T.G. JACOB (ed.): NATIONAL QUESTION IN INDIA: CPI DOCUMENTS 1939-47
P. BANDHU AND T.G. JACOB (eds.): WAR AND NATIONAL LIBERATION: CPI DOCUMENTS 1939-1947
Odyssey, 1988.
The publication of these two volumes by Odyssey press is supposed to fill a serious lacuna in the history of the Communist Party and movement in India. These CPI documents are an important addition to the Party documents already published by the People’s Publishing House. The attempt is no doubt commendable. These documents chronicle probably the most controversial and fateful period in the history of the Communist Party in India. The documents included in the first volume deal with the attitude of the CPI towards the national question in India and the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan while the documents included in the second volume deal with its attitude towards the Second World War and the question of national liberation.
Long before the formal declaration of the Second World War the CPI had been opposing the impending war and had been warning the countrymen against the evil design of the British imperialists to drag India into the war. After the actual outbreak of the Second World War on 3 September 1939 the Communist International published its anti-war document, The War and the Working Class,1 written by Georgi Dimitrov, which characterized the war as the ‘second imperialist war,’2 and asked the workers of all countries to oppose it resolutely. The Comintern exploded the myth built up by the British and French imperialists that they had been fighting a war of democracy against fascism and Nazism. Following the Comintern line, the CPI immediately characterized the war as the “second imperialist war, the heir and successor of the last Great War of 1914-18,”3 accused the British and French imperialists as the “instigators and abettors of war,”4 and conducted massive anti-war campaign throughout the whole of India under the slogan—Na ek pai, na ek Bhai (neither a pie, nor a brother) in this imperialist war.” The CPI also gave a stirring call for the “revolutionary utilisation of the war crisis for the achievement of national freedom”5 and organized many anti-war protest strikes.
But the Soviet entry into the war, following the dastardly attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, changed the whole complexion. The CPI made a fundamental change in its attitude towards the war in December 1941, i.e., six months after the German invasion. For the CPI “...it was no more an extension of the Second Imperialist War but its transformation into a People’s War. The war against the USSR changed the character of the Second World War.”6 The CPI now gave the call for an unconditional support to the war—“Our support to the war has to be unqualified, wholehearted and full-throated.”7 During the people’s war the CPI demanded the “National government for Nation’s war”8 at the centre and did not surrender its demands for civil liberties, democratic rights, release of all political prisoners, etc., but its pro-war line, however, boiled down to an “anti-strike, anti-struggle” stand. The “unconditional support to the war” stand of the party culminated in its opposition to the “Quit India” struggle, for which the nationalists and the non-CPI Marxists put the CPI on the dock. During the period the CPI no doubt committed some serious right-reformist mistakes. The indiscriminate use of the terms like “quisling”, “fifth-columnists”, “fascist agents”, “Jap agents” etc. by the party resulted in its alienation from the prevailing national sentiments. It is better to conclude this part of the discussion with a subsequent self-critical observation made by Gangadhar Adhikari:
The logic of our stand led to Rightist mistakes like support to Pakistan, rigid anti-strike and anti-peasant struggle stand... It is generally agreed that our stand in those days did damage to the Party. It is agreed that our slogan of ‘People’s War’, our campaign against fifth column, our rigid anti-strike attitude—our stand on Pakistan, were all serious errors9
Adhikari continued, “Our attitude of keeping away from the movement (the ‘Quit India’ movement–A.C.) was both theoretically and tactically wrong.”10 He further stated:
The only path of preventing worst sabotage and developing real militant anti-fascist and anti-imperialist movement in peasant areas—which would really stand up to the invader—was the path of being with the national movement and not of opposing it. Our wrong stand vis-a-vis this turn in the national movement arose from our dogmatic understanding of proletarian internationalism-and sectarian attitude towards the national movement.11 (italics in the original).
