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Response to risks

What could the defence force do in response to the risks New Zealand faces?
 
Any organisation consists of labour and training, capital and command and control systems. If we look at the risks again we can analyse what sort of labour and training, capital and command and control systems would be most useful in response to the risk. This does not automatically imply the role should fall to the military, it just means the risk is best managed in this fashion.
 
 Hazard  Capital  Labour & Training  Command and control Potential Defense Responses 
 Bollides


Canterbury University already operates the Mount John observatory which could provide early warning.

It is not known if anti-ballistic missiles can effect bollides and they are hugely expensive.

 

Evacuation is the only effective solution to the bollide risk. This would largely require Police to manage an orderly evacuation. For very large evacuations NZDF could play a role.

EQC covers most natural disasters but does not appear to cover bollide impacts.

The main difficulty with Bollides is the time between detection, course calculation and response.

The scientific community are capable of the former. The main requirements is a point of contact to ensure the information is picked up by civil defence agencies.

 Anti-Ballistic Missile System

 Solar radiation
Radiation hardening of core infrastructure (control systems on health, aviation, energy, finance  and telecommunications networks) adds an extra cost to civilian systems. Requirements should be introduced by statute to avoid non-compliance advantage.  Threat awareness is probably the only training which can assist response to this risk. As with the bollides the principle difficulty is the interface between the scientific community and civil defence agencies. EMP-hardened communications systems.
 Volcano
Volcano warning systems are operated by GNS science. There is practically nothing which can be done to stop eruptions.
 
Metservice operates the volcanic ash advisory service. As with eruptions avoidance is the only option for dealing with ash plumes.
 

Evacuees will normally be absorbed by civilian capacity but camps may be required.

Evacuation is, once again the only practical response to the volcano eruption risk. While this is predominantly a Police task for large evacuations NZDF could play a role.

The volcano risk is well known to all agencies. Command and control structures already exist.

 Engineering Corps

 Desert-ops helicopters

 Mobile field hospitals

 Military Police / SAR

 Field Mortuary

 Robot aircraft/land craft

  

 Earthquake
Christchurch 2011 (Wikipedia)
Earthquakes can neither be predicted nor prevented. The most effective defence against earthquakes is good building codes and strict compliance. This is especially important for hospitals.
 
Water reticulation is especially vulnerable to earthquakes. The need to re-establish water systems can be planned for.
 
Recovery operations require logistical support and transport services via sea and land. Earthquakes can alter harbours requiring rapid maritime surveys.

Personal survival and first aid skills can be required by statute in schools and workplaces.

Specialist USAR teams including dogs can be maintained and trained in the field on foreign disasters,

Field mortuary and field operations support are a natural fit for the NZDF.

New Zealand's response to the Canterbury earthquake earned it the odd praise of being "the best organised disaster" some international USAR people had been to.

While we can learn more from experience the main thing is to ensure the learning is institutionalised.

 Engineering Corps

 Helicopters

 Heavy-lift helicopters

 Logistics/ Transport

 Transport/Ocean Patrol aircraft

 Mobile field hospitals

 Military Police / SAR

 Field Mortuary

 Tsunami
2010 Tsunami, Japan

Long range Tsunamis are subject to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. But short range Tsunamis leave little time for warning.

Tsunami engineers say impacts on low-lying land can be prevented by building stop-banks facing the sea similar to river floodbanks.

The Samoan Tsunami in 2009 demonstrated that recovery operations require supply of clean water building materials and heavy machinery by sea and air.

The 2006 Tsunami's effect on sea-channels made delivery of relief supplies difficult because new maritime surveys and port facilities were needed.

Evacuation is, again, the only practical response to the Tsunami risk. While this is predominantly a Police task for large evacuations NZDF could play a role

Field mortuary, field operations support and evacuation camps are a potential NZDF role.

Civil defence has managed a number of long range Tsunami warnings since the 2006 Boxing Day event. A short range event would likley be coupled with a Volcano or Earthquake event.

 Helicopters

 Field Mortuary
 
 Military Police / SAR

 Engineering Corps

 Ocean Patrol Aircraft

 Transport Aircraft

 Seabed Survey ships and aircraft

 Engineering Corps

 Cyclone/Flood

TEV Wahine before sinking

Prediction of dangerous weather events is handled by Metservice.

Floods are best prevented through use of stop-banks.

Category One (local) Search and Rescue is led by Police.

