Department of Economics
E-mail: Qingmin [dot] Liu [at] Columbia [dot] Edu
∙ Stanford GSB, PhD 2007
∙ Beijing University, BA 2002
∙ Dynamic games/contracts/mechanisms, Epistemic foundations of game theory, Matching
Journal of the European Economic Association, presentation slides
Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
∙ Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, (with George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson)
∙ Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining with Outside Options (with Jihong Lee) Supplemental Materials, Working Paper,
Econometrica, 2013, 81, 1601–1672.
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, 2115–2145
∙ A Simple Proof for the Coase Conjecture, September 2015.
∙ Contests for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Navin Kartik, revised, November 2015, presentation slides
∙ Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Navin Kartik, under revision, March 2015, presentation slides
∙ Auctions with Limited Commitment, with Konrad Mierendorff and Xianwen Shi, under revision, April 2014, presentation slides
∙ Bargaining with Experimentation, with Eduardo Faingold and Xianwen Shi presentation slides
∙ Fall 2013: Game Theory. Syllabus
Economic Theory Reading Group
Link to Papers