Sec. 498A IPC is the 2-in-1 statute/law.

Both kind of offences cannot be treated as same and one


as per SC Judgments in 2008 AIR 231; xxxxxxx; xxx.



Criminal (2nd.Amendment) Act No.46 of 1983 unambiguously show distinctive two separate criminal procedures for offence allegations, if any and if genuinely made,  under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code (IPC) based upon PRESET natural  physical DEAD OR LIVING condition of a wife prescribed by Parliament of Republic   and Democracy India. Living wife cannot be treated as dead wife by choice of wife or any authority - Police Officer or Magistrate.  


The conditions of “living or dead” for non-cognizable or cognizable offence u/s. 498A IPC,   is pre-approved “condition of being alive or dead”, have been set by Parliament vide Crl. (2nd.Amendment) Act no.46/1983 that had created section 498A IPC too.

      The legal procedures in Criminal (2nd. Amendment) Act No.46 of 1983 included along with creating 498A IPC,  for s.498A IPC’s application/use are unambiguous in case of using for (1) dowry death of wife caused by cruelty or (2) living wife despite alleged cruelty upon her (as the case may be) :



1. There were 7 sections in said Act 46/1983 covering IPC -  CrPC - IPC - Indian Evidence Act (IEA) for said purposes. The section 498A IPC cannot be seen, read and followed in isolation from other key Sections like S.198A of Code of Criminal Procedures (Cr.P.C.) and S.113A of Indian Evidence Act (IEA) created by same Act No.46/1983  laying procedure and condition for S. 498A IPC.  


2.  The purpose of a statute has been held “important” by SC. See Schedule “Z1” herein below.


3.      498A IPC: 2 in 1 penal STATUTE for Cruelty

 (1) "causing"- leading to death of wife including by suicide*  

or (2) remaining alive  wife  :-

1st. due procedure established under law, as per statute   Ss. 198A Cr.P.C. and 113A IEA : -  

498A IPC is and was FIRST dowry death penal law for cruelty.

          (a)  So only in case of death of any wife, a police officer can make use of 498A IPC as cognizable offence in which presumptive section 113A Indian Evidence Act  becomes operative to justify use of 498A IPC as dowry death of wife  being a cognizable offence through Police Officer as per statute ; (b) otherwise the (living) wife under S. 198A Cr.P.C. shall lodge complaint to the magistrate for allegation of cruelty u/s. 498A IPC. Living (wife)




4. The legislation u/s. 198A Cr.P.C. does not give discretion to any wife or any authority to submit/accept/create/fabricate complaint to Police Officer u/s. 498A IPC for living wife. If living wife makes such complaint u/s. 498A IPC to Police Officer, then it is self proved it has been done for wife’s ulterior motive for alien purposes not intended in any statute.


5.     The First Schedule of the Cr. P.C at 498A column 4 states that this law is cognizable if complaint made to Police Officer otherwise it is non-cognizable. The First schedule is only indicative of substance and it cannot be used to create 3rd. illegal procedure.


6.      The 3rd.  Illegal procedure in name of First Schedule of Criminal Procedure code (Cr.P.C.), is a fraud upon court because it does not lays any third procedure.

             Further, because First Schedule  gives a brief reference of  two alternative laws in One statute.

     Said part in the FIRST SCHEDULE is QUALIFYING CLAUSE for  Section 498A IPC to decide for procedure for cognizable and non-cognizable status depending upon the death or living condition of wife. The whole Crl. Amendment Act no.46/1983 has to be kept in view for appropriate procedure for s. 498A IPC for death of living wife or living wife - caused by alleged cruelty, if any vis-a-vis S. 198A Cr.P.C. and Sec. 113A of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.


7.      The statutes do not give option to wife or any civil or judicial authority to chose filing of F.I.R. or complaint of living wife to the Police Officer.  See Section 198A Cr.P.C. and Section 113A of Indian Evidence Act, 1872


8.     So the duty of all persons and authorities is to make information to police in case of  suspected cruelty dowry death allegation where s.113A IEA is applicable for Section 498A IPC.