During the whole course of the national movement up to 1940, the issue of the national question was almost neglected. India was considered to be a single nation. The adoption of the Pakistan resolution on the basis of the ‘two-nation theory’ by the Muslim League at its Lahore session in March 1940 brought the issue to the forefront. The CPI’s theorization about the national question was largely in response to the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. The CPI which in 1938 had held that “India was one nation” and “the Muslims were just a religious-cultural minority,”12 suddenly discovered “the democratic core within the Pakistan demand” in 1942 and supported “the right of Muslim nationalities to self-determination”13 which constituted this “democratic core.” Although the CPI held that “the grant of self-determination to the Muslim nationalities has nothing to do with reactionary separatist theories like Pan-Islamism,”14 still the term, “Muslim nationalities” pushed the party very close to the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan as the “Muslim nationalities” could not have any basis other than religious. The party, however, asserted: “The grant of the right of self-determination to all the nationalities of our land will in fact lead to a greater and more glorious unity of India than we have ever had till now.”15
In 1945 the CPI dropped the term “Muslim nationalities” and instead demanded seventeen constituent assemblies for seventeen different nationalities as against the League demand for two constituent assemblies and the Congress demand for only one constituent assembly. The CPI now stood for “a voluntary union of sovereign national states of the great family of Indian nations on the basis of complete democracy within each and utmost help to each other, the more advanced helping the less advanced through a common federal centre.”16 Although the rabid anti-communists blamed the CPI as “anti-national,” one should remember that the ultimate concern of the CPI was the “national unity” or the “unity of India” which, in the opinion of the CPI, would be achieved through the Congress-League agreement in the war period or through the Congress-League-CPI agreement in the post-war period. “Muslim nationalities,”, “a voluntary union of seventeen nationalities,” etc. were only the supposed means to the desired end. The present position of both the CPI and the CPI(M) as the ardent apologists of “national integrity” or “Indian integration” is not too far distant.
The present reviewer appreciates the painstaking efforts and meticulousness of the editors, but at the same time he feels it necessary to comment that some very important CPI documents have been left out, which no doubt merit inclusion. The present reviewer now makes a brief reference to those documents which he feels should have been included.
In August 1940 the Central Committee of the CPI published a document—The Proletarian Path – Inside the National Front.17 It was probably written by Ajoy Kumar Ghosh and published by the Central Committee, after being approved by the Politbureau consisting of four members – P.C. Joshi, the General Secretary, Gangadhar Adhikar, Ajoy Kumar Ghosh and R.D. Bharadwaj. The Proletarian Path chalked out the basic tasks and strategy of the CPI during the “imperialist war” period. It held “India has to make revolutionary use of the war crisis to achieve her own freedom.”18 It continued
...achievement of national independence, conquest of power by the Indian people becomes the immediate task... Political general strike in the major industries together with countrywide and no-rent and no tax action constitute the first steps towards this objective. The national movement will enter into a new and higher phase—the phase of armed insurrection.19
The document made a scathing denunciation of Gandhism, branding it as “a disruptive force,” and gave the call for “political exposure of Gandhism” and even “struggle against Gandhism.”20
The Proletarian Path attempted something innovative. It laid stress on “armed insurrection” and “revolutionary seizure of state power.” It hinted at the role of arms and armed forces in the making of the “revolution with a communist, proletarian impress,”21 visualized as the inevitable outcome of the war crisis. Furthermore, it laid emphasis on an “authentic Indocentric Communism”22 i.e., not the mere mechanistic application of communism, rather “Communism from the viewpoint of the hard realities of Indian social and ideological life.”23
Although The Proletarian Path laid stress on “armed insurrection” and hinted at the “revolutionary seizure of state power,” in reality nowhere in India did the CPI make any such attempt. Of course the party lacked the requisite strength to make such an attempt. Thus the whole thing remained restricted to the level of mere propaganda.
In March 1940 the CPI published the document Unmasked Parties and Politics–Communists Call A Conference to Discuss War and India’s Independence,24 a predecessor of The Proletarian Path. In their articles Joshi, Adhikari and Ajoy Ghosh critically analysed the policies, programmes and role of different political parties during the “imperialist war” period, pointed out the root of the disunity among the leftists and launched a blistering and sarcastic attack upon Gandhi, Jayaprakash Narayan and the CSP, Manabendra Nath Roy, and Subhas Chandra Bose and his Forward Bloc. Gandhi and the Congress leadership were severely criticized for vacillation and compromise and Gandhism was considered to be a stumbling block in the path of any struggle; the CSP led by Jayaprakash was criticized for its abject surrender to Gandhism; Roy was branded a masked compromiser and was condemned for advocating unconditional cooperation in the British war efforts and Roy’s line was considered to be even more reactionary than the line of Gandhism; and Bose was considered “not a leftist, but an opportunist”, and was attacked for intensifying disruption.
