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The Life and Times of Samuel Ibn Nagrela HaNagid

(Shmuel HaNagid, Samuel ibn Naghrillah, Samuel Hanagid)

An Informal Essay about the Machiavellian Jewish Vizier of Granada

February 26, 2007

by

Robert M. Rothman

This book is dedicated to

Ari

who encouraged me to write.

Table of Contents

Preface

The subject of this book, Samuel Ibn Nagrela, and I are old friends. We first met around twenty-five years ago while I was looking for something to take my mind off the college where I was imprisoned. The oil boom promising a golden career to anyone who studied geology I had shortsightedly followed the herd. That led to our second meeting twenty-five years later where I was imprisoned on an oil well drilling platform offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. In the usually very stressful and very confining world of Gulf Coast oil drilling platforms he was able to keep my mind occupied with his world of Medieval Islamic Spain, a place where, very importantly, where no one drilled for oil. Finally, with his help, I started to understand the nonsensical histories of his time. Final revelation came when all the religious justifications of that era were exposed as fronts, every public claim, no matter how self-righteous, was found to have an ulterior motive and that was always the seizure of power. Preoccupation with the politics of 11th Spain allowed me to survive the confinements of offshore well drilling. I owed Samuel Ibn Nagrela a favor, so in gratitude I started to write.

Why one should even bother reading let alone writing about the man I can give this justification, Jewish history is often little more than a record of expulsions and persecutions. Not only is it boring it is embarrassing. In the the long list of tragedies that constitutes Jewish history Nagrela was neither a victim nor martyr, just as important his enemies were. In this, and many other ways, he was both interesting and different.

I always wanted to know about this person but there were no books about him. There were some chapters in some history books about Nagrela but these were inadequate for such an interesting subject, so the events described above and frustration led me to write a book about the man. Now if anyone wishes to read about this very interesting man there is a very good book available on the subject.

Falmouth, Virginia

December 6, 1999

robertrth@gmail.com

A Note About Sources, their limitations and some odds and ends

To approximate the truth compare the lies.

- Leon Trotsky

There are really no outstanding sources about Ibn Nagrela's life. I am aware of no biography ever written about the man, not surprising considering the dearth of certain information about Nagrela and his times. Fortunately this essay is about his heart and mind rather than his itinerary and there is a very good source on that, his poetry. This tells a reader more about the man than most autobiographies reveal about their subjects. Most of it has not been translated into English, what has been provides an excellent window on his world and his place in it; therefore much of it is quoted here. As for putting this into the context of a life there is only one extensive description of Nagrela's life and work, and that has been criticized somewhat justifiably as fiction written as history.

Jacob Ashtor wrote the definitive and only history on Andalusian, that is Islamic Spanish, Jewry, The Jews of Moslem Spain, in which he gives the most detailed description of Nagrela's life in English. It is unfortunately too detailed; many of the details appear to be the author's rosy views rather than recorded observations. Some of his deductions and facts assume far more than reason justifies. Worse, the translators made mistakes, the three days of imprisonment of some Berber warlords becomes three years, the dates of imprisonment of a famous Moslem intellectual as a result of a lost battle are moved twenty years and given to another battle. But worse, much worse, the author pretends that Nagrela is some gentle Hasidic Rabbi rather than a Machiavellian gentleman.

There are a slew of other authors that give bits and pieces of Nagrela's life. Most are based on The Book of Traditions written by Ibn Daud in the 12th century. Ibn Daud wanted the heroic Rabbi Samuel to be a religious leader, which Nagrela was. He also wanted a meditative saintly Rabbi and described the man as such, which he was only part time. He neglected to mention that the Rabbi would peal your eyeball like a grape if you crossed him, or buy you off if he saw your heart was for sale at an acceptable price.

But Nagrela never hid himself, just the opposite, his poetry is blatant, he had contempt for his King and wrote poems about it. He had similar attitudes towards some people, including Jews, his poems say so. Unlike any gentle, contemplative Rabbi he enjoyed killing his foes, and killing in battle, he wrote enough poems about both to make the point clear. On one point both Ibn Daub and Ashtor are right, his Jewish identity was his world, he was infatuated with his people and his faith. Most of all he is infatuated with himself, his poems are not subtle especially on this point. He was also a dedicated family man, scholar and lover. All this is obvious in his work. He was interesting and nobody seemed to really wanted to pay close attention.

The great Jewish historians Graetz, Dubrov and Sassoon all agree that he was a fascinating character and then move on to something not as interesting. Fortunately their work adds to the story, but only as bits and pieces included in a larger history. Nonetheless the bits add up.

Books about the period are more helpful. Reinhardt Dozy, a Dutch author who wrote on Moslem Spain around 1912, is the greatest help. His book is a pleasure and takes on the history of the ruling families of many of the Taifa era’s petty states, a trying and masochistic task. There are a number of helpful modern authors on Islamic Spain, including two, Wasserstein and Roth, that cover Jewish society and the era of the petty Kings. Both of these writers agree, and this one concurs, that a tract supposedly authored by Nagrela attacking Islam could not have been written by the man. Ashtor took the charge at face value, another error, a pretty serious one too. Roth is especially helpful is uncovering many of the less known aspects of Nagrela's world, as well as pinpointing errors and unjustifiable assumptions in Ashtor's work.

Many aspects of the history of Nagrela's time are hopelessly uncertain. The matter is additionally complicated by the fact many of the historians of that period appear to have been what today we would call conspiracy theorists. Fortunately suspicious stories are easy to isolate, a technique used by the police is applicable here, if the story is too detailed, specific and elaborate it is false. There are many such stories in the history of the Nagrelas.

Sometimes obvious information is overlooked in favor of speculation. One error every commentator on Nagrela's life seems to enjoy is the origin of his title Nagid. Some speculate that it was a designation by the rabbinical academies in Iraq. Actually the Encyclopedia Judaica reveals it was the title of the president of the Jewish community in a Berber state in Tunisia. The Sanhadja Berbers who originally came from there just transplanted the position to their new government in Spain. The only mystery is why there was ever a mystery.

Another problem is that historians consider the events of that period was too insignificant to care about. Even the Encyclopedia of Islam states that the wars fought by petty states are too pointless to be taken seriously. The Encyclopedia is right, most of the wars were little more than sheep stealing expeditions. Certain political dynasties also add to the confusion and frustration. The history of Malaga is a mess but it has to be dealt with because it is an integral part of Nagrela’s story. The ruling family and their servants were in a constant war; cousins and chamberlains would continually plot against each other and finally killed each other off, a psychopathic Brady Bunch. It must have been a trial for the contemporaries to keep tract of the antics of this homicidal family and their entourage let alone historians writing years after the carnage. For this reason a detailed description of the history of Malaga is condensed and isolated as much as possible, mercifully I hope, for the reader.

There is one major Arabic source that has been translated into English, Abd Allah ben Boluggin, the last ruler of Zirid Granada. He wrote a history of the life and death of his state that included information on Samuel and his son. He did not like Jews in general and the Nagrelas in particular. He had a legitimate grievance against the family, he was sure Samuel's son, Joseph, murdered his father. Another complaint he must have had against the father was, one suspects, that Samuel Ibn Nagrela was able keep Granada independent while Abd Allah lost it to the Almoravids (a movement of Moslem fanatics from Morocco that took over southern Spain around 1090). Still another gripe he had against Jews in general may have been that he effectively lost an armed slowdown with the Jewish community of the town of Lucena. They revolted and he had to rely on guile and trickery to finally reassert his authority there rather than armed force, a marvelous insult to a proud descendant of Berber Kings. Although he was born a decade after Samuel's death his description of Samuel and his son are as reliable as anyone would be with a such psychological axes to grind. Whatever his inaccuracies he provides some information that is obviously trustworthy, and although his dates and persons identities maybe wrong, correct or likely ones are possible to deduce. Just as important, his prejudices are the prejudices of the time and these are part of the story. Although how much of the story is impossible to deduce, after all there is no absolute truth in any human affair.

This brings forward another problem with writing a story about the time. Any dates provided about anything are merely best guesses. Dozy even gave a date for the destruction of Cordova that is a year earlier than any date given in virtually every other source. There are some exceptions. Nagrela gave dates in relation to particular Jewish holidays, these can be trusted. Events that cannot be dated are placed in timelines relative to those that can without any assurance that these are where they belong. The most unfortunate example of this concerns the conquest of some of the smaller states, sources give dates that are a dozen years apart. So what, as said earlier, the subject is Nagrela's soul not his itinerary. The sequence is less important than the occurrence.

One thing must be stated clearly, this book could not have been written if it were not for four very well written and researched volumes, these are A Jewish Prince in Moslem Spain, by Leon Weinberger, Jews, Visigoths and Muslims in Medieval Spain, by Norman Roth, The Jews of Moslem Spain, by Jacob Ashtor, and Spanish Islam, by Reinhardt Dozy. There were many other sources that added invaluable information but without these four anything gleamed from any variety of other sources would have reduced almost to the level of anecdotes. Fortunately these four books existed and coupled with some good encyclopedias and a number of other relevant tomes enough of the life of an 11th century Vizier was able to be reconstructed to fill a book.

And a note about names,

Latinizations of Arab names are used whenever possible. Names of monarchs are avoided whenever possible because it is assumed that they are too difficult for the reader to easily keep track of, because the author cannot. Therefore instead of reading of Iskaq al-Birzali you will read of the King of Carmona. If this approach were not adopted there would be over fifty hard to remember Arabic names to keep track of.

A problem also occurs with the transliteration of the name Nagrela. There are many different spellings of the name from the common Nagrela to the Arabic sounding Nagrillah and Naghrala. I choose Nagrela, in Spanish it means little black one. If this transliteration is correct then the subject of this essay could trace his family origins to the Christian half of Spain. True or not the only certainty concerning the spelling of Nagrela is its unimportance.

The Geography of Mr. Nagrela's World

To follow this story you will need to look at a map of southern Spain, preferably a topographic map, and preferably one showing the smaller cities. This is necessary as some of the major towns of Nagrela's time are today small, or at least small enough so they do not qualify for inclusion on a map that shows only the major cities of Spain. In Nagrela's time some of these cities became the capitals of city states; the states were named after the capital and included a hinterland around the main city. Occasionally these countries included other well sized towns.

The southern most province of contemporary Spain is Andalusia. The name comes from the Arabic name for Spain, Al-Andalus. It is a potpourri of different climates and geomorphological provinces. Much of it looks like the American west; European movie companies film westerns in parts of Andalusia. Other parts are high mountains; other parts are marshland and beach. Nagrela's home city, Granada, lays in a geologic depression. The landform was cut by the slow moving and silty Genil River, which flows by the city, on its way west to a junction with the Guadalquivir River. On the east and south Granada is hemmed in by the very high mountains of the Sierra Nevadas. To the north there is some relative plain and low hills, then another mountain range and beyond that another geologic depression, this one cut by the Guadalquivir River. It is on the Guadalquivir that the city of the Cordova grew and found greatness. One hundred and twenty kilometers down river, to the west, is Seville, the city of the arch foe of Nagrela. Eighty kilometers to the southwest the Guadalquiver empties into the Atlantic.

Thirty kilometers east of Seville is Carmona, the capital city of an area seized by the Birzali family of Zenata Berbers. Within the territory they originally took as their private thiefdom lay the cities of Ecija, fifty kilometers east of Carmona on the Genil, and Osuna, thirty three or so kilometers south of Ecija. Sixty kilometers south of Osuna lays Ronda, the city on a cliff, it lay is next to a gorge which the Rio Guadalvein flowed flows through. The cliff is 300-350 feet from bottom to top. The city was the capital of another tiny state ruled by the Abu Nur Ibn Abi Kurra, also a Zenata but of a different clan, the al-Yefreni.

The coast of southern Spain twists so that seventy kilometers east of landlocked Ronda is the seaport of Malaga. The seaport sits at the foot of the 10,000 foot high Sierra Nevadas, the other side of which, to the northwest is Granada. Malaga was taken over and held by the Hammudite family of Morocco. One hundred and seventy kilometers east of Malaga lays the seaport of Almeria. It was stolen by a Slav general after the fall of Cordova in 1013. Almeria as well is separated from Granada by the Sierra Nevadas.

The small town of Arcos was also an independent statelet, seventy five kilometers south south east of Seville. Moron, seventy five km or so southeast of Seville, was ruled by the Dammari. That family was also Zenata. Badajoz, a capital of a state friendly to Granada, is located one seventy kilometers to the north north west of Seville.

There were a slew of other small city-states, Santa Maria, Mertola, Niebla, Silves and Tortosa were some of the smaller ones in southern Spain that are still on a map of Spain. None were that important in Nagrela's life. The cities of Saragossa, Toledo and Tudela were also city-states, bigger but to the north and hence out of the picture.

The Possible Timeline of Nagrela's Life

993 Birth of Samuel

1013 fall Fall of Cordova, Nagrela flees to Malaga

meeting with Ahmand Ibn Hazm

1018 Al-Murtada attempts to move on Cordova from Almeria, stopped at Granada by Zawi Ibn Ziri

1018 or 1019 or 1020 Nagrela enters Sanhadja service, Zawi returns to Ifriqiya, Habbus ben Macksen stages coup and takes Granada.

1020 Nagrela dismissed from Sanhadja employment

1027 Nagrela is promoted to Nagid

1031 Birth of first son, Joseph born

1036 War between Almeria and Seville sees Granadan intervention against Seville.

1038 Battle of Al Font, Ascension of Badis

1039 Battle of Genil

1040 Possible fighting outside of Seville

1041 Death of Samuel's brother, Yaddair invades from north.

1042 Fighting in the east, relief of Lorca. Mutadid becomes Kadi of Seville.

1043 Yaddair convinces prince of Carmona to invade Granada, he is captured and probably executed. Prince of Carmona is ambushed and killed by Sevillians. Death of Naja.

1044 Granadan army operates in the east? Nagrela is seriously ill. Daughter dies.

1045 Nagrela ambushed by King of Ronda.

1046 Carmona and Moron conduct forays into Granada, Sanhadja counterattack, fighting continues into the next year.

1047 Ronda raids into Granada, Granada counterattacks whereupon Ronda stages diversionary attack from newly acquired Malagan territory. Granada stages full scale assault against Ronda. Seville sends an army to aid Ronda. Sanhadja destroy army and execute its general. Siege of Ronda fails. Diplomacy leading to a grand alliance against Seville.

1048 Invasion of Seville, alliance falls apart.

1049 Alliance with Malaga, brief capture of Nagrela. Eliassaf born.

1050 Badajoz and Granada assault Seville and Malaga, Badajozis defeated. Granadans withdraw from Seville, Malaga decisively defeated.

1051 Seville annexes number of smaller states.

1052 Samuel fights and defeats the armies of six states in mountains of Malaga.

1053 Fighting in Almeria, alliance against Granada by Seville, Arcos, Moron, Ronda.

1054 Moron and Granada defeat Seville, Nagid ill with skin disease, Nagid prevents massacre of Arabs.

1055 raiding into Seville

1056 Seville raids into Granadan held northern Malaga. Death of the Nagid.

1066 Joseph dies in riot that also takes many other Jewish victims.

The Life and Times of Samuel Ibn Nagrela HaNagid

An Informal Essay on the Machiavellian Jewish Vizier of Granada

by Robert M. Rothman

Introduction

This is a story about the soul of a Jewish Prime Minister that lived a tiny Kingdom in Moslem Spain a thousand years ago. For some reason there appears to be a general lack of interest in the events and people of an unimportant state that disappeared so long ago. This is certainly a pity because so many people like adventure stories and no adventure novelist could ask for more than a retelling of this man’s life and times. There was a civilization on the verge of collapse, military heroism, villains, rebellions, betrayal, constant warfare, treachery, and genius and this would be just Chapter One. The times were interesting as the Chinese say in their curses. In the midst of all this bloodshed and intrigue and behind much of it roamed our subject, a rather peculiar fellow, Samuel Ha-Levi Ibn Nagrela Ha-Nagid. He was such an odd fellow that a novelist would dread having to develop a character like his. Our analytical times have trouble conceiving of a personality that does not seem to logically fit together, especially if the parts are appear contradictory, inconsistent, and unpredictable; with Nagrela both a great saint and a great sinner seem to have shared the same soul. So now we have mystery and those can be interesting.

Should the above mentioned adventure novelist prefer Nagrela the saint he could point to the artistic patronage that helped usher in the Golden Age of Jewish Arts and Letters in Spain. But before the hero can be placed on a pedestal the sinner comes into play; this same saint prevented the unification of Islamic Spain under relatively enlightened Arab leadership. This in turn led to a series of events that cumulated in the conquest of that advanced civilization by backward North African Berbers. One could argue that but for him Arab Spain, with all its magnificence, creativity and lust for knowledge, may have survived a bit longer than it did. That makes Nagrela one of the most unusual personalities in history, a single bureaucrat whose diplomatic and military skills decided the fate of one civilization and whose artistic skills vastly enriched the literature of another.

Today his name is known mainly to those with some interest in Moorish Spain or Medieval Jewish Poetry, which is to say he is hardly known to anyone. Those that do recall him do so as sort of a curiosity because he was the only post-biblical Jewish poet who wrote war poetry. This certainly does not do him justice. Samuel Ibn Nagrela lived a life that had considerably more interesting twists and sharp turns than its long length would suggest. These were partially due to his employer. He served faithfully an amoral and incompetent master, we will entitle him a King, and in serving he had to modify the man's actions for benefits of the state and often for the innocents who would have died at his master's hands.

That does not mean he was a kind hearted man, he enjoyed the death's of his enemies, these were literally a religious experience for him, so much so that he wrote cheery poems about their unhappy ends. He also wrote on religious law and engaged in scholarly feuds about philology with the leading Jewish thinkers of his day, making him a scholar, and led armies on plundering expeditions, making him, by our standards, a barbarian. In his more tender moments he would write love poems to and about young boys. Back and forth, scholar or thug? With his passing there were no one, Jewish or not, who came close to following in his footsteps. His son tried and, predictably for the age he lived in, was killed. As I said, he was a mystery.

Oddly, even though there was no other person quite like him in either Jewish or world history, he was regulated to footnote status. Others who did far less were treated far better. Worse he was largely forgotten by a people who needed a tradition of military violence. His poetry was studied more than his campaigns, and those certainly more than his methods. The oversight may have been intentional, it would not be proper for a community that prides itself on religiosity to acknowledge that a beloved Rabbi systematically bribed, killed, and probably assassinated so he could do those good things that beloved Rabbis are supposed to do. If they did perhaps many others would reflect on his means and accomplishments and see their own successes as pointless or small, or being forced to admit they were playing the wrong, or at the very least, inadequate roles.

I am rambling now, back on track….

Nagrela was born at the tail end of one of the great civilizations of mankind, that of the Caliphate of Cordova. At a time when knowing how to read was considered effeminate by Europeans Islamic Cordova was known for its libraries. The Caliph who reigned just before Nagrela was born is remembered as a one of history’s greatest bibliophiles, with a library of hundreds of thousands of volumes. Tragically this state of the knowledgeable was built on quicksand. There was no binding national, ethic, religious or ideological identity. From the first Caliph in the 720s to the last around 1031 the Cordovan state was under attack from within. Its history is largely a list of rebellions and civil wars. Fortunately for scholarship most of the wars were limited, more in the nature of a national pastime, like baseball, than a society-threatening event. In this somewhat controlled chaos Moslem, Christian and Jew all lived side by side, although never as one family, and each of these groups was divided among itself. Among Ibn Nagrela’s worse enemies were Jews. When the Caliphate was finally torn apart it was due to a usurper whose support was so limited he could not control the numerous natural factions that al-Andalus, as Islamic Spain was called, consisted of. Spain was a Lebanon.

In Nagrela’s youth the Caliphate was replaced by a collection of petty states. Any warrior chieftain could become a “King” by taking over a fortress, summoning help from his tribal faction and promising some mercenaries more loot than a rival. The path to obtaining power was unimportant if the basic ingredient was terror. A suggestion of royal pedigree was a welcome pretense to legitimacy as long as the populace understood that the royalty were still wanton killers. Government degenerated to the level of a protection racket with a bureaucracy gleamed from out of work and most likely, refugee, scholars. It followed, as far as the majority of these states citizens were concerned, that no country or King was worth living or dying for.

Since everyone belonged to a faction the state only existed as someone else’s family business, fidelity safely extended only to the one’s own family, upwards to the tribe, then to the source of potential physical safety and economic prosperity, whether prince, warlord or godfather. The only laws and loyalties that any Andalusian voluntarily acquiesced to were the ones found in one’s own tribe or faction. In most of the states what familial allegiance there was directed towards a ruler of a foreign state whose tribal affiliation was akin to one’s own. Most of the so called governments were the real enemies of the people. The rulers feared their subjects.

All these Kings, Princes, and Caliphs were weak enough to encourage aggression by their neighbors who in turn interpreted any desire for peace as an invitation to attack. Since military prowess became temporary and for hire, based on the right chess moves rather than the intrinsic internal resources of the state, anybody who held real estate with a taxable population could play. Disorder leveled the playing field. Politics was reduced to natural selection. Since a man fighting for his life cannot afford to be choosy a Jew was permitted service as a Prime Minister, a Vizier, of a Moslem state. Nagrela came on the scene at just the right time.

In the midst of this whirlpool Islamic Spain continued to produce scholars in every field. In fact, the confusion may be the explanation for the intellectual success of al-Andalus, as Moslem Spain was called. The educated were necessary to run the petty states the warlords ruled, hence there was a market for the well read. Being a scholar or artistic master paid. It was an odd contradiction, a place in near constant political turmoil while intellectually productive, a genuine prototype of the Italian Renaissance. Another secret of the Spain and Italy’s intellectual success may have been that governments were so preoccupied simply trying to survive that they lacked the energy and resources to mount a proper campaign of persecution. Tolerance was also a sign of times in the Christian Spain of the northern half of the peninsula which was also divided against itself. In all these cases once a single authority was able to take control and impose a modicum of internal order and external security books and people went up in smoke. The usurper that took over Cordova after the death of the bibliophile Caliph gained theological support by allowing the great library to be rifled and it’s sacrilegious, that is, scientific, books burned. Later on he tried to promote himself as a patron of learning in order to get the support of the scholars.

The story of the Jewish Vizier cannot be told without telling the story of this bibliophilic fractious world. The one largely owned his existence to the other.

Part I The Stage and Actors

The Revolution and the Rise of the Non-State

(This chapter should skipped by anyone familiar with the rise of Islamic Spain)

The story starts with a failure by the pagan gods of Arabia in the period before Islam, called the Age of Ignorance by Moslems. By the 500s it was obvious that their religion compared unfavorably to those of neighboring cultures. The Persians to the northeast had the ancient and refined religion of Zoroasterism, the Ethiopians, Egyptians and Byzantines to the north, west and south love based Christianity. There was even a Jewish Kingdom to the south in Yemen, and although it was wiped off the map by the Ethiopians there were still Jewish tribes living there and throughout the Arabian Peninsula. In both the national and tribal setting Jewish peoplehood was defined by the bibliophilic faith of Judaism. There were also Christian tribes. All had contempt for the gods of Arabia and their followers. Actually the Arabs were more than a bit silly, they believed that gods resided inside of stones. Every tribe had at least one, although some recognized a chief god who ruled over lesser gods. He was called Al-lah and lived in a stone in Mecca.

The Arab peoples were in the same boat, more than a bit silly that is. They were the occupants of a place one traversed to get someplace else and that only if there was no alternative route. As far as history, culture or any other standard of civilization they did not count, except as potential bandits or military allies of the more advanced cultures to the north or south. This proud people, like many proud peoples, had little to be proud of. It was doubtful they could even be called a people. They consisted of tribes; there was no significant social grouping higher or lower than that. No common religion, history, King or constitution. They had a similar language but even that was divided between northern and southern dialects. For entertainment there was poetry and raiding, the latter providing some of the material for the poetry. The raiding was very important; it was a lifestyle as well as pastime. The laws of the desert were based on tribal traditions and were little more than protocols for dealing with other tribes. Morality only extended to members of the same tribe, after that it there was only the rule of force and fear. The world seemed to be either ignoring or laughing at them, it was all rather insulting, especially as it appeared to be warranted. Change was called for, particularly a new faith, something that could compete. It was in the air. People were getting angry and embarrassed. But how was a new religion to prove itself?

A few holy men, inspired by whatever inspires such men, preached reform. Finally one arose that managed to back his words with force and hence won the respect of a people that at that time equated might with right. Muhammad preached among the poor, but made at least one convert among the wealthy, a prince of the house of Ommaya. Unpopular in Mecca, the reformer was offered a job in Medina working out agreements between tribes. These he joined together in an alliance. The alliance members vowed faith in the supreme god, Allah and thereupon became a new community, a community of believers in the unity of Allah.

The holy man was a man of action as well as words,words; he attracted followers among the disaffected and disenfranchised. These struck at unbelievers, pagans had to convert or die, join the club or suffer the consequences. Jewish tribes were driven out, annihilated or forced to pay extraordinary high tributes. The new faith therefore showed not only its equality with the other faiths but its superiority. Jews and Christians were allowed to practice their religion on payment of a tax; their ideological superiority over the pagans earned them that right. Besides, the community of believers needed the cash. There was really not much Arab opposition after the first few years. Desert tribes, inspired by loot and pride, joined his crusade and found themselves missionaries. Surprisingly, they discovered that they were good soldiers. They could travel fast and light, maneuver adroitly and hit hard. Under a revolutionary banner the opposition fell like ten pins.

At first the desert warriors expanded easily in every direction, but the way north was occupied blocked by two mighty and ancient empires, the Byzantine and the Sassanid-Persian. Each had over a millennia of military experience and theory in its historical memory. Both had tested its skill against the other in a generation long war that they both lost through utter exhaustion. The Persian Empire had internal problems as well. When the blows from the desert started neither one was in a condition to strike back, the only military option that would have stopped the onslaught. Provinces of both were overrun. Soon, all Persia was taken. 4,000 soldiers and a single battle was enough to take Coptic Egypt away from the Byzantines. In Byzantine land the Arabs were welcome as liberators from Constantinople’s religious oppression.

The conquest advanced west to Tunisia;, there the victors setup a garrison town of Kairouan and were stopped in their tracks for a generation by the Berbers tribes. The Berbers had many leaders and many religions, Christian, Byzantine Christian, pagan. The final anti-Arab leader was a Jewish Berber queen, Kahina.1 Supposedly renowned for her cruelty; she died in the last failed battle against the Arabs. After the military conquest the Berbers surrendered their hearts as well as their bodies and became devout Moslems. In Arab eyes they were still less than equal. They were the wrong tribes, their pedigrees, all-important in Arab eyes, were inferior. Nothing would change that.

The revolution's leaders who took over parts of two empires and found out that they really did not know how to run an empire. They could administer men but not bureaucracies. Rather than struggle they merely left the old bureaucrats at their desks if they could learn the names of their new masters. The bureaucrats were part of the booty of war, like gold or jewels but much more pragmatic for the tasks at hand. They presented their masters with arts and sciences and their masters were captivated. The quality of life of the desert people blossomed, as did the arts and sciences once released from the straitjacket of Byzantine Christianity. The intellect became a source of wealth for those without a military background. The holders of such wealth were understood as being vital in administrating the empire. A market developed for the educated. Well educated administrators were the computer scientists of the time, a hot career field open to all.

Ambitious men, tribal loyalties, religion and greed made stability an unnatural state in the desert. Now that the desert ruled an empire the tribes could not see how to change or any reason to. The raids, wars and feuds continued, this time for bigger prizes. When those who could not find gold and glory in the conquest of non-believers they sought it in the conquest of believers who did not believe correctly. It was another way of fomenting and maintaining what that which was most precious to the desert way of life, violence and strife. Any excuse for a fight was acceptable, religious ones concealed underlying tribal and personal ambitions. The prophet did not want this but he had died. His followers selected the Omayyad prince to administrator their Empire, or try to.

It did not take long for disputes of one sort or another to make the lives of the Omayyad Caliphs interesting and short. One scholar of 11th century Spain, Ahmand Ibn Hazm,2 who will play a role in Nagrela's story, was able to compile a list of the early Caliphs which included details of their assassinations. Their fates were unfortunate because they seemed to be rather a pleasant fun loving crowd. They enjoyed life, including prohibited alcoholic beverages, to the point there were complains about the example they were setting, at least in the histories written during the reigns of the opposition.

While the Omayyads were enjoying themselves in their capital of Damascus in the west a small force of Berbers accompanied by a smaller force of Arabs crossed the straits of Gibraltar. The circumstances that led to the conquest of so much of Byzantine and Persian territory repeated themselves in Spain. In short their target was a body without a heart, an apt enough description of what politics and the and social hierarchy made of the Visigoth Spain. A mannequin. The shell was the Spanish King's supporters and it was very thin. He had managed to offend and provoke a very large portion of the nobility, the traditional power base. At that time everyone was under the impression the nobles were the only ones that mattered, however there was the lower class, serfs or slaves, who worked the estates of the wealthy in order to give them more wealth, which as slaves they could not share. There was a middle class, merchants and traders, but Jews were influential in this class and the King had taken big steps in making sure they were persecuted to the fullest extent possible short of outright mass murder. Finally there was the military, unpaid and therefore unreliable. Most of the residents of Spain had everything to lose by keeping the Visigoth government or nothing to gain by defending it. 12,000 Moslem soldiers were enough to take Spain. They did not conquer it all. A Christian named Pelayo led a band of thirty men and ten women in the north. The Arabs considered him too inconsequential to worry about. Remember the name Pelayo.

According to the most commonly accepted story the Moslems were helped into Spain by a disgruntled Visigoth noble. There are doubts about the story but none about who the Moslems allies were once the invasion started. The Jews sought revenge on the Visigoths by doing everything they could to further the Moslem conquest. They garrisoned captured cities, provided intelligence, guides, helped with logistics and the transport and sale of booty, including human. The slaves also got a good deal. They could become free merely by learning a new way to pray, that is, by converting to Islam.

The situation was so promising that the Moslem commanders exceeded their orders and penetrated into southern France. There were many battles and it was clear to the Moslems that these not going to be one-sided victories. In one the Frenchman hit the desert warriors in a forest, where the French were accustomed to battle but the Berbers were not. Finally, one of their reconnaissance’s- in- force met an insignificant reverse at Tours. It really did not matter; the North Africans had already bitten off more than they could chew for the time being. The regrettable aspect of the situation was that it meant their booty collecting days were over; they would have to work for a living from then on. The Islamic commanders who originally took Spain returned home to receive the inevitable reward for those who exceed their boss’s expectations in creativity, initiative, dedication and courage, that's right, they were fired.

Meanwhile everyone who entered Spain with the invasion force was getting a chance to govern the country. Even allowing for a slight exaggeration chaos was the only true master. Roughly there were three divisions in the conquered land, the Arabs, the Berbers who outnumbered the Arabs, and everyone else who outnumbered both. All the divisions were subdivided into different groups who would eventually evolve into rivaling groups. The main contention was between Berbers and Arabs. The Berbers complained that they did most of the fighting during the conquest but received the worse land as a reward. Worse, it was on the doorstep of the unconquered north, Pelayo's band was expanding and beginning to win fights and raid. That did not affect the rivalry among Moslems, a rivalry that, along with Pelayo's moral descendants, that would eventually destroy Islamic Spain. Between about 716 and 756 there were about 25 so-called governors of Andalus, most chosen by this or that rebellious faction enjoying a temporary military superiority over the rest.4

The Omayyad Caliphs could not help, they were dead. A disagreement with another family, the Abbasids, had resulted in a civil war. Negotiations seemed to have finally resolved the differences and that called for a joint banquet to celebrate the new friendship. In the course of the evening Abbasid employees entered the dining hall and slaughtered every last Omayyad, save two, a young prince in his twenties and another prince around fourteen. The subsequent adventure of the former changed the course of history for centuries. A servant of the this prince arranged escapes for the two survivors. The younger was soon worne out, so that when the two came to a river with Abbasids hot on their tail only the older could make to the other side. The younger was encouraged to return to the unsafe shore by promises of safe conduct by the Abbasids. He took them up on it and was murdered as soon he reached the bank. The surviving Omayyad and his servant fled to the family of the prince's mother in North Africa. It was the leader of this tribe who was trying to figure out what to do with the absence of a stable government in Spain. He did not know what to do with this relative whose sole skill seemed to be in being a member of the ruling elite, so he sent him to some acquaintances in Spain. These Arabs were tired of the chaos that reigned in Spain and sick of the current ruler. They were impressed by the cut of the royal refugee, so impressed they decided to rally behind him as the closest thing to a real monarch they had. They collected their forces, and finally won a decisive victory. That was enough to make Abd al-Rahma King of Andalus, Islamic Spain, but not enough to bring tranquility to the country. Except for a few years two hundred years in the future, Spain would know no peace, by choice. The overwhelming perpetrators of violence would be other Moslems, although Jews and Christians would often pitch in, dissatisfied with one thing or another. Whatever the future the present saw the Omayyads reestablished as independent rulers in Spain six years after being slaughtered almost to extinction in Damascus.

Abd al-Rahman choose Cordova as his capital. The place's name may have been an Arabization of a Hebrew name, kirat tova, meaning good town.4 The city may have been founded by Jews. Cordova seemed to have two recommendations as a capital; it was a road junction and more centrally located in a prosperous area than most other candidates.

The country Cordova was capital of was so cursed by the same redundant problems that its history can be portrayed in a table because separate descriptions for each period are unjustified and confusing. It is also the quickest way of getting through it so we can get on with the story of Nagrela. Column one of course is be the name of the Omayyad ruler, column two the dates of his reign, three rebellions, four attacks on his state, five attacks by his state on others, six comments on government, seven comments on the time. Columns three, four and five would be about the same for all the reigns, but the comments about three reigns would be spectacular, or whatever words could be used to describe a period of literary history equivalent to the period of art history represented by the Florence of Michelangelo.

Note the busiest column was the one for rebellions. For most of the two hundred years of Omayyad rule the Moslem, Christian and Jewish communities staged one rebellion after another. The fact that none were ultimately successful does not to have deterred many. These people seemed hard to please, that or the government was so abusive that risking one's life to oppose it was the most desirable course. Another very likely explanation is that it was a case of the government not giving ambitious men the opportunity to advance, a critically dangerous thing to do in the words of Machiavelli. During the reign of Abd Allah (the Omayyad King, not the Zirid prince) enough rebellions did seem successful and that the populace apparently tired of it and opted for a stable alternative, a rededication to the Omayyad house, in effect rebelling against the rebellions. Constant civil war was finally understood as being bad for business. The words used to describe Lebanon, more of a truce than a country, apply with a modification to Andalus, with very long intervals between truces.

It appears counter intuitive that such an ongoing battleground could have produced anything but wilderness, however the Omayyad dynasty laid the groundwork for a cultural fluorescence whose literary greatness was unmatched in Europe and equaled no where. Much of what was good in Spain was originally imported, but the Spanish liked what they saw and produced more on their own. As with many things concerning Andalus perhaps an understanding of why can be obtained by examining the similar culture of the early Italian Renaissance. Whatever kept the spark alive there did the same in Spain. Education and culture seemed to be the pleasure of the people, it was how they did things in Andalus, they knew no other way, it was how they defined themselves. It was also fun and could pay well.

The apogee was reached during the reigns of Abd al-Rahman III and Hakam II. Andalus became the leading intellectual center of the Europe. Its navy battled the Normans, its army and those of its allies dominated wherever challenged. The greatest monument of Caliphical civilization was the library of Hakam II, it reportedly contained 400,000 volumes. Book production and selling was Cordova's best known enterprise. One's knowledge and ability in intellectual subjects was one's class. One's library was one's reputation. To be unlettered was to be an ape. Just as every Renaissance Florentine was an art critic, every Cordovan was a literary one.

Samuel Ibn Nagrela stated the attitude clearly, years later.

Man's wisdom is in his writing

And all his good sense is at the edge of his pen;

With it a man may reach the rank

Which a scepter allows to a King.5

There are three rulers that define Cordova just before the fall, two we just met, Abd al Rahman III and Hakam II. Towards the end of his life Abd al-Rahman III complained that he had known only fourteen days of happiness in his entire life. This lament appears odd because the sad man's reign lasted 39 years and crowned with relative peace and unheard levels of prosperity and creativity. Apparently the cause of his unhappiness was a devotion to finding moral perfection. He would go about in old clothes to show his humility, this the most powerful man in the western world. He was unusual in another way; he could have found happiness by the traditional means, drunken debauchery. What an example he must have set. His obsession makes him a historical quirk, a successful philosopher King. More often a King who seeks salvation, from Akhnaten to Jimmy Carter, causes irreparable damage to reputation and the state and because he expects divine intervention to solve national crises. He must have had an excellent professional staff; his personality must have inspired them to seek their own salvations at the workbench.

Next came Hakam II, the bibliophile. He was blessed with his father's excellent bureaucracy and moral restrains. Prosperity and relative peace allowed him to send agents throughout the world on buying missions for his library, and to hire translators to make them readable in Arabic. The collection of written knowledge and education in itself as a national objectives occurred few other times in history, and nowhere else in Europe. The Cordovans and Europeans appreciated it. Between these two leaders, the Cordovans were able to create a civilization just for themselves. The memory of other times grew weak, the alternative lifestyles of the unlettered foreigners were held in contempt.

The next Caliph was Hisham II. It is too strong a term to say he followed the earlier Caliphs. He was a youngster who was promoted to the role after the death of Hakam II. He never ruled, that duty was left to a scheming Vizier, the third leader that defined the age. . The Vizier's latinized name was Almanzor. This man obtained his position by outperforming his fellow courtiers in intrigue, betrayal, scheming and manipulation, the equivalent of passing a series of civil service exams. He was able to make the young Caliph a literal prisoner in his palace. Access to the child was channeled through the Vizier, not that an audience was necessary as Almanzor made the all the decisions in the Caliphs name. As it turned out the ambitious Vizier unintentionally set in motion a sequence of events that led to the destruction of the entire country. For all the beauty that was Cordova the system of government was rotten and for all their knowledge the Cordovans either could find no alternative or did not care to. After all it seemed to be working rather well. And besides, what else was there?

Table I Andalusian Omayyad History in a Nutshell6

name

dates of rule

rebellions

defensive wars

offensive wars

government

comments

Abd al-Rahman I

756-788

by former losers, a southern Arab tribe, the city of Toledo twice, a Berber fraction

Abbasids and their Berber supporters, Charlemagne and Arab nobles

divided country into six districts, and set up a functional and well organized government, undercut the power of the nobles and championed the non-noble classes

Hisham I

788-96

revolts by his brothers, rebellion in eastern Spain,

invaded France, northern and northwestern Christian Spain. Successful in France but Christians were able to set up states in northern Spain.

improved government administration, remembered for his dedication to the welfare of his subjects, extremely religious

construction of public projects continued

Hakam I

796-822

religious faction plots overthrow, failed and executed, uncles revolt, rebellious population in Toledo terminated by inviting the leaders to dinner, killing them and throwing the bodies into a ditch, dead numbered in the hundreds, rebellions in Beja, Merida and Cordova

Franks attacked and reconquered French territory, Hakam counterattacked and retook it. Charlemagne set up a no man's land between his and Moslem territory within Spain. Several more Frank attacks within Spain followed. Conquest of Baleric Islands.

considered a tyrant, cruel, made the army his personal bodyguard.

Abd al-Rahman II

822-852

Jews and Christians in Merida rebel because of unjust taxes, Jews and Christians and new Moslems in Toledo rebel. Rebels held city for 8 years. Indicative of the good relations between communities.

Raids of Christian chiefs repulsed.

Normans conducted raids, even took Seville and held it for 42 days. Eventually defeated. Cordova developed a stronger navy as a result.

