INDIAN PEOPLE KILLING FORCE IN ACTION
By Avinash
The battle for Jaffna is finally over. After massing a force of 30,000 against an estimated 2500 strong LTTE force, using heavy fire power including helicopter gunships and tanks and suffering heavy casualties in operations, which took nearly one day for every three kilometres of advance, the mighty Indian Army has finally raised its bloodied flag over Jaffna. But the war is far from over. Apart from the Tamil Eelam people seething with hatred against the new oppressors, there is the nearly thousand strong LTTE force which has slipped away despite the carefully planned 5-pronged encirclement and suppression carried out by the Indian Army. The policy makers in Delhi are now faced with the grim prospects of a long drawn out counter-insurgency campaign in the midst of a hostile population of a foreign country. And along with that, the spectre of a resurgent, militant national awakening in Tamil Nadu, which will spontaneously go to strengthen an anti-Centre national movement, is becoming an immediate threat. Thus there is every reason for the dampening of the euphoria generated in the wake of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. The ‘brilliant’ step taken by the Rajiv regime to advance the interest of Indian expansionism no longer seems to be all that great. Not only that, for some among the ruling classes it is now another instance of Rajiv’s blunders. But this criticism is careful on one point.
While it wants to capitalise on the growing mass sentiment against Indian Army aggression in Sri Lanka to push its own interests the basic interests of Indian expansionism gained through the Accord are sought to be safeguarded. To really isolate this reactionary trend, to grasp the real compulsions leading to Indian expansionism’s latest aggression and thus strengthen the progressive trend of condemning Indian occupation in Sri Lanka we must understand the implications of the Accord and also see the chain of events which led to it.
First of all we must recognize that the recent Accord did not represent any new direction in Indian policies vis á vis Sri Lanka. Rather it was a logical continuation, the crowning act of a consistent attempt to gain a decisive control over the internal and external affairs of Sri Lanka. From the very beginning the Indian ruling classes had insisted that the Tamil Eelam issue involved Indian interests—‘humanitarian’ concern, security concerns and refugee inflow were played up at each turn to establish this. The whole thrust of Indian policy was aimed at gaining recognition of the so-called legitimate Indian interest from the imperialist powers, notably the US bloc, and coercing the Jayewardene regime to accept it. Providing sanctuary for the different Tamil Eelam groups, arming and training them and in some cases organising a whole new group under the guidance and control of the RAW were all done with this purpose. The ‘legitimate interest’ of the Indian expansionist regime also included the systematic elimination of Tamil Eelam demands for an independent state and the suppression of all progressive, revolutionary elements within the Eelam militant groups.
The Indian ruling classes could not side with the formation of an independent Tamil Eelam, particularly in the context of the intensifying national question in India. The emergence of a Tamil Eelam—particularly a Tamil Eelam won with the force of arms—would in its turn strengthen the sentiments and open up possibilities for an independent Tamil Nadu. The Indian rulers had to prevent this at any cost. Moreover, in view of the national movements in Punjab and Northeast, any Indian support for a separate Tamil Eelam, would mean weakening its attempts to secure total imperialist support for its task of preserving ‘national integrity.’
Yet the Indian state could by no means adopt a policy of opposing the armed struggle of Tamil Eelam groups outright. On the one hand, it was necessary for its interventionist designs and, on the other, any opposition would have led to a sharp polarisation and a resurgence of national awakening in Tamil Nadu. Direct links, dangerous for the Indian state, would be established between the Tamil people and the Tamil Eelam struggle. So the Indian state had to both support as well as check and control the armed Tamil Eelam movements.
The best way to do this taking over was by the arming and training of such movements and providing logistical support. Once its principal interest of gaining recognition from the imperialist powers for its intervention in Sri Lanka, and coercing the Jayewardene government with the help of imperialist powers into accepting this was achieved, the Rajiv regime started shifting its policy vis á vis the Tamil Eelam groups. And this dates back to the Thimpu talks.