Apart from these two documents, A Note from Jail Comrades, popularly known as the Jail Document, and the Resolution of the Politbureau: The All-People’s War Against Fascism and Our Policy and Tasks also deserve inclusion in the volume War and National Liberation, as they stood for the changing line of the CPI, its changing characterization of the war—from the “imperialist war” to the “people’s war”. Although The Indian Communist Party–Its Policy and Work in the War of Liberation, a republication of the CPGB in September 1942 of extracts from the Forward to Freedom, February 1942, has been included in this volume, still the full text of Against Fascism: Forward to Freedom: India in the War of Liberation, written by Hansraj, which was the pseudonym of P.C. Joshi, merits inclusion. During the “people’s war” the CPI did not implement even its Forward to Freedom line. The Forward to Freedom stated:
The struggle against the imperialist domination of our country is today to take the war out of imperialist hands. To let our war remain in our national enslavers’ hands is to await a worse enslaver. The struggle for our freedom today is the struggle to make the war our own. To get the people’s war in the hands of the people is to get them to steer the course of their own liberation.25
Did the CPI really make any such attempt? The answer is clearly in the negative.
In the volume, National Question in India, two documents should have been included. R. Palme Dutt wrote an article, “India and Pakistan” in the Labour Monthly in its March 1946 issue.26 In this article R.P. Dutt, while supporting the communist stand on the national question in India in general, criticized some of the formulations of the CPI. While recognizing “clearly the constructive character of the contribution (exaggerations apart) which the Indian Communists have made to the problem of Indian national unity in relation to the multi-national character of the Indian people,”27 R.P. Dutt wrote, “But there is some danger of consequent misinterpretation of the position of the Indian Communists as supporters of ‘Pakistan’ when in fact Pakistan means the official programme of the Moslem League and is basically opposed to the programme of national self-determination put forward by the Communist Party.”28 RPD further wrote, “...it is doubtful if it is not identical with the measure of nationality... and the identification is dangerous and plays into the hands of Pan-Islamism.”29 RPD even went to the extent of using the term, “alleged nationalities”: “The Communist Party calls for seventeen Constituent Assemblies based on seventeen alleged nationalities.”30
This article of RPD gave rise to quite a storm of inner-party discussion, as a result of which the CPI circulated a Party Letter in May 1946, entitled On Palme Dutt’s Article “India and Pakistan” in the Labour Monthly, March 1946.31 This Party Letter which was intended to appease the party comrades who were highly critical of RPD’s article made a very cautious criticism of the said article and sought to reiterate the CPI stand on the issue. It was written in the Party Letter: “Palme Dutt’s suggestion would be discussed by the Party leadership and what is found valuable and corresponding to the practical needs of the situation will no doubt be accepted.”32 The CPI had ultimately to swallow RPD’s criticism, accept his suggestions and modify its stand.
Another CPI document, For the Final Assault – Tasks of the Indian People in the Present Phase of Indian Revolution (pp. 20), the Political Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPI, August 1946, also merits inclusion in this volume.
The analytical framework of the Introductions is more or less sound and convincing. In “War and National Liberation” while dismissing the charges hurled at the CPI by the die-hard communist baiters as shallow, slanderous and acrimonious Bandhu and Jacob have put the CPI on the dock for its mistakes. Even Stalin, the CPSU and the Comintern have not been spared. This is no doubt a correct approach. The leadership of the international communist movement cannot be entirely blamed for all the mistakes committed by the CPI. Such an approach is incorrect. But in any case the international leadership cannot shirk its responsibility. It is also true that “it will be a very shallow approach to call the CPI of the war years merely as Soviet agents. They were at the most putting in practice what they sincerely believed to be Marxist-Leninist. ...It is basically a question of mechanically interpreting the Marxist-Leninist principles and fitting them to the case of India.”
But some of the statements made by the introducers appear to be too harsh and unwarranted. They have alleged that the CPI and CPI(M) leaderships have so far suppressed these documents and have not published them intentionally. This is too far-fetched a charge to be accepted. This silence may at best be interpreted as a sheer indifference on the part of the party leaderships to these documents.
The characterization of the Indian bourgeoisie as the “comprador bourgeoisie” by the editors is debatable. All the Marxists do not agree with them on this point. The present reviewer, however, restrains himself from entering into this debate in this review... Nevertheless, everyone interested in the history of the communist movement in India or bent on making “a conscious political response to the contemporary political developments in India” should preserve these two volumes.