9.     When there is no dowry death u/s. 498A IPC, the living wife cannot pretend to be covered in category of section 113A IEA in any condition because she is not dead and then in case of genuine grievance, if any, u/s. 498A I.P.C. living wife etc. has to make complaint u/s. 198A Cr.P.C. to Magistrate in case of living wife. In all courts a complaint to magistrate is accompanied with affidavit.   This special law cannot be used with other sections of law  by Government through Police officer as  malafide step for illegal terrorism for abusing criminal process for ulterior motives of wife, at cost of government money.


10.    Magistrate cannot entertain cognizable complaint u/s. 498A IPC for LIVING WIFE on and through police report as he has no such discretion under the Crl. Procedure Code, Indian Penal Code and Indian Evidence Act  because the conditions are laid in the law by Parliament for treating offence u/s. 498A IPC as cognizable and non-cognizable for which concerned has to apply judicious mind. The intention of Parliament objectives were to take care of dowry deaths while enacting CRL (2nd.AMENDMENT) ACT No. 46/1983.

     Important:      Dowry death u/s. 304B Cr.P.C.  is confined to dowry death also read with S.113B IEA. And S. 498A IPC has to be used for living wife through magistrate for allegations by wife.


11.      2nd. due procedure established under same law for S.498A IPC  – Living Wife etc.  can only make complaint to magistrate i.e. accompanied with an affidavit to Magistrate in case of genuine cruelty allegations  against husband or his family members.  This will not cause abuse of criminal process unless allegations are made for ulterior motives of wife.


12.  Complaint is defined in section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal

           Procedure that reads as –

“2. Definitions. *** (d) “complaint” means any allegations made orally or in writing to a Magistrate  with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.”  Unquote.


13.     3rd.   UNDUE procedure is not-Established by Law - None such procedure was passed by Parliament of India: Police Officer and Magistrate/Judge cannot treat or "select by choice" the cognizable route through Police Officer for living wife making 498A IPC case for living wife as cognizable without s.113A IEA coming into force because dowry death of wife did not happen.


14.        No death of wife cannot be reward for living wife and it cannot be made punishment to husband or his relatives for not harassing the “wife” and let her remain hail, hearty and alive. Filing of false case for and by her and her group for their ulterior motives for alien purposes is not permitted by SC judgments specifically.


15.        Above mentioned 3rd.  procedure is illegal because singularly or collectively police officer and any Judge cannot create any other procedure because the Parliament’s intentions are clear in foresaid Crl Act No.46/1983 that the said statute is intended for being acted either through first due procedure established by law (As dowry death) or through second due procedure established by law as mentioned above in light of sec 198A CrPC read with section 113A IEAct created for implementation of section 498A IPC for dead/ alive wives.


16.     The Third illegal procedure includes illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. In fact the irrationality has relation to unreasonableness.

Out of the three decisions Wednesbury, Padfield, Anisminic atleast three propositions emerged that are applicable to fraud upon court through THIRD illegal procedure not established by law for s. 498A IPC;

(1)         there is no unfettered discretion in any statutory or public authority ; (3rd. illegal procedure shows use of unfettered and unjust discretion in this matter)

(2).        the discretion vested in the authorities should have been exercised lawfully and as there is contravention of law, the authorities are acting in excess of its powers by using the Third illegal procedure for S.498A IPC (in ‘alive’ wives’ F.I.R.cases as act of illegal terrorism by State Government supported by judiciary if not frowned upon by the judges/magistrate and dismissed prima facie for being not entertained through such illegal procedure.);

(3)        in rendering a decision, the public authority fails to take into account a relevant matter or takes into account an irrelevant matter, or misdirects himself on a point of law or otherwise act unreasonably (amounting to an absurd decision to use third illegal procedure for S.498A IPC), the resultant decision is one beyond or without jurisdiction.


17.         Illegal Procedure for ALIVE wives has been illegally followed by police

officers because those are not reined by Magistrates (Judges) when police officer registers FIR u/s 498A IPC for  ALIVE wives as cognizable offence. SC has ruled that dowry death case attracts provisions like 498A IPC as relevant presumptive section 113A of IEA provides.


18.   Police officer cannot use special 2-in-1 law s. 498A IPC with other penal sections, 

u/s. 155(4) of Cr.P.C.  for making it cognizable case for living wife in deliberate disrespect of   because 498A IPC which is a special law for use in matrimonial homes and for which Parliament has set conditions when it is cognizable and when it is non cognizable. Sec.166 of IPC is also applicable. APP is also covered under Section 166 IPC for penal action for any deliberate acts to cause failure of justice in matter of abuse of criminal process for section 498A IPC.