Successful Moslem attacks on Christian north.

Christian zealots tried to get themselves executed so that they could become martyrs, Muslims held off for as long as possible, but finally had to give in and execute them.

Probably one of the greatest patron of arts in Europe. Court known for its grandeur and pomp.

Muhammad I

852-86

rebellion in Toledo, aided by Christian Kingdom of Leon. Succession of Saragossa and Merida and mountainous region near Ronda.

War with Christian Galicia and Narvarre. Norman attacks but Moslem navy fights them off.

Generally unpopular and incompetent but well-intentioned.

Patron of arts and learning.

Mundhir

886-888

murdered by brother, that counts as a rebellion.

murdered by his brother before he could put down any rebellions.

Abd Allah

888-912

Spaniards of Elvira rebel, long and bloody fighting, Arabs in Seville rise, tribes war on one another, general chaos as everyone goes to war against everyone else.

Populace so sick of war they accept Abd Allah's government

Abd al-Rahman III

912-61

conquered rebellious provinces of Ecija, Jaen and Elvira, Seville surrenders, mountains fortresses near Ronda surrender, Badajoz, Merida, Beja, Toledo and Algrave all reconquered.

Continual fighting with Christians in the north, war with Fatamid supporters in North Africa

Greatest Omayyad ruler in Spain, restored competent government, created disciplined army and navy, crushed power of Arab nobles, took title of Caliph. Established best run government in Spain to date.

In every field of human endeavor Andalus excelled, architect, arts, industry, commerce, learning, agriculture. It was the greatest most successful state in Europe.

Hakam II

961-976

Wars with Christian north and in Morocco

Education pushed as chief preoccupation of the state, greatest patron of learning, incredible bibliophile

Tribes

Cast of characters

The Arabs

The Berbers

The Jews

The Slavs

In Andalus there were no individuals. One was a member of a tribe or one was an outcast or oddball or some other non-respectable category. There were three and a half tribes in Nagrela's drama, the one he was born into, the Jews, the one who employed him and kept him entertained, the Berbers, and the one whose culture he was part of, the Arabs. The half tribe were the Slavs. More about the last later.

For some reason the historical Andalus received the name Moorish Spain. But it was not Moorish, at least not entirely and not where it mattered. The Moors were Berbers and they were very different from the Arabs who really made Andalus into the most intellectually productive civilization in European history before the modern era. They only adopted Islam after losing a war against the Moslem Arabs. For a warrior people military victory was the purest and most irrefutably theological argument. The Arabs and Berbers never really felt they had much in common. The great Arab historiographer Ibn Khaldun described the differences between Berber and Andalusian Arab by writing that the Berbers were stupid of mind and coarse of body as opposed to the Andalusians who had "a sharpness of intellect, a nimbleness of body, and receptivity for instruction no one else has." He attributed diet as the cause of the difference.1

The prejudice, of course, was based upon simply not being Arabs. The Berbers were North Africans who spoke Maghrib and had their own non-Arab customs and culture. War was a large part of both. The stereotypical Berber had a talent, love and interest for war. When one wanted to hire some soldiers in a hurry one hired Berbers. By Arab standards this made them one dimensional brutes, only useful as soldiers, and incapable and unworthy of enjoying the refinements of civilization. It followed that since they were tough and uncultured they could be rewarded with the less delicate and the less expensive, and they would be too dumb to realize or appreciate the difference. When Spain was conquered the Berbers did most of the fighting and Arabs who accompanied them obtained the greatest rewards in terms of quality and quantity of spoils. The Berbers got what the Arabs did not want.

The problem was the Berbers were everything the Arabs thought they were except stupid. They knew that they had been shortchanged in the division of spoils of Spain, and in every deal that followed. The lands they were given were less fertile and closer to the Christian frontier, an unfriendly demilitarized zone of its time. They also realized that in arts and sciences the Arabs had the superior culture.

The Berbers returned the Arab attitude of contempt with one of their own. The Arabs may have had a grand culture but they depended on the unwashed Berbers to defend it. The Arabs, for all their airs were less manly than the Berbers, at least as the Berbers understood manhood, which was the display of courage and skill in combat. The Arabs were not obsessed with war, so they were less than men. That noted, there was still the problem of the division of riches, the Berbers were always fighting the wars and the Arabs always making the profits at the expense of the Berbers.

The Arab view missed one very critical aspect of the Berber reality; the Berbers were experienced in taking over lands and governments by force. Their presence on the battlefield could had made or broken contenders for thrones and countries. Furthermore there were several Berbers Kingdoms in North Africa complete with all the political infighting and bureaucratic machinations to be found in the more dandified Arab states found to the east. These countries were also as well or poorly governed as any Arab one. When the time came the Berbers would establish carbon copies of the North African governments on Andalusian soil.

Of the Berber tribes there were two that made their presence felt in Andalus, the Zenata and Sanhadja. Of course they were traditional foes, everyone was a traditional foe of everyone else, but apparently they were able to rise way above it when there was a practical advantage to it. In Andalus they had no qualms about forming alliances with one another and placing themselves under each others command.

And now for the Arabs. The Arabs considered themselves better than Berbers, Christians or Jews and a lot better than the Europeans. For starts they were the first to receive Muhammad, then their language was a source of pride. The Arabic vocabulary is second only to modern English in size, and that only because of the technical jargon. The opportunities for a poet or scholar to produce something of beauty was therefore greater than in any other tongue. As though these two were not proof enough the spread of Islam and the acceptance of Arabic as the accepted medium of communication throughout the civilized world should have cleared up any doubts, in the unlikely event anyone would have had any, about the superiority of the Arabic culture.

That does not mean that the Arabs were one tribe, in Spain they could be divided into three tribes, those descended from the tribes in the north of the Arabian Peninsula, the Qaysites, those descended from the southern tribes of Arabia, around Yemen, the Kalbites, and others. The first two tribes fought like siblings in Arabia, traditional foes again, and translated their rivalry to Spain. The divisions never healed, generations kept their tribal identity and tribal hatred. Armed conflict was the rule. There was also one very, very important aspect to the tribal division; military drafts for the army were allocated on the basis of tribal attachment. The feudal division of military obligations institutionalized a continual tribal military organization, creating an unending supply of trained and organized manpower for a non-stop civil war between the rival Arab tribes.

The "others" mentioned above included immigrants from all over the Arab world and converts to Islam from the conquered peoples of Spain. This element formed the basis of a loyal populace for the Omayyad dynasty that took over Andalus. Unfortunately for Spain they lacked military training as a body and a tradition of violence. Hence they were not that useful to any central government trying to establish a stable united authority. The Arabs, for all their education and political theorizing, were very bad in the practice of setting up and maintaining stable governments.

The final group of players on the stage were the Jews. It is odd that we do not know more than we do about how the Jews of Andalus felt. We have their poetry, reminiscences, books on language and history, correspondence. All this but what we really want to know was whether they were afraid because they were Jews. We do not know how much time they spent looking over their shoulder. Central European Jewry did often, the Church had seen to that, so had a backward and stupefied populace. But in Andalus the list of Jewish viziers, statesmen, poets, men of wealth and influence is long and yet there were anti-Jewish poems and polemics by Andalusian Moslems, but then again apparently there apparently were as many or more by Jews against Islam. The Kuzari by Yehuda Ha-Levi is the most well known. The one anti-Jewish riot that occurred in Andalus was due not because the Jews were of a different religion, but because the population was angry at some political and economic facts that the head of Jewish community was held responsible for. Even after the rise of Moslem fanaticism in Andalus Jews still had the protection of the law. All indications seem to be that Arabs, Berbers, Slavs and Jews all had their place and roles, and in these roles they were not to be disturbed.

That does not mean the Jews were equal to the Moslems and particularly Arab Moslems. First of all they denied the revelation to Muhammad, hence by their own action they were outside of the course of progress, second their culture was not originally Arabic. This was compensated for by the Jews by assimilating Arabic language and thought. Jewish scholars even wrote Arabic in Hebrew letters. In spite of the this compliment paid Islam and the Arabs there were definite disabilities prescribed for the Jews, and Christians, as described by the Pact of Omar. According to this ancient agreement between believers and non-believers The people of the Book were allowed to practice their religion, but had to pay a special tax and live in a constant state of humiliation.. (Maimonides damned both Islam and Christianity for their treatment of the Jews.) This This rule was unevenly enforced by the Moslem rulers, but when enforced, at least in Egypt, this the tax hurt. But getting money is a different arena than other avenues of human endeavor. The rulers were "probably" more interested in the money than in the religious aspects of getting it. As for the other restrictions outlined by the pact, non-Moslems could not lord over Moslems, or wear the best clothes, in short, had to act and be inferior to Moslems, these were clearly and consistently ignored. There were Jewish and Christian bureaucrats at the highest levels in many Moslem governments and they were the biggest names in tax collecting. Medicine was a Jewish profession, Saladin had Maimonides as a personal physician, but supposedly that doctor did not have to endure some anti-Jewish restrictions because of his station. Probably for most Jews and Arabs religious differences were not that important; with the exception of those Moslems who were failures in life everyone had other things to worry about. As for the Pact of Omar, with the exception of being excluded from the pinnacle of power, which was a blessing considering the fates of many Islamic rulers, and being specially taxed, a small price to pay for living under ones own laws, a Jew probably was not in any particularly unpleasant position. Others had it a lot worse. A quick summary is this, the Jews were considerably less equal than Moslems in the religious law of the Moslems, however the Moslems respected their religious laws as consistently as anyone, in other words when practical.

But who were they? Fortunately, the Jews of Andalus were part of the a culture whose life we have a remarkably clear view of because the Rabbis of a synagogue in Cairo were packrats. The synagogues of the Jewish communities were, in effect, the administrative centers of a separate state, a vassal Jewish state within an Islamic one. The state had its own laws, leaders, and courts. All this generated legal correspondence and all the other documentation found in a state. This particular Synagogue kept these in its attic and did not clean up the place for around a thousand years. A Jewish scholar around a century ago stumbled upon some these letters in a Cairo market and recognized their importance. More surfaced and eventually he was able to track down the source. Thanks to these letters we now know that the medieval Jew of the Mediterranean world was, totally unlike today, concerned about such things as money and love.

As for the way they governed themselves in this vassal state: questions pertaining to finance, marriage, property and matters requiring knowledge of law were referred to scholars and who were recognized as judges by the community. The physical dimensions of the law, such as corporal punishments and jail terms were administrated by the secular authorities at the request of the Jewish authorities. Representation at court was handled by a court Jew, some enticing personality with enough education and selling ability to make himself a leader in two worlds and a link between them. He was appointed by the secular authorities without the permission of the Jewish community. The community could either accept his leadership or not. Whatever their sentiments there was no dispute over who had the last word on Jewish law, that belonged to the heads of the Jewish academies in Iraq. Within their communities then, the Jews had their vassal state with its institutions and limited privileges. In this world they bore whatever humiliating decrees then in vogue and almost certainly a non-believer tax. The Medieval Jew must have certainly felt himself and his faith superior than the oppressor's or he would have converted and saved the money. Then, as well as now, pride surpassing the point of arrogance, along with education, was a key to Jewish survival.

By our standards all this was a very civilized form of persecution. It was tolerance at a price but the Jews learned to play the game. For the most part, though, as mentioned already, almost everyone had more important things to do than persecute Jews. And if anyone wanted to, there was the memory of how the Jews got back at the Visigoths who persecuted them, and the knowledge they could repeat the process in the other direction with the Christians in the North (which eventually they did). Occasionally Jewish communities would, either on their own or with other communities, stage open rebellions. Fear of the other side and of revolt worked to the Israel's advantage, to a point.

There are two anecdotes that may aptly describe the ambiguity of the Jewish position vis a vis the host population. The first occurred on a caravan in North Africa around the time of the Nagid. There were Jewish members of the caravan so out of respect for their religion the caravan halted for the Jewish Sabbath. The second anecdote is almost like the first, a group of hikers stops so their Jewish follow hiker would not have to violate his Sabbath, but the place is Germany shortly before or just after the end of the Weimar Republic. From both stories we can conclude that the Jews and their religion were respected, but it was up to the non-Jew to decide whether or not to grant this respect. And even if granted it was vulnerable to the whims of others.

There is one other very important aspect of Medieval Jewish life that was so routine it appears to seldom have been isolated and identified. That is the network of correspondents that allowed information to tie the fate of any one community to all other communities. The information of Nagrela's time would very likely consist of legal opinions from the Jewish academies in Iraq (the Jewish world's Supreme Court), financial credits, general news and probably most important, moral support for those communities under some sort of assault. One of the great works of medieval Jewish literature, the Epistle to Yemen, was written by Maimonides, an Andalusian born Jew who fled to Egypt by way of Morocco and wrote a letter giving moral support to a persecuted community in located at the tip of Arabia. This network reached from England to India to Yemen and Morocco, places and distances unknown to the majority of the world's population at that time.

It was this informal network that kept Israel alive and oddly strong. When one part of the community was under assault the others could come to its aid, if not aid then revenge. Examples are incredibly numerous, Jewish captives were ransomed from the Cossack massacres of the 1600s by the Jews of Constantinople, revenge against the Spanish was obtained for centuries by bankrolling and inciting piracy against Spanish shipping, including by Jean Lafitte (who was part Jewish by the way), the Jewish community in America undercut Soviet persecution of Soviet Jewry and inspired an anti-Soviet underground, whose spread contributed to the demise of that evil empire. Perhaps it is not enough to say that these communities were a state within a state; considering the wealth, knowledge and connections with the host societies and the physical extent the Jewish world was an invisible empire that transcended the temporal and spatial borders of other empires. It was powerful in that it was virtually indestructible, it could not be defeated or destroyed like a state with armies or a ruling house with ambitious enemies like the Medici or Omayyads. The network made the Jewish world a hydra, cut off one head another would grow to replace it. All those who attacked the empire are dead or demeaned, mostly dead.

Now for the Slavs. They were from Christian Europe, purchased or obtained by other means, as children and raised as servants to whomever those who owned them. Their service was extraordinary; they were made courtiers in the highest courts, generals in the armies, and rulers of provinces and then rulers of states. All this because they were raised to be loyal servants who would not take part of the political tribal infighting that made Andalusian political life so entertaining. Unfortunately there were so many of them they formed their own special interests group and became so skilled at political intrigue that they would betray their masters, murder members of the royal families, and conspire to take over governments. Once in power they ruled wisely or poorly or both. Mainly they got accustomed to power and went after it, conspiring with or against other Slavs for it. The imported slave class took over all of eastern Spain during Nagrela's time.

Part II The Performance

Cordova

Cast of Characters

Samuel Ibn Nagrela

Joseph Ibn Nagrela, Samuel's father

Zawi ben Ziri, a mercenary captain from Tunisia

Almanzor, the Vizier who usurped power in the Caliphate

Muzaffer, Almanzor's eldest son

Sanchol, Almanzor's younger son

Joseph Ibn Jau, head of the Jewish community

Joseph Ibn Arbitur, a Jewish scholar and protégé of Ibn Jau

Moses Ben Hanokh, the Yeshiva head and foe of Ibn Jau

al-Madhi, leader of an anti-Amirid rebellion

Suliaman, foe of al-Mahdi

Judah Hayyadj, a Jewish scholar

Where to begin? Perhaps by first acknowledging that all men are divided against themselves, some more than others, some so much that one side benefits by being unrecognizable to the other. That surely is a large part of Nagrela’s story, as it must be part of the story of all Arab Spain, high civilization cohabiting with anarchy and barbarism.

The future scholar, soldier, statesman, Samuel Ha-Levi Ibn Nagrela was born in Cordova in 993. Little is known of Nagrela’s lineage, this is rather odd because in that time one’s ancestors were a mark of one’s place in the social hierarchy of the community. A proper genealogy could be manufactured in case the real ones were inadequate. A little more is known about his immediate family. Before Samuel’s birth the Nagrelas had lived in Merida but had to flee to Cordova when the civil strife made such a move expeditious. That the family had their origins in Merida was important. It was a tradition among Andalusian Jews that the Jewish community of that place had its beginnings in an order of the Roman Emperor Titus. A lieutenant of his who commanded there requested that he be sent "some nobles of Jerusalem", so a claim of ancient nobility was suggested by geography.1 His father, named Joseph, was a businessman, apparently with a very considerable measure of success judging from the teachers he could afford for his son and that they could afford a live-in poet, the equivalent of an entertainment center of today's home. He was definitely a gentleman considering the values he passed on to Samuel. Also known is that the father had to travel to conduct business, which meant he had to know and understand people, speak several languages and live a life of functional pragmatism, that is, he was not a dreamer. This was and is nothing unusual for the residents of polyglot countries. Also known is that Samuel had a brother that he was very close to. About his mother there is nothing, not surprisingly, women, especially wives, were considered very private manners in the Islamic society which Jewish society was bonded to at the time.

The world he was born into was a self-governing Jewish enclave within a Kingdom on the verge of a nervous breakdown. The enclaves’ master was a protégé’ of Almanzor, a successful and very ambitious merchant by the of name of Joseph Ibn Jau. He, with his brother’s aid had obtained his station by presenting the de facto King with a “gift” of gold and silk. So impressed with the character of such a man was Almanzor that he proclaimed Ibn Jau the chief of the Jewish community. Whatever his title in Arabic in Hebrew he was called a “nasi”, roughly a prince. This meant he had the job of collecting taxes from the Jewish community, making judicial decisions and generally run things the way he wanted or could get away with. The method of tax collection at the time was tax farming. A would-be tax collector would make a bid for that position by promising to collect a certain amount for the government. There were hazards for the tax farmer. One year Ibn Jau fell so short of his quota he did a year’s hard time in one of Almanzor’s prisons. After which he resumed his duties, a little the worse for ware but better motivated and still in charge. His leadership was challenged from below as well. He backed a less popular, although competent scholar, Joseph Ibn Arbitur, to lead the famous yeshiva in the city. Arbitur had been a candidate earlier but the position had already been designated by the great Jewish diplomat of Caliph Abd al-Rahman III, Hisdai Ibn Shaprut, and reconfirmed by Caliph Hakam II. So thorough was Ibn Arbitur’s humiliation that he took an extended vacation in Egypt. Arbitur tried again with Ibn Jau’s backing after that the silk merchant came to power. The new Jewish community leader even threatened violence against the Yeshiva head, Rabbi Moses ben Hanokh, if he did not stop making judicial rulings, one of the traditional responsibilities and privileges of the Yeshiva's head. The scholarly works of Rabbi Hanokh would later play a role in Nagrela’s life. Still the merchant prince’s will was denied, in spite his supposedly total control over the Jewish community. Ibn Jau offended the community in another way. He tried to get the elders of the community sign a document stating that his position would be passed on to his son, in effect making his family Jewish royalty. In spite of his manners and behavior when he died the man who suffered most at his hands, Rabbi Hanokh, mourned him, he was so solicitous of the poor that the Rabbi feared for their welfare in his absence. Such were the wars of the Jews.2

The sophisticated Jewish enclave was one of entities that made Cordova the brightest star in Europe. Byzantium was big but intellectually redundant; the other cities in Europe were collections of Roman ruins and pasture land. While the backward Christian Kingdoms obsessed about horse racing and jousts Cordovan society was happily consumed about writing and collecting books. In that bibliophilic metropolis a man’s writing ability was his class. A good family mattered, but the pedigree involved in a historic name was nothing if the holder were unlettered, he could only expect to be the object of ridicule. Scholars were teachers and the standing of the teacher said something about the standing of the student. The names of Nagrela’s childhood teachers are known and these were the biggest names in Jewish Cordova. There was Rabbi Moses ben Hanokh the yeshiva head and the great grammarian Judah Hayyadj. Hayyadj had developed a system of explaining Hebrew grammar still used today. Their salaries must have been on a par with their stature and those must have been great. The fact that the Nagrelas found these scholars and paid their salaries says much of the values of that household as well as a mark of their notable social and economic status. The conclusion must be that the Nagrelas were recognized as very upper crust. In this respect Samuel Nagrela was wise in his selection of parents. They were grooming the lad for something besides being a traveling salesman.

His curriculum can be approximated by a suggested Jewish student’s curriculum from the 1100s. Remember that history moved slower then so an education did not need to change much between 1000 and 1100, there was not that much new worth learning. Education was to start with reading and writing, beauty in penmanship was less important than simply writing clearly, so not much time was to be spent on that. Next came Torah, starting at age five, followed by Mishna (commentaries) at age 10. This was to coincide with teaching Hebrew grammar along with both religious and secular poetry. At age 15 Talmud, religious philosophy and natural philosophy. Natural philosophy encompassed three areas, the mathematical, which included, arithmetic, geometry, optics, astronomy, music and mechanics (physics); natural science like biology and medicine and the finally, metaphysics. It is in this latter study that we see some of the intellectual tools that made Nagrela's brain so critical to so many. The study of metaphysics joined three subjects. First came “investigation of being”, or just what is reality, next came the development of proofs that were to be applied to the speculative sciences such as logic and mathematics, in short mathematical and scientific logic. The third part was to cover “those entities which are not bodies nor a force in bodies”. Substitute history, government, civics and English grammar and literature for the religion related courses and you have a typical high school curricula for today. The basics seem to be standard throughout history. There is no reason to think Nagrela’s education was significantly different, other than it must have included the equivalent of Arabic studies.3

There is one pointed difference between the medieval education and today’s. Emphasis seemed to be on problem solving by analytical and philosophical thinking as opposed to by rote memorization of facts. Contemplation and speculation about nature and man had to substitute for the discovered facts of our time. Nagrela’s skills in logic and those other areas of metaphysics must have been extraordinary considering his later demonstrated skills in applications. And judging from the events surrounding his initial successes his early education may have stressed penmanship more than the author of the above curricula may have through necessary.

Nagrela had another instructor, one he shared with every ambitious male in Andalus, Abu Amir Mohammed, known as Almanzor in western histories (who we met in Chapter 1 in case you skipped it). Almanzor was heir to a respectable lineage, his Arab ancestors accompanied the Berbers in the initial Moslem conquest of Spain, as a result of some honorable act or behavior they were given some property near Algeciras as a family thiefdom. In his youth he went to the best university in Europe, the University of Cordova (it was virtually the only university in Europe). According to the Arabian Nights like histories of the time it was at the university that he became obsessed with one overriding goal, taking over and ruling the state. In reality he probably just kept on seeing and taking advantage of opportunities until he found himself at the top.

The process started outside the palace walls, he had some sort of writing business, supposedly he would help write letters for petitioners to the Caliph. He knew someone who obtained for him an appointment to a minor post in the city government. Here he was able to impress the city's mayor. So impressed, in fact, that the mayor gave him a recommendation for a position as a property manager for the heir to the throne. The at this point was in his minority therefore he answered to the heir's mother named Aurora. The woman was so awestruck by the young man's wit, bearing and ability that she arranged one appointment after another for the former letter writer. Supposedly a mere seven months passed from the time he was first introduced into court to an appointment as master of the mint. The list of offices grew; until by the age of 31 he held five or six offices simultaneously. Still the rungs of the ladder beckoned and he answered, outwitting his envious fellow courtiers all along the way.

Hakam II, the beloved bibliophile, did not reckon on any danger from the man, his heart was probably too pure too understand the threat, and too preoccupied with the knowledge that his own time was drawing to a close. The Caliph made a few arrangements, like providing for the free education of children of the city's poorer residents and then made his royal entourage recognize his young child, a twelve year old, as the next Caliph. The child was left in the care of necessarily ruthless men who now had a state to run with a lamb ruling it.

The details of Almanzor's maneuvers and schemes would easily fill a book by themselves, suffice to say that these were many, as were his opponents, including his old promoter, the Caliph’s wife, Aurora, and that he cut through the mass like a hot knife cuts through butter, until he was the top, and his opponents dead, cowed, impoverished, imprisoned or exiled. Part of Almanzor's method was to play to the crowd; he recognized their potential use as thoroughly as any self-proclaimed man of the people; in short the classic aspiring populist tyrant, the man on a white horse. One of his publicity stunts was to eliminate the tax on olive oil, which hit the poorer classes hardest, and in so doing earned a solid base of popular support, or so it seemed. Another gambit permitted the religious right to play havoc with the library of Hakam II, permitting those self-proclaimed defenders of Islam, as thoroughly as their later self-proclaimed defenders of Christianity, to defile the human quest for knowledge with the human quest for ignorance in the name of God. In short, it if did not verify the Koran, it was burned. Science texts, as usual, suffered most in the short run. Later in his career, detecting a shift in the winds, Almanzor promoted scientific inquiry.

Most of all Almanzor was a sportsman, which at that time meant he started and won wars. His chroniclers credit him with fifty campaigns into Christian territory, one every six months and they all went well. These were the World Series and Superbowls of the time and the trophy always went to Cordova. In a very real sense these games were more meaningful to the public than today's because the trophies came in the form of plunder, freed Moslems captives and Christian prisoners. When is the last time a resident of Baltimore got a slave form Los Angeles after the Orioles took a World Series? It got to the point Christian princes would pay more tribute than Almanzor asked for.

His best game by far was the sacking of the Christian shrine at Compostela. It was a place of pilgrimage for all Christian Europe so destroying it was a major public relations coup. Not only was reaching it difficult, the campaign involved marching through hundreds of miles of unfriendly country, but the raid provided further proof that Cordova's religion was the right one. As an extra it even provided Almanzor a chance to display his gentlemanly side, he came across a monk at prayer and gave explicit orders that the man was not to be disturbed. In return for the show he made only a few requests of the Cordovan public, a title or two, Prime Minister for his 18 year old son in 991, and the title “noble King” for himself in 996. In short he wanted nothing less than to replace the Omayyads with his own line, the Amirids.

In order to make the transition less painful he took the practical steps any tyrant in his place would, that is, he made sure nothing would work without him. Not only was the Caliphate’s leadership class decimated, but just to round things off he destroyed any semblance of a national army. In its stead was a personal bodyguard composed of mercenaries from all over Europe and North Africa. Berbers from North Africa, Slavs from East Europe, Christians from the north; anyone whom could be expected to place loyalty to their paymaster above any other. The Cordovans were prisoners.

Almanzor's thriving for popularly never worked. He had usurped rule of Cordova from the legitimate Caliph and thereby earned the hatred all but one Cordovan, the young son of Hakam II, Caliph Hisham II. He wanted nothing to do with government, Cordova or anything else. Perhaps it was not for love of the Omayyad line that the people despised Almanzor but dread of what would happen without one. The legitimacy of the Caliph was the nearest thing the country had to a constitution. Without that there was no country, no ethnic or cultural identity, no political religion, or at least no adequate one, and therefore no security and no ensuing prosperity. What was left was a collection of what today would be called special interests groups with no rules of engagement, in short, more disorder than usual with a high potential for complete anarchy. On the horizon was the inevitability that if one ambitious man could undermine the Caliphate other ambitious men would feel obligated to dare undermining whatever government succeeded the first. Order would be a memory. The fear became reality; the talented Almanzor accidentally destroyed his country.

Note that for all the negative that Almanzor was, he was no more brutal than the minimum required to accomplish his ends. He took no pleasure in cruelty and remained a refined gentleman regardless of his power grabbing. Public building and intellectual creativity continued during his administration. His name is not associated with barbarism or sadism, just unmitigated disaster and the destruction of a major Christian shrine.

Almanzor the usurper died in 1002 while on his semi-annual campaign. The illness that struck him was painful but he bore it like the real man he always sought to prove he was, turning even his death into a political tactic. Rather than halt the army while he rested he had them continue on their march with him in a litter. Vigilant even at this stage he send his son Muzaffer hurrying back to Cordova with instructions on how to handle a rebellion on behalf of Hisham II should one occur. He was a few years off, the revolt came in 1006. Muzaffer handled it by beheading the ringleader, a grandson of the beloved Abd al-Rahman III. Samuel Ibn Nagrela was around 9 years old and according to the possible curricula was just starting Mishna, that is, Jewish religious law.

On the face of it Cordova was richer and stronger and more liberal than it ever was. People even had the option of being irreligious or anti-religious. Different schools of Skepticism had formed. One school anticipated Spinoza by insisting that morality and religion be based upon mathematically logical proofs. They received the same response from the religious authorities as did Spinoza. Other skeptics were agnostics, others promoted a universal religion. The point being there was time for such concerns. Thinking was still in fashion fashion and not fatally dangerous. In spite of the book burning Cordova was still the city of libraries and the learned.

Even in success Cordova fomented factionalism. Literacy, security and industry allowed Cordovan society to crystallize into two classes, the very rich and everyone else, adding the divisions of a capitalist society to those of a tribal one. The everyone else wanted the legitimate Caliph Hisham II returned to power in order to play the traditional monarchial role of protecting the poor from the new oligarchs; economics as well as tradition drove support for the monarchy. Muzaffer was powerful enough to ignore that wish but he fulfilled another by dying in 1008.

He was succeeded by his brother, nicknamed Sanchol (Arabic names are often overly similar to one another and difficult for westerners to recall, hence Latinizations will be used whenever possible). Sanchol was an overly ambitious, irreligious drunk and a bad planner. He tried to formalize the existing reality by having himself declared heir apparent to the throne by Hisham II, an act that added unneeded fuel to the fire of Cordova's hatred of the Almanzor line. The population needed only an opportunity to revolt. In 1009 the bad planner gave it to them by campaigning in the winter and getting snowbound with his army in the mountainous north (a winter campaign in the mountains?). Before he could extricate himself there was a uprising. An Omayyad prince with a small band of conspirators struck at the highest Amirid official available, Sanchol’s prime minister, specifically with a sword to the neck. The local military did not who would pay them with the Prime Minister dead so they did not know whose orders to obey, so they decided to obey none and fled. The population rose up in support as soon as the news and the former prime minister’s head hit the street. It was placed on a pole and paraded through the boulevards, the revolutionary equivalent of a verifiable news bulletin. With no police force the joy turned to riot which quelled in a few days once the city's tensions cooled and people realized the bills would not pay themselves. The recognition that the future of Cordova now lay in the hands of the Cordovans encouraged volunteers from every class to enlist in the new Cordovan army. After two and half centuries Cordova finally had half of what it always needed, a classless non-fractional national army. Unfortunately it was untrained, undisciplined and unled. That really did not matter though because Sanchol’s army deserted him. Sanchol, the bad planner returned to Cordova virtually unescorted and was promptly executed by the new acting Prime Minister.

The new Caliph, who took the title al-Mahdi, Hisham II still wanted nothing to do with the government, took office and immediately set about alienating everyone who supported his revolution, the lower classes by dismissing them from the army, their new home and employer, the religious by drinking, the aesthetic and horticulturists by using the heads of his enemies as flower pots, the Slavs by dismissing them from the bureaucracy, and the Berbers by treating them with the same contempt they had been treated with for centuries. The final straw was throwing an Omayyad prince into prison. That did it for the former revolutionary army volunteers and the Berbers. They united under the son of the imprisoned prince and attacked the palace. This in turn outraged the population. They rebelled against the rebels, slaughtering the Berbers and their families and the revolt’s ringleader. Not all the Berber women were murdered, some were disgraced, others even more so by being sold into brothels.

Samuel Ibn Nagrela was about 13.

The surviving Berbers vowed revenge, elevating what was politics as usual to a blood feud. This people accustomed to war were quickly able to discover one of their number who had an abundance of those qualities they make men follow in Zawi ben Ziri, a member of the Sanhadja tribe (whence the name Senegal). Originally from the Sahara they had moved into Tunisia and were able to rid themselves of Fatimid rule (a group that rose to dominance in North Africa at that time). Zawi had been a prince in Sanhadja capital in Kairouan, Tunisia, or Ifriqiya as Tunisia was then known. He had come out on the losing side of a power struggle and had come to Spain looking for opportunity. Almanzor warned his elder son against enlisting this man's aid as a soldier and bringing him to Spain, seeing him as such a respected and natural leader that controlling him would be unnecessarily difficult. Any man recognized as brave, conscientious, and wise as Zawi would inevitably undermine an employer's own authority among the mercenaries. Almanzor was right as usual.

After Almanzor's death the son ignored the advice and invited Zawi to enter his service. He reconsidered the offer of a fighting command after Zawi's arrival and sent him a revised commission as an administrator. The offer shocked Zawi, when he received the orders the reply, as recorded by what must have been his PR men was "War is our line of action, not the bureaucracy; our pens are our lances and our pages are the fallen bodies"3. The statement more or less described the Berbers attitude towards life in general. He got his wish of a field command, fighting the Christians and enjoying the added benefit of having nothing to do with Cordovan politics. His success and presence encouraged other out of luck Sanhadja to come Spain to serve in the holy wars. Apparently they remained very apart from the Andalusian population, remaining in their own camps among their own kind. The attack by the Cordovan mob on Berber families now forced the Berbers to interact the people they had tried to avoid. His general attitude towards his new opponents is revealed in an incident that occurred before the anti-al-Madhi revolt, Zawi was approaching the palace when some guards stopped him and started beating the head of his horse as a sign of contempt for the man. He was said to have replied "Beat my head, the horse has committed no sin".5

Knowing politics as well as war he found a figurehead Omayyad prince on whose behalf he could wage war or revenge, depending on ones seat in the theater, against Cordova. There always seemed to be a figurehead person or symbol on whose behalf partisans of one cause or another could try to enact their own not so hidden agendas. In this case the figurehead prince’s name was Suliaman.

Both sides, the Madhi at Cordova and Zawi needed allies. The most convenient one was a Christian prince, the Count of Castile. The Berbers made the better offer and the Count re-supplied their army and had his own march in support. Together the partners reached Cordova in November of 1009. The Cordovans, more courageous than thoughtful threw together a militia force that marched out to meet the Berber-Castellans at someplace called Cantich on November 5, 1009. They proved as useful as Machiavelli’s Florentine army in similar circumstances. Panic broke out almost immediately and the pursuing allies slaughtered thousands, which means perhaps hundreds (that historians in that time and place had problems with numbers, this problem will reappear here and there in this story). Following the massacre Suliaman and Zawi were able to enter and occupy Cordova. The Cordovans had to change sides or die. Meanwhile al-Mahdi fled to Toledo, found allies, including Christian Catalonia, consolidated his forces and moved on Cordova.

Likewise the Berbers under Zawi and Suliamen moved on the forces of al-Mahdi. The two armies fought at another obscure place, this one called Akaba al Baker. The Berber strategy was to feign a retreat, induce their enemy to break ranks in pursuit and then counterattack, achieving surprise against a disorganized foe. The plan was working as intended when Suliamen saw his army retreat and not realizing it was a feign, fled. The Berbers who had already counterattacked and were winning saw their figurehead King flee and assumed that he knew something they did not, so they joined him. The Catalans, who seemed to do most of the fighting took Cordova as their prize and in celebration, pillaged it.

The two armies staged a rematch on June 21, 1010. This time the Catalan-Mahdi army got the worse of it and had to fall back to Cordova where they killed anyone who looked like a Berber, again. It says something about the regard the Cordovans held the Berbers that the population preferred the infidel Christian occupiers who pillaged and murdered in the city over the Islamic North Africans. At this critical time a conspiracy of Slavic officers assassinated al-Mahdi and restored, in name, the weakling Hisham II. They were of course the real power behind the figurehead. The civil war now deteriorated into a war between two figurehead Omayyad princes. Symbolism then was everything; it was bad manners to fight for one’s own selfish goals, to say nothing of creating problems in recruitment.

The Berbers struck next and destroyed al-Zahra, the beautiful Omayyad administrative center, and butchered its population. A siege of Cordova followed. The blockade was broken in 1011, but the Berbers returned the following year. In April 1013, after another prolonged siege they entered the city, slaughtered a large portion of the population and expelled most of the rest. Those in the eastern and old quarters of the city were allowed to stay, the rest, those not dead or imprisoned, had to get out.

The effect on Europe was probably worse than the fall of Constantinople in 1453. By the 15th century the west had already recovered from its cultural sleep. When Cordova was sacked the greatest reservoir of knowledge in the west disappeared with it. The libraries and academies, students, bookstores and everything all those things beautiful in Cordovan civilization were unable to stand up to the semi-literate thugs imported to fight for the country they were destroying. With the central government gone the Christian princes in the north helped themselves to one piece after another of the Caliphical real estate. Samuel Ibn Nagrela was 18 or 19. Almanzor had been dead for ten years.

This was Samuel's first class in being a refugee, an essential part of an Andalusian’s life skills, like knowing how to drive today. What happened to his parents is not known, but he fled to Malaga. If his youth had any carefree aspects it stopped abruptly. His friends in Cordova, we actually have some names, Yoshua and Yahya ben Aliya, were either dead, refugees, or imprisoned.

How did the Jewish population see these catastrophes? The interpretation of the event involved how one viewed the relationship between government, society and man. These questions were too tied up with religion in the medieval mind for any national happening to be examined as a mere political phenomena. Being ardent Jewish nationalists they probably concluded that civil war and social chaos are the hallmarks of non-Jewish civilization. Jews experienced none of this rancor in their vassal states because they had the superior religion, religion meaning law and lifestyle as well as a system of beliefs. Obliviously, the non-Jews could not be expected to establish and maintain a humane functioning government, like the Jews had in their enclaves because their religious laws were inferior to those of the Jews. As for the collapse of the Caliphate, it was a non-Jewish affair with unpleasant side effects for some Jews, like death and ruin. Except for these side effects the welfare of the Caliphate was really none of their business. As for the Berbers who sacked Cordova, they may have been less cultured than the Cordovans, but they were the moral equivalent.

In short, Cordova was not the Jew's country; their country was the Jewish community. Cordova was merely their most recent hotel. Their tribe would survive as it always had, establishing colonies where its members could live under their own laws and reach its own accommodations with whatever authorities there were. They would also keep a low profile and out of politics for fear something unforeseen would happen and the Jews suffer negative consequences for getting involved in something that was really none of their business. Nagrela and other Jewish writers would write laments for Zion but none for the lost of Cordova.

What did not happen to Nagrela supports this view. For all his education in the ethics of Torah his extensive religious education produced no ideological clash that made him a revolutionary like Muhammad or a visionary like the Hasidic leaders, he had no desire to change the universe for the better or any desire to withdraw from it. Thus although supposedly he was an excellent student (all Jewish personages are described as excellent students, odd because attention deficiency disorder is more common among Jews than non-Jews, one wonders how much Jewish creativity is really a quest for sensation driven by this supposed disorder), there was no imputes toward academic isolation. What he did was experience two worlds, one of learning and humanity and another with power as its only goal and with no restraining principles or ideals. He was introduced to both an age when he first became aware of the world outside of his home; therefore violence in the streets and books at home must have seemed very natural. He must have never occurred to him that the two worlds did not have to live together. If he had lived during the reigns of Abd al-Rahman III or Hakam II he would seen the idealized world of the philosophers live in the politics of the state, but that time was past. Survival in both these worlds, the library and the street, were to be learned at an early age.

There are some autobiographical poems written about his youth although there is a question whether or not they written in his youth. They touch on subjects such as ambitions for the future, frustrations of the present, even a lighthearted description of a storm at sea he was caught in when on a business trip with his father. Two are worth noting. The first says a lot about the author’s ambitions and ego.

The soul is far from its desire and the spirit is refused its requests.

The body is fat and satisfied and vigorous but its precious spirit is unfulfilled.

And a humble man walks upon the earth but his thoughts are spread upon the heavens.

For what help is his flesh to the voluptuary even his goods when his soul is afflicted!

I have friends who cause me distress; they do not do good; they are great of body but their minds are lacking.

They think that I have departed and turned from rest to wandering in order to increase my wealth.

Seeing that my head grows with hair disheveled and my eyes are encircled with paint of night.

Yet my friends do not know the secret of my heart, moreover my friends do not speak with wisdom.