The Thimpu talks had been accomplished with the support of the US imperialists—the chief mentor of the Sinhala chauvinist Jayewardene government. But the talks could not take place strictly according to the designs of the Rajiv regime. By this time the Tamil Eelam militants had eclipsed the impotent TULF, which was backed by the Indian government as the political representative of the ‘fighting boys.’ But on the whole the Thimpu talks signified a major victory for the Indian regime—its role as the final arbiter had been legitimised with imperialist support. The Jayewardene regime had to remould Sinhala chauvinist forces, which had been reared by it, to accommodate the settlement. It also had to prepare grounds for selling its acceptance of Indian expansionist interests in Sri Lanka. The Tamil Eelam groups including LTTE had generally fallen in line with the Rajiv regime’s proposals for autonomy (similar to the namesake autonomy enjoyed by the different States in India), but the issue had to be clinched. Some more time was needed, yet basically it seemed that Indian expansionism had achieved its aims.
The whole scene changed with the entrance of a hitherto unaccounted factor—the people of Tamil Eelam. As soon as news of the impending sell-out, implied by the acceptance of ‘autonomy’ instead of self-determination and formation of a separate state, reached the Tamil Eelam region in Sri Lanka, spontaneous demonstrations against the Thimpu talks broke out. Popular resentment against the sell-out was strong enough to force the Tamil Eelam armed groups to switch their positions and again raise the demand for a Tamil Eelam homeland. The Rajiv regime first tried to bully the Eelam groups into submission. But it soon realised that more groundwork was needed for this. This was the guiding principle behind its manoeuvres in the second phase following the Thimpu talks.
The aim of the Rajiv regime could only be secured by weakening the Tamil Eelam groups and pushing them into a position where they had to obey the diktat of the Indian state. Along with this the situation where a number of contending groups existed had to be eliminated. A leadership docile to Indian expansionist interests and strong enough to enforce these interests on the Tamil Eelam people had to be forged. The tactics adopted was that of intensifying internecine battles between the different groups by utilising the extreme militaristic sectarianism existing in all the Tamil Eelam groups. The thorough infiltration of these groups by Indian intelligence agents was also used for this purpose. This bloody fratricide was effectively played up to both weaken the Eelam groups as well as to alienate them from the masses in Tamil Eelam and in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu.
Earlier the Tamil Eelam groups had enjoyed a special status, which was developed and guaranteed by the Central and Tamil Nadu governments. Now this special status and the contradictions it generated between the Tamil Eelam groups and the Tamil masses were utilised to tarnish the image of the militants and alienate the masses from them. The Rajiv government could not suppress the Tamil Eelam groups outright. Its own needs and compulsions ruled out this step. But short of this it did everything to beat down the militants into submission. At every opportunity it stepped up its level of suppression and constantly tried to gauge the success of its policy through monitoring both the internal developments among the Tamil Eelam groups and the reaction of the masses, particularly in Tamil Nadu. The arrests and weapon seizure during the 2nd SAARC meeting in 1986 was an example of this. And of course as a backdrop to all this, the proposals for a settlement under Indian conditions were always kept alive.
The 2nd phase also did not work out strictly according to the plans of the Rajiv regime. First of all, in the battle for supremacy the TELO (an Eelam group more or less built up from scratch by the Indian intelligence RAW) was ruthlessly eliminated by the LTTE. Of course, the Rajiv regime could still influence developments, even through the LTTE itself, by utilising the AIADMK. But unlike the TELO the LTTE had its own base both within Sri Lanka and abroad. This meant that it was relatively better placed to resist the pressures of the Rajiv regime. It also meant that pressure from the base placed limits on its leadership selling out Tamil Eelam interests. Secondly, the new line of action adopted by the Rajiv regime gave an opening for the Jayewardene regime to intensify its military campaign of suppression against the Tamil Eelam people and militants. No doubt, both these factors complicated the successful achievement of Indian expansionist interests. But its ultimate success was facilitated by the very nature of both the Jayewardene regime and the Tamil Eelam groups and the failure of genuine revolutionary forces in Sri Lanka to intervene effectively.