19.     In view of nature of legislation in Criminal 2nd. Amendment Act No.46 of 1983: Any attempt of even unsuccessful “attempted” suicide by alive wife comes under category of Section 498A IPC  that she has to make  complaint to Magistrate as and by alive wife for which such complaint  is accompanied with affidavit to magistrate.

20.     Any attempted unsuccessful suicide by a wife is covered for penal action for committing attempt to suicide.


21. Based upon: citations of Supreme Court of India  amongst others   that 498A IPC is for 1. dowry death and 2. cruelty:

i.                   Noorjahan Vs. State through DSP  

              Citation:  2008 AIR 231 / 2008(6)SCR903 / 2008(II)SCC55 /2008(6)SCALE423 / 2008(6)JT220 rules. The judgment rules that 498A IPC  is  dual (alternative) purpose cruelty offence law for (1) dowry death of living wife or (2) cruelty to living wife.


ii.       Using a wrong platform for making complaint to Police Officer by Alive wife and avoiding, under abetment of police officer and area magistrate, to not submit complaint to magistrate for making allegations supported with her affidavit, is by itself proof of abuse of criminal process by Wife for ulterior motives for alien purposes for which statutes were not enacted. According to Supreme Court’s ruling persons found to abuse criminal process  shall be stringently punished under existing statutes.


iii.      Thus also deliberately violating Internationally accepted Fundamental Human Rights to “life with respect and pride (dignity)”.

               Fundamental rights are also infringed of husband and his female relatives like his grandmother, mother, sisters and niece etc. in organized disobedience  by authorities of statute by police officers/government, judges for abetting alive wives and her accomplices  against humanity as well as in violation of Constitutional Rights in “name of S.498A IPC” through 3rd. illegal procedure used for living wives.


22.    Using S. 498A IPC for false allegations, is abuse of criminal  process for ulterior motives for alien purposes for wives. Such act(s) are punishable under existing statute. SC rulings be seen for punishing abusers of criminal process for ulterior motives in matter of matrimonial homes.


23. By applying the 3rd illegal procedure, the said third illegal procedure violates ruling of SC . 


24. The s. 482 Cr.P.C. on one side is said to be used sparingly by High Courts as per judgments of High Courts and  Supreme Court but in cases of alive wives s. 482 Cr.P.C. is used liberally unlawfully as and for mandatory deal of “divorce to wife/wives” is obtained and then “quashing criminal case u/s. 498A IPC” without punishing concerned wives for abusing criminal process for getting divorce as part of her ulterior motives.


25.      Does it not show creating 3rd. illegal procedure is deliberate action for ulterior motives and it is corrected u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. for living wives after getting divorce by force u/s. 13B(1)(2) of HMA 1961 or as per applicable other divorce laws, QUASHING the criminal case.  This is open abuse of criminal process abetted by judges of higher level courts, and thus as per SC judgments such persons includes judges are to be punished under existing statutes for abetting and conniving in the 3rd. illegal procedure.


26.   This 498A IPC under objects of Act No.46/1983  was the first dowry death law. 


27.    It is sufficient further additional proof of (illegal) terrorism at cost of public money by police officer(s) for living women(wives) burdening courts with frivolous cases costing Government Crores of Rupees per month from public money for cases u/s. 498A IPC for living wives.


28.     SCHEDULE “Z1” of this application:


                                                  SCHEDULE “Z1”

Precautions and safeguards laid in S. 198A Cr.P.C. and S.113A of Indian Evidence Act (Crl. Amendment Act No.46/1983) have become as equivalent of being “non-existent” despite Parliament enacted such benign law:   Parliament set law is Over-ridden by illegal 3rd procedure amongst other illegal ways in practice.   

   Ref: Supreme Court of India ruling in Judgment: 1963 AIR 358, 1964 (3) SCR 485:

      In  Nazir  Ahmed's case(2) the Judicial Committee  observed that the  principle  applied in Taylor v.  Taylor(3)  to  a Court, namely, that where a power is given to do a  certain thing  in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or  not at all and that other methods of  performance are necessarily forbidden, applied to judicial officers making a record under  s. 164 and, therefore, held  that  magistrate could  not give oral evidence of the confession made to him which  he had purported to record under s. 164 of the  Code.

