Job Market Paper
Fair Social Orderings with Other-Regarding Preferences.
Abstract: We study the fair division of a one dimensional good when individuals have other-regarding preferences. Assuming no legitimate claims, we ask how society should rank all possible allocations for every profile of ordinal preferences. In both a model of average and positional externalities, we characterize a class of social preferences which satisfy appealing efficiency and equity properties. These rankings require giving full priority to the worst off individual in the economy, where an agent's welfare is measured by the quantity which, if consumed by everyone, would leave her indifferent to the current allocation. We extend some of our results to a model with legitimate claims.
Optimal Apportionment, Journal of Political Economy (2013), 121(3): 584-608. (with Y. Koriyama, J.F. Laslier and A. Macé)
Abstract: We provide a theoretical foundation for the principle of degressive proportionality in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each collective decision matches the individual’s own will. The core of the argument is that, if the function is concave, then classical utilitarianism at the social level recommends decision rules that exhibit degressive proportionality with respect to the population size.
Computing the Optimal Weights in a Utilitarian Model of Apportionment, Mathematical Social Sciences (2012), 63(2): 141-151. (with A. Macé)
Abstract: We suggest an algorithm for the numerical optimization of the utilitarian social welfare function in Koriyama et al. (2013) and
apply it to the case of the European Parliament.
Work in Progress
Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation.
Optimal Apportionment with Endogenous Contribution.