Kashmir imbroglio
We are publishing below an article on the Kashmir issue that had appeared in the July 1986 issue of Mass Line, the organ of the CRC, CPI (M-L). Mass Line was started in the late-1970s by a communist grouping in Kerala, with K.N. Ramachandran as editor. Subsequently P.K. Ashok Kumar became editor, and it shifted to Delhi in late 1981. Mid-1982 it became the organ of the CRC, CPI (M-L), which was formed around this time, under the editorship of T.G. Jacob. After his resignation from the party and this post in October 1988, V. Mohan Kumar took over editorship and in mid-1989 shifted the fortnightly back to Kerala. Its last issue was published in Aug. 1991, around which time CRC dissolved itself. We shall be reproducing articles from Mass Line, which seem relevant and important from today’s perspective, with view to archiving them.
KASHMIR: DIVIDED BETWEEN PREDATORS
by Shekhar
The February incidents in Kashmir were not only the subject of wildly exaggerated reportage but a distinctly communal propaganda was woven out of them—and in this were bared the frustrations of an alienated ruling ethnic group not just of Kashmir but of India. As the Pandit community is absorbed in the top ruling machinery of the vast Indian state (extending from Kashmir to Kanyakumari), and precisely due to this and not because of any attacks on Kashmiri Pandits by Muslims, the number of Pandits in Kashmir naturally fell to 70,000 from over 1.5 lakh during 1947-50. The real issue in Kashmir is the growing self-awareness of the people of their national identity. The rising activities of the liberation forces in both the occupied sectors are putting pressure on the reactionary rulers of both Pakistan and India. Seizing the opportunity offered by the 20-24 Feb. Incidents this year India had its governor take over the rule in J&K. The ignoring of the constitutional provision that Central rule can be imposed only with the concurrence of the State government in cases of ‘internal disturbances’ points to something ‘foreign’ to the existing Indian frame. And this foreign element is the growing Kashmiri self-awareness—at once anti-Indian and anti-Pak—threatening the two local centres of reaction.
Settling the Kashmir issue: Ever since the 1931 anti-Dogra mass rebellion, the ‘happy valley’ of Kashmir remains largely unhappy. During Maharaja Hari Singh’s rule, an attempt to free a jailed religious leader Abdul Qadir developed into clashes with police and a few incidents of Hindu-Muslim friction. The rebellion was brutally crushed. A day in july is even today observed as Martyr’s day in Kashmir. In 1947 Kashmir was annexed to India but not all of it; a certain portion was occupied by Pakistan. The ruling chiefs of both the occupied sectors remained always loyal to their respective overlords. Abdullahs’ loyalty to India was unquestionable, though in the eyes of the Delhi rulers they always remained suspect. The same was true in the case of ‘Azad’ Kashmir. In both the sectors the leaders stood steadfast in suppressing the liberation movements in Kashmir.
To make it look as if it is aiding a liberation struggle, Pakistan gives refugee status to Kashmiris from Indian occupied sector—though ‘liberation’ equals only accession to Pakistan. Anything else is sedition. Further, certain areas of ‘Azad’ Kashmir have been coolly made part of Pakistan now. For example, Gilgit (land of Dards). In the May 1985 elections in ‘Azad’ Kashmir, both in Gilgit and Skardu (Baltistan) there were no elections. (To prove its legitimacy of occupying a sector of Kashmir, Pakistan had argued in 1949 at the UN that the local rulers of Baltistan had acceded to Pakistan defying the Dogra king Hari Singh). There were protests against this. Some groups, mainly led from outside Pakistan, called for boycott of elections. Hundreds demonstrated, and the Pakistan government resorted to brute force against them. For all practical purposes, ‘Azad’ Kashmir is part and parcel of Pakistan. Anybody questioning the accession to Pakistan is an anti-national.
Pakistan’s joining hands with China in taming these strategic, high altitude land masses so as to secure a logistical edge over India is well known. Gilgit, located crucially in the approach roads to Ladakh and Kashmir, has been turned into a military base. Pakistan is building a new road connecting Skardu region with the Karakoram highway with the aim of getting access to Sinkiang, the Chinese Turkestan. From such a position of advantage Pakistan wants a ‘settlement’ with India—which the latter may not find to its liking. And yet the division of Kashmir would in general be acceptable to both. But both of them prefer the present ‘undeclared’ settlement. This has to be seen in the context of the recent uproar inside Pakistan; demonstrations and warnings against Zia from Kashmiris all over the world following rumours that Zia may go for a ‘settlement’ permanently dividing Kashmir. (See Sunday, 6-12 April, 1986 for details). J&K Liberation Front headed by Amanullah Khan has warned both the expansionist powers in the area. When even the ruling bosses of ‘Azad’ Kashmir issued statements against such a move, Zia was compelled to change his stand—he repeated Jinnah’s words, “Kashmir is the jugular vein of Pakistan.”