And like an animal of cloven hoof their souls do not know or understand.

Can one restrain himself whose soul is pure and who like the moon labors to rise?

Can one remain still until with her wings, he grids her lions like a man strengthening a tent cloth;

Until he achieves and his feats are made known, and he continues to increase in reputation like the sea?

As god lives and as the servants of the lord flourish, -even I will keep the promise,

I will climb the rock with my feet and descent into that which is stuck in the depths6

Note that he compares his friend's brains to those of livestock and mentions the purity of his soul. An inferiority complex was not part of that man’s baggage.

As for how he saw the present,

My thoughts hurl my heart like a boat by a flying sail on a stormy day.

I am destined to wander, by the book of God, and to roam over every land.

For all who are fated to exile move about like Cain and flee as Jonah.7

Malaga, Ibn Hazm and the Final Disintegration of al-Andalus

Cast of Characters

Ahmand Ibn Hazm, the most prolific Moslem writer of his time

Emir Khairan of Almeria, a treacherous Slav

al-Murtada, a pretender to the Omayyad throne

The Hammudite Caliphs Ali and Kasim, pretenders to the Omayyad throne

In the era of the petty states a military conquest of one town or another was usually of local or no interest. Geography made the port of Malaga different. The politics, or rather the ongoing civil war that constituted politics in al-Andalus seemed to pass through Malaga first. Its location made it the gateway to southern Spain from North Africa and in reverse the means by which an Andalusian force could attack North Africa from Spain. It was the shortest route, in terms of time; one could take between North Africa and most of the inland towns in southern Spain. Whichever army held Malaga could strike out at any point on the compass and not have that long a walk to a town worth sacking. Almeria was five or six days along the coast to the east, Granada four or five days to the northeast, Cordova seven or eight days to the north, Carmona seven or so days to the northwest, Seville eight or nine days to the west and Ronda three of four days in the same direction. Malaga was a knife aimed at everyone’s throat. There were other ports, like Almeria and Algeciras, but an army disembarking there would have a longer walk to its victim.

The taking and holding of Malaga was a necessity for anyone hoping to take Spain. Of course it also meant that anyone who had it had better be able to defend it. . After the sack of Cordova the city had been taken over by a frightened former Slav slave of Hakam II. Seeing his own weakness he searched for a strong ally, which in this case was the governor of Tangier and Ceuta. The governorship of these towns belonged to a clan that was related to the Omayyads, the Hammudite family. The Hammudite governor, Ali, decided to takeover Cordova and replace Suliaman with himself, which of course meant he had to have Malaga. The Slav governor of the city seeing this as an offer he better not refuse accepted a partnership in the conspiracy. Governor Ali was successful in his plans but he felt that his lines of communication through Malaga required upgrading so he replaced the Slav governor with his son. Caliph Ali was murdered in 1019 and replaced by his brother Kasim. Kasim’s nephew, the governor of Malaga with his brother then revolted against him. The important thing to remember is that these were Hammudites, which meant that in the absence of a suitable Omayyad they could claim to be Caliph. The second thing to remember is that no one cared. More about them later.

Such was the content of political life that was practiced with the same forbearance in tiny Malaga and as in what was left of Cordova. Politics was a world most Andalusians were forced to avoid because they had families to care for and, unlike the relatively humane and conscientious Mafia, kinsmen were considered fair game. A careful elocution of who killed who would confuse and divert the reader at this point; a more detailed list of casualties in the Hammudites' brief history in Malaga is provided later. The crux of the matter for now was that Malaga was weak, vulnerable and strategically located, it was going to be taken, the question was only one of the identity of the conqueror. This is the city that Samuel Ibn Nagrela arrived at after leaving Cordova. When he first arrived the Slav governor made a pact with the Berbers to spare the city, which they did. However the pact did not cover the surrounding territories, which the they torn apart. Nagrela must have gone to bed wondering if Malaga would be there in the morning.

Malagan life continued in spite of the disruptive behavior of its governors. As much as Cordova was a center of learning Malaga was a center of nothing in particular, it was merely a small seaport, a convenient enough place to sail an army of invasion to. There were only 30 Jewish families there, concentrated on a certain street, which meant Samuel might be lonely for some Jewish scholastics to talk to but not isolated. His intellectual side was certainly uplifted by a fortuitous meeting with another young Cordovan refugee destined for literary greatness, Ahmand Ibn Hazm. (There is a question whether they met in Malaga, Almeria or Cordova, considering the two traveled in different circles in Cordova, and since the Almeria meeting is uncertain even though Nagrela spent some time there after he left Cordova, I decided to give the meeting to Malaga, either way it is unimportant). Although Ibn Hazm was from a different world, the one outside the Jewish one, the two shared a heritage of ink on paper that assuredly forced them into championship. How they must have stood out in that backwater, in normal times it was their class, the educated, that would run the world, now their positions were given to the friends of glorified bandit gangs. Until better times people like Nagrela and Ibn Hazm had to use each others wits as sharpening stones for their own brains.

Ibn Hazm, in spite of being a year younger than Nagrela had experienced more of life. Until recently most of this was at the top. . His father was a vizier in Almanzor’s court. They enjoyed the good life until the pro-Omayyad revolution brought al-Mahdi to the throne. Although the family had been covertly loyal to the Omayyad cause they were too well connected to the old order to be trusted and as a result the father lost his job. Things got worse with al-Mahdi’s assassination and replacement by a shadow government of Slav courtiers who falsely ruled in the name of Hisham II. One of this crowd had Ibn Hazm’s father imprisoned and his property confiscated for plotting against the people who controlled the Omayyad figurehead. The elder Hazm’s death in 1012 probably saved him from beheading or worse. After the sack of Cordova the son fled to Almeria. His wives disappeared in the chaos of the fall and he was unable to find them for years. Illusions of safety in Almeria ended when the Slav King there, the thick headed and treacherous Khairan, decided to overthrown Suliaman and replace him with a member of the Hammudite family. Ibn Hazm's pro-Omayyad loyalties and suspicion that he was working on their behalf, which he was, earned a stay in prison sometime around 1016. This may have lasted only a few months; whatever the timespan he was banished after serving it. His first stop after leaving Almeria was Malaga where he may have met the young Jewish scholar. In any event Ibn Hazm memoirs confirm that the two did meet and enjoyed some hearty debates. Opportunity soon called both young men away from Malaga, one to fortune, the other to fame.1

Ibn Hazm, with his pure heart remained loyal to the Omayyad line. In 1018 another prince of the blood, al-Murtada, with the help of the King of Almeria, raised an army with the objective of restoring the monarchy. Ibn Hazm, the gentleman and patrician of course joined him and just as naturally was promptly elevated to Vizier in the pretender's army. The way to Cordova lay through Granada, already claimed and occupied by Zawi ben Ziri, the Omayyad hater, who supported the Hammudite candidate, Ali. The geographic positions of both Zawi and Granada meant they would have to be neutralized, preferably by diplomacy, before the Omayyad forces could move onto the capital and re-establish a just and unified government for all Andalus. Zawi was openly contemptuous of the whole effort. This lack of Sanhadja support was too much for the King of Almeria and he betrayed his own side shortly before a critical battle which he did his best to instigate. The subsequent combat saw the annihilation of Al-Murtada’s army and Omayyad hopes. . It may have been 1,000 Sanhadja against 4,000 Omayyads, so says one history.2 From commencement to liquidation the whole campaign lasted only a few weeks. Nagrela by this time may have been in the employ of Zawi. Ibn Hazm was imprisoned again, this time by the Sanhadja. It is not known if Nagrela ever visited him in jail. A guess would be that he did not, it would not been a bad career move for a man in an entry-level position.

The following year an Omayyad prince did take Cordova and appoint an old friend, Ahmand Ibn Hazm, as Vizier. Seven weeks later the new Caliph was murdered and his old friend, Vizier Ibn Hazm thrown into jail, third time. In 1027 he was again a Vizier of another Omayyad Caliph. This Caliph was a bit wiser than his predecessors because he stayed out of Cordova as long as he possibly could. Indeed it took him two and a half years to finally make his way into the city. By this time another vizier had abused his power to the point that there was a public outcry to get the man removed. The Caliph refused, so the public rioted and killed the Vizier. The event set off a popular rebellion; the new Caliph was thrown into prison then the street. The disgusted city elders declared a republic and Ibn Hazm was out of a job for good. Being doomed to unemployment gave him plenty of time to write, teach and burn. The former Vizier vented in the form of missives and polemics against the unprincipled and immoral behaviors of those who ruled and did not give him a job. A good guess is that he would have found the world less malignant if someone gave him a viziership. A certain cure for injustice, regardless of the era seems to be bestowal of power upon the critic. No one was forthcoming and Ibn Hazm stayed a critic. Time fueled the humiliation until he became the bitter judge of anyone who had station. To a devout Moslem like Ibn Hazm that a non-Moslem like Nagrela would be leading, honored and respected servant of the man who ruined the Omayyad and his own hopes could only mean the world was intrinsically foul. This attitude, and his record for acting on principle made him useless, unwanted and disliked by the Party Kings. Because he never worked in government again he was able to take up full time writing and teaching and become immortal as one best and most prolific authors in history. Like Machiavelli and many others he owned his success to his failures.

His experiences manifested themselves in a conclusion that must have been as inevitable for him as for Machiavelli centuries later. The human soul, without its religious discipline, is basically immoral. Unlike Machiavelli he saw a way out, Islam and its prophet. He hated the devil’s imps who degraded his world, somewhere on the list must have been his old friend Nagrela.

Regardless of his later feelings in his memoirs he tells of a different Nagrela, young and friendly but one we would call self-confident to the point of delusional. In one of their youthful debates Ibn Hazm bought out that a portion of Hebrew bible mentioned an obscure and incomprehensible phase, "until Shiloh come". Nagrela responded by stating that the biblical passage referred to him. He may have been kidding but that is not the impression Ibn Hazm got or gives. The author also mentioned that Nagrela was the most accomplished debater he ever met. Now there was a compliment, considering Ibn Hazm had no use for non-Moslems.3

Ibn Hazm plays another role in our story. He would write a treatise repudiating arguments Nagrela supposedly made against the divine revelation of the Koran. Nagrela did not write any such treatise, yet the mud stuck. More about that later. This may have influenced conditions that would eventually destroy Samuel’s son. . That also comes later. But in their youths, maybe in Malaga, or maybe Cordova, the two met, debated and entertained each other and probably kept each other from going mad.

It is in small Malaga that Nagrela gets his second lucky break (his first was in the selection of his parents). Perhaps the town was not such an odd backdrop to some good luck. All the Islamic states, Berber included, required competent secretaries to draft and compose correspondence. The position of official letter writer, sort of a secretary for not screwing up important communications was a position of critical importance in medieval governments. Applicants came from only best circles, the Ivy League of the time. The larger Andalusian cities could be expected to have legions of refined educated gentleman capable of fulfilling the role. Not so Malaga, there was nothing to draw a gentleman there, a Nagrela was an anomaly. Although there is an Arabian nights quality in the story that a 12th century Jewish historian, Ibn Daub, tells about what supposedly happened to him in Malaga, parts of the scenario sound very plausible. Nagrela had some sort of business, according to the story it was spices, in Malaga. As a sideline he wrote letters (remember Almanzor's early business as a letter writer). One of his clients was the maid servant of a vizier in the Granadan government. . She was the landlady of a rental property owned by that Vizier in Malaga. This vizier, Abu l’Kasim Ibn l'Arif, who was the equivalent of the Secretary of Treasury, was impressed by the quality of the workmanship of her correspondence and inquired after its author. Nagrela was subsequently hired as the Vizier's secretary. This had to have occurred between 1013 and 1020. Supposedly he immediately started giving critical advice concerning national policies that were then presented to the Granada King as the work of l'Arif. On his deathbed, according to the story, the Vizier supposedly confessed that he was only repeating Nagrela’s words. The King, duly impressed makes Nagrela Prime Minister. In fact Nagrela probably worked his way up through the bureaucracy as a secretary and tax collector.

The new bureaucrat did not travel to Granada alone; Nagrela was followed to his own new home by his some friends, a Rabbi Judah and his grown nephew and daughter. Rabbi Judah was involved with in a feud of some sort and was anxious leave town. The friendship had a tragic repercussion; the Rabbi and his nephew were murdered, probably by highwaymen. This may have been after they had already settled in Granada.5

While Nagrela was being discovered in Malaga in Cordova the battles lines of the new Spain were being drawn. The mercenaries that Almanzor bought from North Africa and the Slavs, those formerly purchased as slaves and forced into a life of bondage as rulers of provinces and generals of armies, were helping themselves to whatever real estate that was not adequately defended by someone else. Since the loyalty of these former servant soldiers was restricted to the Omayyad paymasters neither the state, the dynasty or the happiness of its subjects was their concern. They came to loot in exchange for fighting. The absence of any paymaster or disciplinarian meant they could help themselves. Which they did, to large parts of the country.

There were a few exceptions; in the western part of southern Spain some traditional Arab governments took hold. Since they ruled by the consent of the governed they did not need to maintain an expensive standing army of occupation. These Arab lands had two props the others lacked, the memory of Arab ruled Cordova and a score to settle with the Berbers. As for the rest of Andalus it came down to the Slavs taking over some provinces in the east, and the Berbers taking Granada, Ronda, Moron, Malaga and a few other bit sized states in the center. The Christians held the north.

The new governments that the Party Kings set up mimicked that of the Caliphate, partially because that was the only government most of them were familiar with and partially out of hope the populace would mistake the imitation for the real thing. The Sanhadja in Granada had adopted a dual system, half Caliphical and somewhat North African. . Traditionally the top post of the Caliphical government was the Prime Minister. Under him there were a number of ministers dealing with the topics that concern governments, like war, treasury, foreign relations, and the administration of justice. Effectively the same organization found in any government today. The actual office connected with the title vizier seemed to vary in place and time. During Nagrelas early manhood it seemed to be equivalent to a secretaryship.

Under the secretaries were assistants who had specialized duties within a particular department. Two of the most important were the undersecretary for correspondence and the undersecretary for revenue collection. (Obviously I am Americanizing all these terms).6

The undersecretary for correspondence may be mistakenly considered equivalent to an administrative assistant, a glorified clerk typist, actually he was a good deal more important. Not only was he expected to be an expert in the use of a language whose vocabulary is exceeded only by contemporary English with its technical jargon, and use the proper boilerplate references to god the merciful and compassionate, but he had to check and make sure the wrong phases were not included, phases and terms that could give offense and obligate the receiver to seek revenge. One such letter during the reign of Abd al-Rahman III almost caused a war with a Christian King. It took months of efforts and diplomatic maneuvering by both sides to avoid what seemed to be an obligatory war of honor. In short this undersecretary had to know the affairs of the world and see that they were incorporated into his work. The position was more diplomatic than administrative.

Another aspect of this man’s work can be found anywhere. Since the correspondence of a government was taken as representative of the government. Since all the governments of the petty Kings were trying to establish their legitimacy they all made special efforts to mimic the only government anyone recognized as legitimate, this meant the Caliphate, so no effort was spared in creating outstanding looking correspondence, in effect using perfume to cover the stink.

Perhaps the most valued bureaucrat was the undersecretary that was in change of tax collecting or more appropriately, tax farming. Tax farming, as already mentioned, was the method of tax collecting at the time. An individual would promise the government that he would collect a certain amount of taxes in return keeping a certain amount as a commission. Jews and Christians were the traditional occupants of this position, probably a natural outcome of the poll tax non-believers had to pay. The poll tax itself could be a major or minor burden, considering the expenses incurred by constant warfare. The poll tax, if it existed in Granada would have hurt. With Nagrela, l’Arif discovered someone he could use in a variety of roles.

There is a title that has a special importance because Nagrela would eventually be at war with a family that bore the title. The title was Kadi. It means judge, but a better translation as it relates to al-Andalus would be lord mayor or provincial governor. In times of lawfulness the Kadi was almost all-powerful within a province. He would appoint town mayors and maintain religious functions for any district were his will could be enforced or respected. He was appointed by the Caliph, but once appointed he was responsible to the law and god. When the Caliphs' power disintegrated the Kadi effectively became the supreme head of the government, making and maintaining any policy he considered wise.7

Finally there was the internal revenue service, with all the terror apparatus found in such ministries the world over, like informants and secret records. Nagrela was on his way right into the middle of the whole thing.

This was the government that the Andalusians had accepted as natural. The Sanhadja had one post the other petty states did not, an official head of the Jewish community, called a Nagid, or prince. Nagid is a Hebrew word, it was used with a prefix "Ha" which means "the". Ha-Nagid means "the prince". The Hebrew title of Machiavelli's best known work is therefore "Ha-Nagid".

Granada of the Jews

Cast of Characters

Habbus ben Macksen, King of Granada

Isaac Ibn Khalfun, Jewish poet

Jonah Ibn Janah, Hebrew philologist

Solomon Ibn Gabirol, one of the greatest Jewish poets

I passed by the street of the butchers where they kept sheep and oxen

And cattle numerous as the fish of the sea and many fowl whose day of misfortune had come

Where blood congealed upon blood and slaughters were in abundance shedding blood.

and next to it were the fishermen, with their catches from the sea as plentiful as the sand and lying in vessels of the men who snared them.

Close by them was the street of bakers,-who work by day and do not sleep at night.

Here men baked and there they ate, from this side they dragged their catches,..1

Such is how Nagrela articulated the noise and smell of his new home, Granada, or Granada of the Jews as it was known out of respect for many, if not most, of the towns inhabitants. The Berber King and historian Abd-Allah Ibn Boluggin maintains that the town owned its success to the fact the Sanhadja moved their seat of government there. His attitude towards Jews and his own need to whitewash his own history precluded acknowledging that the Sanhadja owed anything to that socially inferior tribe. Did he know that he had it backwards, the town's success caused the Berber government to move there? The admission that the town was a successful commercial enterprise because of its Jewish population probably would have dispelled too many personal illusions. The Sanhadja wisely took advantage of the occupant’s economic fiscal achievements and moved in. That and Granada was in more defensible location than their original capital, the nearby hamlet of Elvira.

The new state had a lot going for it, the city of Granada had a population of 26,000, the land was agriculturally rich, and also rich in minerals. Industries even included silk weaving. All that was needed was a stable government capable of competent administration and providing physical security and with the coming of the Sanhadja and Nagrela these were on order. By comparison of the two other large cities in Andalus, Cordova and Seville, the first was a mess, and the second always in a fight. Estimates of the populations of various cities about that time show Granada that with it's population of 26,000, it was roughly equal to Almeria and Badajoz, but much smaller than Seville's 83,000 and Toledo's 37,000. What made Granada much much different was the Jewish portion of the population. One estimate gives it at around 20-25%, other guessers are sure it was a majority. Whatever the demographics it was the Jewish community that dominated Granadan commerce and life. For reference sake, at its height it was claimed that Cordova had 250,000, what the real number was, and how many returned or survived 1012-13 is anyone's guess.2

When Nagrela arrived the Sanhadja were in the process of setting up a government that would fulfil the desires of both Jews and Berbers, and the needs of the Arab community. That government would be the mirror image of the one the talented Zawi ben Ziri had left behind in Tunisia. Thanks to that mercenary captain there were to be two Zirid ruled states, separated by a sea and hundreds of miles, an odd destiny for a desert tribe. The area staked out by Zawi for his entourage's private estate was to be a showcase for his gifts in state and personnel management. What he lacked in human resources he was quickly able to hire from qualified locals. Hence an Arab in his employ, who owned property in Malaga was able to hire a talented Jewish refugee in that town. No one had any political connections to the new masters, so there were opportunities for all based on talent and guile. Take note, when this was no longer the case in the time of Samuel's son bad things would happen.

Nagrela's first three decades in Granada would provide nothing to warrant more than a very respectful mention in the Encyclopedia Judaica. Twenty years of events can be compressed comfortably into a single paragraph. Except for his friends, Rabbi Judah and his nephew being murdered, perhaps at the hands of Jews who did not like Nagrela, being falsely accused of some crime, perhaps being thrown in jail, fired, fined, rehired, becoming a community leader, carrying on a caustic scholarly correspondence with a Rabbi that attacked one of Nagrela's childhood teachers, becoming the patron of Jewish men of letters, among them the great Ibn Gabirol, slithering his way up in the bureaucracy, writing a lot of poetry and scholarly works and being appointed as chief magistrate for the Jews, a Nagid, and serving as a magistrate for a very successful petty state, nothing much happened to Nagrela his first 20 or so years in Granada. There is no attempt at sarcasm here. Other scholarly Jewish bureaucrats also had their success stories; the Encyclopedia Judaica is often little more than a collection of them. It is what came after his first years that allowed him to be unique. But it was during these decades that he was able to learn and prepare for the life of action at a time in life when most men set back and enjoy their grandchildren.3

When did he first arrive? If Nagrela had his encounter with Ibn Hazm around 1016-1017 and was well established in Granada by 1020, he must have made the move there around 1018 or 1019, about the time Zawi was destroying one of Ibn Hazm’s Omayyads and throwing Ibn Hazm in prison. What a coincidence that would have been, a member of the Cordovan elite imprisoned by his old Jewish friend's new Berber boss.4

The trip to Granada from Malaga must have taken about a week. The hike would have been uphill from the coast over some several thousand foot mountains, which meant it was physically demanding but probably otherwise uneventful, as the Sanhadja had paid special attention to keeping the roads safe. This is noteworthy because it says something about the Sanhadja that seems to clash with their reputation. Judging from their accomplishments in Granada one can conclude that the Berbers, or at least the Sanhadja Berbers, got a raw deal from history in terms of repute. True they were robbers and murderers, but so were the cultured and cosmopolitan Cordovans when the right opportunity presented itself. There are many aspects of the Sanhadja persona that stands to their credit, the ability to make and keep a vow, seldom acting aggressively without provocation, tolerant and accepting of other peoples and able to set up a decent government. By the standards of the Taifa epoch they were men of their word. Zawi ben Ziri seems to have been especially conscientious.

A quick review of the man's character is in order because his genius gave Nagrela the stage on which he was to star. As mentioned earlier Zawi was originally invited to Andalus by Muzzaffor, Almanzor’s son. The offer must have especially welcome as he had come out the losing side of a power struggle in the family’s Kingdom of Ifriqiya (Tunisia). He was originally offered an administrative position in the Amirid (that is, belonging to Almanzor and sons) army but he turned it down in order to obtain a field command. Like most of Almanzor’s mercenaries he was bound by oath and financial condition to that family. When Sanchol fell the Zirid and his cohorts were on their own with a blood feud to fight and, as mentioned earlier, they found their own man to support in Suliaman. As Zawi's father’s head was hung from the city’s walls, the man lost it in a rebellion against the Caliphs, Zawi had no inhibitions about destroying the Cordova, center of civilization or not. After which he had his puppet Caliph grant what he wanted, a prosperous piece of territory for his very own.

In spite of establishing a sound government, Zawi was a worrier. The destruction of the Omayyad pretender al-Murtada, in 1018 did not change what he clearly stated was the precarious and logistically indefensible position. His observation was recorded verbatim or close enough to it, "I am not thoroughly convinced that they will always behave in this way (that is, easy to defeat). We may have now been granted victory in the first clash, but we cannot always trust them to respect our lives and homes. If they lose one of their men there are a thousand to replace him. More over they have the sympathy of such of the subjects that are of the same race as themselves. Hence their numbers will increase as ours decline. On our side no one can die and ever be replaced by us."5 He even disparaged the recent victory over the Omayyad, "Do not harbor any false illusions, his defeat was due to the treachery of their own leaders and not our power...the enemy departed unharmed, except their leader, and they will elect his successor without difficulty."6

This view of the future caused a lack of enthusiasm about the present such that in spite of his successes in Spain and the misfortunes that followed his cause in Tunisia, Zawi opted to return to his origins and leave Spain sometime around 1019-20. Supposedly he wanted to establish some sort of Granada-Ifriqiya axis. His history after his return there to Tunisia is uncertain, his fate seems to have been either assassination or just as painful, isolation and indifference. In any event he was never again allowed to exercise his most obvious skill, leadership.

As the conscientious leader he was, Zawi took steps to assure wise administration in his absence, or at least avoid unworthy leadership. To that end he made the Sanhadja chieftains promise not to replace him with his nephew Habbus ben Macksen. Of course as soon as Zawi was back in Africa Habbus rode into Granada and occupied it. That is not to say that this new man was not popular, he was already recognized as a courageous, bold and intelligent. Habbus even clarified his aptitudes and abilities by seizing two towns, Cabra and Jaen for defense and economic purposes.

After seizing power Habbus organized the country into military departments, all the Sanhadja were trained and allotted to into bands under particular commanders who were made lords over different tracts of land. He created in effect a sort of early warning system, no matter from which avenue Granada would be attacked there would always be local troops to encounter or delay the aggressor. Additional troops could be mobilized from other regions as the need arose. In spite of his military skills and new defense arrangements he realized like his predecessor what the long term results would be if the Sanhadja with drawn into a long drawn out war with the Arabs. Apparently he had a favorite expression "The Sanhadja are like the teeth in my mouth, if I lost one I could never replace him."7

Actually he had a domestic reserve of manpower if he wanted to use it, the Jews had a stake in Sanhadja success and a knowledge of violence. The largely Jewish town may have welcomed the Sanhadja. Whatever the respective views towards one another the more perceptive parties on both sides must have seen that they needed each other. The Sanhadja brought stability and security. The Jews and other residents of Granada had no military organization capable of securing the province from marauders, and therefore no reason to oppose the Berbers if they left the Jews alone. Jewish loyalty was always to its own community and those who would give the community the best deal and not to the Omayyads or any other ruling body. Did they also develop a mutual affinity based on their mutual status as outcasts from polite society? Whatever the cause and effect the relationship was symbiotic, although the Sanhadja were probably initially confused by absence of unending war and the Jews must have been wary of having their lives and property protected by a people they normally associated with pillage. Whatever the initial impressions the marriage was a success, each party compensating for the deficiencies of the other.

The fact Nagrela was willing to work for the people who may have hurt his family, albeit only in the course of destroying their enemy Cordova, shows that the young man may have already realized the necessity of moral compromise.

Sometime around 1020 Samuel Ibn Nagrela was probably a young successful tax farmer. He probably held, informally or formally, another position in the government, a secretary of correspondence. In this latter position he would serve others, giving friendly opinions, making friends and impressing superiors, helping the Sanhadja set up the business and run operations. As a tax collector he was helping himself and making money from a very finite resource, the taxable population of some districts he was appointed tax collector of.

Scarce resources naturally produce competition for those resources. In this case the resource was taxable victims. The details are unclear, but sometime around 1020 Nagrela was accused of something, and that got him fired, and according to one source, tossed into prison (another source says this is pure fiction) and fined (also debated). The crime was probably malfeasance in the collection and handling of taxes, or maybe something similar to Ibn Jau' crime of simply not collecting enough. In light of Nagrela's ego and good standing it seems unlikely that he would have risked everything for a momentary gain; that would be way beneath him. It follows he had very nasty enemies, enemies who were very interested in destroying him, most certainly to get at his tax farming position. About this time his friend, Rabbi Judah, and the Rabbi's nephew were murdered. Ashtor says it was part of an attack on Nagrela, another source again says this nonsense. The only other contenders for tax farming positions in Granada were Jews. Were Jews were willing to destroy the innocent for money and power? Probably, the community was integrated into the culture of the times.8

Even in disgrace Nagrela had his allies. One confederate in particular is known not so much for his friendship of Nagrela but as part of the Golden Age of Jewish Poetry. Isaac Ibn Khalfun is famous as probably the first Spanish Jewish poet to make living off his poetry. The Nagrela family supported the poet as a young man; apparently the family was wealthy enough to do this, at their home in Cordova. He was born in 970, 23 years before Nagrela. The two had established a friendship that was to give Nagrela some moral succor during a trying time. The poet makes some useful observations for the future Vizier.9

The world's face is like a lepers neck, therefore it is only right to spit in her face;

It is fitting and proper to cast one's sandals at the nape of her lovers and to strip them bare.

So if you can make them drink of wormwood, but pretend to satisfy them with sweet drinks.

Then make your sword drink deep of men's blood, and do not heed their groans.

Show no mercy to high or low, but say outright: 'That is what I wish to do'.

They are snakes and scorpions, these children of the world, and even if you offer them your precious life as a gift, they will always betray you, as does the world herself in times of anguish and distress.

Yes, they are just like their mother-so put them back into her deep, wide womb;

kill them, either secretly or in the open.

God is your pledge that you will not go down in hell.10

Eventually Nagrela would see the world in this light. But his poet friend was not entirely incitement, he also made rosy predictions concerning Nagrela's future, his reward would be so much so greater for his suffering. Nagrela answered that and the above observations by noting that his foes were not snakes but worms and that they will be ruined only by the hand of God. An older Nagrela would have declared himself the hand of God and killed his enemies, or at least tried to buy them off.

Another poem written to Nagrela by Ibn Khalfun occurred when the two had a falling out and were trying to reconcile.11

This bad luck may have been one of the luckiest breaks Nagrela ever had. If the story Ibn Hazm told of Nagrela's pride is true (how could he invented a story like that) and Nagrela was serious about thinking that a prophecy in the bible referred to him then he was headed for an vanity induced fall. The poetry he wrote about his youthful ambitions in which he refers to his friends as having the brains of cattle also points to a possible attitude problem. There is also another poem stating that he was watched over by two angels, one on land and other for water.12 This comeuppance may have helped deflate a dangerous bloated ego. Anyway he was fired, maybe fined and may have been thrown in jail. Later commentators noted his flair for,flattery; this is where the egotist may have learned the importance of supplication. Judging from his haughty and arrogant youthful poems, and Ibn Hazm's memories, Nagrela was not born with that useful talent. Evidence of Nagrela's new improved attitude is seen in ain a poem that is more of a letter supposedly sent by Nagrela to l'Arif, the man who discovered Samuel in Malaga, showing the poet's thankfulness for his eventual reinstatement,

"My Dear Vizier,

You have no peer among all men of state, and when your letter came I feared the worst. Without a doubt, said I, I am about to get my just desert at last for grievous sins, each one of which has flown to roost! ! But seeking to unroll the scroll while my fast pounding heart beat like cornered thief's who has no place to hide his guilt, I saw your seal, the rose, and wondering if it might impart a secret message to me, I regarded and thought: "Each rose's future is to rise-and rise again thou shalt!” I raised it to my eyes to read-indeed, I was proved right: my stock has risen like the rose's branches when they sprout, and rejoiced as does the groom upon his wedding night!"13

In our society something like the forced removal from an appointed office would end a career. In Andalus it was probably part of life, such an unpleasantness merely slowed down that of Ibn Jau's. It did the same to Nagrela. Somewhere in the Berber power structure, almost certainly l'Arif, there was a patron for Nagrela. Whoever he was Nagrela was soon re-employed, just like Ibn Jau. It should be noted that Nagrela did not flee Granada in spite of an uncomfortably close brush with destruction, he stays and perseveres. Everything known about the man indicates he needed constant sensations and seemed to thrive on conflict.

In 1027 Nagrela was also given the title of Nagid. This title, it spite of its Hebrew name was a Sanhadja bureaucratic position (the Arabic term was Ra'is al-Yahud, head of the Jews). Its holder had a position within a Moslem government, specifically a position inside a Zirid government. The term was first used by a King Badis of Kairouan, the Zirid capital in Tunisia sometime between their independence from the Fatimids in 1010 and Badis’ death in 1016. The first Nagid in Tunisia was a court physician, Abu Ishaq Abraham Ibn Ata. He had wealth, a reputation for scholarship and concern for the welfare of the community. He also served as a general in the Zirid army in Tunisia a few years before Nagrela became a general in the Zirid army in Spain. Later Jewish leadership positions were often given to Jewish court physicians. Ibn Ata was succeeded by another court Jew who was given the same title.14

Habbus ben Macksen, that displaced Tunisian prince, probably gave it to Nagrela to clarify of his tax collecting chores. . The title was used in other Jewish communities, especially Egypt, but its origin was in the Berber government of Kairouan. Now Nagrela had his little own sub-Kingdom, with the money and physical backing from his superiors to do what he could with it.

There was more in the title than tax collection, although that was certainly the government’s main concern. It also meant he was part of the inner circle, what today would be called a cabinet member. In fact the position existed in Spain long before the title did. A “Nagid’ was like a "Nasi" of the Omayyad court. He was the Jewish community's representative at court. He was also charged with keeping the Jewish community in line. Besides collecting taxes he vouched for their loyalty, made sure the communities members did not break the law if the ruler was an Omayyad, or offend the ruler’s will if the ruler was a petty King. As far as internal order was concerned he picked the judges and assumed as much power as he could or desired.

The position deserves some further elaboration because it changed Nagrela's relationship within the Jewish and Sanhadja communities. The Omayyad version of the institution first started in Spain with Abd al-Rahman I when it was first applied to the conquered Christians. The first Omayyad appointed a Visigoth prince as ruler of the Visigoth community so that the Christians could live under their own laws. Similar positions were permitted the Jewish community. The choice for community leader was always a court favorite that already held a position in the government, such as a treasurer or secretary;, physicians were the most common selected. The most famous community leader was Hisdai Ibn Shaprut, who held important diplomat functions under Abd al-Rahman III. He was succeeded by Jacob Ibn Jau, Almanzor's appointee. So at the age of 34 Nagrela obtained one of the more important positions in the invisible Jewish empire. This made him the major power in one of the largest Jewish communities in Spain, and he was just starting.

Sometime in the early 1030s l’Arif died. According to tradition the job of Minister of Tax Collecting was given to his son. For some reason it did not work out and Nagrela was next in line. King historian Abd Allah accuses Nagrela of slandering the lad, the historian wrote that Nagrela would answer that the young man was away when queried by the youth's superiors in such a way that they would lose confidence in him, “as you will observe the son of (l'Arif) is a lad who enjoys life, you can afford to be lenient towards him and pardon his conduct. I am his humble servant, acting on his behalf. Speak only the word and your will shall be done.".” There may be some authenticity in this part of Abd Allah's history because Nagrela was given his late benefactors job in this time when sons normally took over their father's positions. About ten years after being fired for some unknown cause the Cordovan refugee was higher than he had ever been and as high as he could rightfully expect to go.15

Nagrela mimicked Ibn Jau in another way,way; he got into a nasty little argument with a scholar, although the argument had nothing to do with position or power. Indeed here is where the personality of the man diverges; there are two parts to his character, almost opposing halves, the brutal worldly and the sublime. Among the scholars that fled Cordova after the sacking was Jonah Ibn Janah. Jonah Ibn Janah was another one of those Jewish Renaissance men that constituted the Golden Age in Spain. He had quite a number of things in common with Nagrela. They were both recognized as exceptionally talented youths by their teachers, who happened to be famous scholars. They both had to flee Cordova when it went up in smoke. Ibn Janah may have spent more time wandering around Spain than Nagrela. When he did settle down it was a good distance to the north, in Saragossa. Both wrote treatise on philology and biblical exegesis. Like Nagrela he made his living at something besides what he was to be remembered for, for Ibn Janah it was the practice of medicine. Very much unlike Nagrela he realized he had no talent for poetry and did not write any.16

Ibn Janah felt that "Scripture can only be understood by the aid of philology".17 Then he wrote a book that attacked a book by one of Nagrela's beloved teachers, Judah ben David Hayyuj. Ibn Janah put his views about Hayyuj's work in a book entitled The Book of Criticism. As implied by the name the book dealt with Hayyuj's work in a less than respectful matter. Sometime after it'sits publication Ibn Janah was visited by a mutual friend of his and Nagrela who bought with a set of criticisms by Nagrela of Ibn Janah's book. Ibn Janah's reply was another book, The Book of Repute. Nagrela counterattacked by authoring The Epistles of the Companions. Ibn Janah answered with The Book of Shaming, and followed up with The Book of Minute Research, the earliest book written on Hebrew philology to be completely preserved to our own time. Somewhere in all these works Ibn Janah calls Nagrela an oaf, freak, idiot and stammerer. He was later joined by another scholar, Ibn Balam who maintained that small children would laugh at the Nagid's research. He followed up by comparing Samuel to a man who after reading one medical textbook compares himself to the great Galen. The great poet Ibn Ezra noted with disgust that these attacks continued even after the Nagid had died.18

Of the illustrious Ibn Janah's six major works, two were aimed at Nagrela, and one other was based on the works of Nagrela's teacher. The war of written words had must have certainly brought pleasure to the two contestants or else it would have ended before several books were written on each side. The conflict spurred the creative juices that helped Ibn Janah to be remembered as one of the greatest Hebrew philologists of all time. Nagrela's work on the subject have unfortunately been lost, so far. To place this affair in a modern perspective, imagine a Secretary of State engaging in a scholarly argument about classical Latin literature with a Harvard professor. Education and skill in elocution were expected in someone in Nagrela's position, but seldom to the point of being recognized as an authority on the subject, at least by some.

Philology was not Nagrela's greatest contribution to Jewish culture, nor can his own poetry, matchless as it was, claim that honor. Most importantly he deserves the all time award as patron of Jewish men of letters. Like Lorenzo d'Medici, Nagrela retained a court of artisans, but these used words rather than paint or hammer and chisel. Among his entourage was one, Joseph Ibn Hisdai, who achieved a measure of fame and another, Solomon Ibn Gabirol of Malaga, who obtained more than a measure. Another successful Nagrela protégé, Isaac Ibn Ghayyath received succor from both Samuel and his son. Ibn Ghayyath in turn made his home and town, Lucena, into a school and sanctuary for would be scholars. Among these was another well-known poet, Moses Ibn Ezra. Among Ibn Ezra's friends and inspirations was a poet from the north, Yehuda Ha-Levi. The three poets recognized as the greats of the Golden Age of Jewish Poetry are Solomon Ibn Gabirol, Moses Ibn Ezra and Yehuda Ha-Levi. Since Ibn Khalfun also received his economic start from the Nagrela line an argument could be made that the Nagrela's almost single-handedly spurred a very large chuck of the Golden Age of Jewish poetry.19

Ibn Gabirol deserves special attention. That poet came to Nagrela's court around 1045 after he had a spat with the Jewish community in Saragossa of such severity that he had to leave town. He got some measure of revenge by writing insulting poems about his former home comparing it to a Gomorrah. His intellectual production was prodigious; it included philosophical works as well as poetry. Although knowledge of his life is very limited it is assumed he stayed on in Granada after the Nagid's death until his own time came around 1069 or 1070.20

The patronage did not start or stop at poets. Ibn Daub in The Book of Tradition writes "He provided materials out of his own pocket for students of the Torah (throughout Spain, Morocco, Ifriqiya, Egypt, Sicily, Babylonia and Palestine). He also purchased many books-(copies) of the Holy Scriptures as well as of the Mishna and Talmud, which are also among the holy writings. Throughout Spain and the countries just mentioned, whoever wished to devote full time study to the learning of the Torah found in him a patron. Moreover, he retained scribes who would make copies of the Mishna and Talmud, which he would present to students who were unable to purchase copies themselves, both in the academies of Spain as well as the other countries we mentioned. These gifts were coupled with annual contributions of olive oil for the synagogues of Jerusalem, which he would dispatch from his own home."

Back to politics; the reign of Habbus was one of peace. The era between 1018 and 1036 was one in which the Sanhadja were able to consolidate, fortify, and institutionalize their bureaucracy and defense arrangements. While the rest of Andalus was busy tearing itself apart trying to find a suitable Omayyad or Hammudite or some other ruler the Granadans built, manufactured, traded and harvested. Immigration to Granada increased according to the lack of stability and security in other parts of Spain. The Sanhadja state, with peace, able administrators, good location, was quite successful and probably happy.

