"Burden sharing and exchange rate misalignments within the Group of Twenty" (with A. Bénassy-Quéré, A. Lahrèche-Révil and V. Mignon), in C.F. Bergsten and J. Williamson eds., Dollar Adjustment: How Far? Against What?, Institute for International Economics special report 17, Washington D.C., November 2004.
Abstract:
We present equilibrium effective exchange rates for a set of industrial as well as developing countries, based on a methodology close to that used by Alberola et al. (2002), where the real exchange rate is jointly determined by external balance as well as internal balance. We then calculate equilibrium bilateral exchange rates against the US dollar. Finally, we investigate the size of bilateral misalignments depending on the number of flexible currencies within the G-20. To derive the full set of bilateral misalignments, we turn out the solution of adding an n+1 th currency standing for the rest of the world, as this would imply G-20 countries transferring the burden of overall adjustment to third countries. Using various alternative numeraires, we show the diagnosis of bilateral misalignments to be robust for most currencies. The lack of adjustment in some countries is shown to have an ambiguous effect on the adjustments beared by flexible currencies.
"Inter-municipal cooperation and local taxation" (with M.L. Breuillé and A.L. Samson), Journal of Urban Economics, 107, 2018, 47-64.
Abstract:
This paper studies how inter-municipal cooperation, through the creation of a new jurisdictional tier with transferred competencies and tax powers, affects the four main direct local tax rates (business tax, residence tax, property tax on developed land, property tax on undeveloped land) in France. We use an instrumented difference-in-differences method with an original, exhaustive panel of 36,530 French municipalities over the 1994–2010 period. Our estimation results show that inter-municipal cooperation led to an increase in the four (municipal plus inter-municipal) tax rates, which accounts for 35% of the increase observed by the taxpayer on average. Tax increases are greater for the four tax rates when a tax regime consisting in sharing tax-bases between municipal and inter-municipal governments has been adopted. As for municipal tax rates alone, the smaller the municipality, the sharper their decrease. Finally, the heterogeneity of the youth share of the population between municipalities is a key driver of the extent to which the impact of inter-municipal cooperation differs across municipalities.
"When transparency goes against efficiency: fiscal equalization in the context of firm and household mobility", Journal of public Economic Theory, 14(1), 2012, 99-130.
Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the mobility of households and firms affect economic efficiency and whether a transparent system of equalization payments can be efficiency enhancing. When local governments choose their fiscal policy taking into account the impact the policy will have on migration, the decentralized equilibrium does not result in a socially efficient allocation: central government intervention is required. However, assuming the transparency of fiscal equalization -- that is local governments know the transfer formulas as it is advocated by the Council of Europe -- no system of equalization transfers is able to ensure economic efficiency. The system has to combine a transparent transfer with a grant whose formula is not known to local governments.
"Disparités fiscales et redistribution territoriale: de la coopération subie à la coopération choisie", Vie et Sciences de l'Entreprise, 193, 2013, 78-92.
Abstract:
The question of fiscal disparities is a very topical issue. European opening and globalization have induced a higher competition between territories and the consequences can be extremely important in terms of spatial cohesion. An analysis of the instruments used to deal with the sensitive issue of territorial disparities is thus both relevant and necessary. In economics, two different approaches are acknowledged: “fiscal” and “territorial”. The fiscal approach aims at dealing ex-post with territorial inequalities, while the territorial approach aims at defining the rules that lead public actors to think ex-ante of the consequences of their decisions. Fiscal equalization and inter-municipal cooperation are characteristics of these two approaches and relate to different aims and methodologies that are analysed here in order to bring a new thinking about the implementation and the impact of policies of territorial redistribution.
"Intercommunalités: boucs émissaires de l’augmentation des impôts locaux en France?" (with M.L. Breuillé and A.L. Samson), Pouvoirs Locaux, 104, 2015, 32-39.