Notes and References
1. Georgi Dimitrov, ‘The War and the Working Class’ (1939), in Gangadhar Adhikari (ed.), From Peace Front to People’s War, Second Enlarged Edition, People’s Publishing House, Bombay, 1944, pp. 328-46.
2. Ibid., p. 329.
3. ‘Statement of the Polit-Bureau on CPI Policy and Tasks in the Period of War,’ The Communist, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Section of the Comintern), vol. II, no. 1, November, 1939, Calcutta and Bombay, p. 9; Home/Pol/F. No. 7/6/1939: Subodh Roy (ed.), Communism in India: Unpublished Documents (vol. II) (1935-1945), National Book Agency, Calcutta, 1985, p. 114; P. Bandhu and T.G. Jacob (eds.) War and National Liberation: CPI Documents: 1939-1945, Odyssey Press, New Delhi, 1988, p. 2. This important political resolution was adopted by the Politbureau in October 1939. For the characterization of the war as “the second imperialist war,” see also National Front, vol. II, No. 31, October 8, 1939, Bombay, p. 482.
4. Gangadhar Adhikar, The Second Imperialist War, p. 5. Home/Pol/F. No. 37/43/1939.
5. ‘Statement’, The Communist, op.cit., p. 13; Subodh Roy (ed.), op.cit., p. 123; Bandhu and Jacob (eds.), op. cit., p. 11.
6. Hansraj, Against Fascism: Forward to Freedom: India in the War of Liberation. Anand Press, New Delhi, 1942, p. 2.
Hansraj was the pseudonym of P.C. Joshi, the then General Secretary of the CPI.
7. Ibid., p. 57.
8. Ibid., p. 61.
9. Gangadhar Adhikari, Communist Party and India’s Path to National Regeneration and Socialism, Communist Party
Publication, New Delhi, 1964, p. 84.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 85.
12. Gangadhar Adhikari, ‘Pakistan and National Unity’ (1942) in T.G. Jacob (ed.) National Question in India: CPI Documents 1942-47. Odyssey Press, New Delhi, 1988, p. 49.
13. Ibid., p. 61.
14. Ibid., p. 62.
15. Ibid., p. 63.
16. ‘The New Situation and Our Tasks,’ the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPI passed at its meeting in December 1945, in Jacob (ed.), op.cit., p. 167.
17. The Proletarian Path—Inside the National Front, published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Section of the Communist International), August 1940, p. 10.
18. Ibid., p. 1.
19. Ibid., p. 2.
20. Ibid., p. 6.
21. Arun Bose, ‘Reminiscences of the Struggle’ (Part II). Miscellany, The Sunday Statesman, Calcutta, May 1, 1988, p. 11.
22. Arun Bose, ‘Reminiscences of the Struggle’ (Part I). Miscellany, The Sunday Statesman, Calcutta, April 24, 1988, p. 11.
23. Ibid.
24. Unmasked—Parties & Politics—Communists Call a Conference—To Discuss War and India’s Independence. Essays by: G. Adhikari, A.K. Ghosh & P.C. Joshi. Published by the Communist Party of India, March 1940. This important document was actually a collection of five separate articles—i) P.C. Joshi, ‘War Unveils all Parties,’ An Introductory Article; ii) G. Adhikari, ‘Gandhism–A Review’; iii) A.K. Ghosh, ‘From Socialism to Gandhism–Congress Socialist Party and the War’; iv) A.K. Ghosh, ‘Roy–A Masked Compromiser; and v) P.C. Joshi, ‘Whom, How and Why Does Bose Fight?
25. Hansraj (P.C. Joshi), Forward to Freedom, op. cit., p. 46.
26. R. Palme Dutt, ‘India and Pakistan’, Labour Monthly, London, March 1946, pp. 83-93.
27. Ibid., p. 89.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. ‘On Palme Dutt’s Article “India and Pakistan” in The Labour Monthly, March 1946,’ Party Letter, New Series, 12 May, 1946, No. 4, CPI, Bombay, p. 12.
32. Ibid., p. 12.
[Review by Amitabha Chandra in Society and Change, Vol. VI, Nos. 3 & 4. October 1989 to March 1990]