So even before he developed a reputation as a warrior the Nagid had become known as a competent administrator and patron, in fact he seems to have been the one of the most reachable, wealthy and powerful rulers in Spain. Explicit testimonials have come down to us like the following one by an Ibn Hayyan (there was a historian by that name, this is not him). This one is revealing in that it compliments and confirms other bits and pieces of information.

"This cursed man (Samuel), even though Allah did not let him know the only true religion, was nevertheless a superior man, possessed of excellent knowledge, suffering with patience stupid conduct, of a lucid spirit notable for his vivaciousness, of pleasant and amiable manner, combining a firm , capable and shrewd character. Always of exquisite courtesy, he knew to take advantage of all circumstances, possessing the talent to flatter his enemies, to win them over and disarm their hatred by his pleasant ways. What an extraordinary man! He wrote in two languages (Hebrew and Arabic) and) and studied the literature of two nations (Jewish and Muslim), was proficient in the principles of the Arabic language and was familiar with the writings of the best grammarians. He spoke and wrote, therefore, Arabic with great facility, using that language in his own letters and in those which he sent in the name of the King, using accustomed formulas of the Muslims: directing praises to Allah, imploring the blessing of Allah on our prophet Mohammad, and exhorting the recipient of the letter to live piously according to the precepts of Islam, whose beneficent influence he glorified. In sum, one would have thought his letters were written by a good Muslim, no more no less. He was outstanding, furthermore, in the sciences of the ancients-in the exact sciences-and excelled those who consecrated themselves to these (sciences) in his knowledge of astronomy, which he studied with scrupulous attention. He possessed a sufficient knowledge of mathematics and logic; however he was superior in dialectic (reasoning), and on that ground he always defeated his adversaries. Notwithstanding the vivacity of his spirit, he spoke little and thought much. He assembled a handsome library."21

Note the reference to astronomy, Nagrela would observe two lunar eclipses in 1044 and write a poem about it. Another poem would be written with a nature related theme about an earthquake that hit Granada in 1047.22

Other compliments came from an Arab, Ibn al-Fara ben Maynum al-Akhfash.

Seek his welfare, and find hope and success

See in his chamber the loveliness of the sun in the sign of Aries.

Never has a friend found in him fault.

The more fate changes, he does not change!23

Still another testimonial comes from a Moslem poet known as "al-Munfatil".

Those that reckon Moses among them (i.e. Jews) and revel in his light, say what you will of the subject, you cannot attain to the sixtieth (literally tenth) of their qualities.

How many of the wonders manifest in the world have they performed, and how many unending bounties have they bestowed on people!

Oh you (Samuel), who possesses all the glorious qualities of which others have only a portion; oh, you who have liberated captive Generosity, you are superior to the noble men of the East and West as gold surpasses copper.

If men could only distinguish error from the true way, they would kiss only your hands! They would kiss your hands like the Kaaba (in Mecca), for your right hand is made to happiness and your left for beneficence.

Thanks to you, I have received the honors of this lower world and have satisfied my desires; and, thanks to you, I have hope to find in the other world the fulfillment of what I desire. I profess the law of the Sabbath, openly when I am with you and secretly when I am with my compatriots.

Moses was timid, (unable to speak well, restless and poor; but I am secure against timidity and poverty.24

Some scholars for some reason suggested that the author was in Nagrela's employ. Whatever the relationship between the two, one can see that Nagrela was in a position to help people and did. A a great way to develop an entourage and possible sanctuaries in case of the unexpected.

As mentioned above Nagrela continued his family tradition of serving as a patron to aspiring poets. One of his already mentioned entourage, Joseph Ibn Hisdai, earned his keep by writing;

How did the lovely gazelle find such courage and strength to wrap himself in a veil of darkness as in a robe; to tend the flocks of stars; to wander amid desert ruins, haunts of fear and terror; to abandon his home for horrors, the music of lutes for turmoil-till he was caught in the net of dreams, and trapped in the snares of slumber?

...I awoke to find nothing but an aroma that delights the spirit and a trace of liquid myrrh that delights the soul-like the name of Rabbi Samuel, the one and only, the prince, whose fragrance fills the whole earth!25

Solomon Ibn Gabirol also earned his three squares the same way.

Faith! ! Your understanding is wide as an ocean,

And your skill as a teacher gives answers that satisfy all in mind, your law makes the heart wise.

...Words that you find to guide might have come from the same place whence the Ten Commandments were once mined.26

Even Abd-Allah Ibn Boluggin, who hated the Nagrelas, has this to say about him,

"this Jew was endowed with an intelligence and flexibility which remarkably adopted to the period in which Badis and he lived, to the ways of those who wished them evil."27

Another friend, Ibn Said al-Andalusi, added to the praises,

"he was praiseworthy in conduct and of gracious character of much companionship. I visited him often, and have never seen a Jew as wise, proper and of such resolute character."28

As for Nagrela's day to day activities nothing can be definitely said. Fortunately, because if details were available they would consist of biased accounts of intrigues and schemes by courtiers each trying to shove the other out of the way. Chances are we see the same things in our offices, reading about the same silly tricks that took place a thousand years ago would be pointless and boring. The reader is recommended to the works of Machiavelli and The 48 Laws of Power by Bob Geerne and Joseph Elffers if he would like to learn quickly what Nagrela learned. It is known that he collected taxes, wrote correspondence for the authorities, supported Jewish education, administrated justice and gave opinions when asked, wrote scholarly tomes and made friends. Apparently living the life of an influential Arab Jewish gentleman, except that he seemed to like a good warm blooded row, such as occurred with Ibn Janah. That the gentleman liked to fight did not quite mesh with the image of a relaxed official.

There was another verse written by Ibn Gabirol, certainly with his patron in mind.

"Ambition is like a prison."29

The Battle of Alfuente and the Ascension of Badis

cast of characters

Zuhair, King of Almeria

Djafar Ibn Abbas, his Vizier

Badis, son and successor to King Habbus

Boluggin, younger brother of Badis

Yaddair, nephew to Habbus

It is 1037. If the ethnic character of the governors of post-Caliphical Spain were designated by color on a map of that land there would have been four. The north, a conglomeration of Christian states, would be a royal velvet, out of respect for the royal families that would give those states a measure of stability. The Arab ruled southwest, dominated by the two republics of Cordova and Seville, and the Kingdom of Badajoz, would be a cultivated green. Desert brown would describe the center south that was ruled by various Berber clans. The southeast and east was dominated by a Slav run states, perhaps blue would be there their color as they located their estates on the seafront and at least one made a living off of piracy, or perhaps a neuter white because they really had no real clan; they were really a class that occasionally shared certain interests. There were at least twenty statelets, some little more than a fortress with a few armed men surrounded by terrified villagers. All were a few days march from one another, or more to the point, within easy striking distance of one another. Besides some problems involving Sevillian territorial ambitions most seemed to have some semblance of peace. For the most part the Granadan leadership, the Sanhadjan royalty, although traditional war lovers, kept their new country at peace.

The death in 1028 of one Slav petty King, Khairan, the perfidious ruler of the neighboring mini-state of Almeria, was to change all that. Before his exit he made sure his replacement would represent the same moral and intellectual qualities that made anyone who dealt with that man regret it, or maybe the successor was chosen because the late King wanted to be followed by someone who that would make him appear a model statesman by comparison. Whatever the reason for his selection, this chosen inheritor, the eunuch Zuhair, would not disappoint either his memory or intentions. In the period of dissolution of authority the eunuch was able to enlarge his holdings to the point that he held more real estate than Granada. Besides leadership that recognized opportunity his state was blessed with other advantages. Unlike Granada it was centered on a major port rather than landlocked. The interior borders of the state were in some hard to cross mountains. The neighbors were friendly, that is, afraid.

Neighborly relations were cemented with the bordering Berber run states when the eunuch paid lip service to the Berberized Hammudite line, the rulers of Malaga, as Caliphs. This friendship was tested in 1036. In that year Seville attacked Almeria whereupon Granada graciously attacked into Sevillian territory in reprisal, perhaps more out of concern of Sevillian ambition than Almerian fraternity, but an ally is an ally. Along with Malaga the three statelets formed a friendly but informal alliance.

This era of peaceful coexistence in that region of Iberia came to an end when for some reason the Prime Minister of Almeria, Djafar Ibn Abbas, talked Zuhair into trying to take over Granada. There appears to have been no logical motivation for the change of policy. There was every reason to why any change would antagonistic to the state’s interests; a dependable friend would be unnecessarily transformed into an enemy. If there is a key to understanding such a self-destructive change in policy it seems to lay in the intellectual and emotional states of Zuhair and Ibn Abbas. The eunuch may have been trying to emulate the behavior of his mentor, the prior Almeria King, as an example of what lack of compunction and principle could accomplish (recall that King betrayed his own side in a battle outside of Granada in 1018). It may have had something to do with Jaen, originally presented to Almeria by one of the transient Caliphs but ended up in the hands of Habbus.

As for the motivations of the prime minister, although they must have been more complicated they are much more comprehensible, simply because enough is known about the man so that his character is readily recognizable in readily available modern counterparts. The clues come in the form of statements intended as publicity by Ibn Abbas but say more about his character than he may wished. Foremost are the exaggerations circulated to impress an audience with their subject's importance; he was one of the richest men in Spain (it was of course inherited wealth), his purported library consisted of 400,000 volumes, his harem had hundreds of damsels. Also mentioned among his blessings was the all important family lineage, his pedigree reached back to the defenders of the prophet. And yet he was so young, only thirty.

Then there are the stories that he did not invent. He once visited Cordova with his Slav master, commenting after meeting the best and brightest of that town that he had met nothing but empty purses and empty heads. Next there are his own words, he wrote poetry, such as “were all my slaves my soul would still not be content. He would fain mount above the stars, then long to ascent higher”. Another favorite was “Misfortune sleeps ever soundly when I pass by; he is forbidden to cast a dart at me, and does not awake”. A local poet revised the second half of the last stanza to “but destiny who is sleepless will come one day and awaken him”.1

The conclusion reached by those who encountered him was that he had a self infatuation bordering on lust. Self promotion and good fortune apparently convinced him that having being born into wealth was same as or better than earning it through talent and effort. It must have followed that any projects he promoted or initialed reflected his inherited right to be successful and were hence successful by the mere fact that they were his. It was the natural order of things, other men could only try.

It is certain that as a cultured Arab with an unmatched pedigree he had contempt for Berbers, just as certain he had contempt for Jews. Coupled with the contempt he felt for everyone he must have taken the fact that a Berber King would place a Jew in a position consummate with his own as an affront. Any affront to such an ego must have been traumatic, probably not as bad as having to take orders from a castrated non-Arab, but highly irritating nonetheless (there may have been transference here, dislike of Zuhair transferred to Nagrela and the Sanhadja). So revenge for a perceived insult may have been part of his motivation. Another part may have been the solution by proxy of his own unhappy situation as a servant rather than master. Whatever the cause the fire was certainly fed by the notion that he, Ibn Abbas, was incapable of a bad idea or managing an unsuccessful endeavor. Taking over the country governed by two sub-humans may have represented a form of distraction for the invulnerable Vizier. His behavior indicates that he did not consider it a challenge to be taken seriously.

There is a theory that Ibn Abbas was actually trying to have Zuhair and the Sanhadja kill each other off for the benefit of Seville and the Arab cause. Considering the man's conspiratorial state of mind it seems possible. Who knows?

It was this man who decided his master should have Granada. Like many petty tyrants of that time and this he thought he was being clever by being treacherous. He concocted a plan, if the construction of a conspiracy warrants such a respectable term, which seemed to have the goal of conquest with no clearly defined military operation for achieving it. The hope seemed to be that the Sanhadja would betray their King and Jewish benefactor in favor of a treacherous Slav eunuch and his arrogant Arab Vizier.

As for this plan, such as it was, appears to started by assuming the Berbers were stupid and the Arabs and Slavs not. Part one was the traditional construction of a holy cause, that is demonizing, a rallying point showing the immorality of the intended victim. In those religious times causes were expected to invoke religion but the one Ibn Abbas was able to dig up was pathetic. Under Islamic law dhimmi, that is the Arabic word for non-believer, are not allowed to govern or lord over Moslems. Abbas’s agents spread propaganda in the surrounding states pointing out the sacrilegious nature of the Granadan government by employing a Jew to lord over Moslems, or at least see that their taxes were taken. It was a stupid complaint and it is unlikely that anyone failed to understand it as the beginning of a war against the Sanhadja. There was nothing unusual in having Jewish and Christian tax collectors, it was one of those professions that typically employed non-Moslems, even more so as Jews may have formed the majority of the population, besides the Arabs were disloyal and the Berbers incompetent. More to the point the Jews were physically vulnerable and dependent on others for their protection and barred from governing countries. They could be trusted not to turn on their masters out of fear that their tribe would suffer repercussions. Those facts plus education made them invaluable servants throughout Islam and Christendom.

The next step was a letter to King Habbus requesting that he eliminate the Jews, especially Nagrela, from his service, in short wreck his civil service. The insult was an euphemism for turning over the country to Zuhair. Similar letters were sent to the Berber chieftains, a gesture in effect inviting them to join his conspiracy. Even in those times the letters were an incredible breach of protocol, one that was intended to support the myth about Islamic piety being a concern but clearly intended to induce treason by disaffected Sanhadja nobles by offering them an argument on which to base a change of loyalties. The Almerian objective which was embarrassing blunt. The target was not the Jew but his employer.

Symbolic insinuations called for symbolic rebuttals, predictably Habbus ignored the request replying, in round about words to be sure, that he was not interested in replacing a loyal dependent bureaucracy with a factious one, nor was he interested in surrendering the administration of his country to an arrogant foriegner. Any other reply would have been acceptance of Almerian hegemony.

Another aspect of the conspiracy was the concurrent support the Almerian Vizier obtained from the prince of Malaga, with the encouragement of his Vizier, Ibn Bakunna, also known as Ibn Musa in the cheery poem Nagrela would eventually write about the man's killing. Recall that the Malagan monarch was a distant relative of the Omayyad Caliphs and that the Sanhadja gave him de jure recognition as Caliph, probably because he was a Berber and they felt had to support someone other than a real Omayyad as Caliph.

The Malagan motivation for joining the conspiracy seems to have been nothing more than the chance to acquire Granadan real estate and taxpayers. Whatever the cause the acquisition of the Hammudite ally was actually a double feather in Ibn Abba's cap, not only was that state a new ally, but it was on Granada's southern flank, and it's ruler was recognized as Caliph. This support added a bit to the symbolic appearance of legitimacy to the spurious arguments of the Almerian cause, nice but really unnecessary. The conspiracy was topped off with an alliance with the small city-state of Carmona. That petty state was having its own civil war with the Granadans supporting one side and the Almerians supporting the other. This may have been almost a real issue between the two states. Since Carmona lay to the west of Granada, Almeria to the east and Malaga to the south, it seemed obvious that Granada was about to be garroted. Then between 6 June and 7 July 1038, just when things could not get any worse, King Habbus died, and someone who very few people liked ascended the throne, Habbus’ son, Badis.

Succession crises in medieval times were seldom smooth; the Zirid transitions were no different. The one that followed the passing of King Habbus could have been much messier if it were not for his preparation and the activity of his Jewish Vizier. Unfortunately like much of his activity it was intentionally low key and hence not found in the histories. When it came to power Nagrela operated in the shadows, his role in the survival of the new monarch would show itself later.

Before the succession was declared Nagrela had to worry over which of the sons would be selected so he could affix his own wagon to the rising star. Badis was the elder, hence the safest bet. Boluggin, the younger, was apparently a popular fellow with a good military background, but with no desire to govern or be anything more than he already was. There was also a nephew, Yaddair ben Hubasa. Yaddair was originally the man to watch, he had the support of several nobles who apparently supported him over either of the sons. He was certainly the most knowledgeable of the trio in the science of government. Unlike the others he had a good education and the all important love of books that earned him a friendly reception in the more refined circles of Granada. His uncle had entrusted him with various duties of government, including the reception of ambassadors. He should have been the obvious favorite for selection as the new King. For good measure he was also ambitious with a knack for treachery, a handy talent in any time and vital in the Berber court.

Badis on the other hand was unpopular and already known for a fowl temper that would eventually earn him a reputation for unnecessary cruelty. It must have been these very characteristics have touched something in Habbus. Perhaps it was his ability to be cruel and dominating that made Habbus see Badis as the most promising leader for the times he would have to live in. Badis' character flaws as an individual were assets for a leader in barbarous times, Habbus as successful ruler certainly understood this; few other students of that time seem to have. These supposed faults may explain why many underestimated the man, they mistook crudeness as stupidity, forgetting that only a harsh ungentlemanly man could have acted with the sufficient ruthlessness necessary to protect his Kingdom.

There was a problem with this decision concerning Berber and Jewish support. The majority of the Berber chiefs preferred the younger son if they had to have one of the two. Badis’s untrusting and vengeful nature meant that the talents of the chiefs, such as they were, would be less in demand, and hence less rewarded. Boluggin appeared more affable, less of a threat to the Berber nobles, less homicidal.

The feelings Badis must have had before the ascension towards his father's apparent favorite, Yaddair, are not difficult to imagine and these must have acted as a spur to take some action aimed at his cousin as well as the throne. To further both these ends enough gifts and money were provided to enough undecideds that a reliable number of Badis endorsers developed. His father, probably already impressed by his hardness, was still more impressed by his political adroitness. The outcome of the contest for the next ruler of Granada must have been an easy decision. Habbus publicly declared Badis his successor in the course of a ceremony in which the Sanhadja nobles were expecting and hoping to acknowledge Boluggin as the new ruler; Habbus gave them the son they needed rather than the one they wanted. Boluggin, either through familial loyalty or concerns about self-preservation, swore allegiance to his brother and spared, so he thought, civil war, the possibility of rule by a self-serving oligarchy and a personally unhealthy situation. In the same announcement Yaddair was advised to support the decision. The more thoughtful knew he could not and would have to go, in some way.

A very odd fact of this contest was that Jews were involved. Jews had their uses in the highest echelons of Iberian governments but to be so close to the top where they would actually be in a position to influence succession was unheard of. There were Jews who backed Boluggin for the same reason the Berber chiefs did, he was seen as controllable and under control. Three names have come down to us, Isaac de Leon (de Leon is still a Jewish name in this day), Joseph Ibn Migash and Nehemia Ashkafa. Interestingly and perhaps not surprising, all were rich. Very likely none could see any use in not having one of their number not be the national tax collector, in short they were intent on using the succession crisis as a chance to get at Nagrela's very profitable job and position as head of the Jewish community. Whatever the case specifics, they apparently had a very great stake in seeing their man come out on top. This then is the Golden Age of Jewish Culture in Spain, an age when Jews were so integrated into the power politics of the realm that working against members of one's own tribe in some other tribes power plays is within the rules of the game.2

Nagrela by this time was on the inside, a member of the old guard and Habbus' man, which by default made him Badis' man. A new King that Habbus did not select may have wanted those affiliated with the old regime out. Nagrela could be expected to be the top of those to be dismissed list should an anti-Habbus-Badis alignment take over the government. Fortunately Badis' ascension nipped the problem in the bud, at least for a very short while.

As expected Yaddair could not control his ambitions, even after the ascension matter seemed settled. . After the passing of Habbus a conspiracy among the Berber chiefs and Yaddair tried once again to enthrone Boluggin. Yaddair, according to the suspicious histories of those times either planned to eventually kill or in some way control the younger brother. Yaddair's taste for power was apparently such that he not live without it, as he knew he would under his jealous cousin, or perhaps he feared Badis would kill him for insurance purposes. In any event, another conspiracy grew up around the talented cousin. It is a measure of the pragmatism of Yaddair’s followers that for some inexplicable reason they invited Nagrela into their circle. He in turn offered his house to them as a meeting place and then informed Badis of the time and place of the meeting. When the gathering did take place the conspirators had an uninvited guest listening from the attic, their new monarch, Badis. According to the historian Abd Allah this act solidified Nagrela's position as Badis' trusted confident. What happened to the conspirators is not recorded.

In spite of this failure Yaddair still had greater popular support than Badis, hence he could not stop being a threat to Badis' position if he wanted to, which he had no intention of. His ambitions were even stroked by a talented newcomer from aboard, an educated adventurer, Abu al-Futuh, who used his knowledge of fortune telling to predict a long reign for Yaddair. For some reason, Badis did not or could not order the execution of Yaddair and his entourage as a precautionary measure. Perhaps because he thought with enemies like those he was safe or perhaps he was still trying to win support through love at this point, that or his rule was still not secure enough to order such executions. . Or perhaps he was just waiting for the right opportunity to strike. Whatever the cause his cousin and his cousin's supporters were allowed to continue their plotting. He Badis must have been hurt to learn that among those mentioned by the conspirators as a potential replacement was Boluggin. The younger brother eventually asked for his brother's forgiveness, which was temporarily granted.

The next conspiracy came to a head at a racetrack. The plotters had organized an assassination of Badis with the killing ground at one, specifically he was to be knifed as he was preparing to leave after a horse race. It had the simplicity necessary for a good plan but so many people were involved in it that one was bound to lose his nerve. The one who did was even able to show the gold that Yaddair paid him in order to secure his loyalty. The King left by another gate, the conspirators discovered that they had been discovered and fled. Yaddair escaped to Seville with his friend, Abu al-Futuh, who left his family behind in Granada. Badis, at last acknowledging that fear mattered more than love, had them thrown into prison. At this point he was certainly listening to his trusted Jewish Vizier.

The increase in distance did not curtail Yaddair's ambitions; indeed the sanctuary provided by the friendly ruler of Seville doubtlessly excited them. His network of friends among the Sanhadja nobility formed an underground, the existence of which was only revealed when letters from Yaddair to officers in the Sanhadja army fell into Badis' hands. The number of his correspondents was petrifying if true, supposedly numbering two hundred. This number is suspicious, given the problems the Arab historians had with numbers, however even if exaggerated it points to a definite loyalty problem. For any monarch there is only one punishment for an officer that corresponds with someone who tried to murder said monarch twice. Badis planned to multiply the envisioned executions by two hundred. With war on the horizon or closer the Jewish Vizier came up with another idea. Abd Allah attributes these words to Nagrela that were probably close to what Nagrela would have said, "In my view it would inadvisable to take any of them to task for these letters or even to let them know that the letters have fallen into your hands. I suggest at once that you kindle a fire at once. Tactful handling of people is the acme of wisdom. If you mete out punishment, how many are you going to punish? They are the wings of your army. So find some other way of dealing with the problem." Then the Jewish Vizier brought the conspirators off with wealth, position and praise, turning "son against father and brother against brother." Is the story true or partially true? Unlike much of the stories from the time this one has no Arabian Nights air about it. It sounds more than plausible. Assuming the account is largely true then the result was to place an incredible amount of power in the hands of Nagrela. He effectively was placed in change of the army. He could manipulate men to his desire. Their fortunes were dependent on his.

Also remarkable is that Abd Allah is the chronicler of this event. He had tried to display the religious nature of his dynasty by claiming that Nagrela never had authority over any Moslem. In fact this story shows not only was he the King's counselor, he was his master. Nagrela says so himself

"My influence with the King and that all

State affairs and plans are decided by me

And that a decision not taken by me is no decision."4

It is extremely doubtful that Nagrela’s loyalty to Badis was based on love, although gratitude may have played a part. The primary motivation for his dedication certainly went no further than self-interest. By keeping Yaddair out of power and ingratiating himself to Badis and the officer corps he was securing his job. The three other Jews who had supported the cousin were acting to his determent. As noted if Yaddair were in then one of those three, or a friend of one of those three would have been the new Nagid. At the very least Nagrela would have had to take an extended vacation like Ibn Arbitur or live in humiliation and very likely danger. As it was the three eventually had to leave town. Ibn Migash fled to Seville were he enjoyed particularly good fortune. Back to Zuhair and the Almerian war.

Zuhair certainly knew or at least suspected the turmoil that was associated with the transition of authority after the death of Habbus. The iron being hot he struck, but although not very hard. Another letter was sent, this one like the last insisting on the dismissal of Nagrela. Badis responded to the letter by sending a Moslem theologian on a peace mission to Almeria. At first site sight this would appear as a symptom of remarkable naiveté considering what political life would degenerate into in the Taifa states. A closer look reveals that Badis-Nagrela had concocted their own devious ploy, the mission by a Moslem theologian was their own symbolic gesture, something to take the wind out of the sails of Zuhair's argument of religious impiety by the Sanhadja and an effort to provide a rallying point to those who did not want to join or sought to oppose the Almerian conspiracy. Who better to repudiate a charge of sacrilegious behavior than a Moslem theologian in the employ of Granada? Another benefit of the peace mission would have been that to delay any Almerian action or timetable allowing the Granadans to organize. In any event it met with predictable failure. That left Granada with new untested and unpopular leadership, an apparent abhorrence of aggressive warfare (a sign of weakness in the eyes of street bullies and tyrants), no allies and no reserves of manpower. All considered the Sanhadja state must have seemed too easy a prize to pass up.

The plot thickened in August of 1038 when Zuhair escalated his attempts to intimidate Granada out of existence. He crossed the border, unannounced, with what amounted to an army by the standards of the time, which means he may have had a few hundred men. The fiction he initially broadcast was that he was going to pay homage to his friend, the late Habbus, by visiting the departed monarch’s gravesite. Of course no one took that seriously, but the symbolic gesture required that Granada play along. The Almerian boss probably assumed that since the Sanhadja did not mount an attack on him right then and there that they could not.

Serious talks, if talks based on a ridiculous pretense can be called serious, they were serious in that they were to provide the moral basis on which the destruction of the Sanhadja state was to be justified, were started once Zuhair's army was encamped outside of the capital city. Again importance was attached to Nagrela, who had to go or else, plus Granada had to change sides in a civil war then brewing in Carmona. Not only did Zuhair want control of Granada's civil service but of it'sits foreign policy as well, in short a complete surrender of all those national prerogatives associated with sovereignty. A rather heavy price in exchange for what at best would amount to a stay of execution. Even in the unlikely event that Badis would have accepted these terms the Almerian could not risk a Sanhadja resurgence or insurrection. The safest and most thorough course of action left open would be the complete annihilation of the Sanhadja presence. In modern parlance Zuhair's offer could be called a die now or die later plan. As expected talks broke down, certainly as foreseen and desired by Ibn Abbas. The evening of the day this happened Badis sent a final emissary to plead for peace from the man who had begged and received Granadan military aid two years before. The effort was rebuffed with such contempt by Ibn Abbas, he accused the emissary of being afraid of Almerian might, that the Sanhadja officer returned to Badis with tears of rage rolling down his face. Their courses of action reduced by the arrogance of Ibn Abbas to fighting or dying the Sanhadja made the easiest decision. The popular Boluggin, the younger brother, was selected to lead their army.

It is hard to gauge the thought processes, such as they were, of these leaders with the resources on hand. It looks like Zuhair found his army was too small for the task of finishing off Granada right then and there. Big enough to provoke but too small to conquer. Perhaps this same lack of foresight caused the Almerian leaders to not figure on needing to protect their routes of egress. A critical bridge in the town of al-Font was left unguarded. Its importance was that if it were held the way back to Almeria would be over plain. Since the armies of the time were top heavy with cavalry staying on flat ground was critical. If anything were to happen to that bridge the way home would be diverted through some of the very high and dry mountains that separated Granada from the coast. Cavalry would be next to useless and the advantage would lie with anyone who knew the mountains better than his foe and had more archers. This says something about the relative strengths of the armies. The Almerians must have an alarmingly high number of cavalry because the Granadans felt it in their interest to destroy the bridge to force a mountain battle. The resulting series of ambushes, skirmishes and small battles is called after the Romanization of the name al-Font, the Battle of Alfuente or Alpuente.

Before we get into the subsequent events some digression into the art of war as it existed between about 400 and 1600. It is dangerous to generalize about such a board subject but in general terms the calvary was considered the key to victory on the battlefield. Through its speed and manoeuverability it could strike at an opposing army's baggage train, assault weak points in his line, turn flanks, or isolate a battlefield. There was one big negative about relying on cavalry, in the mountains they were little more than targets. That was not really much of a problem; there was nothing anyone really wanted in the mountains. The idea of luring an enemy army into such rough terrain to do battle was novel to the warrior states of the time. Not only were the mountains a suspicious place to wage a battle but battles themselves were something one tried to avoid. Since the object of war was plunder, something that would increase wealth with minimal gamble and expense, a battle, with its inherent risk that even a victory would not be worth the price, was usually something the armies of that place and time preferred to avoid. This was especially true of the Sanhadja with their limited manpower. Fighting a battle in a place with nothing to loot was unusual indeed.

If the warlords of the time were wary of battles they were in no condition to think in terms of strategic warfare, the planned massive assaults by several forces at once to obtain a clearly defined political goal or the prevention of such assaults against themselves. Generals of the time knew some tactics, how to maneuver and forage, but the line between soldier and bandit in the period of the petty states was government direction. Other than that there was no difference. Since the object of war was loot and not the destruction of another sides war making ability generals did not have to be strategic thinkers. The Sanhadja must have been uncomfortable finding themselves for the second time since Zawi founded the Zirid state being forced to fight a full fledged battle for their state's survival, a strategic problem. However, to use a phrase coined by T. E. Lawrence, their practice was better than their theory.

An example of how muddled their thinking was is the final contact Badis had with Zuhair. There are many stories in the histories of that era that reek of pure fiction, as usual anything too good to be true usually is. But there is another type of story that can be categorized as so stupid it must be true, as no one would bother making up a story so unbelievable. In this story the new monarch was incredibly afraid of the man or blindly hopeful of a return to good relations. Either way he sent an emissary to Zuhair warning them not to take their army through the mountains. Fortunately for the Berbers Ibn Abbas was present when the emissary presented the warning to Zuhair. Since the recommendation did not come from Ibn Abbas, Ibn Abbas would not acknowledge its worth and dismissed the warning as further proof of the awe in which the Sanhadja held his army. That was enough to make the Berber leave in a huff. The trusting Zuhair followed his prime minister’s advice and went through the mountains.

Another interpretation could be that Badis-Nagrela wanted the younger brother and his army to fail or at least not be as successful as they were. If too successful they may have been confident enough to remove Badis and install a more popular relation as King. Another interpretation, upon reflection the most likely, is that the story is complete invention.

The events and their sequence in the battle are somewhat murky. Part of the problem is that some of the information comes from Nagrela's hard to understand poetry. This much is generally agreed upon. Predictably the Granadans took to the high ground with their infantry and archers, whittling down the Almerians in a series of ambuscades. At one point Zuhair did find enough level ground to give a proper cavalry battle. The opening attack was led in person by the eunuch's lieutenant, Hudhail, with a troop of Slav horse. The result was the almost immediate death of that troop commander. Discipline and organization ended with his passing; and thereupon the attackers turned tail taking with them the last Almerian hopes. All this occurred within minutes of the initial cavalry assault. That did it for a troop of Negro mercenaries who, either through an attack of pragmatism or a financial gift from Granada switched sides taking the Almerian reserve arms with them in the process. There were also Andalusian units in the Almerian force but these, in the best traditions of Cordovan intellectualism, logically evaluated the situation and left. Zuhair disappeared probably to met his end in the course of subsequent skirmishes, no one knows how or if. A more ironic fate awaited his confident Arab Vizier, the clever and lucky Djafar Ibn Abbas. He, he was captured. According to Dozy all the other prisoners were executed with the exception of one Almerian captain that publicly accused Ibn Abbas of treason. According to other sources all the prisoners were released, with of course the exception of Ibn Abbas. This true son of Cordovan civilization was distraught that captured along with him were several of his excellent and valuable books, and he expressed unrelenting concern for their safety to his captors. He appeared to be still be be convinced of his invulnerability at this point. The happy Granadans took the one who would fain rise above the stars back to Granada weighted down in chains. The author's guess is that Nagrela got hold of Djafar’s books.

It was the custom of the time to ransom the better class of prisoner. The still very confident Ibn Abbas recommended this route to his captors. Of course it was pointed out by many, doubtlessly including Nagrela, that Djafar could be expected to conspire against Granada in the future, maybe even leading a second invasion and this time paying attention to geography, ergo they wanted him executed. On the other hand he did have and could provide a great deal money. It was a difficult choice so Badis avoided making it and Ibn Abbas stayed in jail. The Cordovans, perhaps hearing of Ibn Abbas' concern for his books, pleaded for the Vizier's freedom.

The question of the ex-Vizier's release was finally resolved one evening after supper by Badis, his brother and another senior Granadan Vizier, (it was not Nagrela, although he certainly would have wanted to be there and he was certainly there in spirit). In the course of an after dinner ride they found themselves in front of the residence where Ibn Abbas was imprisoned. Upon Badis' command he was presented to the trio and suspecting something unpleasant promptly doubled the offer of his ransom. He finally got the picture and started pleading for his life. The three Granadans however decided to make a night of it and started stabbing the follow with whatever weapons they had at hand. The number of cuts was recorded; seventeen. The number indicates the riders must have enjoyed the show. One wonders what the three did after they killed the man; continue on with their ride, refreshed?

The geopolitical results of the war were threefold, first due to the addition of new real estate, including valuable seashore frontage, Granada was now the largest and strongest state in eastern Andalus. Second, the alliance against her was wrecked. Third, the likelihood of any government trying to establish hegemony through intimidation on the Sanhadja again was reduced.

The scholar Nagrela, with the exception of the skirmishing against Seville two years previously Nagrela never experienced a war in his middle life. He witnessed earlier wars but not at the highest echelons of government. According to the stereotypes we have of Jewish religious scholars and poets he should written something esoteric about God favoring the Jews, blah, blah, which he did, and a poem anguishing about the loss of life, which he did not. Instead he wrote an epic poem that showed an utter relish at the thought and results of war, including the lose of life. The poem will be quoted from below but first it should be pointed out that in it we see this rabbinical scholar’s unadulterated blood-lust, the jubilation he felt in killing his enemies. Rather than lamenting war his poetry shows the gratification he felt knowing that his enemy's had vermin eating their corpses. There was no regret over the human wastage, no recognition of tragedy. It was written very much in the Arab tradition and shows how integrated he was into the Arab-Berber culture. At the age of 45 the tax collector may have been introduced to a part of his personality he never met before, as supposedly happens in war. The scholar Nagrela met Nagrela the killer, a war lover, a Jewish Berber. There had been no struggle in his soul or else his poetry would have reflected it. Conflict brought out what was already there. He both willingly and by necessity adopted the values of his station and employers. Added to his need for mental simulation his nature crystallizes into what we would call today an adrenaline freak, a thrill seeker. After all, war saved his career and what bureaucrat would condemn something that saved his career.

The emotional aspects aside, the analytical half of the tax collector must have been processed the events the way his logic classes taught him to. He certainly analyzed the battle and synthesized the results. Perhaps unconsciously, but we know he did because he wrote poems about it and the left side of his brain was not that far from the right side as his works on law and philology show. What did he think when he saw that on one side there was a prepared confident foe, aggressive and united leadership with the advantage of strategic surprise and probably numerically superior in the all important cavalry. The opposition was unprepared, with unpopular, untested clumsy leadership, rapidly organized and maybe numerically inferior, yet the bums won because they torn down a bridge. When did he deduce that the key to victory in war is not knowing how to order about cavalry but manipulation of circumstances and boldness, two areas the chess player and thrill seeker, Nagrela, by necessity and discovery, was very adept at.

Religion, of course, was always a large part of any medieval attitude. His opponents had identified not only him but God's congregation, Nagrela's words for the Jewish community, as intended victims. The similarities with the events of the Book of Esther were too obvious for there not to be a biblical equivalence. The events could not have been accidental, God's hand was evident and Nagrela was a big player. Ibn Abbas was Haman, and Nagrela was Mordecai. Al Font was a chance to mimic those ancient Jewish heroes, confirming the mission he told Ibn Hazm that had been ordained for him in the Bible. The Ibn Abbas clique deserved to die and he wanted to be the instrument of their death, it was mandated, as well as being a pleasure. Religion too then required that he restrict his humanity to those whose loyalty was undeniable. In the name of God his analytical abilities now turned from biblical exegesis to war. Notice in his poem about the battle how he relates the killing of Ibn Abbas to the day of rejoicing over the Torah, that says a great deal about the man, time and place. Religion, people, career, and personality all said war can be a positive career move as well as an artistic motivator, a true Berber's attitude.

Nagrela's joy at Abbas' removal is shown not only in his poetry but in his subsequent public relation campaign throughout the civilized (that is, Arabized) Jewish world. This campaign was waged by mail to critically placed Jewish community leaders. These were the press releases of the time. The defeat of Abbas was spun as a Jewish victory, a second Purim with Nagrela as Mordecai, which it would have been if Granada had a fraction the civilization as Persia. Actually the worse that probably would had happened should Zuhair had won is that the Almerians would have made a show of dismissing a few of the more prominent Jews from the tax collecting rackets and the symbolic gesture of beheading Nagrela. The Jews were still needed and too dependent to be disloyal to whichever master currently required a loyal bureaucracy. Nonetheless the claim of a Jewish victory was good propaganda inside the Jewish community and Nagrela had learned its value from Abbas. The Jew appreciated the method if not the teacher. What a fitting end to the ego of the Almerian Vizier, that the target of his propaganda campaign should use that instigator's methods to celebrate the death of their author.

All this naturally got to Nagrela's subconscious, especially as there was unfinished business left over from the victory, Almeria's co-conspirators against Granada. The result was a dream that so stirred Nagrela that on awaking he set the whole thing to a poem (it would be one of two he would write on this particular subject, the second will be covered later). “Ibn Abbas is already dead, with his trusted friends, praised be god, hallowed is his name. The other minister who plotted with him will be brought low. What avail their threats, their enmity and their might?" The other minister was Ibn Bakunna of Malaga, the Vizier who backed the conspiracy against Granada. . In those days such dreams were considered prophetic. A follow Jew from Vienna 900 years later would have assured him the dream was mere wish fulfillment. Freud would have been wrong, it was in fact prophetic, although anything predicting a violent and early end to anyone affiliated with the Hammudite ruling family in Malaga was anything but a long shot.

As for position, it meant that in the course of a few weeks he had gone from prominence to virtual predominance. To make a list of the power centers in Granada and relate them to Nagrela would reveal a man who virtually owned the country: he saved the position and very likely the life of the King, he saved the position and very likely the lives of a large number of the officer corps, to say nothing of keeping the pay regular, the officer crops was drawn from and part of the nobility so they to were obligated to Nagrela and by Abd Allah's testimony they, the officers, were divided and corrupted by his schemes to safeguard his King, or more correctly his interests in the King, he was already in control of the Jewish community, and numerous testimonials indicate his popularity with the Arab community. There were certainty parties with whom he was unpopular but he had ways of buying them off as the anecdote concerning the Arab merchant reveals (we will get to that later, quickly he gave an Arab merchant who did not like him money so he would). He was the key man, the communications link, both vertically and horizontally, in the entire social hierarchy, the person people would see if they had a problem. We can imagine him listening patiently to petitioners’ sad tales, showing concern and assuring the complainant of his assistance all the while calculating what would be best for the petitioner, the state and Nagrela. Thus the Jewish lawyer became Granada's benevolent puppeteer, an Almanzor who ruled from below and behind the throne with no ambitions on the throne.

It's time for a selection from Nagrela's epic poem, The Battle of Alfuente. Note how the words describe the sensibilities of the author.

There are those who make covenant against me, but I too have the patriarchs covenant to protect me!

Why then should I not relate the words of the Lord, since I am an eloquent and a man of words!