The comprador Jayewardene regime cannot exist even for a moment without the continuous political and economic support of its imperialist mentors, mainly the US imperialists. It is true that there are strong comprador opposition lobbies within important Sri Lankan state apparatuses such as the military and bureaucracy itself apart from the parliamentary opposition. But the severe economic crisis, intensified due to the Tamil Eelam struggle, means that none of these opposition lobbies can come to power without the explicit backing of one or the other imperialist power. So in the final analysis, the Sinhala ruling classes, more or less all factions of them, could be forced to stop their military suppression and accept Indian arbitration. The fact that both the imperialist blocs were basically supporting the Rajiv regime’s intervention emphasised this point. On the other hand, none of the Tamil Eelam groups (those engaged in the armed resistance) had a thorough anti-imperialist, democratic nature. The gun dominated all of them and was the instrument of settling all differences—both within particular organisations as well as among the groups. All of them were built up on the essentially collaborationist policies of relying on the Indian government, both politically and militarily, to achieve their aim.
Thus, within Tamil Nadu all of these groups had consistently worked, both through propaganda and practice to strengthen support for Indian intervention and mute anti-Centre sentiments among the masses. After the Thimpu talks and the shift in the policies of the Rajiv regime, some of the groups, including the LTTE, had started realising the need to become self-reliant. But this could be achieved only by breaking decisively with their past and undergoing a thorough political rectification. Self-reliance called for relying on the Tamil Eelam masses and progressive sections among the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, allying with the cause of the Tamil national liberation in India, exposing Indian expansionism and both the imperialist blocs. But the class nature of the leaderships of the Tamil Eelam groups, their petty bourgeois nationalist militaristic outlook effectively checked this rectification and facilitated the ultimate success of Indian expansionist interests.
In the post-Thimpu phase, ex-Marxist-Leninist elements within the different groups had started a process of rethinking. But none of them could break out from their ideological, political confusion and opportunism which had in the first place created favourable grounds for the rise to domination of the nationalist-militarist outlook. Moreover, their ranks had already been severely decimated within all the groups through physical elimination itself.
Thus, new factors complicated the smooth implementation of Indian expansionist policies, but its ultimate success, at least in the short run, was assured. The Jaffna air drop was the last act to clinch the issue. Indian expansionism achieved its ends through the Accord. At the same time, it tried to cover it up by coming forward both as the saviour of the Tamil Eelam people as well as the protector of Sri Lankan integrity. The very terms of the Accord and the secret clauses (now going to be converted into an official treaty between Sri Lanka and India) sharply exposes this reality. Politically, the Indian ruling classes have gained the right to decisively influence and shape up the Sri Lankan defence structure according to their
needs. Economically, a vast field of exploitation is opened up for the Indian big bourgeoisie both through short-term activities to rejuvenate the war-torn economies of the Tamil Eelam region as well as through long-term penetration.
The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord represents a qualitative change in the role of Indian expansionism in this region. Earlier too it had utilised its military to back up its interventions in Nepal and Bangladesh. But these were on a short term. With this Accord, not only the political role of India as an arbiter of internal affairs of other countries in this region, but its military role as a gendarme of South Asia itself has gained legitimacy in the world of imperialist politics. Regardless of whether the Indian army could have pulled out if the LTTE had fallen in line, the fact that its presence in Sri Lanka was accepted as a provision of the Accord itself denotes this qualitative change.
The Accord was put together under the guidance of the US imperialists and it signifies the attempts of the US bloc to firmly secure the Rajiv regime within its orbit. Naturally, the Russian imperialists have not been keen on this development—the Accord got a late, lukewarm approval from them. But basically both the blocs have backed Indian expansionist intervention in Sri Lanka and have accepted the usefulness of having India as the gendarme of South Asia. This common backing, despite different pulls and angles, from both the imperialist blocs for the role of gendarme was instrumental in the high tide of euphoria exhibited by all factions and lobbies of the ruling classes when the Accord was signed. Indian expansionism had arrived—or so they thought. And this is the significance of the battle for Jaffna—the capacity of the Indian state to carry out the new role was being put to test. Along with that the new burdens involved in carrying out this role were also being realized. The Indian expansionists would have preferred more time and better conditions for the test. They were expecting that they could pass, for the time being, with a mere show of force. But as usual the factor usually left out from their calculations, the revolutionary urges of the masses, upset their neat plans. And that is also the significant lesson of the battle for Jaffna which remains despite the victory of the Indian army.
