Pedro Daniel Jara-Moroni

short CV

Postal Adrress:

Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Departamento de Economía,

Av. Lib. Bdo. O'Higgins 3363

Estación Central, Chile

Fono: +562 27180751

send me an e-mail

Research Interests

Primary: Game Theory, Mathematical Economics, Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, Expectational Coordination.

Secondary: Transportation Networks, Urban Economics, Transportation Economics.

Research Papers

• Global games with strategic substitutes, R Harrison, P Jara-Moroni International Economic Review (2021) 62, 141-173.

• Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games P Jara-Moroni Economics Letters (2018) 162, 153-156.

• Integrated traffic-transit stochastic equilibrium model with park-and-ride facilities CE Cortés, P Jara-Moroni, E Moreno, C Pineda Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies (2016) 71, 86-107

• A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes R Harrison, P Jara-Moroni Journal of Mathematical Economics (2015) 57, 1-11

• Stochastic transit equilibrium CE Cortés, P Jara-Moroni, E Moreno, C Pineda Transportation Research Part B: Methodological (2013) 51, 29-44

• Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players P Jara-Moroni Games and Economic Behavior (2012) 75 (2), 668-684

• Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts R Guesnerie, P Jara-Moroni Economic Theory (2011) 47 (2-3), 205-246.

Proceedings

Modelo de equilibrio estocástico para asignación conjunta de transporte público y privado (con CE Cortés, E Moreno, C Pineda) Congreso Chileno de Ingeniería de Transporte (2013)

Working Papers

Efficient Entry in Symmetric Cournot Games (with R. Harrison)

Social Movements in Democratic Regimes (with B. Matta)

A Two-Stage Model of R&D with Endogenous Timing in Quantity Competition (with LJ Basso)

The Cournot outcome as the result of price competition (2008) PSE Working Paper 2007-24.

Work in Progress

Social movements in democratic regimes, joint work with B. Matta

Global Games and Strategic Substitutes, joint work with R. Harrison

Equilibrium selection in entry games, joint work with R. Harrison

Endogenous timing and equilibria in market competition, joint work with E. Zuiga and LJ Basso

Expectational Coordination and Rationalizability in Games with a Continuum of Players

Thesis Jury: Roger Guesnerie (Advisor), A. Jofré (co-advisor), M. Ali Khan; Gabriel Desgranges, Christophe Chamley, Stéphane Gauthier.

PhD Thesis:

Racionalizabilidad en Juegos y Coordinación de Anticipaciones, Universidad de Chile (2008)

Rationalizabilité en jeux et la coordination des anticipations, Paris, EHESS (2008)