School of Economics
The University of Adelaide
Nexus 10, Level 4
Adelaide SA 5005 Australia
- Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis (with Werner Güth), Economics Letters, 2015, 134, 1-3.
- Organisational structure, communication and group ethics (with Matthew Ellman), American Economic Review, 2010, 100(5), 2478-2491. [Supplement]
- Competition with forward contracts: A laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design (with Jordi Brandts and Arthur Schram), Economic Journal, 2008, 118, 192-214. [Supplement]
- Bidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis (with Tibor Neugebauer), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2007, 63(1), 55-72. [Supplement]
- Auctions for government securities: A laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs (with Klaus Abbink and Jordi Brandts), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2006, 61(2), 284-303.
- An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction (with Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch, Bettina Rockenbach, Karim Sadrieh and Reinhard Selten), European Economic Review, 2005, 49(2), 505-530. [Reprinted in New Developments in Experimental Economics - Volume I, Enrica Carbone and Chris Starmer (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.]
- On the impact of Low-Balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions, International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, 31(1), 69-89.
- Pareto's compensation principle (with Murray Kemp), Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, 16(3), 441-444. [Reprinted in International Trade and National Welfare, Murray Kemp (Ed.), Routledge, 2001, 209-212.]
- Auctioning Public Assets: Analysis and Alternatives, Maarten C.W. Janssen (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2002. In World Economy, 2005, 28(10), 1559.
- Asymmetric multiple object first-price auctions [PDF]
- Structural analysis of first-price auction data: insights from the laboratory (with Andres Romeu) (Coming soon!)
- Structural inferences from first-price auction data (with Andres Romeu) [PDF]
- Eliciting bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions (with Karim Sadrieh) [PDF]
- Sequential descending-price auctions with asymmetric buyers: Evidence form a fish market [PDF]
- Sequential auctions with supply uncertainty [PDF]