My RoME 2017 Presentation

posted Aug 9, 2017, 9:35 PM by shalomation   [ updated Sep 4, 2017, 8:03 AM ]

My paper "Is There Still Room for Intertheoretic Choice-Worthiness Comparisons?" was accepted for presentation at the 2017 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME). I will present it on Friday August 11th, 10:10 at Humanities 186.  
I attach the long handout below (if you don't see it, click the title of this post above first).
I welcome any comments, thoughts, etc. Feel free to drop me an email about it.
Looking forward to seeing you there!

This one has to be in Hebrew מה שקורה כשעובדים על החלטות תחת אי-ודאות ושומעים בוב דילן

posted Feb 26, 2017, 5:22 PM by shalomation   [ updated Feb 27, 2017, 7:23 AM ]

כשעובדים על תיאוריות של החלטות תחת אי ודאות

  שומעים דילן עם אוזניות שכוללות מיקרופון

  ומונעים מהמוטיבציה לפעול נכון דה-דיקטו...

 יוצאים דברים כאלה:

Audio player, not for mobile devices

מילים: רן עבודי. לחן: בוב דילן.

Found a video of an exchange I had with Michael Bratman on the web

posted Feb 22, 2017, 7:17 AM by shalomation   [ updated Feb 27, 2017, 7:29 AM ]

To see the video (which will open up in a new window) click this picture :

(I tried to get this video to start right before my question; in case on your browser it starts at the beginning, my question starts shortly after 01h40m.)

You will also find there the rest of Professor Michael E. Bratman's exciting 2016 Pufendorf Lectures, which I had the honor to attend (as well as the Metaphysics & Collectivity Mini-workshop). Prof. Bratman presented his new (unpublished) interesting argument which aims at establishing a special kind of rational pressure towards self-governance. I came up with another argument to the same effect, which is based on game-theoretic reasoning where the present self and the future self are thought of as different players, and suggests that the equilibrium would support self-governance to a certain extent. At this point it is not clear whether my argument competes with Bratman's or rather complements it. Anyway, I've learnt a lot from this visit at Lund university, enjoyed the company of many participants, the food, and the alcohol... 

Settled in Toronto

posted Sep 10, 2016, 10:25 PM by shalomation   [ updated Feb 26, 2017, 8:29 PM ]

On September 1st we landed in Toronto, and it looks great! I will be spending some time here as an international visiting graduate student, working under the supervision of Professor Thomas Hurka. There are many other scholars here whose works interests me: the chair tells me that this is the largest philosophy dept. in the English-speaking world!

One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary

posted Jun 25, 2016, 11:55 AM by shalomation   [ updated Apr 16, 2017, 10:49 AM ]

My forthcoming publication in the journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, "One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary", was also accepted for presentation at the 2016 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME) under the name:
"(Mis)Underestimating the Deliberative Role of de dicto Moral Motivation."

I attach a penultimate version below (as well as a handout for my presentation in RoME). Please quote only from the published version, available for free viewing at:  http://rdcu.be/mOUK
Or for download at:


De dicto moral motivation is typically characterized by the agent’s conceiving of her goal in thin normative terms such as to do what is right. I argue that lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation (at least in a certain broad sense of this term) would put the agent in a bad position for responding in the morally-best manner (relative to her epistemic state) in a certain type of situations. Two central features of the relevant type of situations are (1) the appropriateness of the agent’s uncertainty concerning her underived moral values, and (2) the practical, moral importance of resolving this uncertainty. I argue that in some situations that are marked by these two features the most virtuous response is deciding to conduct a deep moral inquiry for a de dicto moral purpose. In such situations lacking de dicto moral motivation would amount to a moral shortcoming. I show the implications for Michael Smith’s (1994) argument against Motivational Judgment Externalism and for Brian Weatherson’s (2014) argument against avoiding moral recklessness: both arguments rely on a depreciating view of de dicto moral motivation, and both fail; or so I argue.

Summer School on Philosophy of Education at the University of Birmingham, UK

posted May 18, 2016, 8:07 AM by shalomation   [ updated Feb 26, 2017, 8:31 PM ]

Got accepted to an International Postgraduate Summer School on Philosophy of Education at the University of Birmingham:

I hope this will help my project which aims to justify the cultivation of certain qualities of character as a wise preparatory measure for unexpected new normative understandings. 
Looking forward to it!

Is it virtuous to defer in the cases of transformative experience which L.A. Paul discusses?

posted Jan 6, 2016, 12:09 AM by shalomation   [ updated Feb 26, 2017, 8:25 PM ]

I had the honor of addressing this question recently at The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas in Tel Aviv University, as a commentator on L. A. Paul’s lecture “Preference Capture”. My power point  file is attached further below.

I also started a different paper related to Paul's writings; for a 4 page abstract click here.

PhD Summer Workshop on Well-being

posted May 19, 2015, 5:32 AM by shalomation   [ updated Jan 8, 2016, 5:05 AM ]

I got accepted as a PhD Summer Workshop Fellow of the CMPP. The workshop will be on wellbeing, with L. W. Sumner. My interest in well-being is related to my interest in the activity of practical deliberation (in which we reason in order to make decisions regarding what to do): Is it constitutive for this activity to have some concern for well-being, happiness, or the good life in any sense?  

Self, Motivation and Virtue Project Grant Application

posted Mar 19, 2015, 7:05 AM by shalomation   [ updated Jan 8, 2016, 5:05 AM ]

Our research project “Development of Human Values and Virtues” has passed the first stage of evaluation in the Self, Motivation and Virtue project ! At the next and final stage about ten research teams will be selected among 17. We now work on completing a full research proposal, on the basis of which we will be evaluated. Our project team is composed of both psychologists and philosophers: Ariel Knafo, Liat Hasenfratz, Arnon Levy, and I. I am excited about this combination of perspectives.Though it is not always easy to bridge the gaps. For instance, it took me some time to understand how psychologists use the term values (they view them as types of motivations).

Presenting at AS

posted May 5, 2014, 12:42 AM by shalomation   [ updated Jan 8, 2016, 5:06 AM ]

I will be presenting at the Postgraduate Session of the The 2014 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at Cambridge, UK, July 11-13. My talk has been postponed to Sunday due to my tradition of not working on the Jewish Sabbath (Shabat).  Here is an abstract of my talk:
Is doing the right thing in order to behave in accordance with the moral truth as such less virtuous than doing the same right thing for the sake of some more concrete moral value (such as benevolence)? The former type of motivation has been called de-dicto moral motivation, whereas the latter - (non-derivative) de-re moral motivation. I argue that in cases where an effective de-re moral motivation is more virtuous than an effective de-dicto moral motivation (assuming that both would lead to the same right action), this is due to (1) certain applicable practical advantages of this de-re moral motivation (such as leading directly to action without wasting precious time on unnecessary reflection about the right de-dicto), or (2) certain virtuous non-deliberative dispositions the presence of which this de-re moral motivation indicates (such as an emotional attachment to a spouse). In cases where an effective de-dicto moral motivation neither indicates a lack of such virtuous non-deliberative dispositions, nor has practical disadvantages that are important enough, it is in no way less virtuous.

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