Sticking to the existing line of control, despite minor border skirmishes or battle of words seems to be a fait accompli. The Simla Agreement of 1972 says: In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally...” Though this understanding had undergone different interpretations depending on the mood and needs of the respective regimes, India used to remind Pakistan of the Simla accord whenever the latter raised the issue of Kashmir. And according to Pakistan, any talk of UN resolutions on Kashmir could only postpone the day of ‘settlement.’ The two lines of concern are convergent. Simla Agreement accepts the present division of Kashmir; the talk against UN resolutions is a talk against demilitarization and plebiscite in J&K. So, a ‘settlement’, i.e., a division of Kashmir is necessary for the ‘peaceful co-existence’ of the two predators in the area.
A third interest alien to Kashmir is China’s which has part of Ladakh already with it. Reports indicate that the unity with Pakistan is only temporary, and China has its own interests. Chinese posters have appeared in the border areas showing the ‘cultural link’ between the people of Hunza and Sinkiang (Talk of cultural link is only a cover for annexing Hunza; the latter forms part of ancient Dardistan, the mountainous tract between Hindukush and inner ranges of Himalyan north. But Turkish resemblances of Dards can be easily shown; and Sinkiang is a Chinese Turkestan). Just as Pakistan has taken over certain areas of Kashmir, China too wants its share—thus giving a meaning and purpose to its cooperation with Pakistan.
Land and Peoples: J&K under the Dogras covered a land of 86,000 sq. miles bounded on the southwest by Punjab (then united), on the west by Northwest Frontier Province, on the north by Afghanistan and Sinkiang (China) and on the East by Tibet. It hosted 1 crore of different peoples spaking 13 languages and dialects of which Dogri, Kashmiri, Dardi, Ladakhi and Pahari were the major ones. The beautiful vale of Kashmir, spotted with lakes and flowering flora, spread over the two Wazarats of Baramulla and Anantnag, drained by the rivers Jhelum and Kishanganga, hosted a majority of Muslim agriculturist population cultivating in Summer and spinning in Winter. The Dardic mountainous tracts of Gilgit, Skardu and Hunza formed the northern tip; the Indus and its tributaries flowed on the left; the Tibetan/semi Tibetan plateau of Ladakh (average elevation: 19,000 ft) with a dry, arid snowline terrain and a below-snowline rugged barren land mass penetrated by deep vertical valleys of sparse green belts and occasional streams hosting about one lakh Buddhist population on the right, and buttressed from below in south by the large level areas of Jammu with a majority of Hindu Dogra population.
Apart from being a meeting place of different civilizations, this total land mass has its own history and culture. Radio-carbon findings of Burzahom excavations give enough evidences to the fact that even Neolithic cultures flourished here 24 centuries before Christ. Later Afghans, Huns and Turks have had their dynasties here, and Mauryas and Kushans have ruled. Kashmir underwent many reorganisations under several internal dynasties. Until 3rd century AD, when Buddhist temples were dismantled by Hindu kings, Buddhism and Saivism had flourished. During the Kushan period, Mahayana Buddhism took its birth here. Taxila (Takshashila) now in Pak Punjab was a great centre of learning and formed part of Kashmir in the 7th century. Kalidasa was born in Kashmir. During the Sultanate period (1320-1586 AD) the backbone of the present Kashmiri identity (‘Kashmiriyat’) began taking shape. Islamic mysticism prevailed over Hinduism. Sheikh Noor Ud Din Wali, popularly known as NUnd Rishi, a Sufi who accepted the spiritual mothership of Lalla Ded, a Hindu Yogin was the cornerstone of this movement—generally referred to as the Rishi movement. during this period Kashmiri literature also developed. With Lalla Arifa (a poetess) of 13th century, Kashmiri literature develops. Kashmiri is a prakrit language with sharda script. Now different scripts, like Persian and and Devanagari, are used. Kashmiri is Dardic (of the Dardic languages, Kashmiri is the only language with a developed literature) in origin, and later became predominantly Indo Aryan. Kashmiri is the main developed language in the whole area. (Next to Kashmiri comes Dogri. Takri was the ancient Dogri script). The illiteracy of Kashmir largely owes itself to the reluctance of the J&K governments to facilitate primary education in Kashmiri language. Hindi or Urdu is encouraged. This is one move to deny the land of its identity.
Importance of Kashmiri Identity: The question of Kashmiri identity is something uncontroversial, accepted by Kashmiri Pandits as well as Muslims. And it is seen that this identity is the backbone of secularism in Kashmir. Questioning this equals challenging secularism itself. When Tariq Abdullah (Farooq’s brother) stated that accession of Kashmir to India is final, Pandit Premnath Bazez, an important Kashmiri Gandhian, criticized him as defying “the basic values of Kashmir identity” just to please Delhi rulers. It is only the attempts to deny this identity that had communalized the social fabric of Kashmir. Starting from 1931 onwards this was the case. Barring a few Pandits, others have sided with alien rulers: with Dogra rulers earlier; at present with the Indian rulers.