Provision of supplies may require NZDF off-road trucks or helicopters. To respond to island cyclones these should be able to be delivered by air or sea.

 Sandbagging operations and emergency stop-banks require some training to be effective. Cyclones are a fairly routine civil emergency in New Zealand.

 Ocean Patrol Aircraft

 Helicopters

 Military Police / SAR

 Pandemic
US Flu hospital (Wikipedia)

Epidemics are managed by the Ministry of Health. Pandemic emergencies under the National Health Emergency Plan. The plan does not explicitly mention the NZDF.

Overflow field hospitals. NBC equipped vehicles (eg the LAVIII), NBC equipment and decontamination sprays, and field mortuaries may be required.

Pandemic assistance to other nations may require that some of these assets can be moves by air or sea.

NBC warfare training would make NZDF a useful pool of labour in a major medical emergency. The National Health Emergency Plan has been exercised but not tested.

 Engineering Corps

 Military Police

 Field Mortuary

 Mobile Hospital

 Transport Aircraft

 

 Agricultural epidemic
2001 Foot and Mouth Outbreak (The Guardian)

Biosecurity is the duty of MAF Biosecurity New Zealand.

NBC vehicles could reduce decontamination time. Decontamination vehicles could be useful.

UAVs for air samples could be useful for some pathogens.

NBC warfare training would make NZDF a useful pool of labour in a major biosecurity emergency. This planning is well established.

 Military Police

 Logistics/Transport

 Chemical fire/gas

1984 ICI chemical fire Auckland

The Fire Service is equipped for fighting these fires.

NBC vehicles could be useful for evacuations in particularly bad fires but availability is not likely to be great.

The Russian Emercon department uses rocket launched fire suppressant.

While this is largely a NZ fire service task NBC warfare training would make NZDF a useful pool of labour in a major emergency. The planning and training for this is established.

 Mobile Hospital

 Helicopters

 

 Chemical/oil spill
Rena clean-up (Maritime New Zealand)

Maritime New Zealand is responsible for this and has been found lacking by the Rena spill.

The Norwegian Coastguard regards oil spill countermeasures as a key national defence task for its ships.

Helicopter based dispersant is normally applied by civilian contractors 


Defence force personnel have the NBC clothing and training useful for dealing with these hazards.

Significant lessons will be learned from the Rena. Maritime New Zealand's management will doubtless be questioned.

 Helicopters

 Heavy-Lift helicopters

 Heavy-Crane Self-loading Logistics Ship

 Light Fast Spill Response Ship

 Logistics

 Uncontrolled/Unsustainable fishing
Orange Roughy in nets

There are two risks: inadequate information and inadequate supervision

NIWA's Tangaroa is the only deep sea research vessel to cover 4 our million square kilometre EEZ. It was recently overhauled. This is still inadequate.

Supervision usually involves onboard observers but they have to sleep. UAVs can monitor ships without being detected.

 Monitoring, bording and surveillance are well understood naval tasks.

More emphasis needs to be placed on fisheries research. Having six naval ships to a single research ship demonstrates a misunderstanding of the fisheries mismanagement risk. 

The overlap between the Ministry of Fisheries, the Navy and the Police is well explored. There could be more overlap between the Navy and Niwa. 

 Ocean patrol aircraft

 Light fast patrol ship with helideck

 Helicopters

 Subsea Survey Vessel

 Robot Subsea Craft

 Piracy
Indonesian pirates

Piracy attacks generally involve low cost craft/vessels and weapons. Pirates rely on speed, deception and opportunity. While warships will certainly overwhelm pirates ships that appear to be targets will have a better chance of capturing them.

Night Surveillance UAVs would be useful.

Like fishing catching pirates requires patience and a solid understanding of the area and quarry.

Taking part in international anti-piracy operations is essential for maintaining capability.

Piracy operates in the grey spaces of international law. It takes advantage of national boundaries and failed states. In some places it may even amount to privateering.

 Ocean patrol aircraft

 Light fast patrol ship

 Oiler/ patrol support vessel

 Special Forces 

 Robot aircraft / subsea craft

 Maritime (category 2) Search and Rescue

SAR essentially comes down to beacons. Without beacons its hard, with them its easier. Surveillance UAVs or aircraft are needed.

Helicopters with radars to find lifeboats, sufficient range and capacity are needed to rescue people in high seas. Redirected civilian vessels are useful.  in normal seas

SAR is a fairly well understood role for air and sea crews. These systems are in place. Better communication with defence assets however could save lives.