It  was said that otherwise all the precautions  and  safe-guards laid down in ss. 164 and 364, both of which had to be read together, would become of such trifling value as to  be almost idle and that "it would be an unnatural construction to  hold  that any other procedure was permitted  than that which  is  laid down with such minute particularity  in the sections themselves."


The  rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor(3) is well  recognized and is founded on sound principle.  Its result is

(1)  I.L.R. [1960] 2 All. 488.

(2)  L.R. 63 IA. 372.

(3)  [1875] 1 Ch.  D.  426, 431.


that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid  down  the method      in which  that  power          has  to  be exercised,  it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act  in any  other manner than that which has been prescribed.   The principle  behind the rule is that if this were not so,  the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted.  Xxxxx  xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

       Relying  upon  Nazir  Ahmad's   case  and  applying  the principles  laid  down in Taylor v.  Taylor [(1876)  1     Ch.D 426] this Court in Singhara Singh's case (supra) held:    "The  rule adopted in Taylor v.  Taylor [(1876) 1 Ch. D 426]  is well recognized and is founded on sound  principle. Its  result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an  act and has laid down the method in which that power has to  be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The  principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted.”  Unquote



29. Public Prosecutor / APP pursuing cases of 498A IPC for living wives are acting against their ethical duty and profession.  Please see Schedule Z2, Z3 and Z4 for their and magistrates’ unethical intents in matter of pursuing s. 498A IPC (F.I.R.) as cognizable offence at cost of government money instead of letting the court know the truth of law relating to s. 498A IPC.


30.       SCHEDULE “Z2”

I quote from SC judgment of 27/4/2004 in W.P.(Civil) No.46 of 2004 in Vijay Shekhar & Anr Vs. U.O.I. & Ors :-

xxxxxx . This principle in our opinion applies to judicial acts also. 
This Court in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1986 SC 872) at para 118 has held thus : 
    "Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end design. There is a distinction between exercise of power in good faith and misuse in bad faith. The former arises when an authority misuses its power in breach of law, say, by taking into account bona fide, and with best of intentions, some extraneous matters or by ignoring relevant matters. That would render the impugned act or order ultra vires. It would be a case of fraud on powers. The misuse in bad faith arises when the power is exercised for an improper motive, say, to satisfy a private or personal grudge or for wreaking vengeance of a Minister as in S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 733 : (AIR 1964 SC 733). A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise. Use of a power for an 'alien' purpose other than the one for which the power is conferred is mala fide use of that power. Same is the position when an order is made for a purpose other than that which finds place in the order. The ulterior or alien purpose clearly speaks of the misuse of the power and it was observed as early as in 1904 by Lord Lindley in General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtown, 1904 AC 515, 'that there is a condition implied in this as well as in other instruments which create powers, namely, that the power shall be used bona fide for the purpose for which they are conferred'. It was said by Warrington, C.J. in Short v. Poole Corporation, (1926) 1 Ch 66 that :
        "No public body can be regarded as having statutory authority to act in bad faith or from corrupt motives, and any action purporting to be of that body, but proved to be committed in bad faith or from corrupt motives, would certainly be held to be inoperative."
        In Lazarus Estates Ltd. V. Beasley, (1956) 2 QB 702 at Pp. 712-13 Lord Denning, LJ. said :
        "No judgment of a Court, no order of Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything."   (emphasis supplied)
        See also, in Lazarus case at p. 722 per Lord Parker, C.J. :
"'Fraud' vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity."
All these three English decisions have been cited with approval by this Court in Pratap Singh's case."
          Similar is the view taken by this Court in the case of Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and Ors. (2003 – 8 - SCC 319) wherein this Court speaking through one of us (Sinha, J.) held thus :
     "Fraud as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by word or letter. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues there-from although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata."

          Thus, it is clear a fraudulent act even in judicial proceedings cannot be allowed to stand.”    Unquote



31.       SCHEDULE “Z3”

          Quoted from: http://www.ballew.com/bob/htm/fotc.htm


   "Fraud On The Court By An Officer Of The Court"
And "Disqualification Of Judges, State and Federal"

1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"

1. Who is an "officer of the court"?

        A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully. State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).