When 'Agag who dwells by the shore of the sea and his vizier called the son of Abbas saw

How I was esteemed by the King and that all the royal matters and counsels were confirmed by me,

And all the plans that I did not approve were not put into effect,

They envied my glory sought by force to drive me away,

As they said: How is it that power and dominion over this people is given over to this foreign folk?

Thus speaks the vizier against me with boasting and evil without dread or fear.

He wove his numerous lies in a scandalous letter,

But far it for me to imitate his intentions,

And he spread aboard in the provinces his letters to make them well known among his people,

And to set them against me with lies like the gossip of those who bore a branch upon a pole,

Not me alone did he wish to destroy with his slander which he invented and created,

But also intended to cut off the lord's congregation, remnant and offspring, the woman giving birth and the one with child.

Yet my master did not harken to his words nor give heed to his defective opinion.

However he died a short while thereafter on a day of wrath for my sinful soul.

And I said: 'Woe! How will I survive since my shade is removed and my doom is come.

For God found my sin and judged me and his punishment was properly measured.

Thereupon this enemy who rejoiced at my misfortune sent a message to his friends:

'The day whose coming I have long awaited is here for the fear is removed

And Samuel is lost since his King is lost has perished and his hope is gone and parted.

I was indigent and God was angry and his face like a fire was kindled in rage against him.

Then there arose a young lion of the nations and succeeding his father governed his people as sovereign.

And my enemy in haste wrote a fierce and haughty letter to him without entreaty,

And sent to him (saying)'Do you know that according to our faith it is a sin to allow Samuel to live.

For there is no peace or quiet so long as the soul of this Jew is in his body preserved.

Send him away and strife and contention will be removed and take a settlement in his place.

For if not know that Kings have conspired to plot a war against you'.

Thus answered he in his letter: 'If I grant your request a curse will come upon me!

And if I deliver my servant into the hands of his enemies may life be over to my foes!'

At this my enemy was wroth and he persevered in his accusations and it did not suit him and he was enraged

He did not rest until he gathered his armies: Amalek and; Edom and the sons of Q'turah.

But from the beginning God decreed their fall in the city of Alfuente, in a dug out pit.

He pitched his tent on the mountain on one side and we pitched ours on the way of the crossing.

We were not concerned about his troops; we considered them a caravan.

Yet he continued to speak as he approached and sent men upon me to incite them.

But when our foes saw that our company agreed with me ,

The did he draw the spear, the lance, the sword and the javelin in order to do battle.

Even as the foe arose the Rock stood up against him, and how can a creature survive when the Rock is his opponent?

The armies stood in battle array facing the lined positions of the enemy.

On the day of anger and fury and revenge men think that the angel of death is a prize,

And each seeks to purchase fame for himself though he sell his life in the bargain.

.

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The day was obscure and misty, and the sun like my heart was dark.

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And when the sun came out, the earth the earth was dissolving at its pillars as if drunk,

And the horses sped and then turned back like vipers drawn from their caves.

The flying spears like lightning filled the air with light.

And the arrows were like drops of rain and the bucklers as sieves,

The bows were used like serpents and each spit out a bee with his mouth.

The sword upon their heads was like a torch whose light was dimmed as it fell.

And the blood of men upon the earth ran like the blood of rams at the side of the Temple court.

Mighty men were weary of life and choose death instead.

Young lions saw a festering sore upon their heads as a crown.

To die was right, they believed and to live was forbidden.

What am I to do? There is no escape or stay or staff and hope is sterile!

Enemies spill blood like water on the day of distress while I pour forth prayer

To the God who brings low and fells all evildoers into his pit which He did surely dig.

On the day of battle He turns back into the heart of the enemy the sword and arrows which he prepared and threw.

I did not say: 'Give me victory lord because I walk in a straight path

Or because of my learning which travailed and gave birth at a time when the knowledge of the 'learned' is barren

Or for the sake of my logic in resolving difficulties in the nights when I awoke before the watches.'

Rather, I said: 'For your sake be unto me a sheltering rock and a fortified wall of fire.

As for the enemy,-dispatch your anger upon him that he may be consumed like stubble on the day of the whirlwind.

Do to them as to Sisera and for me as you did for Baraq and Deborah.

Flash lightning O God and scatter them: rebuke them that they may perish from the reproach!

Redeem me from bitterly destructive hands and make my pursuers atone for me on this day.

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And will the man who was notified that, 'If you walk into fire' be consumed in the flaming battle?

Say to him: "God, rise up in anger, consume them that they may be destroyed in the flame!

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Turn back their swords upon their hearts and rise against them; be not with them and set their bows to breaking.

Ye angels! Draw near and make war upon them even the stars and shining sun,

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And the fire of death consumed them and they were annihilated like wood in a hot stove and cooking oven;

As flaming chaff in the midst of the bonfire were all my enemies all of them in the dust.

And the heads of lords were on the ground, like figs selling a thousand for a Gerah.

And the officers in their downfall were puffed up like skin bottles, like a pregnant woman.

There they lay, slaves upon masters and paupers with Kings with no choice in the matter.

there they were with 'Agag their King as dung in the midst of the field and no burial was given them.

And one in ten thousand survived among them as gleanings in the vineyard on the day the vintage is done.

Now the traces of 'Amalek were wiped out from Spain and the armies were destroyed and their dominion uprooted

As once before when 'Agag perished at the hands of Samuel and Haman by the Logician,

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We abandoned them in the plain for the hyenas, the serpents, the leopard and the sow

And we left them reclining on rocks and leaning on brier and thorn.

We gave their flesh as a gift to the vulture and offered them a present to the lion and wolf

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And the young lions will make a banquet over their flesh and the lioness will have enough for her young.

We conquered their cities and their lands and we razed with vengeance wall and castle.

And we took possession of villages and towns and we vanquished with power city and fortress.

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For the Vizier who counseled and ordered to slay me even issuing a decree,

And who came to the shore of rivers to do me harm, was there shaved by the razor that is hired!

I seized him and brought him in chains to the prison house and put him under saws..

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then did he die the death of a churl on the night of rejoicing with the precious Torah.

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Then I was at ease and rested from my foes and was honored and added to my power.

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Every tongue will be filled with jubilation and with rejoicing in song about my redemption,

And the mouth of each person will be given leave to be filled with laughter in this world for the saving of my life.

Therefore my brethren give forth with hymns to the eternal God and increase the songs and praise in the assembly.

.

Now make a second Purim for the God who arose and cut off from Amalek flower and fruit.

And make it heard in Africa and Egypt and notify the children of the Chosen House,

And tell it to the elders of Pumbeditha and to the sages of the academy at Sura,

(note: Pumbeditha and Sura were two Jewish rabbinical academies in Iraq that functioned as a Supreme Court of Jewish law in Medieval times.)

And call its name: "Sister to the Happening of Ahaswerosh and Lady Esther!'

And write it in your books that it may abide forever and be remembered from generation to generation!5

There are no post-biblical Hebrew poems written in the same vain as this by any other author.

There were some loose ends after the battle, these were Yaddair and Boluggin, the nephew and brother of the King.

The Rise of Seville

cast of characters

Kadi Muhammad ben Abbad

Ismail, his son

Caliph Kasim, a Hammudite

Caliph Yahya, a Hammudite, Kasim’s nephew and enemy

a mat weaver that looked like Hisham II

The ruling family of Seville, the Abbadids, provided the only real challenge to Nagrela the strategist. For generations, and particularly those following the decline and fall of Cordova the members of this family inevitably found themselves at the top and in control. Their behavior was the mirror image of Nagrela's contortion of events and people with the difference that there was an ideological aspect along with the personal profit motive and an absence of supplication. Logically they should have been servants of some Berber or Slav warlord, they started with no military entourage, nor connections to anyone who did. In Taifa Spain they should have rated sitting duck status. But their mind was more than a match for their opposition, indeed if it were not for Nagrela it would have been a very one-sided match. Wealth was part of their method; they were among the richest if not the richest family in Spain. Supposedly they owned one-third of the province of Seville. The other factor was more esoteric. They saw, as every Arab in Spain saw, the Berbers as the cause of Andalus' unhappiness, and this they exploited, for themselves and for the Arabs. Get rid of the Berbers and there would be security, prosperity and freedom, a simple enough formula and one that enough Andalusians bought into. The Abbadids therefore had a plan, or at least the basis of a plan, or a goal on which to base plans. They also had the patience to not move until all the pieces of their plans were in place. Their program was an intellectual exercise, a chess game with talking pawns.

Seville was traditionally a poor cousin to Cordova during the Caliphate. Its population was considerably less than half of Cordova’s, maybe less than a fourth. It could boast of a musical instrument industry, a sort of a counter-reputation to Cordova’s in books. In normal times it was governed from Cordova, but the Cordovan inability to govern its own streets mandated that some sort of Sevillian independence evolve. Eventually the concept of independence progressed from practice to theory resulting in de jure statehood along with the de facto one already achieved. It was a case of the right leadership at the right time.

The family that made it all possible had originated in Yemen and arrived in Spain shortly after its conquest. In the days of Almanzor, Ismail ben Abbad was celebrated as a soldier, poet and theologian. Added to these achievements were accolades as a man of honesty, never accepting gifts from above or below and generous in that hallmark of Arab good manners, hospitality. His crowning glory was an appointment as Iman at the Grand Mosque in Cordova. His death in 1019 eventually ruined Nagrela’s retirement. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately for Seville, again paraphrasing Dozy’s words, his son was his father’s intellectual equal but not his moral one.

The son, Muhammad, got his start by coveting his father’s position of Kadi, effectively lord mayor of Seville. Another candidate had already been selected so Muhammad appealed to Caliph Kasim, the Hammudite, the one who took over after his brother Ali was killed after overthrowing Suliaman. The argument, whatever it was worked, Muhammad got the appointment.

The ongoing civil war was instrumental in allowing Muhammad to get moral support for his appointment from Seville patrician class. Not so much out of respect for his talents but for the knowledge that if whichever intended Caliph was currently within striking distance would hold him responsible for anything that was displeasing, in short it was his neck in the noose. Unfortunately Mohammed insisted on a triumvirate, so two respected suckers were found to co-administer the province with him. Later he dropped the pretense and ruled alone, much to the relief of the other two. The Abbadid also did something that the Omayyads seemed unwilling to do, he established a united multiethnic national army, although about a hundred years too late to do Andalus any good.

A practical man, his first concern was the recruitment of soldiers. A few hundred of mixed backgrounds were at first attracted by above average pay. The conquest of two castles subsequently allowed him to absorb their garrisons into his armed forces. There was at this time no central authority to prevent him from making war on the next lowest rungs of the political food chain. The supposed Caliphs, the Hammudite family, had their hands full by engaging in a family feud; the late Caliph Ali’s sons were trying to replace their uncle Kasim as Caliph, which made it a civil war for all Andalus. As a result most Andalusian towns became independent whether they wanted to be so or not. In 1022 one of the sons, Yahya, along with the King of Carmona, lay siege to Seville. Kadi Muhammad surrendered his own son to Yahya as a security deposit and recognized the Hammudite as Caliph.

The following year the Caliph Kasim was forced out of Cordova and sought refuge with the man he had promoted to Kadi in Seville. Among his transmitted wishes was an order to evacuate a thousand homes for use by his army. The request helped make Kadi Muhammad enough of a gambler to try and emulate Cordova in that city’s efforts to rid itself of Berbers. He promised the Berber commander of the town’s garrison overlordship of the city in return for keeping out Caliph Kasim and army. . The Berber agreed and when Kasim arrived at the city’s gates he found them closed. The Caliph's two sons were residents of the town, which probably explains why he did not push the matter. After negotiations he took his sons and property and left. The Sevillians then turned on the Berber garrison and forced them out. Seville was now the second Arab ruled republic in al-Andalus, as already noted, Cordova had already thrown out the Berber Hammudites.

The Kadi’s next move was an alliance with the King of Carmona in an enterprise to take some real estate from the petty state of Badajoz. The family that ruled Badajoz was originally Berber but had Arabized through the years. The net result was the establishment of one of the few consistent foreign policies by any of the petty states; Badajoz would be forever the enemy of the Abbadids. By 1034 the Hammudite Caliph Yahya, ex-Caliph Kasim was in one of Yahya’s prisons, had taken over Carmona and exiled it’sits Zenata Berber King. This was the first step in uniting every Berber in Andalus under his flag for a coalition war against every Arab state in Andalus, with Cordova and Seville topping the list. On the face of it such a war would be walkover. The Arabs were divided, unmilitary and apparently incapable of uniting in the time to prepare to meet any threat, particularly a Berber one. Irony entered on the Arab side for once for it had sent the exiled King of Carmona to Seville.

“Caliph” Yahya struck first next at Seville, its conquest would secure his rear when he moved on Cordova. However the policy of absorbing former opponents into one’s army backfired. Some Zenata Berbers from Carmona were still very loyal to their exiled King. Some of these managed to make their way to their real lord, the one who took refuge in Seville, with a plan. They pointed out that Yahya was drunk most of the time, in this state his judgment was based more on passion than analysis. An attack feigned against his forces would probably be countered by the drunken Caliph in person. If this were the case the attacking forces could fall back into a preset ambuscade which the Caliph could be lured into. The plan was adopted, executed and successful. Yahya was killed, the King of Carmona got his estate back, his army returned to their previous loyalty, the anti-Arab Berber alliance was dead and Seville was now a regional rather than local power.

The commander of the Sevillian assault was the Kadi’s son Ismail, so the Kadi was a pound father thrown into the bargain. It was to prove the single biggest Arab military victory over a Berber force in the history of the petty states, and it was due more to stratagem rather than brute fighting prowess, a foretaste of the conflict between Arab and Berber to come. There was still the problem of how to unite the Arabs of Andalus. A unifying symbol was needed that would bring universal Arab acceptance.

The Kadi finally staked his strategic fate on a mat weaver’s face. The mat weaver looked like Hisham II, the do nothing and seldom seem Caliph who let Almanzor take over and corrupt the Caliphate. No matter, the Kadi proclaimed that he had discovered and saved the real Hisham II. It sounds crazy but it was understood and somewhat accepted as a moral rallying point in lieu of something better. No one really knew what became of Hisham II, but it was remembered that he was the grandchild of Abd Al-Rahman III and that was enough. The manipulator Kadi tried to convert the mat weaver Caliph into a rallying point, a flag, church and constitution rolled into one. Whether or not the Caliph was the real thing or not, or whether the real thing was worth a drop of blood was completely beside the point. A Caliph meant the legitimate owner of Andalus was alive, well and Arab and all the petty rulers had no claim to their very valued pretense of legitimacy. Everyone who wanted the land liberated could vow loyalty to the Caliph, which was the same as telling the Kadi that he had their support for his actions. Hoaxster or not, liar, murderer, or snake oil salesman was also besides the point. A few of Hisham’s harem girls and associates were found and convinced to support the hoax, so at the very least the public respected the Kadi for making it easier for them to pretend to believe the farce. Symbolic gestures were everything in Arab society, reality had to be adoptable to be useful.

Other statelets could buy into an alliance by paying homage to the lie, as the Slav rulers of Valencia, Denia, Tortosa and the exiled Carmonan prince did. Even the Cordovans found it convenient at one time. Or get out of an alliance and break relations with the Kadi by proclaiming the Caliph a fake, like Cordovans eventually did when they got sick of the Sevillian boss. That came about when the Kadi tried to have the mat weaver enthroned in Cordova. That was too much for the patrician ruler of that city. He had been willing to play along with the farce in the face of Caliph Yahya but that did not include de facto acceptance of Sevillian overlordship. When the Kadi and the mat weaver/fake Caliph arrived in front of Cordova they found the city’s gates closed and the Cordovan ruler denouncing the mat weaver as a fraud. The pair had to stay in Seville.

The next item on the Kadi’s agenda was the Slav King Zuhair of Almeria. Not only had he not bought into the anti-Berber alliance but he had recognized the Hammudite line as legitimate Caliphs. Seville therefore attacked into Almerian territory, as previously mentioned a difficult task because the cities of Seville and Almeria were not close and separated by unpleasantly high mountain ranges. Zuhair countered by asking for aid from Granada. Granada graciously attacked into Sevillian territory, the first time the two sides met in combat. The Sevillians fell back and considered the implications of a war with the Sanhadja. Their winning streak was over, and a protracted struggle about to begin.

Occasionally the original goal of the Sevillian leadership would take a back seat as the temporary alliances with other states, including Berber states, had to be made. But these detours did not alter the final destination. The Abbadids came from a subtle, patient and educated class, like Nagrela, and very much unlike Badis. It would be up to the Jewish vizier to deduce and counter the Sevillian strategy.

The contest was equal in that either each side had advantages the other lacked. The Granadans, under their Jew, had a polished professional military machine, or at least as polished as the times allowed. On the down side the Granadan Berbers were seen as foreigners, and hated as occupiers. They maintained their presence over the Arabs of Granada by terror and over the Jews by indifference. When their numbers were too few to inspire terror the local populace could be trusted to rise and kill every Berber they could get their hands on. Seville was the home team, Arab run and ruled; any territory the Sevillian army took would require no army of occupation, they came as liberators. Unfortunately for the Abbadid master plan, the Andalusians were as competent soldiers as the Florentines of the Renaissance and for the same reasons. They were cultured, civilized and had better things to do they lose their lives in a continual state of warfare with no immediate prospect of an end, hardly any definition of a victorious strategy, and no clear advantage to them if they did score any tactical wins.

Since the Sevillian national objective, the elimination of non-Arab rule in Andalus, required an offensive strategy, and their own armed forces were not up to it they naturally adopted tactics that minimized the use of these inadequate forces. Mainly, this policy would be aimed at the largest Berber state, Granada, with that state subdued the rest would follow, then it would be the Christians turn. Proxy armies that could be used to wear away at the limited Sanhadja presence would be the forces by any statelet that had a score to settle with Granada. Preferably these would be other Berber states, therefore killing two birds with one stone. Also useful would be contenders for the Sanhadja throne. These could foment revolution inside of Granada and were willing to accept Sevillian support, in effect selling them the rope Seville planned to hang them with. Anyone, in fact could be used, just as long as Seville’s army could be kept safe and well rested for the day when it could finish the job.

By these means, used towards a defined end, circumstances almost guaranteed an eventual Sevillian victory in spite of the absence of militarism in the national character. The Moors would have to had won every major engagement in the unending wars in order retain property. An alternative Berber strategy would require that they limit themselves to defendable areas; it would economize their manpower but restrict their resource base, leaving them vulnerable to long term defeat as their manpower was eliminated and their ability to buy more was reduced. Berber survival therefore depended on forming and keeping alliances, keeping Seville too busy, too poor and too weak to purchase additional manpower. If possible the city should be captured and its leadership class annihilated. As for the Arabs, if they could not be controlled by terror or corruption, Nagrela always preferred the latter method; the Berbers had no reservations about killing them all.

As for the third party to the Granadan-Berber-Sevillian Arab conflict, the smaller, mainly Berber, states. These all had different histories but they all had the same basic agenda, they all wanted to survive being eaten by the bigger states. That none succeeded is proof of both their incompetence and the hopelessness of their situation. Odd, because it was these smaller states that jointly held the balance of power. Did any of their leaders realize that whichever major state could control the smaller could also dominate the other major state? If those rulers had any strategic perceptions at all they would seen that a mutual defense pact would have strengthened if not secured their position. Of course that implies mutual trust and that concept was obliviously foreign to that crowd. Nonetheless, either by design or accident the petty rulers enjoyed several years of success at playing both sides off against one the other until both Seville and Granada lost patience with the continual making and breaking alliances and swallowed most of them up.

The duplicitous method was unnecessary, the Granadans were the more trustworthy; unlike the Sevillians they were not expansionist unless driven to it. For some reason the smaller states could not distinguish between Abbadid ambitions and Sanhadja fears, perhaps because they were Zenata Berbers and could not forget the old ways. Perhaps they distrusted the ability or desire of Granada to aid them in emergency. For some of those states it made no difference, they were so small, weak and isolated their doom was inevitable. The Sevillians would walk in and take over, even escorting the former ruler to the exile of his choice. But for most of them the survival game was incompetently played. They could have backed Granada and lived. Of course that would have meant placing their lives in the hands of an odd winning team, a Jew and the drunken Badis. Not even Nagrela could save someone intent on suicide.

The Hammudites of Malaga

The account of Nagrela cannot be told without telling the story of the silly and homicidal Hammudite family. For the sake of clarity their tale must be told separately, as much as possible, from the rest of Nagrela's narrative. The reason is that their account is so convoluted and uncertain that it spreads confusion when connected to any other part of the story. Parts of the information presented here will be repeated as needed elsewhere in this essay. This chapter should be considered as a collection point for information about the Hammudites, it can be referred back to if the record elsewhere of Andalusian politics becomes too murky.

As quick as possible then: Around 1014 a member of the Berberized Hammudite clan of North Africa takes, or is given Malaga. His name is Ali and he is a former general in the Army of the figurehead Caliph Suliaman. The Hammudites were relatives of the Omayyads, therefore he could claim the Caliphship of Cordova. He did and turned out to be so cruel that he alienated the entire population. Happily for his constituents he was assassinated by some of his servants in 1018. He was succeeded by his brother, Kasim, but was not accepted by the late Caliph's son, Yahya who leads a rebellion against his uncle. Kasim lost the civil war after being kicked out of Seville by Kadi Muhammad, giving that city a jump start on independence. Yahya then defeats and imprisons his uncle for 13 years, after which Yahya had him strangled on suspicion of wanting to be free. In the interim Yahya had to fight with everyone for domination of Andalus, but was successful mainly in holding on to Malaga. In 1035 Yahya took Carmona and tired to take Seville, but he was betrayed by his new and very disloyal Carmonan-Zenata Berber subjects and killed in action by an army led by the son of the Kadi of Seville, Ismail. With his death Yahya's brother Idris became the powerless Caliph and King of Malaga. It was he, with the connivance of his Prime Minister Ibn Musa, aka Ibn Bakunna, that who conspired with Zuhair and Ibn Abbas of Almeria to destroy Sanhadja Granada. Idris died, probably of stress a few days after receiving Ismail ben Abbad's head following the battle of Genil.

With that Hammudite dead, the way was clear for his two most prominent Slav Viziers to try and kill one another. One, Ibn Bakunna wanted to enthrone the late Caliph's young son, Yahya, so that he could rule through him. The other Vizier, called Naja, wanted to rule through a cousin, Hasan. Hasan, being ambitious, moved quickly and sent a fleet to Malaga, scaring Ibn Bakunna so badly he fled to the hills. Hasan promised him sanctuary should he return, Ibn Bakunna did and Hasan killed him. Of all people Ibn Bakunna should known better than to trust anyone in power, then again where was he to flee, Granada, Seville? He tried to destroy one and killed the son of the ruler of the other.

Hasan was on such a winning streak that, he followed up his victories by killing the other claimant for the throne, his young cousin Yahya. The child's older sister was Hasan's wife. She avenged her brother by poisoning her husband, Hasan, (in case you lost track).

That left Naja ruling over Hasan's son. Naja killed the child, threw Hasan's brother into prison and proposed himself to the new Berber clans as the new King. They grudgingly swore allegiance in the absence of a better candidate, the Hammudite line being rather sparse at the moment. There was another Hammudite ruler in Algeciras. That was enough for Naja to throw his halfhearted army against that town. The lack of interest in his soldiers for the struggle suggested that he had better return to Malaga. On the way he entered a defile, his enemies, which included virtually everyone in Malaga at that point made sure he did not exit. The date of his end is actually known, perhaps, February 5, 1043. Hasan's brother was released from prison and declared Idris II.

Idris II was pious, trustworthy, reverent, kind, a patron of the arts and protector of the poor. Badis had the man for lunch. What Badis wanted from the man he got, whether territory, fortresses or in one case his Prime Minister. The man did something to displease Badis and that King requested Idris send the Vizier to him. Idris sent the poor man to Badis who promptly executed him.

The Berbers of Malaga could not risk having such a pushover stay in power so they replaced him with a cousin, Mohammed. This Hammudite turned out to be everything they could hope for in a leader, for he was a cruel bastard. He died or was poisoned in 1053. He was succeeded by Idris III, who promptly died. Running low on Hammudites the nobles were forced to call back to power the warm, loving, worthless Idris II, who lasted until 1056. That year found someone proclaimed Mohammad II in charge at Malaga. By this time Seville was eating up one petty state after another. Malaga was obviously high on the list. Badis-Nagrela acted first and occupied the town and state. It remained part of Granada until the Spanish reconquest in 1492. The conquest was certainly planned by Nagrela, it was his most long lasting political achievement.

And that as near as can be deduced is the story of the Hammudites in Spain.

The War for Carmona and the Battle of Genil

1039-1040

Cast of characters

Kadi Muhammad ben Abbad, Arab ruler of Seville

Badis ben Ziri, Sanhadja Berber ruler of Granada

Muhammad al-Birzali, Zenata Berber ruler of Carmona

Idris ben Hammud, ruler of Malaga and claimant to the Caliphate

Ibn Bakunna or Ibn Abi Musa (he went by both names), vizier of Malaga and leader of the Malagan expeditionary force against Seville

Granada, after the stresses of 1038, was trying to relax. Following the unpleasantness that led to the Battle of Alfuente and the succession crisis both Sanhadja and their Jewish friends and subjects looked forward to a return to the peace and prosperity that characterized the rule of the late King Habbus. Their recent memory included many more years of peace than of war. What war there was appeared completely resolved with the removal of Zuhair and Ibn Abbas. Even that pair's co-conspirators in Malaga and Carmona had decided in favor of the Granadan cause once the Granadan cause won. A bit further back in time there was an affair with the aggressive Sevillian state, but the retreat of the Abbadid forces that affair too seemed successfully resolved. A closer look, and be sure Prime Minister Nagrela was driven by shear force of intellect and sense of survival to always take a closer look, revealed the Sevillian state had no reason to be aggressive other than the invisible desires of its rulers. Nagrela must have been suspicious of these and realized the long term danger if his worse scenario conclusions were correct.

Carmona, the not so small city-state in 1039 appeared to meet the Abbadid criteria for absorption. The city-state was weak, Berber, strategically located, apparently friendless and nearby. The Zenata Berber family of Birzali ruled there. Kadi Muhammad started the active part of the program against the smaller states by launching an invasion of Carmona in 1039, held by his former ally against the would-be Hammudite Caliph Yahya, Muhammad al-Birzali. The city-state was nineteen miles east of Seville, it capital city was a fortress on top of a mountain, named after the province, or maybe the province was named after the fort. The Sevillian army was led by the Kadi's son, Ismail, the same who successfully led the Sevillians against the Caliph Yahya and killed him. He also could boast of successful operations against the Badajozis that included the conquest of a small city. That there was no one better to lead the expedition quickly became obvious. The towns of Osuna and Ecija fell and the Carmonan leader was forced back on his capital city, under siege.

Before locking himself inside his fort the Carmona King sent pleas for aid to any leader who had an interest in not seeing Seville take over his state and had the means to prevent it. The criteria was apparently met only by the Berber states of Granada and Malaga, both of whom seeing the ramifications of an anti-Berber Arab onslaught promptly sent relief expeditions. The Malagan army was led by Ibn Bakunna, the same one who was involved in the conspiracy against Nagrela and his employers and whose death Nagrela literally dreamed about. Badis led or did not lead the Granadans in person, the histories give both versions. It is certain that Nagrela was present, either in overall command or as an executive officer. The Yaddair episode apparently precluded Boluggin’s re-employment in that position.

There are two versions of what happened next. They both start the same. Ismail the Sevillian was made aware of the approach of the allied force. The two Berber armies united at the town of Ecija on the Genil River, retaking that hilltop town from the Sevillians in the process. There are indications in a poem by Nagrela that they fought and won some sort of skirmish here but it is hard to be certain. What happened next is also open to interpretation. In one version because two armies were advancing on him Ismail was given the option of lifting the siege or becoming the victim of one. If he did not move he would risk the possibility of being caught between two forces, one inside the walls of Carmona, the other around his camp. The possibility seemed unpleasant so the siege was lifted but rather than run he made for the Berber army. Of course this allowed the small forces of Carmona to operate in its rear but these were apparently considered too insignificant to matter. Meanwhile the combined Berber relief expedition was aware only that the war was over because the siege was over, and hence the combined army separated and started for their separate homes. It seems they still thought of war as being a glorified raid, rather in terms of state annihilation. Or perhaps they were only given a limited mission, relieve Carmona and return home. In any event the Granadan army was preparing to cross the Genil River near Ecija when they received information that the Sevillian army was already there, waiting for them, blocking the only practical ford. The Granadans sent an urgent request to the recently departed Malagans to return and help what seemed to be an unavoidable fight.

This is one version. A less complimentary one maintains that the two Berber armies advanced blindly into the statelet of Carmona, discovered how strong the Sevillians were and ran for it, leaving the al-Birzali clan and their Zenata entourage to handle the Abbadids as best they could or could not. The former explanation seems to carry more weight as fleeing small armies usually move quicker than their larger more confident pursuers. Reading between the lines it sounds like the Berbers were leisurely walking home when they were out maneuvered by the Sevillians. A form of confirmation of this view is the behavior of the Malagan army once the request for emergency assistance arrived, they rushed to the aid of Nagrela and the Granadans, something they would probably not had done if they were already running for their lives.1

One does not have to guess what this battle would have meant if the army of Ismail of Seville were victorious. If would have meant that the greatest military asset of the Berbers, shear muscular brawn, could be matched and overcome by the Arabs. The unification of Andalus under Arab Abbadid rule would be assured and accelerated. Ismail was not likely to be afraid, he had defeated and killed the overconfident Caliph Yahya outside of Seville, he had done the same to the half-Berber half-Arab rulers of Badajoz earlier, as his father had done before. He had placed one Berber clan, the rulers of Carmona, under siege and seized their cities. One can guess his thoughts on learning that two numerically inferior enemy armies were approaching, one a Hammudite army, the same clan he had defeated before, led by a Slav with no military accomplishments to his name, the other, a Sanhadja army lead by a Jew and maybe his drunken master. The Granadans may have presented a threat if it's leadership was not such an obvious joke, everyone knew Jews were not soldiers, at least not as good as Moslems. The question before Ismail would have been not what to do but who to kill first. As for the siege of Carmona it could be resumed after the Berber relief was disposed of.

Intelligence was always a priority for the Abbadids. Ismail must have learned quickly that the Berbers reversed direction after he lifted the siege. He must have also known quickly of the relief forces decision to divide their forces in the face of his united force. The way home for one of those contingents was easy to deduce, the Sanhadja army would force the Genil River at Ecija. If that ford were blocked the Sanhadja would be forced to fight a numerically superior relativity far away from its homeland. It would be an easy victory.

Whatever the circumstances leading up to October 5, 1039 the events of that day are not in dispute. On that day on the Genil River at or near the city of Ecija the army that was to begin the reconquest of Spain for the Arabs forced a battle on a Berber armies army trying to make its way back to Granada, while its own route of escape was obstructed by the river at its back. When Nagrela saw his predicament he sent a plea for assistance to Ibn Bakunna and his Malagan force. The Malagans promptly marched to the Granadans aid and confronted the Sevillian Army.

One wonders why if Ismail could move so quickly as to place himself in front of the Granadan army why he did not just wait until half of it had crossed the river and attack. To fight with a limited exit, like a river fordable only at certain points appears to be an uncommonly risky approach to take with something so uncertain as a battle. Was General Ismail over-confident of his position or so unsure of his men that having no exit in case of emergency was the only guarantee of their loyalty? If the latter his reservations proved themselves, the Berber mercenaries in Seville's army left the field, whether through tribal loyalty, pragmatism or bribery is not known. The result after that could not have been in doubt, the Kadi’s army was decimated and his son Ismail the general, the heir apparent, was killed (histories give a day for his death as one or two days after the battle, without any explanation). Carmonan territorial integrity, such as it was,was restored. More importantly, Seville was contained.

There were souvenirs of the victory. The King of Malaga was sent Ismail's head as a trophy. He only got to play it for two days before died. Stress followed by too great a relief probably demanded too much from the man's constitution. Earlier he had apparently received word of the strength of the Sevillian army and after seeing his own army off fled Malaga for the nearby mountainous region of Bobastro. Badis only got a ring from Ismail's finger, not even a hand. If the smallest of the souvenir caused him sadness there was another that certainly consoled him, Yaddair's old friend, the incompetent fortune teller Abu al-Futuh. That man missed his family so much that he surrendered to Badis, hoping and expecting to be pardoned in celebration of the victory. Instead Badis had him and another traitor Sanhadja arrested, imprisoned and publicly humiliated. Sometime later, in October 1039 in the course of a drunken revel Badis personally beheaded them both.

The victory was gratifying but hardly decisive. The architect of the Abbadid goal was still alive and had other sons. His territory was not compromised and mercenaries were always available. The victory bought time, and not much time for the prince of Carmona. Nonetheless it was a significant military victory, the first one by aan army at least partially under the command of a Jew in years and the first by an army at least partially commanded by Nagrela. Although he had to share the glory with his old adversary Ibn Bakunna, nonetheless the occasion warranted another epic war poem and another reference to the anxiety he had before the battle. In this poem we see a very scared man, one not a bit confident about the outcome of the battle.

Behold my distress this day, and be entreated by my prayer.

Remember the promise to your servant and let me not be ashamed of my hope....

.

I am passing through the waters, draw out of my fears;

I am wawalking in a conflagration, set me free from my flames.2

The poem is only ten lines long. It ends with "And if in your judgement I am not worthy, then do it for my son and my Torah!"

The poem about the outcome of the battle is 150 lines long. It starts with

Will You do wonders for me each year

As You have done for the patriarchs and saints?

It goes on to tell how

"we returned after carnage and the burning

And our hands were filled with spoils."

The poem then goes go to say that spies advised Ismail that the allied armies were weak, so weak they would make for an easy victory. Further on in the poem Nagrela notes that the Berbers were very afraid when confronted by the Sevillian army, but "when they (the Sevillians) saw those whom they thought to have driven off, close by

They fled in seven different directions."

The author of works on bible and Hebrew goes on

"Their princes and their servants were killed

Their heads like filth upon the face of the earth;

Their heads in the dust were like dung.

..

As my enemies drew near to eat my flesh

I rose up while they fell down enfeebled."3

There is no mention that he probably owned his victory and perhaps his life to the man he hated, Ibn Bakunna. Nagrela was about 46 years old.

Another analyst would have taken issue with the self-congratulatory remarks expressed by Nagrela in his poem. The victory was due to three armies working in concert against one. Neither one could handle their opponent by himself. All three of three allies had previously been enemies of one another or an ally of the state whose army they just defeated. All three allies were from different tribes who had their homes outside of Spain, none had a means of obtaining reinforcements from their traditional homes to make a difference in a quick war. The Arab populations of all these states hated them as outsiders. The homeland of the defeated state, Seville, still had a larger resource base for local manpower than any of the Berber states. All of Nagrela's subsequent actions indicate he understood this situation perfectly and the other Berber leaders not at all. He became by default the most prominent and capable strategist on the Berber side.

There is a footnote concerning Badis' brother, Boluggin, the more popular sibling. With Yaddair hiding in Seville and Seville defeated he was automatically the focus of any attempt to remove the elder brother. According to different accounts, Badis either poisoned him or denied him medicine when he was ill. This, according to Ibn Daub, in retaliation for always offering unsolicited advice. True or not there is a poem by Nagrela noting that among the virtues of a new born state was that they kill all rebels, an odd virtue to mention but apparently foremost in Nagrela's mind and heart. Was he thinking of what should have been done to Boluggin instead of the forgiveness granted him by Badis after consorting with anti-Badis conspirators? Did Rabbi Samuel oversee the removal of another threat to Badis?

Possibly, very possibly. As mentioned earlier Boluggin's three Jewish supporters, Nagrela's competitors, had to leave town after their favorite's removal. They went to Seville.

Yaddair vs. Badis (Nagrela) and the Eastern front

Cast of Characters

Yaddair, a prince of Granada, nephew of Habbus

Muhammad al-Birzali, King of Carmona

Kadi Muhammad of Seville

Badis, King of Granada

Samuel Ibn Nagrela

Emir of Valencia

and his son, Ubaidallah

and his brother-in-law, Abu-l-ahwas Ma’n

Emir of Denia

Sources disagree on whether there was fighting in 1040, so for safety's sake we must jump to 1041 to find some more. By this time, as already noted, Badis’s old opponent, Prince Yaddair had found a new home in Seville and patron in its ruler. Yaddair and apparently many others inside Granada were still convinced of the Yaddair's worth, at least relative to Badis. Muhammad ben Abbad saw the man as a catalysis for the internal division of Granada, maybe even its dissolution. Yaddair was clever enough to see that that was the cause of the Kadi's friendship. Both men knew too that if and once Yaddair did become the ruler of Granada his first task, after killing any potentially residual disloyal elements, would be the betrayal of this friendship in order to ensure the independence of Granada. Both men knew as well that the Abbadid preferred a prolonged civil war between the supporters of Badis and Yaddair rather than a successful revolution by Yaddair over Badis. Neither one could tell the other that he planned to exploit the other for his own unstated ends, both had to place false assurances of loyalty and fidelity in front of the other and both understood these to be mere expediency. In spite of the duplicity the ambitions of the two complemented each other. Sevillian money and means were placed at Yaddair's disposal and with these he was able to acquire enough mercenaries to stage an invasion of Granada, this time from the north. His plan was apparently to gain enough real estate to set in motion a popular uprising on his behalf. He already had a number supporters ready to risk their all for his benefit by accompanying him on his invasion and two of these, their names were Wasil and Murwafaq became his lieutenants for the invasion. He got as far as the city of Argona, whose commanders he slaughtered in the process of capture.

The Granadan response was led in person by Samuel Ibn Nagrela, this was his first time that he was without qualification in overall command of an army, recall that the historical sources seem divided on whether he led the Granadan forces at Genil. The campaign also revealed his ability to integrate political and military objectives. The opposition, Yaddair’s fifth column the pretender had such high expectations for, never materialized. . Even it were not already disorganized and divided thanks to Nagrela's ploys among the disloyal officer corps, it was unlikely to act once a strong response was obvious for all to see and mediate upon. The aspirant himself found himself besieged in a mountain fortress, Somontin, with Nagrela on the outside doubtlessly simmering over not having beheaded Yaddair when he was available. In was during this siege that the Yaddair showed his real talents. In the confusion of the final assault he managed to escape, again, with part of his company to Cordova. It was not a complete lost because two of his lieutenants were captured. Nagrela, still seeking the same closure he obtained with regard to the Djafar Ibn Abbas, contacted the Cordovan authorities with a request for extradition. For some reason it was adequate, maybe Cordovan frustration over Sevillian aggressiveness had something to do with it. Once in Nagrela's custody Yaddair’s underground or the Kadis' agents, arranged another escape, at least his third from Badis so far. This time he fled to Carmona and received safe haven from its prince, the one who owned his life to Badis and Nagrela.

The al-Birzali prince for some reason apparently saw the growing power of Seville and Granada on each side of him as a threat rather than as an opportunity. As a buffer state his independence could be guaranteed by either state out of fear of the other. Or perhaps Prince Yaddair was such a persuasive speaker and titillating personality that he was able to convince the Carmona King to play a game in which he had nothing to gain and everything to lose. Whatever the reason rather than win by doing nothing the Carmonan lord entrusted his fate to Prince Yaddair, a man with an unblemished track record of failure, except as an escape artist.

In 1043 the Carmona King and Yaddair staged some raids into Granadan territory, sort of a reconnaissance in force to test the military waters, apparently the lessons of previous several years were inadequate or something made them extremely confident. Recall that Granada won every war it had been in, annihilating three enemy armies in the process. As with so much concerning the decisions of the Taifan Kings, the behavior of the Carmonan leadership is incomprehensible without assuming that whatever makes one stupid, they had.