 Ocean patrol aircraft

 Helicopters

 Light fast patrol vessel

 Navy Divers

Robot Subsea Craft

 Cyberwarfare
UAV footage on Youtube

Cyberwarfare is rapidly becoming a serious risk. Typically Governments protect their own secrets reasonably well but contract out of protecting critical national infrastructure which they would protect from airstrikes.

Cyberwarfare probably requires a larger slice of Police and Defence attention. This is currently the responsibility of the GCSB.

Field hacks on remote control equipment must be countered and enemy systems jammed.

This is an extremely arcane and difficult defensive arena. There are legal problems defining jurisdiction and talented practicioners are unlikely to appreciate defence values or culture.

Tactical cyberwarfare is something soldiers may struggle to understand technically but will grasp the ramifications immediately. This is a new area of specialism for all deployed defence force staff.

Currently the responsibility of GCSB it might make sense to seperate the intelligence gathering role of GCSB and the cyber warfare aspect.

A Network Security Organisation should not be a Police operation but should focus on defence of the realm from cyber attack.

 Organic network specialists in all military  units. All units should be capable of offence/defence in the network dimension.

 Terrorism
Terrorism is a Police concern. That said there is a clear role for special forces in combating terrorism. This includes surveillance UAVs, vehicles and helicopters.  Appalling as it may sound the only training worth having is against real terrorists. To remain current anti-terrorist units have to be deployed to engage actual terrorists in other countries. There is always a risk of casualties. Terrorism can strike unexpectedly. Norwegian mass murder Anders Behring Breivik distracted authorities with bombs before his rampage. The Mumbai terrorists were similarly swift. Police must be capable of calling for assistance and military staff must be capable of responding within an hour.

 Special forces troops

 Military Police

 Helicopters

 Robot aircraft/ land units

 Engineering Corps

 State Sabotage/Mining
Rainbow Warrior, Auckland Harbour (Greenpeace)

There is an overlap between Defence and Police operations in this respect. Modern sea mines hide on the seabed and home. Mine clearing requires detection equipment, ships with countermeasures and specialised divers.

Intelligence agencies (in particular signals intelligence) are needed to assess a threat possibility. That said it was the intelligence service of an erstwhile ally which carried out the only act of peacetime state sabotage carried out in New Zealand and NZ intelligence had no inkling of the threat.

 This is a specialised area of military training. To maintain a capability force crews would have to work with foreign navies.

Preventing sea lane mining requires a maritime presence with vessels able to detect sea mines or undetectable UAV or surveillance aircaft able to deter the attempt.  

 Ocean Patrol Aircraft

 Subsea survey vessel

 Robot Subsea Craft

 Navy Divers

 State failure
Honiara, Solomon Island (source BBC)

State failure essentially requires the ability to move large amounts of equipment and personnel into a territory quickly and efficiently so as to prevent loss of life and property. This is unlikely to be a contested landing but may involve sniping with automatic weapons or RPGs.

Port facilities may not be operational so ships and aircraft should be self-loading.

Field hospital and international air ambulance evacuation capability would be useful.

 In the case of state failure defence personnel must effectively operate as Police. This requires an understanding of what is, and what is not permissable.

Officers in particular need to understand the diplomatic and legal circumstances under which they are operating.

Troops need to be able to protect themselves appropriately from snipers, improvised explosive devices and unarmed but angry locals.

State failure is a confusing operational situation because the chain of authority and legitimacy can be confusing or split. Command structures from the diplomatic to the operational should be integrated through a single on-scene commander.

 Transport Aircraft

 Ocean Surveillance Aircraft

 Heavy-Crane Self-loading Logistics Ship

 Fast Supply Ships

 Military Police

 Special Forces

 Helicopters

 

 Low intensity proxy wars
RNZAF Iroquois in Timor-Leste

Typically the targeted state will be operational when it calls for assistance in a proxy war. This reduces the need for self-sufficiency

There is still a need to deliver personnel, equipment, helicopters, surveillance UAVs, and mine-protected patrol vehicles by air and sea. This requires ships and aircraft.

Field hospital and international air ambulance evacuation capability would be useful

The need to build secure bases or compounds is essential.

Personnel must effectively operate as Police. This requires an understanding of what is, and what is not permissable.

Officers in particular need to understand the diplomatic and legal circumstances under which they are operating.