The basic assumption of accession, either to India or to Pakistan, is denying the Kashmiri identity. When the peoples of Northern Frontier, whose well being was generally ignored by the Dogra rulers, revolted against the king, Maharajah Hari Singh fled to Delhi in aid of arms. Indian armed forces attacked from air to suppress the Frontier tribes, and meanwhile New Delhi got an accession ordinance issued by the king acceding J&K to India. Pakistan also intervened and J&K is divided in between through a war. By managing a Radcliffe award of Gurdaspur (in Punjab) to India using the good offices of Mountbatten, New Delhi, could establish its land connection of Kashmir through Jammu. The services of Sheikh Abdullah owing to his allegiance to Nehru were also made use of. While the New Delhi interests are expansionist, Gandhi had a different understanding on the issue of Kashmir. He was of the opinion that as the majority in Kashmir were Muslims, it should be ruled by Muslims. This attitude reflects more a religious-democratic tone than a secular democratic one based on the Kashmiri identity. Sheikh Abdullah represents the unity of both the Gandhian and Nehruite thinking in this regard. He was for accession to India as well as for Muslim rule in Kashmir. This is clear when he says, in a recently released autobiography, that if Gandhi had not been assassinated, people of Kashmir would have realised their dream of a real autonomous and progressive state within the frame of the Indian constitution. What may be the shades of their differences, all these views denied the secular identity of Kashmir. And the very accession to this or that communal state (India or Pakistan) is again a denial of Kashmir’s political identity.
Kashmiri identity could really cut across the religious practices and personal laws. When the debate on Shariat and Muslim Personal Law and the hue and cry on the so-called Muslim violence on minorities in Kashmir were going on, very interesting informations were pointed out knowingly or unknowingly by the same press that was engaged in a communalized dissemination of facts. The information is this: Kashmiri Muslims give precedence to their customary laws over Shariat laws. For instance, adoption is acceptable under customary laws, though Shariat prohibits it. The influence of Sufi saints and indigenous socio-religious culture are behind this. There are cultural practices applicable to both Pandits and Muslims. (See Indian Express, New Delhi, 30 March, 1986).
But despite all this, how did Kashmir come to be communalized? A more or less similar development as that which took place in Punjab can explain this. In spite of the common culture and language, Indian ruling classes could manage a clear communal cleavage as an effective alternative to Punjabi nationalism for the time being. To keep the ruling interests on, in Kashmir also, the Kashmiri identity has to be torn apart in order to keep it further subdued. This explains partly the present state of affairs in J&K. The revival of Muslim fundamentalism only helped the Indian state in strengthening its anti-people and communal designs. The communalization of a liberation movement in Kashmir can create a bigger holocaust than that in Punjab due to the fact that Muslims are a stronger and widespread minority in India than the Sikhs. But, the major side of the reality is that the Kashmiri liberation activities and attempts to suppress it are at a high peak.
The economy of Kashmir is also undergoing serious changes; it is being reconstituted to suit a completely dependent tourist economy. Walnuts have a world market and everything depends on the market’s interests. Kashmiri apples are facing stiff unfavourable competition from Himachali apples. Button mushrooms now encouraged in Kashmir are meant to treat the guests in Srinagar. Previous ban on transforming rice or maize fields into cash crop fields is withdrawn. As everywhere, unemployment is rampant among the educated youth as well as in the agricultural sector. Dalits and herdsmen are in the lower ladders of suffering. As the economy is so developed as to import the needs of the people, a transport industry is thriving. High prices of things due to the irrationally high freight charges point at the stranglehold of this industry over the life of the people. The attempts to develop Kashmiri economy is on the lines to integrate it with the rest of the country, i.e., to increase its dependence on the rest of the world. And this type of integration has only speeded up the growing alienation of Kashmir from the suppressors. The increasing self-awareness of Kashmiris as a nation preyed on by local expansionist interests of Pakistan and India is a dangerous omen to both these governments.
As Kashmir is of strategic importance to Pakistan and India, it is equally important to the people’s forces in these areas. To a certain extent, Kashmir was used as a weapon to maintain the imperialist carved states of India and Pakistan as such. In the same way, Kashmir can pave the way to their destruction also. Once the ‘jugular vein’ is cut apart, death is sure to follow. The challenge offered by Punjab to the Indian state (the demand of Khalistan has stirred Pakistan also. Recently Benazir Bhutto has said in her tours throughout Pakistan that the next aim of these Khalistanis would be Lahore as their capital.) has inspired the Kashmir liberation forces. Containing this struggle by puppets of any shade has become an impossibility. Hence the take-over of the J&K administration. Untruths are a must for a morally weak position. Hence the communalization of Kashmir. Permanent ‘international borders’ cutting across the same nationality would give a new challenge to the states of Pakistan and India. In a situation where internal ‘accords’ are so fast becoming out of date, India would be in the most stupefied position to go for an international accord.
(Mass Line, No. 18; vol. 12, no. 5, July 1986)