It is not that the LTTE has been transformed overnight and has purged itself of its earlier erroneous politics, which manifested many elements of even downright reactionary thinking. But objectively for the present its stand of refusing to bow down to Indian expansionist coercion and decision to fight back has given expression to the genuine aspirations of the Tamil Eelam people. And thus it has actively brought into play new factors (already contained potentially in the terms of the Accord itself) and caused a qualitative change in the political situation—not only in Sri Lanka and India but also in the South Asian region as a whole. The Resolution of the Second All India Conference of the CRC, CPI(ML) had identified the potential for this when it pointed out that “This blatant expansionist move (of Indian ruling classes)... has only tightened the noose around their own necks. Indian military, political and economic domination in Sri Lanka has already aroused opposition in the Sinhala people and is growing among the Tamil Eelam people. Thus a new basis for unity between both the peoples targeting both the Sinhala chauvinist compradors and the Indian expansionists is being laid. Not only that, the illusions about the ‘liberating’ role of the Indian state will rapidly be dispelled in Tamil Nadu also, as the oppressive role of the Indian army becomes more and more clear.” In one heroic sweep the LTTE has cleared the stigma of being an Indian agent and the misconception of the Tamil Eelam struggle as an Indian conspiracy—both of which were very strong among the Sinhala people.
Secondly, it has swept away the negative effects generated in Tamil Nadu and other parts of India due to its (and other Tamil Eelam groups) collaboration with the Indian state. Particularly for the people of Tamil Nadu all illusions about India’s role have been shattered. The real enemy, the Indian state, stands out sharply. Thirdly, it has put to test the military might of the Indian state and has clearly demonstrated that in all military skills, except superior fire power, the Indian army is ill fit to face up to a guerrilla war backed by the masses. Along with this, it has put the Indian army in a damaging position of having to carry out a long drawn out counter-insurgency campaign and thus effectively weakened its overall fighting capacity. We will examine these aspects in some more detail.
Within Sri Lanka, the basis for a new alliance between the Sinhala and Tamil Eelam forces opposed to the Jayewardene regime has already emerged centring around the common concern of throwing out the Indian expansionist army. Its manifestation, at present, is seen in the statement of the LTTE, the JVP and leading sections of the Sinhala Buddhist clergy. All of them clearly express the possibility of uniting to oppose the Indian army. This is a positive turn and pulls the noose around the Indian expansionists’ neck even tighter. It holds out the prospects of drawing in and tying down the Indian army all over Sri Lanka. And if this takes place the Indian expansionists will be thrown into a severe crisis. Of course, too much cannot be read into this.
The sentiments of the Buddhist clergy basically represent the interests of the Sinhalese ruling classes. Objectively their contradiction with Indian expansionist presence (not necessarily with indirect domination) has driven them to this position. And this can easily shift given the comprador nature of the ruling classes and the top echelons of the Buddhist clergy. Then the JVP is reported to have strong pro-Soviet links. Its ideology is pseudo-leftist and heavily influenced by Sinhala chauvinism. And its politics of seizing power is basically putchist. As for the LTTE, despite its heroic stand, there are still no clear signs of any thoroughgoing rectification. There are no signs of a break with the erroneous concept, common to all Eelam groups, of considering India as the rear base of their struggle. This concept was, and is, nothing other than justification for refusing to rely on the masses, both Sinhala and Eelam Tamil, in Sri Lanka itself. Tamil Eelam nationalism and strong pressure from the rank and file and the masses could easily be the factors which led it to take a stand against the Indian army. But it will not do to sustain the struggle. The upper caste, upper class nature of the LTTE leadership also means that the politics of collaboration with corresponding interests in India and through them with the Indian ruling classes will not be easily abandoned.