The Granadan leadership, which meant Nagrela making tactful suggestions and Badis consenting, was not one to gradually escalate by means of a measured response. In those times every violent provocation called for an even more violent response, anything less would be interpreted as weakness and weakness was an invitation for attack by some state that was afraid that someone else would get to prize first and become unstoppably strong. . The Sanhadja army therefore counterattacked in force throwing the two unwise leaders out of Granada and taking and keeping a chuck of Carmonan territory, including its second largest city, Ecija, as an example to rest of Andalus.

Simultaneous with the Granadan counterattack the Sevillians, either upset at the Granadan presence in Carmona, angry over the events of 1039 or just sensing wounded prey attacked Carmona from the west. The end came quickly, Yaddair as usual, was captured by the Granadans. By this time Badis presented Yaddair with a prison he could not escape from by having him beheaded (that is one version, in another no one is sure what happens to Yaddair except that he disappears from history, considering the nuisance he made of himself it is very unlikely Badis-Nagrela would let the man live, nor is it likely, considering the man's obsession with power, that he would have simply and quietly disappeared). Nagrela used his defeat and probable death as the subject of a very cheery poem, so Yaddair’s life was not wasted after all. As for the prince of Carmona, he fell into a Sevillian ambush and was killed. The ambush should have served as a warning as to what the former friends of the Abbadid's could expect from the family. For some reason, some form of political denial, the lesson did not register.

(According to one modern historian Yaddair was imprisoned in a fortress called Almunecar and there died a natural death. This is one interpretation ofon to a murky preface to one of Nagrela's poems dealing with Yaddair.1 As mentioned above considering Yaddair's proclivity for escape and the nuisance he made of himself this seems unlikely, considering the ungenerous nature's of Badis and Nagrela.2)

Something that at first would seem almost inexplicable happened after this in that Carmona was not wiped off the map. The Granadan reason for this apparent lenience is not hard to guess, it would have been extra territory to occupy, stretching limited manpower thinner than it already was. The al-Birzali ruler was dead but his tribe still was alive and well; even if battered it was able to fight and recruit allies. The betrayal of the late Hammudite Caliph Yahya by still loyal Zenata may have also influenced the Granadan decision. Another potential complication was the late ruler's son; he was alive and able to serve as a rallying point. That Carmona would be hard to occupy was illustrated when those Zenata proved able to retake the town of Ecija. Although Samuel was able to take it back in 1044 it was clearly in Granadan interest to keep Carmona as an independent buffer between it and Seville, sort of a canary in a mine. . The Sevillians probably did not try to take Carmona out of memories of what happened in 1039 at the Battle of the Genil.

Nagrela described it all in two poems. In the English translations the first was only 45 lines, the second about 75 lines. Like most of his poems he spent a lot of time creating praises to God before getting to the important points. An excerpt from the first one gives some idea of the man's attitudes.

"I trust the Lord who caused my enemies to fall into snares that lay in hiding for my own footsteps.

On the day that the foe came into the fortified city and slaughtered the commander like a calf and fatted cattle.

This foe was kin to my King and the treachery of a stranger is less painful than that of a friend.

Two viceroys of Spain were there together with the troops of the zemari

They vanquished the city and moved like a deadly disease to the mountain fortresses to ravage them

And we moved out to expel them and God proceeded to banish them in my behalf.

The beginning of the month of Elul found them upon the heads of the rocks, without grass and fruit.

And we made them fall to the earth like birds who have touched the heights and are no more.

They were scattered in four or five directions like olives shaken by a hired hand.

And we slew them two upon three like the pointing ..

We smote them with a devastating blow...

And we defeated the two viceroys-for this is the punishment of the rebels

All were annihilated save nine who fled and he (Yaddair) the tenth with them.

He was sought out and carried as a prize and a gift to my King ...3

Nagrela's second poem on the subject shows more of what his experiences meant to him.

“I thank you (now) with song as when the rebel and King's kin entered the fortress in his folly

And there thought to save himself in his stronghold

As he entered therein,-even a curse stuck to him like leprosy.

We encamped at its base and his men on the towers were small in our eyes like locusts and worms,

But with God's sword my troops were successful while his followers were by the sword cut down.

.

The princes dressed in fine linen touched with red were made crimson by arrows and the assembly of the proud was covered with blood .

Here I saw a crowd breaking through and hurling stones and there I heard jubilant shouts and trumpets.

And we rose up and climbed to its tip on a ladder made of bows and flying arrows which wearied the tender hearted.

We made a road to their gates for all who would plunder and we came into their courts as one enters a city that is broken in.

And we made mounds of earth colored with their blood and a highway from the dried up corpses of their lords.

As you walked you trampled with your feet upon a body or a skull and you heard the cry of the mortally wounded.

Here were those who remembered and did avenge and were laden with booty while there groans of the wounded flowing with blood.

There they took Yaddair's two companions,-one was instantly slain, the other chained in the stocks.

But (Yaddair) fled with a trembling and a weak heart as one bereft of his senses and was not brought to justice or to the bidding of the King.

The fugitive thinks that every tree wiles to kill him and each rock is a sword that will cut off his arm.

He escaped to a mighty potentate while his mind went mad after what he saw happening to his companions.

it sated by our victory we took him from there by a stratagem with a high hand and clear planning

I drink the cup of salvation even that of my triumph while he imbibes filthy spittle and shame in his beaker"4

All this occurred on Granada’s western front in 1043 (there were really no borders, only battle fronts). The previous year also produced some problems on the eastern front (I am breaking down events by geography first then chronology, hopefully that will make things easier to follow). Almeria was short a King after the battle of Alfuente. For some reason the local oligarchs sent out to the King of Valencia for one. He came to Almeria and dropped off his son, Ubaidallah, to rule the country and his brother -in-law, Abu-l-ahwas Ma’n, to run it. The latter showed his gratitude by staging a revolt against his nephew in 1042. The King of Valencia of course counterattacked and invited the King of Denia along for support, of course at a price. That King had territorial ambitions of his own that the Valencia King certainly bribed him with.

Ma’n found himself in a fix. He now had two armies at his back instead of the one he had counted on. He correctly saw that this presented an opportunity for Granadan assistance. Badis saw, or was made to see that three weak states at each others throats was more in his interest than two moderately strong ones with good relations with one another. This was a decisive argument for backing Ma’n with an army. Assistance for Almeria involved certain complications unlike similar efforts in the west. The logistics of moving an army east to Almeria involved moving forces over 8,000 foot mountains, something that argued heavily against successful deployment in time to make a difference. Nonetheless duty required that both Badis and Nagrela try and that they accompany the army on this trek. A far greater complication arose because of the effect of the march on Nagrela's health.

The 48-49 year old Vizier received a warning, this time from nature. The rigors of the march to and from the east had so weakened him that he nearly died. Since Granadan strength was a function of Nagrela’s health and state of mind even a victorious outcome that took Nagrela out of the picture would have been a disaster for the Sanhadja.

By this time Badis' was either on his way to or had surrendered the day-to-day administration of Granada to his Jewish Vizier. Nagrela became in effect the guardian of a man whose subject populace wanted that lord dead and the custodian of the state, an Andalusian version of Cardinal Richelieu. Badis responded to his unpopularly by retiring on the job, staying drunk and letting the Jew run things, in short he pioneered a management technique widely adopted centuries later in the Soviet Union.

As luck would have it they could have taken their time. The King of Denia had grown suspicious of potential Valencian power, his mercenaries wanted their pay and out and he was out of money. By the time the Granadan army had encamped outside the city of Velez with the intention of marching on and relieving the siege of the city of Lorca, the alliance had fallen apart and there was no fighting to do.

Mutadid and the King of Ronda

Cast of Characters

Abu Nur Ibn Abi Kurra, King of Ronda

Muhammad ben Nun, King of Moron

Mutadid, Kadi of Seville

Ibn Bakunna aka Ibn Musa, Malagan Vizier

By 1044 a list of Nagrela's enemies would have read like an obituary column, Yaddair was finished and probably dead, so was Boluggin; Zuhair and Ibn Abbas were likewise departed as was Carmona's ungrateful King. The Sevillians had looked like an expansionist state but since Genil they had only murdered the King of Carmona, an act that Badis and Nagrela would have liked to have claimed for themselves for the aid he gave Yaddair, and gobbled up the tiny statelet of Mertola, an act that seemed so natural it went virtually unnoticed. Sevillian silence could also be attributed to a change in command. Kadi Mohammed Ibn Abbad died in 1042 and was succeeded by his 26 year old son. The Sanhadja leadership was presumably relieved that the aggressive Kadi was no longer part of the Andalusian landscape. A 26 year old youngster could not be expected to continue the provocative policies of his elder with the surrounding states and their more mature leadership and experienced military. The developing bipolar conflict between Berber Granada and Arab Seville appeared over. Seville would probably lose territory once the smaller statelets tested the new leadership and found it uncertain and weak. In any event it seemed that at last Granada would have its respite from war.

The new Kadi of Seville would eventually take the name Mutadid. His Arabic name is somewhat more complicated so we will use that name since he is generally known by it in the west. He would have almost certainly agreed with the above assessment of Seville's military situation. When he came to power the Sevillian army was little more than a collection of mercenaries that were routinely beaten by the Sanhadja. A defeat at the hand of any state implied a vulnerability that any of the dozen or so Taifa states could be expected to find appetizing. That Seville was weak was known, it was paying tribute to a Christian state. The only possible way to prevent the otherwise inevitable assaults was to act quicker and with greater aggressiveness, brutality, vigor and visible ruthlessness. Mutadid understood his very limited options and took appropriate action, as it turned out he did not have to fake brutality.

The peculiar intellect of Mutadid would not emerge immediately after his ascension, but with his arrival the struggle for control of Andalus crystallized into a battle of wits between Nagrela and the Sanhadja on one side and Mutadid and whatever resources he could mobilize on the other. The character of Nagrela was already known, that of Mutadid would reveal itself in a way that the Dutch scholar Dozy would describe in a way that incorrectly contrasted him to Badis even though his real opponent was Nagrela "(they) differed as a barbarian villain differs from a civilized villain; and all things considered the barbarian was the least profoundly depraved of the two. Badis displayed a certain brutal frankness even in crime; Mutadid was inscrutable, event to his closest friends."1

Dozy wrote very early in the 20th century so he lacked our advanced knowledge of evil and human bestiality. If had written today he probably would have described Badis as a just a type A personality (worrier, heart attack candidate) and Mutadid as a type B (relaxed). As for being villains, he appears to have been somewhat unfair to both; both men had legitimate agendas towards which they strove with the support of their peoples. Neither had a barrier imposed by law or society to their passions. Both were surrounded by sycophants, both had to accept the presence of assassins in their life and plan their day accordingly. Their courts were centers of suspicion, fear, intrigue and insecurity. Both felt unloved. The result had to be isolation, loneliness in the mist of a crowd. Since no one could really be trusted so all had to be made to fear, a simple survival mechanism. In short, all the ingredients for paranoia, except that the enemies were real. In this condition they had to protect themselves and their dreams. As for cruelty, it was proof of sincerity. Failure to humiliate and gruesomely kill one's enemies whenever possible was an indication of weakness and indecisiveness, the very definitions of poor leadership ability. A humanitarian would have lost all respect, like Idris II of Malaga.

Mutadid's position therefore required by our standards (hopefully) that he lose a portion of his sanity; the part which is tormented by cruelty and unhappiness. Years later the necessities of political life in Andalus would dramatically intrude in his personal life. He would eventually kill his own son with his own hand, along with the young man's friends, servants and wives. To give the father his due the kid did try to kill him, but only after becoming so mortally afraid of the father that the son thought that was the only way to save his own life. There are many supposed quotes from the histories of the era, most are at best suspicious. One quote from a Vizier of Mutadid's the day after the massacre rings very real, "I entered the presence chamber with my colleagues. Mutadid's countenance was terrible to look upon; we trembled with fear, and as we saluted him we could scarce stammer a few words. The prince with a piercing glance measured us from head to foot; then roaring like a lion, he cried: 'Wretches! Wherefore are you silent? You gloat in your hearts over my misfortunes! ! Begone from my sight!"3

A confirming aspect of new Kadi's character is revealed in his choice of pastimes. Mudadid's was to collect a label the heads of his late enemies and keep them in a box under his bed; he would view them for entertainment the way a boy would his collection of base ball cards. He also hung people in his courtyard and was recognized as a talented poet. A stanza from one of his ditties read "Whole battalions have I put to the sword; the heads of my enemies, threaded like pearls, hang like a necklace on the gateway of my palace.” One gets the feeling that if circumstances had not made them foes, Nagrela and Mutadid would have been great pals.

For anyone in the position of the two leaders, Mutadid and Badis alter ego, Nagrela, certain responses must have taken on an almost instinctive nature, attack here, betray there, pay tribute to that King while demanding some from that one. The villainy that Dozy described was nothing more what today we call practical leadership skills for the time, the things they had to do to conduct business. The two appeared to have been made for the environment.

Back to 1044, Mutadid has been in power for two years, he is 28, Nagrela is about 50-51, Badis is drunk. Seville and Granada are the two big Islamic powers. The Christian states are advancing. For whatever reason, the most likely one being a preference for loot over danger, the Moslem states are more interested in plundering each other than fighting the Christians. There are a host of smaller states surrounding the big two, these are ruled by either Berber, Slav or Arab families. The foreign policies of a few of the statelets are predictable. Some like Santa Maria, are consistent because they live in utter terror of Seville. Others, like Badajoz unreservedly hate the Abbadids, so they too are predictable.

If there were newspapers at that time the headlines in 1044 would have bannered that Mutadid seizes the initiative. The story's details then would have delicately mentioned that whatever strategy he developed would depend on four statelets, the Berber ruled ministates of Carmona, Ronda, Moron and Arcos. These Berbers were Zenata, traditional Sanhadja haters although Zenata had served under the command of Zawi ben Ziri during the dissolution of the Caliphate. Now they were free to be who they wanted to be, hence natural enemies of Sanhadja and natural friends of Granada's enemies. Dislike of one traditional foe did not make them automatic friends of Seville, they were also traditional enemies of the Arabs, so they could enthusiastically serve either side with equal disloyalty. Carmona had changed sides like a weather vane, but it was still ruled by the Banu Birzali (Banu translates into clan or family), more ambitious and energetic than thoughtful. Moron was founded by the Banu Dammon, and currently ruled by a Mohammed ben Nun, the state was weak, but critically placed, and the mental equivalent of the Banu Birzali without the energy. Between it and Malaga was Ronda, a natural fortress ruled by Banu Yehfreni, perhaps the strongest of the four and allied with Seville. Raids could be conducted from there to any point on the compass and return to a defensible sanctuary. It would also constitute an active sanctuary for any force operating in the rear of any other force advancing into Granada or Seville. Finally there was Arcos, ruled by the Banu Kirzun, small and the weakest of the four.

Nagrela had a few very personal and unpleasant adventures due to the lack of terror of these smaller states. One occurred in the spring of 1045 at the hands of the King of Ronda, Abu Nun, at night, in an isolated country defile in the form of an attempted assassination. The level of importance given the attempt is seen in that the Ronda King, personally led the ambush party.4

The attempt was made when Nagrela was engaging in job related overnight travel, away from his home and city. Part of his duties was the overseeing of the repression of rebellions, a routine enough function for a Vizier. To this end Nagrela had gone to the northern part of Granada. The task appeared so ordinary that he brought his son Joseph along to see what daddy did at work. Fortunately the boy became homesick and returned home.

The Rondan knew how to set out a good ambush. Indeed it was such an important methodology that the procedures were detailed in an Andulasi treatise of the art of war 200 years later. 5 The first requirement was a defile. Ismail ben Abbadid ambushed and finished off some enemies in a defile and the soldiers who did in al Naja did so in a defile. Specifically a narrow pass with a river running through it was selected for the Nagrela's killing ground. Heavily armored horsemen were to lead the main attack followed by light infantry who would finish off anyone who was left.

Nagrela’s description of the event confesses that no one in his party foresaw any danger although they had apparently passed close to the Rondan border. They had settled in for the night, apparently so confident of a peaceful evening that guards were not posted. Fortunately, the Rondans failed to think things through on several points. Their big mistake was that they apparently attacked at night or dusk, when their advantages in numbers and organization would be minimized. Control and communication, as well as their target identification would be almost impossible. The result was enough confusion to allow Nagrela and some others to lead their horses into the river and swim for as much safety as could be gotten by jumping into a river at night. The heavy cavalry and infantry of the Rondans dared not follow them into the river, the mud would have gotten them even if the current did not, nor could their archers find him. Nagrela and the other survivors found refuge on the opposite bank.

There are many interesting facets concerning the attempt. First, on the face of it the main winner of a successful assassination would be Seville. With Nagrela out of way Badis would operating without a brain, at least a sober one. In a balance of terror sense it would have been in Ronda’s interest to keep both states alive and at each throats, a balance of power that would assure the independence of the smaller states. However the Rondans behavior in the aftermath indicates their lord was more interested in undermining Badis than in helping Seville, but with the petty Kings treachery was so ingrained the attempt could have been due to force of habit as much to some complicated political ploy. More over whoever planned the attack had to have had detailed intelligence to know Nagrela’s routes, times of travel and number of men in his company. Everyone in those days had to watch his back.

Perhaps out of fear of a Granadan retaliation Abu Nun turned around and signed a treaty with Granada. Badis, and probably Nagrela, realized the blow this would deal to Sevillian plans. Turning an enemy into a useful friend was very much part of Nagrela’s modus operati as will be shown later, however what Nagrela would liked to do to his new friend is not hard to imagine.

Nagrela wrote a poem about the incident in which he credits God with his escape. Its circulation must have given him a measure of revenge in that it would have humiliated the Ronda King. The poem was entitled "Will You Remember This Only?" by Leon Weinberger, the translator. The first few stanzas sound like his traditional war poetry"

.

.

On the day the Kings gave chase to kill upon horses thick as clouds

And went in devious ways designed to ambush you from all sides,

You fled and fell into the river whose banks overflowed like a philanthropist's generosity,

But they were disappointed in their hopes as they returned frustrated with bitter sadness.

After these words the poem goes on for 55 lines on why he should remember all the other good things God did for him, including deportment at court

"He taught you how to reply nobly when standing before the King so as to save a life from the pit

And in peacetime, the proper conduct of peace even wise strategy in seasons of war.

He instructed you how to ignite the flames of conflict or put the heated passions in the councils

Even to tread upon an enemy with angry spirit as ones presses grapes in a wine cellar.

Will you remember this only? Will you not recall when He stood up for you in time of trouble and redeemed you speedily,

And sated your sword with blood like water drawn from the wells of rejoicing.6

He turned a miraculous rescue into proof of God's personal benevolence.

There were more good tidings for the Nagid from southern Andalus about the same time. The unfriendly vizier of Malaga, Ibn Musa, a.k.a. Ibn Bakunna, the same who plotted with the late Almerian Vizier Ibn Abbas and saved Nagrela's neck at the Battle of Genil, got on the bad side of some North African Berbers. His army was smaller than their army so when they offered him the chance to surrender he took it, then they killed him. Nagrela celebrated the murder in poem (below). His replacement was a Hammudite, which meant he could claim to be legitimate Caliph. He appointed a Slav, Naja, as Prime Minister and was then poisoned to death by his wife. The new Prime Minister, assuredly out of pure force of habit, started to plot against virtually everyone in the country. Finally his own soldiers started a conspiracy of their own the result of which was the seizure and decapitation of the new Prime Minister. Nagrela also wrote a poem about that Vizier's end. The deaths of Malaga's Viziers provided considerable material for Nagrela's poetic efforts. Note do not expect too great a repetition of the political problems of Malaga here, since the place seemed to switch ruler ever few years an earlier separate chapter is set aside to clarify the political attics of the Hammudites and their civil service. Suffice to say here that no one is entirely sure who ruled when. It more or less boiled down to the Hammudite family and their servants all trying to kill one another. Here is Nagrela’s poem about the killing of Ibn Bakunna, it says a great deal about the sensitivities of the scholarly Rabbi concerning his foes. (Nagrela actually wrote two poems dealing with the end of this enemy, see p. 68. In the preface to this one he relates that he was dreaming of his foe’s death when he was awoken by a friend who was sleeping nearby, a physician named Abu Mudin, a few days later Nagrela received the good news of Ibn Bakunna's demise.)

O bringer of good tidings, inform me and raise your voice with your favor

Chirp it to me like a swallow or a crane and be not stingy with your words:;;

"Is it true what I have heard, and how did it come about?"

Tell me "Has me the body of Ben 'Abi Musa been stabbed?

And his corpse,-is it dragged about in the streets and cast away?"

He answered me: "Rejoice and be happy and your heart be glad,

And rise and stamp with your feet and keep on clapping your hands.

..

For Ben 'Abi Musa is fallen in a pit

He longed for 'Ibn Abbas, who sought to slay you.

..

And go to all my friends and make them happy with your words,

That they may know that his soul is being dragged into hell

For a King has slain him...

Rejoice Ibn 'Abbas for your companion has come to visit you.

Dwell together and take turns beating each in the darkness

And if you wish, tie ropes upon your heads..

Like you may Ben 'Abi Musa rot in the grave.

..

I rejoiced at the death of my foes whether in their homes or on the battlefield.

And he said: Who is it that accomplished your desire for you?"

I replied: "Do you not know. God has done it!"7

Remember the young Nagrela's reply to Ibn Khalfun's poem, about God taking revenge for the wrongs done Nagrela.

The Not So Grand Alliance and Some Thoughts on Method

Do you remember the mountain pass of sand which I crossed alone while fleeing from you and afraid?

Even today I am in transit over you,-but behind me are tens of thousands who obey me like their father

And wait for my utterances as for rain and attend to my wisdom as to prophecy.

Because of this bless them for me my God,-may they follow after me willingly today.

(The Mountain of Sand, translated by Leon Weinberger)1

Sometime during that night in the defile during in 1045, between the first shouts of alarm and the time Nagrela was out of range of the Rondan archers, it must have occurred to the Nagid that Granada never be at peace until she was the dominate state in Andalus. It must have further dawned on Nagrela that this required the utter destruction of the greatest threat against Granada. He may have assumed it was Ronda, the ambush was an aggressive act against a state that had absolutely no desire for anything than peace.

The Sanhadja had no argument with this the Zenata King of that place, yet the Rondan had tried to kill him. The only explanation was that he did so for pleasure and for some sort of profit. That winter, in 1045-6, the Zenata rulers of Carmona and Moron jointly engaged in provocative operations against Granada apparently for the same reason. There was no explanation for their behavior other than the pleasure that came with gathering plunder. The Sanhadja needed peace but again showed their military skill by engaging in an quickly mounted counter raid into the territories of the two. It was Nagrela, now in his fifties who had to ride with the troops of Sanhadja Berbers to teach a lesson to the Banu al-Birzali and Banu Dammon. Territory and plunder from their realms was taken, most likely the wealth destroyed or taken belonged to the locals who did not wish to be involved in any fight between the North African tribesmen. Note: the above poem was written by the Nagid when he crossed a familiar pass while conducting operations against Moron and the Carmonan city of Osuna.

The two petty Kings did not call off their petty war by spring, actually it may have been nothing more than a series of forays, our definition of larceny seems to match theirs of war, and earned another visit by Nagrela and his Sanhadja friends as a result. The net result was an increase in Granadan territory, which also meant more demands on Granadan resources. Little is known about these campaigns other than they happened, and even that is uncertain.

While all this was going the weakling King of Malaga, Idris II, had ceded territory to both Ronda and Granada, giving both additional staging areas for an assault on one another. By 1046 the Ronda King felt secure enough to renounce his treaty with Granada and raid into Granadan territory. In the fall Nagrela led the counterattack into Rondan territory.

There is a literary note to these pointless stealing expeditions. The Nagid would trespass again over a route he took when fleeing Cordova thirty years prior. There were two poems written about this experience, one glorifying his success, the other contemplative. Whatever his words the trek had to be tiring and irritating. It is impossible to know how much of the adventurer still survived in the 53 year old.

Back to the fighting; the Ronda King rose to the challenge with a new improved strategy against a state that did not want to fight. He managed to open a second front against Granada in what was former Malagan territory, probably in the hope that a new theater of operations would alleviate pressure from his home front. This technique would become standard operating procedure in the years to come. The Rondan presence in Malaga was to become quite a nuisance.

The new front partially owed its creation to the unstable political situation in Malaga. The weakling Hammudite, Idris II, earned so much contempt that he was overthrown and a new claimant placed on the throne. Badis entered the flay in order to return the easily controllable weakling to the Kingship. It was then that the Ronda King entered the campaign in order to keep the weakling out and a strong anti-Sanhadja candidate in as well as diverting the Sanhadja army away from Ronda and towards Malaga. Among Badis' faults could not be counted cowardice, he took personal charge of the 1047 Malagan campaign. For whatever reason it was a failure. The new monarch retained the throne.

A failure in any sphere was to appear weak and therefore invite attack and thanks to the failed Malagan campaign Granada now found itself in that position. The King of Ronda was already obsessed with doing harm to Granada, the new King of Malaga, Idris III, a man as aggressive and cruel as his successor was delicate and indecisive, also saw that this was in his best interests in light of Badis' efforts to remove him. Now the character of the new leader of Seville, Mutadid, showed itself. He joined the lords of Ronda and Moron in a coalition against Granada. The Sanhadja had never had to fight such a coalition before, the danger the three represented was compounded by the possibility that they would find additional allies and become unstoppable. Much of Nagrela's education revolved around problem solving and these now showed that his and Granada's options were limited to fighting a multi-front defensive war with their enemies picking the time and places of attack or a preemptive strike at some weak point in the Sevillian alliance. An attack on Seville was,unlikely; it was too hale and would leave Ronda and Malaga in the rear of any Granadan army that moved against it. An assault against Malaga would leave the Sanhadja army isolated from its homeland behind a wall of 10,000 foot high mountains with the forces of Ronda and Seville a few days walk over plain from the Granadan capital. That left Ronda, the city on a cliff, conveniently located in the Guadalquiver basin. The city may have been on a cliff but the road to it was not particularly difficult. A campaign against the small, mountainous, strategically located and very overconfident statelet of Ronda was mounted.

The Ronda King may have thought he had the initiative when the Granadans failed in Malaga, whereas he was able to mount diversionary assaults upon Granada from his new fortresses there. If so the illusion of military equality abruptly ended when the Sanhadja successfully began operations in his territory. The pretensions of his one-man war against Granada were forgotten and what was assuredly an excited request for military assistance was sent to Seville. For the first time Mutadid sent forces against Nagrela and it was to be an education for both. The Kadi's general Muhktar was dispatched with a force of cavalry that was to rendezvous with the Banu Yehfreni and jointly assault and crush the Granadans.

The Sevillians and Zenata had already seen the Granadans outwitted in Malaga and fighting on multiple fronts. They probably assumed their foes to be tired, that often forgotten but overwhelmingly critical element in warfare, and as such may have assumed an easy victory. With this in mind they joined cavalry forces for what they must have thought would be the final defeat of the war weary Sanhadja. Only a few things are known about the resulting battle; like its date, September 1047, it was a cavalry action, and the outcome was predictable and a forecast of things to come. The Sanhadja defeated the Sevillian-Rondan force, General Muhktar was captured and executed and the Rondans driven back within the walls of their tiny city. That done the Sanhadja lacked the logistics and spirit for a sustained winter siege and withdrew. Tactical victory followed by strategic defeat, although the Sanhadja tribesmen may have not recognized it as such. They still may have not conceived of any strategy longer lasting than that of a plundering expedition. Nonetheless the truth was that it was a strategic defeat, if the objective was to teach a lesson. That did not stop Nagrela from writing a poem about the campaign depicting it as a victory.

Did Nagrela really see it as a victory? Probably not, for one thing it was clear now that Mutadid was a fighter, and would almost assuredly continue his family's hostility toward the Sanhadja. Nagrela must have clearly seen that unless all the smaller states were brought within the Granadan orbit, or in some way neutralized, or Seville somehow destroyed, Granada would never be at peace or more realistically, achieve long term security. The Nagid was therefore confronted with two alternatives, put together and keep together an alliance that would eventually destroy the only state large enough to be a serious threat to Granada, Seville, or establish hegemony by some other means over the smaller states, in effect isolating Seville. The latter strategy would involve killing the leaders of the petty statelets and absorbing their lands, a program that required more resources than the Sanhadja had.

The former possibility, the formation of a vast coalition against Seville with the objective of eliminating that state once and for all, was the only real option. This option brought with it the nerve wrecking realization that the alliance partners would feel compelled to desert the alliance in direct proportion to the closeness of complete victory, either out of fear of Granadan hegemony or more likely, simple laziness and stupidity. Nagrela's task would be to try and convince his slippery allies to stay the course, in short convince them that this was a war to save their lives from the Abbadid ambition of conquering all Andalus rather than a plunder gathering expedition, the only type of strategic concept the tribesmen seemed capable of understanding. Here again the Jewish scholar reveals himself to be the only strategic thinker on the Berber side, or at least the most capable. He could be said to have been ahead of his time, or before it, because the generals of antiquity did think in terms of long-term goals rather than sheep stealing as a national objective, as did the Zenata Berbers.

In spite of a pessimistic forecast that he must have made about his chances partners for the venture were found, the Badajozis, never forgetting the humiliating beatings they received at Abbadid hands of course were in. Carmona came, the city-state with its capital 19 miles east of Seville, whose leaders thought that ruling a country was the same as running a collection of shepherds and livestock rustlers, as did little Moron and Arcos, whose leaders reasoned the same, both to the east of Seville and within a week's walk. What arguments Nagrela presented them with can be guessed at, a good one would be that bribed them with the possibility of more loot than they could get by raiding into Granadan territory. That would be enough to change the direction of their foreign policies. Even tiny Hvelva, little more than a hamlet on the Atlantic west of Seville joined. An alliance as widespread and ambitious as this required the appropriate symbolic rallying point, a religious sanctification that was such a traditional part of the Semitic warmaking method. Nagrela would have preferred the alliance be made in the name of the Hammudite Caliph-Emir of Malaga, the city was only a short trip away, unfortunately Malaga went over to Seville. Luckily there was another branch of the family that ruled in Algeciras, a tiny port at the tip of the straits of Gibraltar. The alliance members, at Nagrela's direction, therefore declared themselves for the Algecira King as Caliph. This called for a ceremony, the Kings of Granada, Carmona, Moron and Arcos came. The Kings of Badajoz and Hvelva could not make it but were present in spirit. The whole alliance and enthroning was choreographed by Nagrela, it was his tour de force, his opus magnum. The fate of Islamic Spain, or at least the Berber presence in Islamic Spain, was now dependent on the diplomatic and strategic foresight and skill of a Jew. He was at the pinnacle of his power; few diplomats were ever able to play so critical a historical role. The next Jew to hold such a pivotal position in deciding the diplomatic direction of a military alliance arranged for the survival of several independent countries would be Henry Kissenger.

The ruler of Seville, the one who tried to pass off a mat weaver as Caliph, propagandized against this new alliance, pointing out that the architect was a Jew. The same number of people who cared about the leadership of the Caliph of Algeciras cared about that, in short no one who mattered and probably no one who did not. Worse for Seville, or maybe better for Seville, it was deserted by the King of Ronda. He had evolved from recognizing the mat weaver as Caliph to the King of Malaga. Now with the winds shifting strongly in favor of the man he attempted to murder and the state he had continually harassed he decided to fence sit and see who came out on top before committing himself to any entangling relationships. The whole affair was something new among the Taifa states. A campaign launched not for the purpose of plunder or seizing bits and pieces of territory, but a multi-state effort aimed at the total elimination of a major Taifa state. There had never been such a wide spread coalition before in Andalus, nor would there ever be again. On paper it was the strongest coalition Seville ever faced; in reality the same phobias about single big state domination were still present in the hearts of the leaders of the smaller states, although their main preoccupation was assuredly easy plunder.

The diplomatic details of the alliance, that is, promises about the division of spoils, were completed by the winter of 1047, operations commenced the following spring. The initial assaults were to be two pronged, the Badajozis would attack from the north while another force composed of troops from Granada, Arcos, Moron, and Carmona would strike from the east. The Sevillians would be forced to defend everywhere or leave the avenues into their hinterland inadequately protected; eventually morale would break, and a siege would follow against an insufficiently defended city. Allied forces would then be in a position to take advantage of any opportunities the situation presented.

Again the results were foreseeable. The moves proceeded as designed. Sevillian territory was torn apart as her forces proved insufficient to mount the necessary counterattacks. The city of Seville was besieged exactly as planned. Nagrela personally led forces that burned a famous orchid overlooking the city, the famous Mount of Olives, he was always an unforgiving and spiteful man when provoked. He also took the towns of Osuna and Estepa, these must have been seized from Carmona earlier. Just as the objective was in sight another prediction turned into reality, the smaller states, true once again to their heedlessness of their own welfare pulled out of the alliance. Their objective had been obtained, widespread thief, so there was no motivation to continue with the risky, uncomfortable business of war. The Badajozis, the only state the Sevillians continually and decisively proved able to defeat, and Granada, able to win battles but unable to exploit the victories, were left isolated days away from their homelands trying to maintain a siege, protect supply lines and forage in unfriendly country. Partially it was logistics, perchance it was also morale, but the remaining two allies could not maintain the siege and had to withdraw.

Did both Nagrela and Mutadid see this outcome as inevitable? We can conceive of Nagrela praying that his child, the alliance, would last the few extra weeks needed to secure his victory, and cursing the inevitable failure for it to do so. Both Nagrela and Mutadid must have understood that an alliance was necessary to eliminate either one of the two major Taifa states and that none such with the smaller states could be trusted to last long enough to do so. The Abbadid, unlike Nagrela, could execute the logical answer, eliminate the smaller states. Nagrela must have now understood his task as concocting ploys to buy time until internal conditions in Seville neutralized that state as a threat to his own. It was a pessimistic forecast, but the only one that at least offered a glittering of hope.

Nature provided the alliance with its final symbolic gesture, the Hammudite Caliph-Emir of Algeciras died, apparently of natural causes. Nagrela used the tragedy to re-establish ties with the Hammudite King of Malaga. Since Malaga was looking for a friend at the moment Nagrela urged Badis to recognize the powerless Hammudite Caliph, that is, the King of Malaga, as the new powerless Caliph and the legitimate heir to the Omayyad throne. This act made Malaga and Granada allies again, which is to say that the Malagans were going to assist Granadans against her enemies until she received a better offer from someone else. The new alliance was tested in April 1049 when the Malaga King loaned Granada some troops for a small Granadan siege expedition that Nagrela led in person. The identities of the intended victims were not recorded but it sounds like a Rondan fortress was the objective. Of course once the outcome appeared nearing success the Malagans deserted. The prospect of harm, irregardless of the potential for profit by taking the fort, may have been the reason. With the Malagan desertion the besieged felt confident enough to foray from their fortress and take at least one Granadan prisoner, a Jew named Samuel Ibn Nagrela. What would happened if they killed Nagrela right then and there? The Kadi of Seville would have been overjoyed to add Nagrela's head to his collection, the King of Ronda would felt cheated but happy at having the job finished that he had to leave undone in a defile a few years before. Whoever the captors were, and whatever their excuse for not killing the Jewish Vizier their opportunity passed quickly. The Granadans rallied, counterattacked and retook their Jew. Nagrela wrote a poem of thanks about the event. A good guess is that Nagrela's rescuers received a handsome tip.

The following year, 1050, the Berber King of Badajoz, the King of Carmona and Badis jointly attacked Seville. The attack was not a single thrust, but rather separated, with several armies advancing at once, from several different directions. In fact a repeat of the same technique used by Nagrela against the Sevillians two years earlier. Indeed it was almost a play by play repeat of the events of the first collective effort against Seville. At first the King of Badajoz was successful, but the tide turned and the Sevillians started inflicting defeats on the Granadan ally. The Sevillians played the Malagan card, as the King of Ronda had done before, by convincing the King of Malaga, the one just recognized as Caliph by Badis, to attack Granada. The diversionary tactic first developed by the Rondans was now standard operating procedure by the enemies of Granada. As before Badis had to withdraw his army from Sevillian territory and turn it on Malaga. But rather that let the new Caliph gloat over his military acumen he cut the Malagan state to shreds. It apparently never occurred to the Hammudite that he had little to gain from engaging in a war with a larger state based on the promises of one who was in no condition to aid anyone. Perhaps he was hoping that Badis would break off the contest after a few skirmishes and plunder as had occurred before. In any event Badis could not let the Malaga King think that undermining important Granadan military programs by treachery would result in a mild counterattack. As usual Nagrela wrote a poem about the war. Just as typical there was no closure to the hostilities; it was all part of Seville's strategy and the stupidity of the smaller petty states.

This would be a good time to address how the poetic and analytical mind of Nagrela synthesized the political and social realities that confronted him. As with all men he was a product of breeding, experience, education and thought, so through these filters he evaluated the normal confrontations between servant and sovereign, the state and history, goal and ambition, and a leader and his responsibilities. All these observations were tuned to adages or poems that address the topic with such articulation that speculation concerning Nagrela's views are unnecessary. Note that even though Nagrela made a career of saving Badis' life, position and neck, and Badis in turn made him probably the most powerful Jew in the world; there is only contempt for the man displayed in these stanzas. . (Leon Weinberger gave the titles to these poems).

At Court

Does your King anger you with bitter words and deeds?

And you hope he has turned from his wrath?

But can the wisest of man break an earth jar

And guarantee that he will once again put together the shreds?2? 2

The Monarch’s Favors

A Monarch will not favor you unless he hopes to be

At ease while you labor and exert yourself in his service.

You are caught in his tongs: With one hand he brings you into

The flames,-, -while protecting you from the fire which with both hands he sets against you.3

Dread Your Great King

Dread your great king whether he be resting or scolding

And his wrath both with your own home or in the gates.

He is pacified like a child; he rages like a boor.

He will strike you and laugh; he will slay and not care.

His anger is like a blazing fire consuming the trees of the forest.4

He Promotes the Clowns

Fickleness in a King is like that of a drunkard

He is appeased when he should be angry; he is wroth when he ought to be forgiving.

Occasionally he exalts the wise, though more often

He humbles them and promotes the clowns.5

and also as though that were not obvious enough;

Is there any frustration like that of these?

The wise being judged by fools,

Failing strength as it is broken by force

or the kind who depends on the cruel?6

Nagrela is remembered for his war poetry, but here there is something also unique, could it be called bureaucratic or managerial poetry? Could any management Sciences professor say as much with so few words? The attitudes reflected in these poems must have been old in the time of the pharaohs.

There is another observation about these stanzas; they could have gotten Nagrela killed if Badis had seen them. There is clear evidence of disloyalty in them; Badis had a definite program for those suspected of disloyalty. But Badis did not see these poems, they were published after the author's death. Nonetheless, they could have used by enemies of Joseph Ibn Nagrela. For whatever reason they were not, perhaps.

There is another very illustrative anecdote concerning Nagrela's place in Badis' eyes and Nagrela's methodology. As usual there is more than one version of the story. One day Badis and Nagrela found themselves strolling in front of an Arab merchant. The Arab cursed the Vizier so thoroughly that the King offered to have the Arab killed. Nagrela replied that would be unnecessary and that he would handle the problem. The next time the King and Nagrela ran into the Arab he was singing the praises of the Prime Minister. The King asked how the miraculous transformation occurred. Nagrela explained he had given him a sum of money. That's one version.7

In the second version the Arab is imprisoned by the King for his impertinent language and his tongue ordered to be cut out. Nonetheless Nagrela has him released. That kindness kindles a new respect and love for the Jewish Prime Minister and King and induces a new attitude in the merchant.8 When Badis asks why he did not cut the man's tongue Nagrela answers that he did, and he had replaced with a silver one. The reader can pick his favorite version of the story. The first seems to ring a bit more in keeping with the character of the Vizier.

