tougher to create the usual propaganda smoke-screen used to confuse public opinion. Moreover, under the Treaty, the Sri Lankan government could legitimately demand Indian army support in its battle against the JVP-led insurgency. This would be a really tricky situation leading to stretching the Indian Army, which is already overextended. And so India is dragging its feet, not because the treaty does not deliver the goods, but because it is more than what it can take on for the present.
This stalemate over the treaty led to the second initiative of the Sri Lankan government—the opening of direct talks with the LTTE. (The reasons leading the LTTE to participate in the talks are not clear. Initially, it had rejected Premadasa’s invitation. One plausible reason for the sudden switch in its position could be an attempt on its part to exploit Sri Lankan-Indian contradictions, though it is still not clear whether the decision to participate in the talks reflects an unanimous position.) The talks signalled trouble for India. If an agreement was patched up between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, then the whole basis for the Accord, and along with that for the IPKF’s occupation, could be blown apart. Premadasa was stepping up pressure to get the Treaty signed. India could not oppose the talks openly, but it made every effort to sabotage them and discredit the whole thing. Communal riots were instigated in the North-Eastern Province and the EPRLF was pressed into service to accuse the LTTE of selling out Tamil Eelam interests. But this package of ‘dirty tricks’ did not click. The talks progressed and Premadasa could prepare sufficient grounds to declare that Indian ‘help’ is no longer required to settle the Tamil Eelam issue, meaning that their continued stay can now be legitimised only by the proposed Treaty.
The chances of India withdrawing its army are extremely remote. The chances of its going for a ‘Cyprus solution’ (called for by that mouthpiece of rabid expansionism, the ‘Times of India’) by setting up a puppet Eelam cannot be ruled out, even if it means exposure and isolation. A temporary withdrawal to barracks or even to India, followed by a campaign of subversion to create chaos and justify the return of Indian troops could be the devious route to achieve this aim. But even in that the Indian Army will be tied down on two points—policing the borders of its puppet state and continuing its counter-insurgency campaign against the LTTE. It is doubtful if the Indian rulers will opt for this risky path at this juncture. Yet the Rajiv government has to make a move in the coming days. In any event, once Premadasa’s deadline is crossed, Indian armed occupation will lead to severe public exposure.