It is quite possible that the LTTE leadership views its present military struggle as a means to hold on till mass opposition in Tamil Nadu and bourgeois opposition—Hindu revivalist forces—in India come up and put pressure on the Rajiv regime, and that it actually plans to go back to the bargaining table. The military strength might be a sop to those who insisted on fighting and also a means to convince them of its futility. The military tactics adopted by the LTTE in Jaffna itself reveals this possibility. Despite the clear indications of mass support and involvement in the fight against the Indian army there is no indication at all of an active policy to arm the masses. There is no indication of a break with its militaristic outlook of depending on arms rather than to politicise the masses. This outlook itself strengthens the grounds for reliance on external powers and ultimately for collaboration with the enemies against the people.
But the political turn in Sri Lanka, the emergence of a new basis for uniting the Sinhalese and Eelam Tamils and breaking the grip of chauvinism—created by Indian military intervention and strengthened by the LTTE’s armed resistance—does not depend on the future line of action of either the LTTE, or the JVP and Sinhala Buddhist opposition. Indian expansionism’s political-military intervention, the contradiction this has given rise to, generates this basis and it will remain as a basic factor in Sri Lankan politics. Utilising this factor to build up a revolutionary united struggle of the Sinhala and Eelam Tamil people directed against Indian expansionism, the Sri Lankan state and imperialists of both blocs depends on the capacity and will of genuine Marxist-Leninist forces in Sri Lanka to break out of the confines of erroneous thinking, which has unfortunately pushed them to the side lines, and to boldly take up the political challenge of waging revolutionary armed struggle. The political situation in Sri Lanka forcefully demands this and also generates the impetus and elements necessary to achieve this.
And what about the situation in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu? We have already noted the popular opposition, strong in Tamil Nadu and growing in other States, to the Indian army’s brutal campaign in Sri Lanka. But to understand the real significance of this shift and the prospects it offers we must review the developments in Tamil Nadu in relation to the Tamil Eelam struggle over the past years. The Tamil Eelam struggle had a dual impact in Tamil Nadu. It created tremendous support for the struggle and in its wake also strengthened Tamil national consciousness, which was dormant for some time. Among the revolutionaries it helped to review their stand on the question of national liberation and in some cases to rectify their earlier erroneous position of advocating ‘pure class struggle.’ But on the other hand, the collaboration of the Tamil Eelam groups with the Indian state and their open propaganda in favour of Indian interests had a negative influence on the Tamil masses. The new awakening of Tamil national consciousness was muted as a result of this and the line of demarcation between it and Indian nationalism (always sharp in the past) was considerably blurred. A change occurred after the Thimpu talks when the Rajiv regime’s dirty tactics became increasingly clear. Even then the demarcation was not being drawn against Indian expansionist interests and thus Indian nationalism.
It was drawn against the Rajiv regime which was seen as representing a North Indian interest unconcerned with the brutalities being suffered by the southern Tamil Eelam people. The polarisation had strengthened because the Indian government was not intervening energetically. It was reflected through the anti-Hindi agitation and the setback suffered by the AIADMK (a Congress-I ally and the ruling party) in the Panchayat elections. This situation actually reflected the uneasy coming together of popular Tamil national consciousness thrown off-track temporarily and the opportunist Tamil pretensions of the upper most class in Tamil Nadu, who had every stake in preserving Indian integrity and fostering Indian nationalism. It continued even after the Accord was signed and the Indian army landed in Sri Lanka. Resentment against the Rajiv government for sitting idle while people were being massacred in Tamil Eelam turned into joy and approval when news came of the Indian army’s landing. But the potential for undoing this negative situation was already contained in the provisions calling for Indian military presence in Sri Lanka. The LTTE’s stiff resistance to the Indian army created the impetus to realise it. The significance of the shift in Tamil Nadu politics lies in this.