There is also a poem in which he complains of a courtier whom he considered a friend but who spread a lie about his health. Nagrela was hurt by the new knowledge that the man could not be trusted, a discovery that was certainly part of his education at court.

As for man and the state and history; there are only a few translated poems that cover Nagrela's attitudes on the subjects and those could have been written by Niccolo Machiavelli if he had been a poet. As in so many things the Italian renaissance and Andalusian period of the Party Kings produced identical attitudes. An Andalusian gentleman was expected to be versed in historiography. Ahmand Ibn Hazm stated so specifically and the scholarly population of Andalus certainly took for granted. There is only one translated poem by Nagrela about the subject but its says a great deal about what the author considers important.

When the state begins it is harsh, for

all rebels are instantly slain.

If any revolt when it is firm, he suffers,

but not death's bane.

When 'tis calm and at least like to Tyre, then

it remains so a while ere it fall

Like fig from a tree which at first

is hard and tart to the taste.

And so it remains for some days, though

its hardness with moisture is laced.

And when it grows full and handsome and ripe

from the tree it will certainly fall.9

The poem is from a collection called, Ben-Mishlei, Son of Proverbs, it could have come Machiavelli's The Republic.

Note what Nagrela considers the hallmark of a young country, it deals harshly with traitors. There are no comments about a virtuous King or energetic population, what is noticed is its severity towards rebels. Also notice that an advanced state of civilization according to the poem is an indication of softness that will inevitably led to the destruction of the state. Historiography reduced to kill or be killed. It seems to argue against humane behavior, because that hallmark of civilization will be seen as softness will lead to the fall of the state. This may be reading too much into a few lines but the trend is very much there. Be heartless to your enemies and survive, get soft and die, no petty ruler in Andalus or Renaissance Italy would disagree.

As for courtiers,

Take risks when you aim for power,

And defeat the foe with the sword.10

One recalls Van Clausewitz's maxim that in war boldness is everything.

Also

Be patient in taking revenge on an enemy, even if the days pass

Before time comes when you have the power to slay him.

Learn from the baby birds who dwell on the cliffs of the rock;

They do not budge unto they have grown feathers.11

In the same vein,

Announce good things to the hater with your lips

But inwardly beware of his deeds.

Keep his offenses in your heart.

And when you find the possibility to kill him, do so speedily!12! 12

And a warning,.

He who depends on the princes

rises and falls with their fate;

as he who fleeing by ship is saved

from evil, or sinks with its weight.13

There is another poem that rings very democratic, one that shows that a humane philanthropist existed in the same soul as a Machiavellian schemer.

Who forgives his people's misdeeds

And toils for the good of the poor.14

The Nagrela who wrote that would have agreed with the Lincoln who said that statesmanship is using individual meanness for the general good. There is another poem that supports this view the power should serve morality.

The tyrant who rules the homeless and poor

with harshness forgets, enticed by his power,

that the Lord holds moments like arrows that kill-

and one will soon strike through his liver.15

Along the same lines, a King's duty to lead by example is promoted

Could Kings right a people gone bad,

while they themselves are twisted?

How, in the woods, could shadows that bend

be straight when the trees are crooked?16

From another poem,

How many are there who heartless destroy, and think their destruction a start?17

Compare that line with the attitude of the Taifa leaders who initiated pointless wars yearly as little more than shoplifting expeditions.

Another could be considered a warning to the frauds he saw at court.

Flutter or rest, every soul

in goodness receives its lot:

to this one much, to another a little

guile won't change what you've got.18

Whatever the ruthlessness in Nagrela's character it was tempered by principle, there must have been considerable balancing acts in his soul.

Besides this there is little on Nagrela and political theory, but what little there is qualifies Nagrela for another title, the Jewish Machiavelli.

Mountain of Sand

A mighty force I posted for the night in the fortress

Which sovereigns had long since destroyed.

We slept within it and by its side

Even as its owners slumbered below

And to myself I said: "Where are the multitudes

And the nations who dwelt here before us?

And where those who built and laid waste;

The princes and paupers, the slaves and masters?

...

Indeed, O my soul, indeed like them will I be

On the morrow, myself and this huge force!1

It is 1051. After a series of military reverses Seville and it dictator are stronger than they have ever been. Granada, after a succession of battlefield victories has failed to achieve the one condition that guarantee the survival of the Sanhadja venture, peace.

Mutadid had taken tiny Mertola in 1044 as a precludeprelude to bigger fish. By 1051 conditions were right for a massive program of expansion, in short Mutadid was confident that he had the resources to handle the inevitable counterattacks that would be attempted by his victims. First on the list in 1051 was tiny little Niebla. When the prince of that state saw himself threatened he asked and received aid from Badajoz and Carmona. Both sent armies, Carmona included a prince with its. The response of the grateful Nieblan prince was to deflect to Mutadid. The Abbadid then destroyed the allied army, killed the Carmonan prince, adding that man's head to his collection. The Badajozis likewise suffered devastating losses. After finishing with those two Mutadid decided to finish what he started and turned on the Nieblan prince. The Nieblan leader saw the game was up, surrendered and was given a gentlemanly escort to Cordova, his head safety on his neck. It was Huelva's turn next. It was Arab but the Abbadid program called for unification as well as Berber elimination, as a bonus it was a former member of Nagrela's grand alliance against Seville. Apart from the principle of the thing the prince of that hamlet state had enough money to interest Mutadid. The prince saw his "country" was finished and arranged to sneak into Cordova with the help of a Carmonan escort; his money traveled with him.

Another miniature Arab state, Silves, went next. It was so impressive a nation that Mutadid entrusted its reduction to an army led by his thirteen year old son. The prince of that place vowed to die fighting, but failed and was exiled after his town was taken. Santa Maria went next, after a brief resistance. All these absorptions occurred by 1052 by one source, between 1053 and 1057 by another. another.2 The earlier date has the support of a different source that noted that in spring of 1052 Mutadid moved against Carmona, something he would be unlikely to do with so much unfinished business in his rear. These conquests produced more reflection than understanding on the part of the rulers of the other petty states. Many still sought alliance with Seville.

Carmona was always an annoyance, it was uncomfortable close to Seville, Berber, unfriendly, with an unhappy Arab population. More to the point, Seville always had a great deal of luck killing Carmona's Berber rulers. The war started in the spring of 1052 with the traditional invasion and siege followed the traditional request by the Zenata rulers for Granadan aid. Badis promptly sent his Jewish warhorse and army to the rescue. The Sevillians fled with their coming and found an adequate fortress where they were in turn besieged by the Granadans. The Sevillians then launched the traditional diversionary assault against Granada by way of Malaga. After two weeks the Sevillian expedition in Malaga withdrew, probably after alleviating enough pressure on their besieged comrades in Carmona to allow them to escape.

That is the version according to one source, according to another source Samuel and the Sanhadja fought a major battle against the combined forces of Seville, Ronda, and at least six other small cities (I am quoting verbatim here) in the mountains near Malaga. According to the source he won a decisive victory. It is impossible to know which source is more reliable. The second account seems the less likely of the two because it is questionable that by 1052 there were six smaller states left in condition to undertake operations against Granada.3

Nagrela was 60 now. His attitude towards war, at least in his poetry no longer expressed of accomplishment that came with killing one's enemies.

"War at first appears like a beautiful woman, with which every man wishes to flirt, but finally appears as an ugly old woman, which all are sad and in tears after meeting."4

In the same vein,

"I am disgusted with the service of Kings

Ever ready for battle."5

He even wrote a short poem about being 60. The last two lines are

"The age of sixty differs from previous years; it removes my perversity with its own.

And after 60, laughter will no longer be upon my mouth nor singing on my lips"6

There is another poem, although it is not clear when it was written it is perhaps an apt model of Nagrela at 60.

"When you are depressed make your heart strong,

Even standing at death's door

There is light in the candle before it is out,

And in the gored lion, a roar." 7

While the Sevillians were busy in Carmona and Malaga the eastern front started to cook. The details of this war can be described as the usual provocations. The current King of Almeria, Muhammad ben Ma'n had succeeded his father in 1051 (sources of course disagree on the date, but 1051 is certainly close enough). The new King was a youngster which made his country more appetizing than usual to the neighboring states. These included Valencia and Toledo, even a district governor of Lorca, part of Almeria, turned of his young master. The young man's uncle sent a request for aid to their old benefactor Badis. The same truths about the eastern front prevailed as before. Divided they threatened no one, united they could turn into another Seville or a strong ally of Seville. As usual Badis and Nagrela took to the field, this was the spring of 1053. Again the aging poet general had to cross the high sierras with all the exhaustion of the climb, with the dry air assuring that the temperature would vary between very hot and very cold coupled with all the pleasures of a cuisine restricted by limited storage, transport, and budget. What other joys troops crossing the mountains can be guessed at. Worry and stress would inevitably be part of the wise commanders baggage, would the army be large enough and healthy enough when it arrived at it destination, would the capacities of the enemy army be greater than one's own. Worse the time in the field was time away from the desk and drawing room, where Nagrela created and entertained.

Unfortunately for the talents of Nagrela and Badis there was not much of a fight. Internal dissension and disputes over money in the aggressor’s forces guaranteed they could not fight a protracted war with Granada. The alliance fell apart as Badis-Nagrela lifted the siege of a coastal town. Nonetheless the Granadans lacked the will and resources for a sustained effort to retake all that Almeria had lost. As a result Almeria lost most of its territory.

As for the southern front; the increasing strength of Seville and the unstable condition of the eastern front made the independence of Hammudite Malaga an unacceptable variable in Granadan security arrangements. Granada had been attacked too many times from Malagan territory, Seville was obviously eyeing that territory for eventual absorption, and sooner or later Granada would have to fight to take Malaga or retake it from Seville. Common sense demanded the removal of an unfriendly monarch as a precursor to occupation.

There is a story that like one of those concocted for some Arabian Nights history on the act that led to this elimination. Supposedly in 1053 or thereabouts Badis sent as a present to the King of Malaga, apparently Mohammed ben Idris, a cup of wine. According to the words given the Granadan courier who carried to repeat, that was fit only for a Caliph. The Hammudite was about to taste it when he grew suspicious and asked the courier to taste it first. The courier did and promptly dropped dead. Apparently the vapor coming from poison was potent enough to kill on its own for the Malaga King died three days later. The story is too clear and detailed to be trustworthy. Even the name of the courier is given in a time when histories would confuse the names of Kings. Since those times were too disorganized for anyone to take and keep reliable notes such detailed accounts are very suspicious.8

But suppose it did happen, would Nagrela be capable of planning and executing something so blatant. He could hate enough to kill, and be patient enough to ignore his feelings until opportunity for action presented itself. Political assassination was part of his job, nonetheless so coarse and indirect method seems unlike the man. Who knows? Whatever the circumstances one more Hammudite was dead, that clan weakened further by another lost at the top and Malaga edging towards absorption by Granada.

Meanwhile the Kadi Mutadid had worked out the details of the playbill of 1053. At first sight it was to be the traditional multi-small state alliance, supported by a big state, against another big state. Troops from Moron would start the show, once the Granadans staged the inevitable counterattack Ronda would attack from the southwest. The Sanhadja would again be divided, overextended and pushed back, maybe losing enough ground and personnel so that everyone gone go home with a piece of Granada.

There was some good news, Granadan intelligence picked up word of the impending assaults, not that it made much of a difference. The Sanhadja army was defeated in a succession of an encounters. As of December 1053 the tide of battle appeared to be going heavily against Granada. No one realized it, but Granada was not Mutadid's target for that year, it was the states that he had fighting Granada, his allies.

In Moslem custom, as in Jewish, the circumcision of a newborn son is a time of celebration. Relatives, guests, and those with whom one wishes to remain on good terms with are invited to the ceremony. So it was with that the lords of Ronda, Moron and Arcos received and accepted invitations from the ruler of Seville for his new son's circumcision. The specifics of what happened next depend on the source, although all of them agree on the outcome. According to one author, the three leaders arrive at the same time and are immediately offered a refreshing steambath by Mutadid. In another version the three are about to leave when Mutadid accuses them of half-hearted loyalty and has them imprisoned for three days in their tents. After that detention releases the three and by apology gives them a banquet and recommends them to a refreshing steambath. The centerpiece of the tale is the steambath, something not normally associated with shifts in the balance of power or geopolitical opportunism. Whatever the circumstances the three found themselves relaxing in Mutadid's sauna, so much relaxed that they either did not notice or attach importance to the masons working around the room's entrances. These were walled up, the temperatures rose and the three Kings steamed boiled to death. Insult was added to injury when their heads became part of Mutadid's collection.

Any worries Nagrela had about the outcome of that year's campaign were alleviated with the elimination of the opposing teams' leadership. Mutadid had successfully solved a problem that Nagrela had found so vexing for so long, what to do with those irritating, fickle, smaller nuisance states. It was taking forever but gradually under Abbadid leadership Andalus was reuniting. As for the Arcos-Xeres, Moron and Ronda, with their rulers dead, new leadership not yet established or organized and their armies engaged in a war against the only state strong enough to defend them, their short term prospects appeared dim.

(There is an obliviously false explanation why Mutadid cooked his guests found in Dozy. According to this story he overheard the three lords planning his own murder when he was once their guest. The story is too detailed and convoluted to be true besides the fact Mutadid probably did not speak Berber. Furthermore why would they fight his by side if they were going to kill him, that would be an unnecessarily complicated betrayal even by the standards of the time. If any further confirmation is needed the reader can ask how is it that such a conspiracy tale was recorded and from what sources. It sounds as though Mutadid cooked up the story himself to justify the murders.)

The Sevillian army struck first at Ronda. There was not much fighting, at least not by the Sevillians. With the Rondan army engaged with the Granadans the Arab population at last had a chance to strike at their occupiers. They rose and slaughtered every Berber not lucky enough to escape the city, non-combatants included. The son of the late lord tried to escape down the cliff the city was built next to but slipped.

Arcos-Xeres promptly disappeared from the map to be replaced by a slightly enlarged Seville, which left Moron. The successor of the late ruler asked for and received Carmonan and Granadan help. In 1054 the armies of the three Berber states met and perpetrated their traditional defeat on the Sevillian army. The architect of the victory was Nagrela, who conducted the campaign and diplomacy. It was a setback for Mutadid, but Mutadid always experienced setbacks, the long-term trend towards the elimination of all the petty states was clearly visible. The remaining Berber states could only delay the inevitable, assuming they even understood what was happening. They may have thought Mutadid just wanted to steal Arcos’, Moron's and Ronda's sheep.

There were specific aspects of the conquest of Ronda and the rebellions elsewhere that Badis certainly found unsettling. The Arab citizens of three towns killed their Berber neighbors first chance they got. This was a bad sign for a cruel, unloved drunken Berber prince who ruled over an Arab population, for it certified that his Arab subjects could serve as a fifth column of potential traitors within the Sanhadja settlement.. The alcohol rotted mind of Badis was incapable of solving any problem by guile, so this one he planned to solve in the same way he would have solved the problem of the disloyal officer corps if Nagrela had not stopped him. His very simple, very practical plan was to kill a significant portion of Granada's Arab population before they had a chance to be openly disloyal. He worked out the details by himself; part one was that the news was to be circulated that on a certain Friday the army was to have a review. This would allay any suspicions anyone would have upon seeing armed men all over Granada. Since the leveling was planned for a Friday, the responsible members of the Arab community would be at prayer in the city's main Mosques. These houses of prayer would make excellent killing zones, egress would be impossible once the attack started; the army would have an easy time blocking the exits and massacring the worshipers. Not as original as cooking them all in a steambath, but still workable, conclusive and efficient. Before he put the plan into operation Badis explained his ingenious idea to the Prime Minister, no doubt expecting his cleverness to be praised.

Unfortunately for Badis' ego Nagrela's old reservations about mass murder resurfaced. In the arguments he supposedly gave to Badis against the planned butchery he did not mention that the victims would include personal friends, a concept probably foreign and therefore incomprehensible to the Berber lord. Such a statement would have certainly placed the Jewish Vizier among the first victims, and possibly the first. Rather than tempt fate Nagrela brought out the practical aspects of making every Arab household in Andalus swear personal vengeance against the Sanhadja over the murder of their compatriots (if he did use this argument it was a poor one, Arabs butchered Berbers on principle, without personal antagonism). Badis however, according to the story, had already made up his mind and could not fathom Nagrela's lack of enthusiasm for such an easy and practical solution to the Arab problem, especially in one previously so enthusiastic about killing rebels. Nagrela seeing no possibility of altering his master's plans promptly tipped off the Arabs, supposedly through a female acquaintance, and when Friday came the Mosques were almost empty. The Prime Minister was subsequently called on the carpet by his boss, who was outraged at having his good idea ruined. Now it was Nagrela who had to wiggle out a change of disloyalty, the one area were Badis and every other tyrant draws the line and the fully understanding the punishment for that charge. Nagrela may have had second thoughts about endorsing the death penalty for traitors in his poems. First he lied and said the presence of the soldiers frightened off the practitioners; the military review cover story was presumably suspicious to a people who had to develop a sixth sense about politics in order to survive. Second he restated his objections to the attack, again coupled in “I am only thinking of you" terms.

Whatever the artistic exaggeration the gist of the story the methods and arguments ring true enough to be taken as approaching factual if not completely arriving here and there. A more exact truth would certainly show a more labyrinthine scheming than less. The more unknowable details aside, assuming that the main elements of the story are true then there were obviously limits to which Nagrela would let his ambitions and King carry him. Among his other qualities the Nagid should be remembered as one of those rare individuals who risked themselves, their families, wealth and careers to prevent an injustice. There are not that many examples of people willing to do that, particularly at the top echelon of government, were sycophants are the most prevalent. In any event he survived and so did the Arab community.

The events of 1054 are not clear, there was some fighting, Nagrela was victorious, but the campaign further assaulted his health, this time he even wrote of a skin disease. After two months his health returned, but not before he experienced a bout of delirium. The spring of 1055 brought the usual raiding into in Seville. The histories do not tell who the victims of these raids were. We can assume that they were subsistence farmers, already harassed by taxes generated by unending wars. One wonders why they were selected for pillage. Was it thought that their pain would be felt by the Kadi, the one with a toybox full of severed heads. The victims of the raid were like Zawi's horse, the one whose head was beaten because Zawi's head could not be. Unlike Zawi's horse they could strike back. The raiding had to produce new support for Seville.

The following year brought a Sevillian reaction in the form of raiding into the north of Malaga. Nagrela led the counterattack regaining fortresses and taking prisoners. The campaign ended as had most of his campaigns as a tactical success. It was a particularly good year for Granada, Malaga fell under some sort of Granadan suzerainty in that year. The Sevillians would try to retake it years later but the Granadans would get the best of them and retake it. Malaga would remain part of Granada through the vicissitudes of time and fortune until the final conquest by Pelayo's descendants in 1492.

By 1056 Nagrela must have felt his body surrendering to more than age. His last collection of poems are preoccupied with old age and death, indicating that he knew it was almost time to leave the stage. If he still wished to boast of further victories he could point to Malaga, if he still cared at all for all the aggravation that state caused him. As usual he had his vengeance, he was very big on vengeance in his earlier days, but now his poems indicate that he may have been, as we say today, sick of the whole thing. Whatever his sentiments, his guardians angels had could take pride in their accomplishments Nagrela's life read like a succession of success stories. His enemies were dead, at least several of the ones he was personally angry at, his friends secure, his community wealthy and protected, his literary, philological and religious works read and held in the highest regard or dislike by those he resented. The poets he had patronized were now on there own, at least one, Ibn Gabirol, on his way to surpassing his patron in fame. Hisdai and Kalfun, already having left the stage, would also find that ephemeral substance, fame.

Unusual things happened to those he touched. Ibn Janah who fought him, found his celebrity increased by his argument with the Nagid. The son of another foe, Ibn Migash, the one who had to leave Granada because he supported Yaddair, would rise to fame in the court of Mutadid and that Kadi's son.

He could boast that whole peoples applauded his performances. Within Nagrela's own tribe, Bnei Israel, that tribe that would forever retain its national solidarity although scattered to every corner of the earth, he was honored as a protector and scholar. The Arab population of Granada trusted his heart, the Sanhadja his intelligence. Perhaps there were no more conquests available for Samuel Ibn Nagrela Ha-Levi Ha Nagid. He was old enough to know the future could see that the next year promised more wars, more redundant pointless wearying campaigns against Seville with more pointless victories, generaled by a tired old Jew, albeit with fewer of those annoying little tinier petty states.

He must have understood that the eventual fate of Andalus would be decided by the forces that succeeded Mutadid, and that really was none of the Jews' business. Their business was to benevolently exploit their hosts for the benefit of the tribe of Israel. The rules of the game were imposed and thus the Jews would play. Brutally put, but what alternative was there, for the time being. The tribe, family, friends and God were the only important things. All these he had served. His tribe could be especially pleased, he allowed it to continue playing it's tricks on history for another generation, waiting for it's time, what form and when this time would arrive only God alone could decide. Since his son, Joseph, had been groomed by Samuel to take over his post, the father was expendable and redundant. He was getting in the boy's way.

He authored a poem about concern for one's legacy and worries over one's past. Part of it reads " For me there is only the hour in which I am present in this world. It stays for a moment and then like a cloud moves on."9 Every moment had to have a sensation or it was wasted; wasting God's gift was sacrilege. He was running out of sensations.

The scenes of 1056 were the last; Nagrela left the stage after 63 years. He died in December of that year, on campaign according to one source, after the completion of one according to another, in bed according to still another.10 The cause of death was certainly the prospect of boredom.

Ibn Daub wrote that he had "earned four crowns: the crown of Torah, the crown of power, the crown of a Levite, and towering above them all, by dint of good deeds in each of these domains, the crown of a good name."

Here is a corundum about the Nagid, would he have preferred to die in the field on a military campaign like Almanzor or in bed surrounded by family and books like a beloved scholar and gentleman?

The Jewish community was shattered. There were extensive memorial services in his honor as far away as Egypt. One of those who enjoyed the Nagid's patronage, the poet Ibn Ghayyath, wrote a elegy in Aramaic. Observers mention the wailing coming from the synagogues. They may have suspected that they were singing a dirge for themselves as well as for their prince.

There was a gate to the city, the Elbira, the Nagid was buried there. Ten years later Joseph was too, next to his father.

The Fall of Joseph and Granada of the Jews

The story of Samuel'sof Samuel’s son is the story of the end of the era of Granada of the Jews as a result of an anti-Jewish riot. After the riot the Jewish community continued there but they must have spent their time looking over their shoulders and looking for some place else to live. Their Golden Age ended either on December 20th or 30th of 1066, as usual the sources disagree, when an orchestrated riot caused the death of Joseph and an undetermined number of Jews (no two sources give the same number, guesses range from 300 to over 3,000, the more trustworthy ones do not mention a number, I suspect 30 is a better guess). Joseph's story is much more typical of the Taifa period than that of Samuel's, and very similar to that of the two Malagan Viziers, Ibn Musa and Naja, the Slavs who fought for control of their state at the cost of their lives.

The riot is often called a pogrom, because historians assumed it was another case of the Jews being assaulted because they were Jews as in 19th century Russia. Furthermore there were Arab historians who attributed the riot's cause to an anti-Jewish poem written and circulated among the residents of Granada. But Abd Allah, the anti-Jewish historian does not mention any poem. Nor does it seem likely anyone outside of a university would assault anyone else over a poem, it has never occurred anywhere else in history and potential rioters are seldom so literary conscious. The likely real cause of the riot had nothing to do with anti-Jewish propaganda, at least not in the form of a poem. A riot was the traditional Andalusian method of removing an unpopular magistrate. It happened numerous times in Cordova during the last years of the Omayyads. The target of the riot was not the Jews because they were Jews, but Joseph Ibn Nagrela and those who would give him support or would profit form his patronage. The Jews were attacked because they were of the same tribe as the Joseph, they were the ones supporting him and receiving his patronage. If he had been a Christian or Slav or someone named Smith those tribes or families would have been attacked. The reason there were no other anti-Jewish riots in Andalus was due to the absence of any other high echelon Jewish Vizier as unpopular as Joseph was. There was nothing atypical about civil strife and rebellions, Andalusian Jews initiated and participated in many. It was the electoral process of the times.

The sequence of events is described in detail by Abd Allah. In fact the details are too specific, therefore suspect, and much clearly not true, and most of the rest boring and pointless. At one point he describes verbatim a secret conversation in which the elders of the Jewish community advise Joseph on the best method for committing treason, as though the Zirid author were present or had notes from the meeting. Then, as now, concocting Jewish conspiracy stories to explain certain acts rather than attribute them to ineptitude is a characteristic of imbeciles who write.

Abd Allah's overall accuracy or rather lack of it can be judged from his account of another event, the rescue from the planned mass murder of Granada's Arabs. It was attributed to Joseph but probably (it is imkpossible to know for sure) took place during Samuel's stay in office. One thing Abd Allah is accurate about, the feelings he and others had about Joseph, these can be trusted and explain the truth better than his record of events.

Back to Joseph. We know some things about Joseph's family, he betrothed and married to the daughter of the highly respected Rabbi of Kairouan, who, by the way, Samuel had sent money to. When she arrived he was shocked to see that the girl was virtually a dwarf. He had a son, named after his grandfather according to most sources, who with his mother went to live with a poet friend, Ibn Ghayyath, the former protégé of the Nagid, in Lucena after the disturbance of 1066; the lad died during his twentieth year.

Joseph took over his father's position upon his father's passing. It was the tradition of the times for a son to move into the father's position after the elder's death or retirement. This Joseph apparently did, but according to Abd Allah the elder Nagrela advised his son on how to get rid of two powerful viziers who stood in his way, another thing the historian would have not known even if Samual had. He also accuses Joseph of buying off bureaucrats in order to get his father's tax collecting business and then of supplanting the man who gave him his job.

Abd Allah's had a reason for denigrating Joseph, the Nagid's son was the main suspect in the murder of Abd's father, Sayf al-Dawla. Sayf-al-Dawla was, according to Abd Allah, a man of the people. He was respected for mitigating the cruel judgments of Badis, revoking death sentences and generally known and respected for his humanity and ability. At first Joseph and Sayf got along. Apparently Joseph's ambition and the badmouthing by Joseph's enemies turned Sayf against his old friend. Joseph realized that his welfare and position depended on the next King being as friendly as the contemporary one (Badis) so, according to Abd Allah, he decided to eliminate his old friend so that he could have a more compliant brother become King in his place. In short setting up a Badis figure in lieu of a Boluggin or Yaddair. The method was poison, Joseph invited Sayf to his home for some talk and supposedly some poisoned wine. At the end of it Sayf took ill, dying a few days later. Everyone assumed Joseph did it, even though two others were executed for the crime. Abd Allah does not elaborate on the evidence against these two. Nor why Joseph would be so obvious.

The end finally comes when a drunken slave leaves a dinner given by Joseph and screams to the population of a purported plot to betray Granada to the King of Almeria. This immediately incites the population to attack the Jewish quarter and kill Joseph. How could anyone be suspicious of a story like that?

How much of Abd Allah's story is true and what was the real cause of the riot? As mentioned only Abd Allah's attitude is certain. As for Joseph, he had to be an intriguer, that was required. He had to increase the wealth of his cronies, or he would not have had any cronies. That meant he had to tap the sources of wealth for the state for his benefit. Translated collect and distribute taxes and appointments to his ends. Tax collectors are always unpopular fellows; we can assume that under Joseph's administration taxes went up as the well connected scrambled to become rich from soaking the productive. Another clue to the cause of the end comes from the Jewish historian Ibn Daub. He mentions Joseph's arrogance, even though the he wrote long after Joseph was killed. Perhaps the most significant statement about the Joseph and the perception of the Jews of Granada is from Abd Allah "All sections of the population had a detestation of the underhanded ways of the Jews and the widespread changes they had wrought for the worse. Appointments to offices were no longer what they used to be". Another clue comes from the author of the famous anti-Jewish poem that supposedly triggered the riot, he was a former judge or some such official who had lost his job for some reason. Like the population of Abd Allah's complaint, he blamed the Jews, hence the poem. It is the sad job of a fan of that creative time to say the obvious, the population of Granada was as just as prone to stereo-typing and witch hunting as any other people in any other time. Some Jews were guilty so all Jews were guilty. The fact that other tribes were also given blows, very often much worse and more often assuages the sadness somewhat.

So what we have of Joseph was what at first appears to have been a blessing, station without trial, was actually a curse. Ibn Daub says precisely that and seldom is a psychological cause such an obvious truth. He was able to gain no experience that came with gradually rising through the ranks; there was no place for him to safely make mistakes. He had never tasted failure, disgrace or poverty before having the finances and future of the state placed in his hands. He knew only the pinnacle and may have thought that station was affixed to the Nagrela family. Or so is the picture that comes down about the man. Compare the statements noting his Samual's talent for flattery to those noting Joseph’s arrogance. Abd Allah Ibn Boluggin describes him as flouting his wealth, wearing clothes more beautiful than the monarchs and living in a palace. He most certainly did that. He was one of the people who lived in and added on to the magnificent Alhambra. That part of the Nagrela legacy is very much alive and with us.

There are two other parts of Joseph's threefold legacy, he also edited his father's work, and his fate reinforced the fear Jews had about seeking high positions in government. The worry was that if something went wrong, it would not the fault of the man but rather the fault of the Jews. To what extent that fear exists today can only be guessed at, but it was alive and well a generation ago.

Perhaps Samuel wrote Joseph's and the Granadan Jewish community's epitaph in one of his poems.

"Man's sojourn in the mother's womb is a life in cramped quarters until the time of exit

And on the day of his going forth,-he comes into a distressing

world and narrowly he escapes from trouble to trouble.

On the day when he returns,-it is to a scanty grave and to the anguish of recompense for sins.

Will he forever be handed over from one dread disease to another and from ruin to ruin?

For what is the value of man stricken with hardship in a world without a cure?"1

A final corundum, in light of what happened to his son and the Jewish community in Granada, can Samuel the Nagid's life be judged a success?

Part III Character and Epilogue

Family, the Man, Faith, Community

Unless one is searching for scandal or melodrama the private life of public people does not offer much that cannot be safety ignored. Here the subject is Nagrela's soul therefore his private life is half the story. Family, war, the importance of education for the next generation are words that come uncomfortably close to summing up the man. The importance to the picture being painted of Nagrela is that love was a very large and important part of his character. This chapter could be entitled the loves of Nagrela.

His immediate family is easy enough to describe, a father Joseph and a mother not mentioned in his works, not surprising, in Moslem countries ones female relations were a very private and closely guarded matter. He had a brother named Isaac who died in 1041. Samuel wrote ninety poems about his dealing with his death, from illness to grave. He had two sons that reached adulthood, the older Joseph, born in 1031, and Eliassaf, born in 1049. There was also a daughter that died in June of 1044, and another son, Judah, of whom nothing is known. It is assumed he died in infancy.1

Although there are several poems expressing the depth of the love he had for his brother and son Joseph, at least in English translation, about Mrs. Nagrela we have only this advice to his son on the secret of a successful marriage.

If your wife would dominate and rule you like a husband

Beat her regularly.

Do not, my son, be a wife to your wife

She shall your women and you a man to her.2

There is nothing written or known about Mrs. Nagrela besides what can be deduced from this poem indicating he had a typical marriage. According to Ashtor he married the daughter of the murdered Rabbi Judah. Supposedly, her brother eventually was promoted to the chief tax collecting position in Granada after Samuel became chief Vizier. The absence of more information about the lady is understandable, as already noted, no Arab gentleman would ever consider his wife as a topic of discussion out side of the home.

As for his son, there are a slew of advice poems, such as:

"Fear your mother and speak kindly to your uncle and cousin and honor your friend..

..before you gain wealth acquire a good name in the community..

Speak gently to him and remember your own needs when making your

bequest.

Be brave for valor will bring you honor but do not rest upon my laurels, do not despise your subordinates."3

If Nagrela could pick out one poem that would describe all that is important to him it would probably be the one in which he writes his son about the work the boy did in his copy book. The poem is written before a battle and Nagrela is afraid for the boy's education should he perish.

"Joseph take this book that I selected for you from the choice works in the language of the Arabs.

...In order that wisdom may come upon you, -for it is dearer to me than discovering my foes defeated.

Take it and reflect upon it and quit the crowds who deride language and speech."4

Another four liner is pure advice.

"My son, do not devise evil in your heart against your friend and do not bring him to disgrace.

Take not even the wisest woman into your confidence, and do not experiment by drinking deadly drugs."5

Even then drugs were a destroyer of foolish and reckless youth, and a terror to responsible parents. His warning extends to wine, at least too much of it.

"My son, do not turn to wine when it is seen in the cup.

Would you rather tarry over your cups and put an end to your wealth and property.."6

And oddly for a wine loving man,

..vow to abstain from strong wine and intoxicating beverages;

..the goblet will destroy your vigor and make a hell out of your life."

There are those who drink both evening and morning and end up with their houses disturbed and destroyed."7

Finally there is the preface, written by his son Joseph, to another.

"And he (Samuel) had me copy in my youth and promised me compensation for my every notebook, and I sent what I copied and then he wrote me the following".8. Even then children expected to be paid for doing their schoolwork!

The Nagid liked giving friendly homilies as advice, he wrote a whole collection of advice poems, not all of it originally his. Such as what to expect when it comes to looking for a job (at least that is one interpretation).

"When you are poor,-ride a lion's back to get

Your food, and do not beg from others.

Be not envious, for desire will

Sadden your heart before it does others."9

As for listening to the intellectual elite.

"He will incite you to evil with dream-like talk

And with words of poetry he will urge you to deception.

My son, not every dream comes true

Neither are all the words of the poet veritable!"10

Now for sex. For most male figures of history the sexual histories are predictable, hookers, then marriage followed by mistresses. Nagrela, as usual offers something considerably different. Although nothing written or known about Mrs. Nagrela there is a great deal of his poetry dealing with the loveliness and desirability of young men or boys. This is shocking to us, so shocking one wonders why the editors of the work did not exercise the disgraceful works. The answer is that, in that society, in that time, and apparently this time, homoerotism for males was normal, end of story. The Afghan saying "a woman is a duty but a boy is pleasure" was at least partially if not largely the case in Andalus. Poetry about the sexual love of a man for a boy was so common that its acceptance is undeniable. . Although such poetry is not generally found in anthologies of Jewish literature, Nagrela was an Arab poet writing for an intellectual elite, he did not expect his poetry to be widely read or understood. As such his poetry on the subject is typical. Indeed his experiences, for the time he lived in, including sexual, are exactly what would expect from a person whose life was a search for sensation. He certainly was not alone or uncommon unusual. Another of the Spanish Golden Age's great poets, Moses Ibn Ezra wrote of the love he felt for a young Moslem boy, Arab poet Abu Amir Ibn Shuhayd wrote about his love lust for a Jewish boy, as did Arab poet al-Zaqqaq. In short, although forbidden in both in Islam and Judaism, as many things are, the condemnation was as respected as our condemnation of pornography. Perhaps the people of Andalus anticipated the contemporary approach and redefined the sin out of existence; pornography becomes adult, homosexuality normal although different. They just carried the trend a step further and throw pederasty in with the rest making it affection.. As a footnote, interreligious sexual unions indicate that the communities, Jewish, Christian and Moslem, were not obsessed with proving they were better than the other, let alone making the other guy miserable because of his faith.11

That does not mean Nagrela was completely on the other side of the fence. He also wrote poetry describing the beauty and attractiveness of Arab women. So did Ibn Ezra.

Here is an example of some the Nagid's erotic poetry.

"I have shown you a fawn in order to bring sorrow to your heart

By his eyes, even as you have brought grief to me.

The Lord who made your heart like cold snow to my entreaties

Has also placed within me flames of desire for you.” 12

The Nagid may have been a party animal. Like many Arabic poets he wrote a number of poems in praise of wine and its effects. The poems also praise the beauty of the male and female cupbearers who were the attendants at these parties. These parties for some reason saw the dawn break, one can assume because they lasted all night rather than started at four o'clock in the morning. Not all his get togethers had a potentially raucous tendency. At one gathering one poet guest recited a poem about a bowl of apples, another guest translated into Hebrew. The guests then asked Nagrela to improvise a poem about the apples, which he did. Apparently this was the party game for his class, like scrabble or wife swapping is today. It also says something about the caliber of talent of the guests in the Nagid's home.

The Nagid's solicitude was not automatic. There is a piercing satirical poem "about a dull man who clings" to him.

"your depth knows no bounds; you’re an angel of God, not a man.

Your name reaches to the stars and needs neither a ladder nor wing.

I'm imprisoned by someone besides me whose climbing knows no end.

He has no sword, but he slays me."13

In another poem he responds to "someone who sent him a weak poem".

"..I found it exquisitely copied-

all the vowels were precisely arrayed."14

The most biting and contemporarily applicable of his translated frustration poetry concerns listening in on a synagogue and hearing the practitioners make a mess of their studies.

"Could time turn on its scholars?

or have they turned on the law and bequeathed it to stuffed old fools in robes?

....

They think that by the grace of fringes and beard and turban that they are men qualified to head the academy?

Do you remember my brother when we both went to the synagogue..and heard an ass braying and shrinks of oxen and they were all howling close by.

And I said "Who is it that has turned the house of God into a stable, it is indeed a sin and a crime!"

And they replied "There are no asses or cattle in the house of the Lord, these are men engaged in a study of a tractate in the Talmud!"

And there was the teacher and his students...With their mouths they insulted Hillel and Shammai, and slapped the face of Rabbi Akiva."15

The Nagid ends the poem by giving the teacher the ultimate insult, he calls him a woman. One wonders what Nagrela would have thought of modern Jewish religious observance.

Now we finally get into the man and his faith. In truth we have been there all along. Every act in Nagrela's life, without reservation or doubt on his part, was choreographed by God. The medieval mind accepted this as too mundane a fact to be mentioned. That the Jews had the means to understand God was obvious from his study of the holy books.

The Judaism of the Nagid and community was much more than a list of holidays and prayers, as it is now, and more than a religion inside of a nationality as it was a hundred years ago. The Jewish universe had it's own portals to the will of God, its own history and prehistory, its own language, literature, wisdom, philosophy, laws, morals and even its own science and mathematics. The science was astronomy and was used to determine dates. Since the calendar was lunar and the lunar calendar was inferior to the solar the Rabbis had to be experts at mathematics and astronomy. Nagrela was. The discipline to master science was part of his practice of Judaism. Time itself, for his heart, was Jewish. So was his cuisine, like his language, music and poetry, it was Arabic only the outside, but conforming to the Jewish universe on the inside.

There was a problem Nagrela and all the Jews of Araby faced, as well as those of Christendom, mistreatment at the hands of the non-Jew. How could they reconcile the insult of official inferiority with the knowledge that they had the better truth? Then, as now, barbarism was blamed on evil men rather an incompetent and uncaring God. The Nagid's poems destroy the rosy picture that sometimes arises concerning the convivencia, the living together of the three faiths in relative harmony. Perhaps some undefined percentage of Moslems considered the Jews the equivalent of educated Negroes in the old south, tolerated but occasionally needing to be reminded of their place. Or perhaps the Jews felt something that was not entirely there. Nagrela's poem on this condition, unlike many of the Jewish poems from this era, reflect a desire to get at the offenders throat, rather than a whiny lament over the lost of Jerusalem.

"Lord bare today your right arm and rescue the children of Abraham from Edom (the Arabs), and to those who flaunt their pride and haughtiness before you grid yourself in the strength to rebuke them in anger.

