School of Economics
The University of Adelaide
Nexus 10, Level 4
Adelaide SA 5005 Australia

Tel.: +61.(0).88313.3928
Fax: +61.(0).88223.1460

Curriculum Vitae

  • Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis (with Werner Güth), Economics Letters, 2015, 134, 1-3.
  • Organisational structure, communication and group ethics (with Matthew Ellman), American Economic Review, 2010, 100(5), 2478-2491. [Supplement]
  • Competition with forward contracts: A laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design (with Jordi Brandts and Arthur Schram), Economic Journal, 2008, 118, 192-214. [Supplement]
  • Bidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis (with Tibor Neugebauer), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2007, 63(1), 55-72. [Supplement]
  • Auctions for government securities: A laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs (with Klaus Abbink and Jordi Brandts), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2006, 61(2), 284-303.
  • On the impact of Low-Balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions, International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, 31(1), 69-89.
  • Pareto's compensation principle (with Murray Kemp), Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, 16(3), 441-444. [Reprinted in International Trade and National Welfare, Murray Kemp (Ed.), Routledge, 2001, 209-212.]

Book Review
  • Auctioning Public Assets: Analysis and Alternatives, Maarten C.W. Janssen (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2002. In World Economy, 2005, 28(10), 1559. 

Working Papers
  • Asymmetric multiple object first-price auctions [PDF]
  • Structural analysis of first-price auction data: insights from the laboratory (with Andres Romeu(Coming soon!)
  • Structural inferences from first-price auction data (with Andres Romeu) [PDF]
  • Eliciting bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions (with Karim Sadrieh) [PDF]
  • Sequential descending-price auctions with asymmetric buyers: Evidence form a fish market [PDF]
  • Sequential auctions with supply uncertainty [PDF]