The Paris Environmental and Energy Economics Seminar is a joint initiative of Université Paris 1-Paris School of Economics, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense, Université Paris Dauphine, Agro ParisTech, Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole des Mines, Ecole des Ponts, CEA, CIRED, Climate Economics Chair and IFP School.

In 2015-2016, the seminar takes place every three weeks around on Thursday, 4:30pm to 6:30pm, at Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris.  

Keep the dates: 10/08/2015 - 11/05/2015 - 11/26/2015 - 12/17/2015 - 01/14/2016 - 02/04/2016 - 02/25/2016 - 03/17/2016 - 04/14/2016 - 05/12/2016 - 06/02/2016!

The seminar allows to present and discuss frontier research by French and foreign scholars on Environmental and Energy Economics.

Seminar coordinator: Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline (Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Organizing Committee: Jean-Christophe Bureau, Anna Creti, Stéphanie Monjon, Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, Matthieu Glachant, Fatih Karanfil, Frédéric Lantz, Nidhal Ouerfelli, Natacha Raffin.

On June 2, 2016
at Maison des Sciences  Economiques (Room S/17)

Stephen Salant (University of Michigan)

joint with Soren T. Anderson and Ryan Kellogg

"Hotelling under Pressure"


We show that oil production from existing wells in Texas does not respond to oil prices, while drilling activity and costs respond strongly. To explain these facts, we reformulate Hotelling's (1931) classic model of exhaustible resource extraction as a drilling problem: Firms choose when to drill, but production from existing wells is constrained by reservoir pressure, which decays as oil is extracted. The model implies a modified Hotelling rule for drilling revenues net of costs, explains why the production constraint typically binds, and rationalizes regional production peaks and observed patterns of prices, drilling, and production following demand and supply shocks.

Armon Rezaï (WU - Vienna University of Economics and Business)

joint with Larry Karp

"Trade and Resource Sustainability with Overlapping Generations"


Trade changes incentives to protect an open-access natural resource.  In an OLG setting, the capital asset market transfers policy-induced future gains and losses to the current asset owner. The asset market creates incentives for agents currently alive to protect the natural resource under autarchy. Trade reverses these incentives.   In a dynamic political economy, agents without bequest motives choose resource-protecting policies in both the open loop and Markov Perfect equilibria under autarchy; in the open economy agents choose policies exacerbating the open-access distortion, harming the resource. The difference arises from the interplay of the asset market and general equilibrium effects. Trade generally lowers welfare.