Annul the covenant made by those who fail to do your will and establish the promise given to David the monarch of your Kingdom.

Upon those who stretch forth their hands against your flock

Send your wrath, like a raging and consuming fire!"16

And in another poem.

"Make me drunk with blood of the foe on the day of war, and satisfy with his flesh on the day of redemption.

For nearly a thousand years I have declared my sorrow, with many tears and with fasting, ..will you not answer me?"17

Besides craving anti-Jewish blood Nagrela wanted Israel to act.

"O evil queen, give up your reign;

Rule over your foes, o condemned Sarah

Ailing in bed, arise awake.."18

In still another.

"Shake your self free, shake yourself free, and be appraised that the day of redemption is neigh!

Your mourning time is ended and your anguish removed, healing now exists for you.

Rise up, you are tossed about and reeling and repay those who have made you stagger...Zion like a withered tree will henceforth give fruit.

They will be abashed who once put you to shame and no longer will call you:

'The rebellious people'.19

In these poems it is clear that the Israeli army had a poet laureate before they had any battalions.

Another aspect of the Nagid's Judaism was his dislike of the Karaite sect. Apparently his attitude towards them was similar to the feelings he had for those who had personally insulted him. Their crime, however was worst, by calling themselves religious Jews and not practicing the same Judaism as Nagrela they were insinuating that his Judaism, the very thing he held most dear, was false or at the very least, of a lesser quality. He got back, as he usually did against his enemies, apparently by persecuting them.20

Rabbi Nagrela also had a critically important task that he shared with Jewish community leaders in all places in all times. Roughly he was a secretary in charge of correspondence with other Jewish communities, institutions and scholars. To this end Nagrela maintained correspondence with the leading Jewish academies and communities of his day. The list his correspondents included scholars and communities in Kairouan, Babylonia, Palestine, and Sicily, the Jewish Ivy Leagues of that day. The subjects could cover mourning periods for respected scholars, he saw to it that letters were sent to Cordova and other towns requesting that memorial services be held for the a recently departed scholar, Rabbi Hushiel of Kairouan. The Nagid also oversaw such ceremonies in Granada and Lucena.21 Nagrela even sent olive oil to synagogues in Palestine, good publicly for the Granadan community in the eyes of the Jewish world. All was not completely smooth sailing. One of the Nagid's works on religious law was suspected of insulting the decisions of the most respected institution of the Jewish world, the academies in Babylonia, which constituted the equivalent of a tribal Supreme Court. He had to write a poem as an apology. The network had a hierarchy and although the Nagid was important he was not the top man. Conclusion, Nagrela was a communications link in a very powerful and extensive network, one that extended north to England and east to India.

Author

If ambition was the Nagid's prison then writing was his escape. . The Sanhadja’s Prime Minister authored works on philology, Talmud and biblical exegesis that we know of. Unfortunately all these have been lost, although parts of one have been reconstructed and there is almost the inevitability that someday someone will clean out the attic of a North African synagogue and discover some long lost work of Nagrela's. That was the story of his poetic works. Early in this century a Jewish scholar and collector of Judaica, David Solomon Sassoon, discovered a box of ancient and forgotten Hebrew manuscripts in the Syrian city of Aleppo, among which was a copy of the Diwan (Diwan means a collection of poems) of Rabbi Samuel Ha-Nagid dating from the 1584. That volume was copied in that year by one Tam Ibn Yehiyya from a still earlier edition. Ibn Yehiyya’s copy even contained a list of former owners, as though it was a property for which the former title holders had to be carefully recorded, like real estate.

Sassoon in turn presented it to the famous Hebrew poet and scholar H. N. Bialik.. Mr. Sassoon also saw that an Oxford University edition was published in 1934 entirely in Hebrew, with himself as editor. editor.1 Up to that time only around 250 of the Nagrela's poems were known. The Sassoon edition contains 1,743. Regrettably not all of the Diwan has been translated. The translators obliviously cared more about the poetry than the poet, so their translations also cover comments on how the poetry was constructed, the mechanics of verse and meter, and whatever those things are that make poems interesting to English teachers, and only small introductions to the man and his time.. The approach here so far has been to view both the Nagid's and his poetry from the other end. First viewing the man, and then seeing what the poetic works reveal about him. The mechanics of the poems will not be discussed because the author is and hopes to remain ignorant of such things.

Ha-Nagid originally wrote his poems in Hebrew Arabic using Arabic Hebrew script, probably for convenience sake, as Arabic was his working tongue, although he certainly had to use Maghrib to converse. The Arabiyya, the absorption into Arab language and letters had reached into the Jewish community and captured it, as Greek had done earlier and German and American English would do later. . The Jews spoke Arabic in order to do business and enjoy the best things in Andalusian life. Arabiyya penetrated deeper than just speech and calligraphy, it turned a Jewish poet into an Arab one.

An outstanding contemporary scholar of that place, Dr. Anwar Chejne collected the names of hundreds of Andalusian authors in fields such as history, geography, medicine, courtly love, philosophy, belles letters, and of course, poetry. As for that he was able to delineate the themes of Hispano-Arab poetry into eight categories, love, praise, satire, elegies, war, ascetic, descriptive, and wine. The ascetic poetry, according to Chejne, dwells on the transitory nature of the world; on fate, virtue, knowledge; on union with God. Descriptive can include attitudes towards nature or places like cities. Mountains, ruins, monuments, flowers, and such are included.2 Nagrela wrote poems about all these subjects, although his praise poems have not been translated other than the ones in which he honors himself. That is probably a very thorough reflection of the number of people the Nagid respected, although there is a legend that has a ring of reality about it, that in order to impress his sovereign he wrote a poem praising the man and then translated it into seven languages. . Conclusion, culturally, he was an Arab poet, spiritually, a Jewish one.

There is a historical curiosity here. In the Arab world in was permissible to be both, in Europe, if you were Jewish and sought to enjoy the surrounding non-Jewish culture you were an intruder. Kafka described the miserable state this left the Jews who tried to live in both worlds.

Back to the Diwan, the collection of poetry actually is three books, Ben Tellhim, (Son of Psalms), Ben Mishle (Son of Proverbs), and Ben Koholet, (Son of Ecclesiastes). The first was edited by Joseph, perhaps with Samuel's help, and contains most of his autobiographical poems, including those dealing with war. There are 222 poems in it, many well over a hundred lines long. It is in this book that many of the poems are prefaced. These superscriptions provide invaluable historical information both on the times and the man. As mentioned elsewhere, the superscription may provide the only information known about a particular event. In addition the poem would be virtually incomprehensible without the added information. Most are rather murky with the added information.

The second book, Ben Mishle, is a collection of aphorisms that may or may have not been revised by Samuel. The preface to the collection admits that the collection is not entirely the author's work, some are simply repeats and rewriting of common sayings. The book was edited by Nagrela's second son, Eliassaf, (born in 1049). Supposedly Samuel requested the boy start the editing work in 1056, when he six.

The last part of the Diwan, Ben Koholet, consists of 411 poems that seem to be leftovers from the first two parts. In it are the poems about the eclipses and earthquake and many depressing poems apparently written in later life, including those about aging and death.

One curious observation was made by the author of an article on the Nagid. This author noted the sad attitude in Nagrela’s poetry. . There is in many of his poems this attitude, but these are written to describe sad observations, like death or ageing. However, there are many works that are joyous, particularly those dealing with the deaths of enemies. Another observation is that there are references in his poems that are virtually incomprehensible today and were probably partially so in his. The references are usually biblical; the implication is that a reader would also have to be a biblical scholar to appreciate what he was reading. It was probably not that great a demand for his planned audience. The well rounded of his time was were expected to be as well versed in religion, philosophy and literature as we are in sports and television.

The Nagid's major work dealing with religious law was Sefer Hilkhata Gavata. The Encyclopedia Judaica describes this work as "a compilation and explanation of halakhah based on both Talmuds, the decisions of the geonim (sometimes criticized), Midrash and the She'iltot of Ahai of Shabka". Translated he was an expert on the most complicated aspects of Jewish law, the equivalent of a law professor today specializing in a half dozen different aspects of these laws, which were written over a period of 1,500 years and partially in Latin and partially in Greek.3

The work was apparently written in Aramaic and Hebrew and possibly at least partially in Arabic. . The Encyclopedia article cites 1049 as a possible completion date and states it influenced later Andalusian Halakhists. That means the law professor's works were read and studied by other people who aspired to also be law professors. Although a complete original has been lost one dedicated scholar, M. Margolioth, has managed reconstruct parts of this work. . Among them were six principles in this work that the Nagid wrote were the basis of Jewish belief:

I am thankful that my rock has no beginning like things created and there is no end to him.

I am grateful that the resurrection is a certainty and that the dead will be awakened from the earth,

And that Moses and his Torah which is in our hands is truthful and prefect,

And that the words of our sages are just and their lore and the study thereof is pleasant,

And that there is reward in the world to come for the pure and the dead are recompensed for their hidden sins,

And that God is the ruler on dry land and on the high seas, in the heavens and over 'Ayish and Kimah.4

He also wrote an introduction to the Talmud, also lost.

Conclusion, Nagrela was a product of a more advanced civilization than that represented by the Sanhadja and the Taifa world. He was also a lawyer, which may answer several other questions about his character. Which brings us to the notorious Radd of Ahmand Ibn Hazm. Radd means refutation.

When last we met Mr. Ibn Hazm he was being involuntarily excluded from the corrupt world that he wanted to be part of, that is, it ruined his career in government. As men often do in times of trail he turned to God a bit too often and became unhealthily religious. He recognized the superiority of his own faith, the utter worthlessness of all the others and the need to humiliate non-believers in order to help them see the light (degradation as argument, Socrates would not have approved). All this he stated explicitly in his work on comparative religion.4

Considering these views his indignation must have been beyond measure when he was presented with a refutation of an anti-Koranic tract written by a Moslem theologian (the theologian wrote the refutation, not the tract). Ibn Hazm never saw the original tract, nor he ever explicitly state the author of it. He did mention that the author of the tract that he did not see was a non-Moslem high official in an Islamic government and that he lorded over Moslems, something illegal under traditional Islamic law. Ibn Hazm then went on to write his own rebuttal, the Radd, based not on the original work but on the work of the theologian who originally answered it. For some reason everyone assumed that the author of the original Koran bashing tract was Nagrela. We do not even know if he was aware of the charge, even if he was as he was used to intrigues at court and one extra more or less would have been handled as a routine matter.5

Did he write the tract, assuming that any such pamphlet was ever written? Not likely, there is absolutely nothing in anything known about the man's character, history or views to indicate that he would go out of his way to offend his superiors, friends, the population in general as well as giving ammunition to his enemies. Nagrela was known for his ability to manipulate people, flattery, avoiding messy conflicts with unpredictable outcomes, going out of his way to convert enemies and neutrals to friends and keeping a low profile. The very last thing he would do is unnecessarily offend every devout Moslem in the world. Furthermore considering that Ibn Abbas used Nagrela's Jewishness against him, it seems unlikely that he would help another enemy with an anti-Koranic pamphlet.

So who did write it? There were other high ranking Jews and Christians in Islamic governments all over the peninsula, the details and names of many and perhaps most have been lost to history. It may have been one of them. One contemporary scholar suggests Joseph, the son of Samuel, as the author, another maintains the whole thing was concocted by Ibn Hazm as an attack on a man he must have hated.

Since all these facts were known, why would anyone assume that Nagrela was the author of the mysterious tract? Several such tracts were written, and only a well read scholar, such as would be expected to find employment in a Taifa government could have produced it. But that is neither proof nor evidence of Nagrela's hand. Unfortunately the mud stuck and since his time he has become known as the author of his invisible work. What is that saying about history, that it is a lie agreed upon?

By the way, the Nagid's poetry spawned some criticism in his own time; remember that every Cordovan was a literary critic just like every Florentine was an art critic. During or after his time there was a saying "cold as the snow of Hermon or the songs of the Levite Samuel".6. There is no record of his responses to criticism of his poetry. Another corundum, would he have responded by reason and inquire about the possible failure in technique, or would he have given the complainer hell. Since there was no need for guile as there was at court so he could vent his feelings. After all art is not war, one could afford to get emotional.

The Legacy that was and the Legacy that should have been

Where can the Nagid be placed in history? In Andalusian history his location is clear. If he had died the day of the ascension of Badis Granada would have probably fallen before it did. Badis would have killed off his officer corps out of fear of treason therefore fatally weakening his army. The administration of his country would have gone to the most convincing sycophant, assuring that the economy was taxed into oblivion. Emigration would have increased and eventually the Sanhadja overlords would have found themselves too poor to buy mercenaries, isolated from potential allies and therefore vulnerable. Seville or some other petty state would have gobbled the Zirid state up. With most of Andalus under one government there would be wealth enough to fight the Christians without asking for aid and then becoming subjects of Moslem fanatics from Morocco, at least for a while.

The first of the fanatics were the Almovarids who may have annoyed the Jews but still allowed them the protection of the law. A generation later a nuttier group of fanatics, the Almohads, took Spain from the Almovarids. . Their presence spelled the beginning of the end of the Islamic and Jewish efflorescence in Spain. The Almohads permitted only prayer as recreation and that had to be Moslem prayer. Persecution of the Jews became law finally leading to expulsion, a precedent for FredinandFerdinand’s and Isabella's equally stupid, bigoted and self-destructive expulsion of 1492.

So the Nagid was bad for the survival of Arab rule in Spain, and hence bad for the freedoms and culture enjoyed by the population of that land, however good he was for the Sanhadja government. But who cares about that? Whatever Arab government would have survived would have been unstable, either the Almohads or the Christians would have eventually destroyed it. Nagrela, by keeping Granada solvent and victorious and hence Andalus divided and weak compared to the Christian north or Moroccan south, may have just accelerated the process of Arab collapse a few years.

So much for Andalusian history, now for it'sits literary history. There are volumes and volumes of poetry; to the non-poetry reader it all is or mostly is, pointlessly dull. In spite of this there is much for even a poetry hater to enjoy in the works of Ibn Nagrela, for his poems are adventurous. Regerttably Unfortunately only a limited number of his poems have been translated, so even if those who knew of his existence wanted to read his work they would have a rather limited choice. That situation is slowly getting better, however. There are three books of his poetry currently in print.

As for poetry lovers, they should respect the name Nagrela as for the same reason that art lovers respect the that family of art patrons, the d'Medici, more so perhaps, because the Medici never produced anything by their own hands. Nagrela did. But he produced far more by the patronage and encouragement he gave to others and the patronage and encouragement his protégés gave to still more. This is a lot and those who are aware of it are grateful for it. There must be several dozen in this category.

Now for Jewish history. History has many uses, to inspire, to warn, to honor, to understand among others. The lessons of a life as full as Nagrela's could have found a place in any of these groupings. Perhaps it was simply the dearth of readily available biographical material that prevented it from being examined and written about. This is definitely the most tragic aspect of his whole life; it's lessons were not used by generations who could have found inspiration in his method, especially in this the 20th century especially.

For Jewish history the 20th last century is the Holocaust and the rebirth of Israel. Specifically, as regards the first event, Jews are still trying to figure out how to prevent the Holocaust, somehow it can never be accepted as irrevocable, and logic seems to lose a contest with the heart over this. Nor can the rebirth and triumphs of Israel be accepted as anything less than glorious without measure by the a people with a history of tragedy and insult. Realistic appraisal or not these two events create a filter through which the rest of Jewish history is viewed and judged. To put it another way there is nothing that is not viewed as contributing or not contributing to these two events. Regrettably so, because there is a third experience that for some reason seems to have been overlooked, this can be called the Ashkenazi Renaissance, the cultural awakening that started with Mendelssohn in the 18th century and continues with Steven Speilburg. Could the lessons and accomplishments of Nagrela's life impacted this century, or any other that would have influenced any of these events of our time?

Let's take the cultural Renaissance first. Jewish education, as most Jews are taught in the west, consist of learning various drills, called prayer, to prepare one for a Bar Mitzvah. The literary and philosophical heritage from Philo to The Dybbuk is everywhere for the most part almost completely ignored, along with the poetry and works of Samuel Ibn Nagrela. So in one area of Jewish and literary history his legacy is alive but hidden, and although enjoyed by a dedicated and lucky few it is ignored by the rest. There is much useful wisdom in Nagrela's works, but for the most part these are being denied youth and everyone else.. Along with his works are those of the first Jewish Renaissance in Medieval Spain, the Sephardic Renaissance, with all its beauty, trials and glory, either avoided or inadequately exploited. Therefore the impact of Nagrela on contemporary Jewish culture and literacy is minor, but should be major. Every educated Jew should know at least one Nagrela poem or one by his protégés, as part of his tribal heritage.

Now for the horror of the 20th century, let's rewrite some history, at least pedagogical history and have Jewish teachers, outside of modern democracies where such lessons are unnecessary, for the last 900 years teach a course on the life and lessons of the Nagid. What would the students have learned from him that could have prepared the Jews? There is much, but the crux is that one could be a religious Jew and a killer, if the victim deserved to die. Religion and warfare could have been associated rather than religion and suffering. Maybe ruthless action could have become part of the Jewish method. . If a memory of Diaspora communities becoming violent in their own defense became part of the tribal memory could the history of one persecution after another been different? The historical inspiration and argument would have been there, a precedent for violence, a tradition of action rather than lament. The lessons of Nagrela's life and work probably would have made a difference somewhere, how much is impossible to guess.

As for the rebirth of Israel, speculations on the possible impact of the lessons of Nagrela’s life are unnecessary. The Israelis and the Nagid would be quite comfortable comparing notes, the average Israeli would see nothing exceptional in the Nagid's attitudes, and Rabbi Samuel would feel quite comfortable reading a military and political history of Israel. Indeed the ghost of Rabbi Samuel is frequently seen in the halls of various ministries changed with the defense of the Jewish state, whispering in the ears of those changed with strategy and operations.. The ghost seems generally content.

Glossary

Taifa-fraction or part. Islamic Spain after the dissolution of the Caliphate was divided into two or three dozen tiny states. These were called the Taifa states.

Party Kingdoms-another name for the Taifa states. Because each statelet was ruled by its own party.

Places (Arabic names are given in parenthesis) city -states were named after their capital.

Algeciras-a small seaport on the southernmost tip of Spain, governed by a member of the Hammudite family.

Almeria (al-Mariya)-One of the larger city -states. It lay to the southeast of Granada, on the sea and behind the Sierra Nevada mountains. The city of Almeria was a seaport. During the civil war it was taken over by a Slav general, Khairan, and bequeathed upon his death to the Slav, eunuch, Zuhair.

al-Andalus or Andalusia-the Arabic name for Spain.

Carmona (Karmuna)-a city statecity-state whose capital was nineteen miles east of Seville, on the way to Granada. It was ruled by the Birzali family of Zenata Berbers.

Cordova (Qurtuba)-Capital of the Caliphate of Cordova, known as the most enlightened city in Europe. It was renowned for it's libraries, bibliophilia, and dedication to learning.

Denia and the Balearic Islands-a Slav run city -state, known for the piracy of its rulers..

Ecija-a city inside the city -state of Carmona. It changed hands many times during the wars. Nagrela won a major victory of the Genil River near here. It is located between Granada and Carmona.

Estepa-another Carmonan city, raided by Nagrela.

Genil River-a tributary of the Guadaquivir River. The city of Granada was locate on its banks.

Guadalquivir-the major river of southern Spain. Cordova and Seville are riverports of this river.

Granada (Gharnata)-one of the larger city statecity-states that arose during the civil wars. It was governed by the Ziri clan of Sanhadja Berbers. It had such a large Jewish population it was known as 'Granada of the Jews'. Between the military prowess of the Sanhadja and the economic competence of the Jews this city statecity-state was very successful for a time.

Huelva-a small city -state on the Atlantic coast, west of Seville.

Jaen-a city originally owned by the Almerians, it was taken over the Sanhadja and added to Granada.

Kairouan-the capital of the Zirid state in Tunisia. A major Arab and Jewish intellectual center during the period of Nagrela.

Lorca-a city in the city -state of Almeria. Nagrela conducted a siege of it in 1042.

Lucena-a city in the city -state of Granada, it had a large Jewish population. It was also home to the poet Ibn Ghayyath, a protege of Nagrela's who gave succor to his daughter in law and grandson after the riot ot 1066.

Malaga-a city -state centered around a seaport. It was ruled by the Hammudite clan from about 1013 to 1056, when Granada took it over. It was separated from Granada by the very high Sierra Nevadas.

Mertola-a small city west of Seville, located in what today is southern Portugal. It was absorbed by Seville in 1044.

Moron-a small city -state located between Seville and Granada. It was ruled by the Dammonari clan of Zenata Berbers.

Niebla-a small city -state, eaten by Seville.

Osuna-Carmonan owned town between Carmona and Granada. It was raided by Samuel.

Ronda-a city -state between Seville and Granada. It was ruled by the Yehreni clan of Zenata Berbers. Its King was very antagonistic towards Samuel and even went out of his to kill him. The capital was located next to a steep gorge.

Santa Maria de Algrave (Shantanariya al-Gharb)-a very small city -state.

Saragossa-a larger city -state to the north. Home of Ibn Janah and at one time, Ibn Gabirol. Also known for its Jewish Vizier who executed on charges of corruption. Later found to be innocent.

Seville (Saraqusta)-One of the larger and finally the largest city -state. It's capital was known for it's musical instruments.

Sierra Nevadas-a mountain range between Granada and the coast.

Silves (Shilb)-a small city-state.

Toledo, Tortosa, Tudela, Valencia-Arab ruled cities in northern Spain.

People

Tribes

Sanhadja-a Berber tribe that took over Tunisia, (Ifriqiya).

Zenata-a Berber tribe, traditional foes of the Sanhadja.

The Omayyads of the Caliphate

Abd al Rahman I-(756-788)-founder of the Omayyad state in Spain

Abd al Rahman II-(822-852)-one of the most successful Omayyads

Abd al Rahman III-(912-961)-Cordova reached it's zenith under his enlightened rule.

Hakam II-(961-976)-Cordova became the first state ever to have the obtainment of knowledge as a national goal during this Caliph's reign. He was also one of the greatest bibliophiles in history. A highly moral man, he bequeathed money for the education of the poor in his well.

Hisham II-(976-?)-his son, the child caliph whose Kingdom was usurped by Almanzor. No one was quit sure what became of him.

The Amirds of Cordova

Almanzor-(976-1002)-the ambitious chamberlain who usurped power from the Omayyads, accidentally leading to the destruction of the whole country.

Muzaffer-(1002-1008)-his eldest son, died in 1008

Sanchol-(1008-1009)-his youngest son, killed, after which Cordova entered on a generation of instability

Pseudo-Rulers and Pretenders of Cordova

Suliaman-(1010-1013)-a figurehead Caliph used by Zawi in his fight against the Cordovans and al-Madhi

al-Mahdi-(1009-1010)-the leader of the anti-Amirid revolt.

al-Murtada-an Omayyad pretender to the throne, encouraged by King Khairan of Almeria. His army was destroyed by Zawi ben Ziri and the Sanhadja outside of Granada in 1018, after King Khairan betrayed his own side.

The Zirids and friends

Emir Badis in Kairouan-One of rulers of the Sanhadja in Tunisia. Had a Jewish Vizier and general.

Zawi ben Ziri-(1013-1019,20)-Sanhadja mercenary leader who fought for Almanzor's son. Subsequently fought against Cordova and took over Granada and it's environs, setting up his own country. Returned to Ifriqiya around 1019 and was never heard from again.

Habbus ben Macksen-(1019,20-1038)-the nephew of Zawi, took over and ran Granada from 1019 to 1038. His reign was one of peace.

Badis-(1038-1073) his eldest son, nasty and vicious, he was selected to succeed his father because he had the personality the job required.

Boluggin-his more popular younger brother.

Yaddair ben Hubasa-the treacherous, ambitious and clever nephew of Habbus.

Abd Allah ben Boluggin-(1073-1090)-the final King of Granada, wrote of history of Granada that whitewashed the family's shortcomings and the extent they relied on the Jews.

al-Futah-a fortune teller friend of Yaddair.

The Slavs and Arabs of Almeria

Khairan-(1013-1028)the treacherous Slav King of Almeria, betrayed his own side in a 1018 battle against Zawi.

Zuhair-(1028-1038) His successor, probably killed in action against the Sanhadja during battle of Al-Funt.

Djar Ibn Abbas-(?-1038) Zuhair's rich, stupid and arrogant Vizier.

The Hammudites of Malaga and their Civil Servants

Ali(1013-1018)-a Hammudite who crossed to Spain from Morocco and claimed the Caliphate, and helped make Spain a bloody mess, assassinated by his servants.

Kasim(1018-1021)-his brother who tried to become Caliph.

Yahya(1022-1026)-Ali's son who fought his uncle, killed by the Sevillians in battle.

Idris I(1026-1035)-Yahya's brother, became ruler of Malaga but died after receiving headagram (the head of the enemy general) announcing his side won an impressive victory over the Sevillians.

Yahya(1035-1039)-young son of Idris I, murdered by his cousin Hasan.

Hasan-1040-a relative who took over after Idris death and murdered his young cousin Yahya to assure his uninterrupted rule, promptly poisoned by his wife in revenge for murdering her brother, Yahya.

Ibn Musa-Ibn Bakunna-a Slav vizier who conspired against Nagrela and whom Nagrela hated.

Naja-another Slav vizier, took was actually able to take over Malaga for a short time before he was murdered.

Idris II(1042-1046)-a weakling King, 1st reign.

Muhammad ben Idris (1046-1053)-a not so weak King who may have been murdered by Badis.

Idris III-(1053)-a cruel replacement of Idris II.

Idris II-(1053-1056)-returned to power for lack of anyone better.

Muhammad II-(1056)-final King of Malaga, Granada finally took Malaga in 1056.

The Abbadids of Seville and their Generals

Muhammad-(1023-41,2)courtier in the Caliphate, Kadi of Seville-established Sevillian independence and set expansionist and anti-Berber national objectives.

Ismail-his son and successful general until Nagrela killed him at the Battle of the Genil.

Mutadid-(1041,2-1068,9)-another son of Muhammad ben Abbadid, Nagrela's arch foe.

Mukhtar-a general of Mutadid's killed in action while fighting against Nagrela.

Banu al-Birzali of Carmona

Abu Abd Allah-(1023,4-1042(3)-Zenata ruler of city statecity-state of Carmona, lost head to Sevillians after helping Yaddair start a war against Granada.

Ishaq-(1042,2-1052,3)-his son, maybe killed in battle also against Sevillians.

Banu Dammani of Moron

Ibn Nun-(1013-1041,2)-Zenata Berber founder of city statecity-state of Moron.

Muhammad Ibn Nun-(1041,2(?)-1053(?)his son and successor, cooked by Mutadid.

Manad ben Mohammed-(1053)-took over after his father's murder.

Banu Yehreni of Ronda

Abu Nur Ibn Kurra-the King who tired to kill Nagrela, cooked by Mutadid.

Abu Nasr Ibn Nun-Ibn Kurra's successor.

Banu Kirzun of Arcos-Xeres-the Zenata Berber family that ruled Arcos-Xeres.

One of which was cooked by Mutadid.

The Jews

Samuel Ibn Nagrela-Jewish Vizier of Granada

Isaac-his brother, died 1041

Joseph-his eldest son, born 1039, died 1066

Samuel-his grandson

Eliassaf-his second son, born 1049

Judah-another son, thought to have died in childhood

an unnamed daughter, thought to have died in childhood

Joseph Ibn Jau-president of the Jewish community, given position by Almanzor.

Joseph Ibn Arbitur-Ibn Jau's choice as Yeshiva head, had to leave town after not receiving public acceptance.

Hisdai Ibn Shaprut-diplomat in the court of Abd al-Rahman III

Moses Ben Hanokh-Yeshiva head, one of Samuels' early teachers.

Judah Hayyadj-Hebrew grammarian and teacher

Ibn Ghayyath-poet and protege of Nagrela and his son

Solomon Ibn Gabirol-poet and protege of Nagrela, one of the big three of Spanish Jewish poetry

Isaac Ibn Khalfun-poet and protege of Nagrela's father, friend of Samuel.

Abu Ishaq Abraham Ibn Ata-Vizier and general in Zirid court in Ifriyiqa

Jonah Ibn Janah-Hebrew philologist who got into an argument with Nagrela.

The Arabs

Ahmand Ibn Hazm-greatest and most prolific Arabic writer of the 11th century.

Abu l'Kasim Ibn l'Arif-the Granadan vizier who discovered Nagrela in Malaga.

Bibliography

Ashtor, Jacob, The Jews of Moslem Spain, Jewish Publication Society, 1973

Many scholars say bad things about Ashtor's work, none have done anything better.

Baron, Joseph L., A Treasury of Jewish Quotations, A.S. Barnes and Co., South Brunswick, New Jersey, 1965

Berdiner, Elmer, The Rise and Fall Of Paradise, Barnes & Noble, 1995

Carmi, T., The Penguin Book Of Hebrew Verse, Penguin Books, 1981

Chejne, Anwar G., Muslim Spain, Its History and Culture, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1974

Cole, Peter, Selected Poems of Shmuel HaNagid, Princeton, 1996

Dozy, Reinhardt, Spanish Islam, New York, Duffield and Company, 1913

Flecther, Richard, Moorish Spain, Henry Holt and Company, 1992

Goldstein, David, The Jewish Poets of Moslem Spain, Penguin Books, 1965

Grotein, A Mediterranean Society, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967

Graetz, Heinrich, History of the Jews, Jewish Publication Society, 1967

Halkin, Hillel, Grand Things to Write a Poem On, A Verse Autobiography of Shmuel HaNagid, Gefen Publishing House Ltd., Jerusalem, 2000

Handler, Andrew The Zirids of Granada, University of Florida Press, 1974

Hitti, Philip K., A History of the Arabs, St. Martin's Press, 1970

Imadmuddin, S.M., A political History of Muslim Spain, Zeeco Press, Dacca, 1961

Ibn Daub, The Book of Tradition, Jewish Publication Society, 1967

Lane-Poole, Stanley, The Story of the Moors of Spain, Black Classic Press, 1990

Loewe, Raphael, Ibn Gabrirol, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1989

Roth, Norman, Jews, Visigoths and Muslims in Medieval Spain, E.J. Brill, Lieden, 1994

Shirmann, Jefim, Samuel Hannagid, The Man, The Soldier, The Politician, Jewish Social Studies, Volume XIII, Number 2, April 1951

Sassoon, H.H. editor, A History of the People, Havard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1976

Stillman, Norman A. editor, The Jews of Arab Lands-A History and Source Book, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1979

Tibi, Amin T., The Tibyam, Memoirs of Abd Allah b. Bulluggin, Last Zirid Amir of Granada, E.J. Brill, 1997

Wasserstein, David, The Rise and Fall of the Party-Emirs, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985-excellent chronology of rulers, allows the student to give up hope of ever figuring out which record of events is correct.

Weinberger, Leon J., A Jewish Prince in Moslem Spain, University of Alabama Press, 1973

Various articles in the Encyclopedia Judaica and Encyclopedia of Islam

Encyclopedia of Islam

Al-Andalus

Gharnata

Ibn Hazm, Abu Muhammad

Abbadids

Malaka

Kurtuba

Encyclopedia Judaica

Cordova

Granada

Seville

Spain

Samuel HaNagid

Jehoseph HaNagid

Jonah Ibn Janah

Nagid

Jacob Ibn Jau

Hanokh ben Moses

Judah ben David Hayyuj

Kairouan

Kahina

Notes

Throughout this book the works of Reinhardt Dozy, Jacob Ashtor, Leon Weinberger and Norman Roth were heavily relied on. The attributions to their contributions made in these footnotes are inadequate. The military and political analyses are my own.

E.J is the Encyclopedia Judaica, E.I. is the Encyclopedia of Islam, idid. is short for the latin "ibidem" meaning in the same place. I always got angry at authors who expect their readers to be literate in several different languages so I decided to define the word for the reader.

The Evolution of the Non-State

Many general histories contributed to this chapter; Hitti, Flecther, Bendiner, Lane-Poole, Chejne and Ashtor all helped, extra praise belongs to Imadmuddin for organizing Andalusian history in such a matter that a quick and easy presentation is possible.

1) Encyclopedia Judaica article on Kahina, there is some debate over whether or not Kahina is merely a legend. If so it is an odd choice for a legend.

2) Mernissi, p.29

3) Imadmuddin, the appendices list govenors, and Ommayads and miscellaneous rulers.

4) Encyclopedia of Islam, the Arabic word is Kurtuba, the article appears under name.

5) Weinberger, p.118, The Edge of his Pen

6) The divisions of Andalusian history and the pinpointing of what was important during under epoch comes mainly from Imadmuddin.

Tribes

The works of Benliner, Chejne, Flechter, Imadmuddin, Wasserstein, and Grotein all contributed to the composition of this chapter.

1) Ibn Khaldun, p.66

Cordova

This chapter relies heavily on Ashtor, Dozy and Roth.

1) Weinberger, p.1

2) Encyclopedia Judaica, articles on Ibn Arbitur, Moses ben Hanokh, Judah Hayyuj, Ibn Jau

3) Stillman, p.226

4) Handler, p. 14

5) idid., p.17

6) Weinberger, p.19

7) ibid., p.21

Malaga and the Final Disintegration of Al-Andalus

Ashtor, and Chejne are the major sources.

Roth was emphatic that Ashtor was wrong in giving the encounter between Ibn Hazm and Nagrela to Cordova. I am a bit suspicious because the two probably traveled in different circles in Cordova.

1) E.I. article on Ibn Hazm

2) Tibi, p. 49

3) Ashtor, Shirmann. Shirmann spent a lot of space in his article on the Nagid covering that single meeting in what must have been the equivalent of an afternoon in a student's coffee house/hangout.

4) Ibn Daub, Abd Allah gives a slightly different name for the man who give Nagrela his start. Actually the Arab names were so long and convoluted that it appears the two authors used different parts of the same name.

5) Ashtor says the murder was the work of Jews who wanted to undermine Nagrela. Roth says this is nonsense.

6) Chejne, see chapter 7 on Society and Administration

7) ibid.

Granada of the Jews

Ashtor, Roth, and Dozy are, as usual the major sources for this chapter.

1) Weinberger, p.96

2) Roth, The number 250,000 must be viewed with suspicion. Authors then and now had problems with numbers. Often words are meant to convey emotions rather than information. The number 250,000 was probably meant to impress rather than inform.

3) Ashtor, Roth, Ashtor maintains that Nagrela was thrown in prison, Roth says this is nonsense. Ashtor also said Nagrela had one eye, Roth also says this is nonsense.

4) Ashtor, E.I. article on Ibn Hazm

5) Tibi, p. 50

6) Handler, p.30-31

7) Tibi, p. 52

8) Roth, p. 90, Roth is way too hard on Ashtor as much of Ashtor's data comes from Shirmann.

9) Shirmann, p. 104

10) Carmi, p.281

11) Goldstein, p.98

12) Weinberger, p. 72

13) Halkin, p. 43

14) Encyclopedia Judaica articles on Nagid and Kairouan

15) Tibi, p. 55 "As you will observe the son of (l'Arif) is a lad who enjoys life, you can afford to be lenient towards him and pardon his conduct. I am his humble servant, acting on his behalf. Speak only the word and your will shall be done."

16) E.J., article on Ibn Janah

17) Baron, p.29, quote 65.C.5

18) Shirmann, p. 116

19) E.J.

20) Loewe

21) Roth, p.97

22) Cole, p. 142, 145

23) Roth, p. 97

24) ibid., p. 97

25) Carmi, p.302

26) Loewe, p.57

27) Roth, p.99, Tibi, p. 56

28) Baron, p.7

The Battle of Al-Font and the Ascension of Al-Andalus

Ashtor, Dozy, Graetz, and Shirmann supplied effectively the same information for this chapter but in different quantities. Dozy and Ashtor as usual were the most useful.

1) Dozy, p. 611

2) Ibn Daub, He had a chapter on the Nagid, all references concerning Nagrela are from it.

3) Shirmann, p. 104

4) Weinberger, p. 22

The Rise of Seville

The whole chapter has only one source, Dozy. The military political analyses are my own.

The Hammudites of Malaga

Dozy again. The sarcasm is my own.

The War for Carmona and the Battle of the Genil

Ashtor and Dozy are, as usual, the main sources.

1) Dozy maintains that the allies were running. Ashtor says that the allies though the enemy had already withdrawn. I suspect Ashtor was right.

2)Weinberger, p.33

3) ibid., p. 34

Yaddair vs. Badis(Nagrela) and the Eastern Front

1) Handler, p. 47

2) Weinberger, p. 143

3) ibid., p.51

4) ibid., p. 54

Mutadid and the King of Ronda

Here again Dozy described the man and events. I analyzed the thought processes.

1) Dozy, p. 629

2) ibid., p. 641-2

3) ibid., p. 648

4) Ashtor related the story of the ambush which was based on the preface to a poem written by Nagrela.

5) The tract mentioned can be found in The Art of War in World History by Gerard Chaliand, University of California Press, 1994, p 410

6) Weinberger p.73

7) Weinberger p. 47, p. 142

The Not So Grand Alliance and Some Thoughts on Method

1) Weinberger, p. 78

2) ibid., p. 61

3) ibid., p. 61

4) ibid., p. 62

5) ibid., p. 62

6) Cole, p. 96

7) Graetz, vol.III, p. 257

8) Rabbi Romberg at Beth Shalom Temple in Fredericksburg, VA told this version of the story. He could not remember exactly where he read it.

9) Sassoon, p.457

10) ibid., p.457

11) Weinberger, p.116

12) Shirmann, p.119

13) Cole, p.135

14) Sassoon, p.457

15) Cole, p.148

16) ibid., p.98

17) ibid., p. 94

18) ibid., p. 140

Mountain of Sand

1) Weinberger, p. 130

2) Wasserstein, see chronology in rear of book

3) Roth, p.95

4) Weinberger, p. 68, I modified the translation a bit.

5) Shirmann, p.109

6) Weinberger, p. 79

7) ibid., p. 118

8) Handler, p. 57

9) Goldstein, p.55

10) Ashtor has the Nagid dying in bed, Shirmann a few months following a campaign, assumingly in bed, the Encyclopedia Judaica states that he died on Campaign

The Fall of Joseph and Granada of the Jews

Any source that discussed Samuel discussed his son. Nonetheless there are really only two major original sources, Ibn Daub and Abd Allah. Of the two Ibn Daub is the more reliable, at least in his discussion of Joseph. Abd Allah's description of Samuel's unfortunate son and his end cannot be taken at face value. The Zirid historian described in detail events that he could not have been aware of, ergo his history should be interpreted the way intelligence analysts analyze enemy propaganda, reading between the lines.

1) Weinberger p.132

Family, the Man, Faith and Community

1) Ashtor provides the details about Nagrela's family.

2) Weinberger, p.66

3) ibid., p.63

4) ibid., p.65

5) ibid., p.115

6) ibid., p.117

7) ibid., p.117

8) Cole, p.54

9) Weinberger, p. 115

10) ibid., p. 116

11) Roth, p. 186

12) Weinberger, p.120

13) Cole, p.36

14) Cole, p.35

15) Weinberger, p. 39

16) ibid., p.90

17) ibid., p.91

18) ibid., p.91

19) ibid., p.92

20) Shirmann, p.115

21) ibid., p.114

Author

1) Cole, p. xv

2) Chejne, p.223

3) E.J. article on Samuel Ha-Nagid

4) Weinberger, p.6

5) Roth and Wasserstein addressed the supposed charge that Nagrela wrote an anti-Islamic with suspicion.

6) Graetz, vol. III, p. 260