Pierre-Olivier Weill

Professor of Economics, UCLA

Research Associate, NBER

Research Fellow, CEPR

Department of Economics

University of California, Los Angeles

Box 951477

Los Angeles, CA, 90095-1477

poweill (at) econ (dot) ucla (dot) edu

Updated on September 3rd, 2021, revised for the Review of Economic Studies:

A Theory of Participation in OTC and Centralized Markets, with Jérôme Dugast and Semih Üslü. Revise and Resubmit, Review of Economic Studies.

Are OTC markets too large relative to centralized trading venues?

Revised version: the least sophisticated investors optimally participate in an OTC market as customers, even when they have the option to join a centralized market: although they receive worse terms of trade in the OTC market, they benefit from the intermediation services provided by the most sophisticated investors, who optimally participate in the OTC market as dealers. We find that more customers should participate in centralized market, and more dealers in the OTC market.

Updated on July 28th, 2021, and forthcoming, Theoretical Economics:

Heterogeneity in Decentralized Asset Markets, with Julien Hugonnier and Benjamin Lester. Forthcoming, Theoretical Economics.

Search and bargaining asset market with arbitrary distribution of valuation.

Updated on June 9th, 2021 and forthcoming, American Economic Review:

Incentive Constrained Risk Sharing, Segmentation, and Asset Pricing, with Bruno Biais and Johan Hombert.

The Search and Matching in Macro and Finance Seminar a great bi-weekly seminar organized by Zach Bethune, Briana Chang, Lucas Herrenbrueck, Batchimeg Sambalaibat, Bruno Sultanum Semih Uslu, Shengxing Zhang.