Troops need to be able to protect themselves appropriately from snipers, improvised explosive devices and unarmed but angry locals

The NZDF has long trained is soldiers in the art of guerilla warfare. While it is unlikely this will ever be needed it provides a useful perspective on enemy planning and operations.

The difficulty of proxy wars is not becoming the meat in the sandwich.

This means clear command structures and a good exit strategy must remain clear and viable at all times.

 
 Transport Aircraft

 Ocean Surveillance Aircraft

 Heavy-Crane Self-loading  Logistics Ship

 Fast Supply Ships

 Military Police

 Special Forces

 Helicopters

Occupation/Guerilla Wars
NZ soldiers perform haka in Bamiyan, Afghanistan

The difference between occupation wars and low intensity proxy wars is the role of the invading power. Typically the invading power provides most, if not all, of the infrastructure and intelligence context of the occupation. The role of the defence force is to do what it is sent to do and avoid casualties.

Guerillas always attack soft spots not hard ones. To avoid being a soft spot a force needs mine-protected and armoured vehicles which can be deployed in useful numbers to the war zone. This is a trade-off between deployability and survivability. Other useful kit is tactical UAVs and decent ballistic protection. Standards based communication is essential.

The difficulty is co-operating with both an invading power and local authorities. This can place troops in an invidious position.

Officers in particular need to understand the diplomatic and legal circumstances under which they are operating.

Troops need to be able to protect themselves appropriately from snipers, improvised explosive devices and unarmed but angry locals.

The NZDF has long trained is soldiers in the art of guerilla warfare. While it is unlikely this will ever be needed it provides a useful perspective on enemy planning and operations.

Occupation wars are even more complicated than low intensity wars.Clear command structures and a good exit strategy must remain clear and viable at all times.

 Special Forces

 Engineering Corps

 Military Police

 Transport Aircraft

 

 High intensity war

The Battle of Coral Sea 1942

No ABM system for New Zealand means we are at risk from nuclear missiles, however these are unlikely to come our way.

Winning a hot war (as called for in the NZDF doctrine) is a fairly meaningless concept. Winning a battle is a more feasible ambition. Winning a battle essentially means a political victory through use of arms. Massacring civilians doesn't count.

Essentially winning a battle means surviving enemy strikes, inflicting damage and forcing withdrawal through manouver. This requires better resolve, thinking, and effective weapons than the enemy. The question then is "who is the enemy?" Unless the enemy is much poorer than we are it is unlikely the NZDF will have any of the advantages needed to achieve battlefield victory.

For the past 60 years the typical enemy New Zealand forces have encountered has been a guerilla with an AK47 or an RPG. Only in Bosnia did we encounter armour. Never have we entered a hot war without air superiority.

Guerillas have won a great many wars and should not be underestimated. Much has been learned about fighting them using air, artillery, armour and infantry tactics. That said fighting guerillas has little direct economic value to New Zealand. In general it is a costly waste of resources.

Planning for a hot war is probably pointless. The range of scenarios is too broad and complex for any benefit to come of it.

Planning for battles between guerilla and NZDF forces is a very sensible precaution.

 Air Superiority Fighters

 Anti-Ballistic Missile System

 ASW Patrol aircraft

 ASW Helicopters

 ASW Swarm Ships

 Anti-shipping Strike Fighters

 Submarines

 Special Forces

 Partisan Irregulars with large  supplies of hunting calibre automatic rifles, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons.

 

 

 

 Submarine Sneak Attack
To attack submarines one needs ASW aircraft (eg the Orions), ships (eg the frigates) and helicopters (Seasprites).
 
While attack is a good form of defence it only works if you have an enemy.  There is no local enemy.
 
A submarine is mostly useful for attacking high-value assets. The best way to kill a submarine is to deny it a target while retaining a lethal search capability. A swarm of lower cost ships and helicopters capable of ASW is a better response to the submarine threat than a few highly expensive targets.

Training in ASW should be proportional to the risk. The risk is minimal.

ASW is a very specialised form of warfare. The question is whether there is any reason for NZ to bother with it.


 Ocean Patrol Aircraft

 ASW Helicopters

 Swarm ASW ships

 Robot Subsea Craft

 Antarctic Programme

Long range air and ice-capable sea transport is required to support the Antarctic programme.

Ice-capable fisheries research and patrol ships could not only protect the southern oceans but also assist in the research mission.

The training of airforce, Naval and Niwa staff has avoided casualties to date.

 

 Ocean Patrol Aircraft

 Research ships

 Navy Divers

 Robot Subsea Craft