The demarcation between Indian expansionist nationalism and Tamil national consciousness has come out sharply. And this demarcation is closely related to the class position of the different sections of the Tamil masses. Thus the potential and possibilities of creating favourable political conditions for launching a genuine national liberation struggle has immensely strengthened. Once again, the actual achievement of this task depends on the ability of the Marxist-Leninists (mainly those who have already achieved an advance in forging a correct line to take up this task) to come forward and give effective leadership to the masses. The present agitations led by the regional bourgeois opposition, mainly the DMK, create good conditions to accomplish this. But a consistent attempt to elevate the level of the spontaneous mass sentiment and expose the limits of the parliamentary opposition and a creative effort to develop a style of work which will unite separate and small forces to achieve maximum impact is a must for this. In other parts of India too the developments in Sri Lanka gives opportunities to the Marxist-Leninists to forcefully target the reactionary nature of Indian expansionism and its corollary Indian nationalism.
Finally, let us examine the military aspect. The Indian army had started with a force of nearly 8000 supported by the navy, helicopter gunships and armoured carriers. But today it stands over 30,000 and may well have to be increased. According to press reports, two whole divisions and parts of two more divisions had to be deployed to capture Jaffna against a 2500 strong LTTE force. The Indian army spokesmen have tried to create an impression that the slow rate of advance was a result of their ‘concern’ to avoid civilian casualties. But stories of army atrocities, of gunships strafing villages and roads and of heavy artillery barrages which have come out in the foreign press expose this lie. The fact is that despite its heavy superiority in fire power the Indian army could not advance steadily, even at a slow rate. First of all, its initial thrust petered out within 5 days of commencing the offensive on the 10th of October and reinforcements had to be urgently flown in. Then, the LTTE was able to repulse and throw back the Indian army from positions it had secured at least a few times. In other words, it was only heavy fire power which made the Indian victory possible, that too at the cost of failing in one of its important objectives (total elimination of the LTTE) and suffering heavy casualties. As Army reports indicate this was not mainly due to the modern weapons acquired by the LTTE, but due to effective utilisation of age old guerrilla techniques of mining and booby trapping. And this lesson is important for revolutionaries. The support of the masses for the resistance also played a crucial role, though its full potential was not unleashed due to the militaristic outlook of the LTTE. Despite this drawback the LTTE has apparently followed a sound strategy of drawing the Indian army in, while forcing it to fight for every inch of advance, and then melting to harass it continuously.
In a recent interview a top LTTE leader had declared that it was preparing for a drawn-out guerrilla campaign. Indian army chiefs have openly expressed their concern over this possibility. If such a guerrilla campaign develops the Rajiv regime will really be in a fix. The deployment of 3 divisions in Sri Lanka is being utilised by the army top brass to demand the raising of 3 wholly new divisions since, according to it, the northern borders have been depleted of their reserve formations. This means a substantial hike in the defence budget from the already high level of 17% allotted in the 87-88 budget. It also means a boost in militarisation. The financial and political strains this will cause in view of the whooping deficits (already growing due to the drought) and the political instability of the present regime are obvious. The new prospects this opens up is doubly stressed by the demolishing of the myth about the invincibility of the Indian army and by the exposure of the fact that it is already extended beyond its means.
The fact that the US imperialists had orchestrated developments leading to the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord is now openly accepted by representatives of the ruling class intelligentsia itself. In the coming days, as the Rajiv regime gets more and more bogged down under the burden of acting the gendarme’s role, contradictory pulls will certainly come up. This will be an arena for intense competition between the different imperialist lobbies in India. For the time being, the Russians and their lobbies are going along with the Rajiv regime’s moves, but this could easily change. The Russian imperialists have all along kept up both direct (e.g. with the pro-Soviet, CPI linked EPRLF) as well as indirect (through its proxies like the PLO) contacts with the Eelam groups. Apart from this the pro-Russian revisionist party in Sri Lanka has also been shifting its stand on the Tamil Eelam struggle and manoeuvring to gain influence. All such forces could be utilised by the Russian imperialists to put the heat on the Rajiv regime and check the advance made by the US imperialists who, at present, stand to gain most from the Accord and also India’s role as gendarme. The Rajiv regime’s getting tied down in Sri Lanka will increase its dependence on the US imperialist bloc, particularly in the context of the worsening economic situation of India. This will provide a good opportunity for the US bloc to step up its political pressure and bring the Rajiv regime into its orbit.
