Jiao Ji

Lecturer in Finance (Assistant Professor)
C088, Sheffield University Management School                        
University of Sheffield
Conduit Road, Sheffield, S10 1FL, UK

Phone: +44(0)114 222 0986
E-mail: jiao.ji@sheffied.ac.uk                                                                           

Research Interests

Corporate Finance and Governance, Empirical Finance, Financial Disclosure using Text Analysis,
Emerging Market Economies, Corporate Social Responsibility


    Curriculum Vitae | Teaching |

Publications and Working Papers

"Board Meeting Frequency on Various Topics and Corporate Governance", with Oleksandr Talavera, Shuxing Yin

Abstract:Our paper examines to what extent the frequencies of board meetings on particular topics on corporate governance. We utilize a unique dataset of specific topics discussed at board meetings, drawn from the reports of independent directors of listed firms in China over the period of 2003 to 2010. Our results show that turnover-performance sensitivity is weaker when there is a higher frequency of board meetings discussing the nomination of directors and top management. Moreover, the link between CEO compensation and firm performance is enhanced only when directors meet more often to discuss growth strategies for the use of IPO proceeds, investment and acquisitions. The paper provides support for agency theories on the effectiveness of board monitoring. It sheds lights on what makes boards more effective, and how board monitoring of different decisions at board meetings modifies the connection between CEO interests and firm performance

"Auditor Change and Corporate Governance: Audit Committee Reputation"

We focus on the role of the audit committee in changing the external auditor. We argue that director’s reputation in the labour market can be a source of incentives to motivate audit committee members to work diligently and demand a high level of audit quality. We find that an audit committee with more reputable members is more likely to change the auditor. Further, they tend to employ an auditor providing higher audit quality with better brand-name, bigger size, and higher independence. By comparing the effects of a voluntary and involuntary auditor change on discretionary accruals, a proxy for earnings quality, our results reveal that only a voluntary auditor change is significantly and negatively related to discretionary accruals. The study contributes to our understanding of audit committee functions and provides direct evidence that concern about reputational losses is an important incentive for the audit committee to change auditor. Policymakers should focus more on how to improve the monitoring function of the auditor committee and other internal corporate governance mechanism, and cautiously implement mandatory auditor rotation.

"The Hidden Information Content: Evidence from the Tone of Independent Director Reports"

Abstract: The paper examines the information content of independent director reports (IDRs), a novel dataset for observing board tasks and decisions in Chinese listed firms, using the Chinese word segmentation and Naïve Bayesian machine learning algorithm. We find that firms with younger independent directors, more directors with accounting expertise, more board committees, more board meetings, less leverage, and controlled by private shareholders tend to have more positive IDRs. The average tone of the IDRs is positively related to future firm performance after controlling other factors that influence firm performance. We also find that that the negative tone of IDRs is negatively correlated with firm performance for firms with greater monitoring necessities.

Papers in Preparation

"Innovation, Top Management Cognition and Firm Culture"

"Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Value Added?"

"Auditor Opinion and Audit Committee"