2. What is "fraud on the court"?

        Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."
        "Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."

3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?

        "Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court.
        It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).
        Under Illinois and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.

4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"

        Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain circumstances.
        In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
        Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.").
        That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."
        The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.
        "Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
        Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.
        Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself. None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.
        Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
        Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge). However some judges may not follow the law.
        If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.
        However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.
        The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.
        Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.


32.       SCHEDULE “Z4”

    Quoted from:  http://www.clr.org/fraud.html



The Illinois Supreme Court has issued court decisions which has defined "fraud" by an attorney.

It should be noted that the definition of fraud applies to everything an attorney may be engaged in, whether in court, in his office, or even at the neighborhood restaurant. The Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, the official commission involved in the investigation of misconduct of attorneys, has investigated an attorney who was the president of his condominium association and who was charged with fraud by a condominium owner.

Note that the operative phrase is "anything calculated to deceive". It is not required that your attorney did in fact deceive you or the court, only that he engaged in any activity in which you or the court could have been deceived. Further an attorney has a fiduciary duty to his client, a duty which is over and beyond what a non-attorney's duty is to another person.

The Illinois Supreme Court has held in In re Eugene Lee Armentrout, Jay Robert Grodner, Charles A. Petersen, Kim Edward Presbrey, William H. Weir, and William John Truemper, Jr., 99 Ill.2d 242, 75 Ill.Dec. 703, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983) that:

"Fraud encompasses a broad range of human behavior, including " ' * * * anything calculated to deceive, * * * whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by silence, by word of mouth or by look or gesture.' " (Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 419, 435, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858, citing People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Gilmore (1931), 345 Ill. 28, 46, 177 N.E. 710; In re Alschuler (1944), 388 Ill. 492, 503-04; Black's Law Dictionary 594 (5th ed. 1979).) Too, this court has previously disciplined lawyers even though their fraudulent misconduct did not harm [99 Ill.2d 252] any particular individual. In re Lamberis (1982), 93 Ill.2d 222, 229, 66 Ill.Dec. 623, 443 N.E.2d 549."

"The Court has broadly defined fraud as any conduct calculated to deceive, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, by word of mouth, by look, or by gesture. Fraud includes the suppression of the truth, as well as the presentation of false information. (In re Witt (1991) 145 Ill.2d 380, 583 N.E.2d 526, 531, 164 Ill. Dec. 610).". See also In re Frederick Edward Strufe, Disciplinary case no. 93 SH 100 where the Court stated that "Fraud has been broadly defined as anything calculated to deceive."

It is clear and well-established Illinois law that any attempt by any officer of the court, whether attorney or judge, to deceive is considered fraud, and when the attempt to deceive occurs in a judicial proceeding, it is "fraud upon the court".

Has your attorney or judge engaged in fraud?

Rule 8.4(a)(4) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct states that:
"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."

Has your attorney or judge engaged in misconduct?

See Fraud upon the court

See "Fraud upon the court" makes void
the orders and judgments of that court


33.     The State Government has to stop engaging advocates (APP) in matter of section 498A IPC for living wife/wives as it is third illegal procedure.


34.      The judges / magistrates are bound to take penal action against all persons for abuse of criminal process.


35. The illegal procedure for section 498A IPC leads to getting the wife live with other man like married woman without taking divorce from "victim of 3rd. illegal procedure"  husband under label of 498A IPC. No authority taken action against such wives instead of abetting her in destroying matrimonial culture for getting "post facto" divorce from victim husband contrary to Hindui Marriage Act that states no illegal pressure or  unlawful threat for obtaining divorce by mutual consent divorce by wives/wife.


36.     The Judges and police officer concerned should punish the wives for giving wrong information against husband and his relatives for abuse of criminal process otherwise the faith in judiciary will vanish in this democracy and Republic India. 


Published by Sushilkumar Sharma Chief of Legal Department, 

Mulkhraj World Foundation 

PB No. 9306 DELHI 110092  -


in public interests for sake of pure justice in matter of saving domestic matrimonial homes from the third illegal procedure for s.498A IPC used for living wives through police officer illegally.


Ref. No.166IPC/498A_461983/2009.

Delhi Dated 22 OCTOBER 2009