Assistant Professor of Finance

            Warwick Business School 
            University of Warwick

            Email: Onur.Tosun@wbs.ac.uk
            Phone: +44(0)2476 524 541

Address: C2.42, Finance Group 
            Warwick Business School, 
University of Warwick
            Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom

            Curriculum Vitae



      ·        Ph.D. Finance, minor in Economics, 2013. University of Maryland, Smith School of Business           

      ·        MBA, 2008. Bogazici University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences

      ·        B.S., Industrial Engineering, 2006. Istanbul Technical University, Faculty of Management





      ·        Empirical Corporate Finance: Executive Compensation, Capital Structure, Corporate Governance.





      ·        “The Effect of the CEO’s Option Compensation on the Firm’s Capital Structure: A Natural Experiment”; (Job Market Paper).

      ·        “Does Internal Board Monitoring Affect the Debt Maturity? - A Natural Experiment”; (2012).

      ·        “Changes in Corporate Governance: Externally Dictated vs Organically Determined”; (with Michael Faulkender); (2012).

      ·        “The Effect of Industry Structure on Debt Maturity”; (2010).

      ·        “The Effect of (In)Flexibility in Capital Allocation on Leverage and Liquidity”; (2009).





      ·        IB236: Corporate Finance (Undergraduate); University of Warwick

      ·        BMGT 446: International Finance (Undergraduate); University of Maryland





·        “The Effect of the CEO’s Option Compensation on the Firm’s Capital Structure: A Natural Experiment” (Job Market Paper)


The empirical challenge in studying the relation between CEO option compensation and the firm’s capital structure decision is that these are both choices of the firm that are made simultaneously. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude from the existing literature the causation of this relation. Using the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 162(m) tax law as an exogenous shock to the compensation structure in a natural experiment setting, I can identify now firm leverage changes as a result of the CEO option compensation changes. The evidence in this paper provides strong support for the debt agency theory. The results indicate that CEOs raise less debt when they are paid with more option grants and as those options become a higher percentage of the firm’s future cash flows. The findings are robust to addition of corporate governance and convertible debt dimensions to the estimation. The results clarify the conflicting evidence previously documented in the literature and provide guidance to compensation committees as to how CEO compensation impacts firm leverage.



·        “Does Internal Board Monitoring Affect the Debt Maturity?  - A Natural Experiment”


I investigate the effect of the powerful board monitoring on the debt maturity structure in the firm. In order to identify the independence of the board of directors precisely and provide its real impact on the maturity, I use the Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 and the SEC regulations as the exogenous shock to the board structure in a natural experiment setting. Supporting the agency theory, my findings indicate that the firm can issue more debt with longer maturity as the board independence increases and the internal board monitoring becomes powerful. The results are even stronger for companies choosing straight debt over the convertible debt. Researching the effect of the strong monitoring via independent board on the debt maturity in times of financial instability, I find that my original findings are more significant possibly due to greater need for a solid and strict monitoring during crisis periods.



·        “Changes in Corporate Governance: Externally Dictated vs Organically Determined”


This paper investigates the individual impacts of externally mandated as well as organically decided board and key committee modifications on the firm performance while comparing and questioning the results of these changes. SOX and SEC regulations are employed as a natural experiment in order to represent the imposed rules and elucidate the identification issues. The evidence supports significantly the agency theory along with the idea of the optional adjustment. The findings imply that companies willingly determine the necessary corporate governance modifications based on firm specific characteristics and needs perform better compared the case where they are all forced to alter their board and key committee structures. While this influence is valid and strong only for particular governance characteristics during recession times, the findings can not provide sufficient and significant evidence in terms of firm performance considering the small cap firms only. The outcomes of this study clarify the conflicting opinions discussed in literature.