It is still too early to make a definite analysis of the future trend in the relations of India with the two superpowers. US strategic interests in Pakistan contradict with the interests of Hindu revivalist ruling classes and the geopolitical interests of the Soviet ruling classes and the Indian rulers continue to be complementary. Though the Reagan regime has endorsed India’s claim to regional hegemony, its stakes in Pakistan, related to both Afghanistan and the Gulf, cannot be abandoned lightly. But all the same the old relations between the two superpowers, the Indian state and other neighbouring countries, including China, are not rigidly defined as of old. Important realignments and shifts are definitely in the offing.
Along with military operations the Indian government has launched a massive propaganda barrage against the LTTE and the Tamil Eelam struggle in general. The press is full of horror stories of bloodthirsty Tamil Eelam ‘terrorists’ going wild, killing each other and civilians. All of a sudden the use of violent means to resist Sinhala ruling class domination, which was aided by the Indian rulers for their expansionist interests till recently, is being condemned. It is natural for the reactionary ruling classes to do this and more. Both within Sri Lanka and India, pro-Russian revisionists, pseudo-Left groups and some Tamil Eelam groups are echoing this reactionary propaganda. For them, the LTTE’s hegemonic actions, including the killing of members of rival groups, is the greatest sin justifying all actions undertaken by the Rajiv regime. This reactionary propaganda, exactly as the one carried out against Khalistani militants in Punjab, must be firmly rebuffed. Today in Sri Lanka, the primary question is that of fighting against the Indian invader. Whoever weakens this fight or equates the forces fighting against Indian occupation with the invader is an agent of Indian expansionism, a reactionary. This is the line of demarcation, and the struggle against the LTTE’s petty-bourgeois militaristic outlook can only be waged by standing with it on the same side of the barricades and turning the guns against the Indian invader and its collaborator, the Jayewardene regime.
Similarly, within India the task of any revolutionary left force is to rouse the masses against Indian invasion of Sri Lanka, to actively work for the defeat of the Indian army in Sri Lanka by developing all possible forms of struggle. The struggles for liberation of the different nationalities in India and the struggles of the Sinhala and Tamil Eelam people have every reason to support each other—they face a common enemy, the Indian state and its imperialist mentors. Just as the struggle against Indian expansionism provides a new basis for uniting the struggles of the Sinhala and Eelam Tamil peoples of Sri Lanka so too active propaganda and struggle in India favouring the defeat of the Indian army will bring forward the basis for such revolutionary support. The fence sitters who express ‘humanitarian concern’ over the atrocities committed by both the LTTE and the Indian army are doing nothing other than pushing the Indian ruling class propaganda in a sophisticated manner. They deserve to be condemned and exposed as sharply as the outright peddlers of reactionary propaganda such as the revisionists.
(Avinash, Mass Line, No. 22, Vol. 13, no. 3, Nov. 1987)
What do the Indian Ruling Classes Stand to Gain from the Accord?
POLITICAL AND MILITARY GAINS
Control over Sri Lankan foreign relations.
Control over radio broadcasting facilities in Sri Lanka.
Defence Pact tying Sri Lankan armed forces to Indian ruling class interests.
Control over the strategic Trincomalee port with the provisions of allowing other countries to use it so long as it is not against Indian ruling class interests (i.e. in no way impinging on the ‘supreme rights’ of imperialist powers).
Control over Sri Lankan military contacts and personnel training exchanges with other countries.
ECONOMIC GAINS
All barriers to the free flow of Indian goods into Sri Lanka will be removed.
Contract for restoring the Trincomalee oil tank farm. Indian right to join in its operation and profits guaranteed.
Huge construction contract opportunities coming to nearly Rs. 400 crore in relation to restoring the war- torn economies of the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. A substantial chunk of this money will be ‘aid’ from imperialist countries and agencies. Thus imperialist plunder is assured and the Indian ruling classes will get their pickings as executors of projects and also by getting a market for construction goods.
Opportunities to penetrate in Sri Lanka fisheries, energy industries, and off-shore oil exploitation.
Training (and thus influencing) Sri Lankan Planning Commission and banking personnel.
(Published in Mass Line, No. 22, Vol. 13, no. 3, 1987)