Briefly, a realist about x holds that x enjoys mind-independent existence, that is, x exists regardless of whether anyone thinks, hopes or fears that x exists.
<Details & References> Pete Mandik & Chris Eliasmith

A set of properties P realize a set of properties M just in case the instantiation of the properties in P is sufficient for the instantiation of the properties in M. See also physicalism, token identity theory, supervenience, and functionalism.
<Details> Pete Mandik

reasoning, practical:
Figuring out what to do; reasoning directed towards action (as contrasted with reasoning directed towards arriving at belief).
<Details & References> Elijah Millgram

A property of a representation which denotes what the representation is about, or 'of'. See sense, intentionality.
Chris Eliasmith

referential opacity:
Two terms are referentially opaque if they cannot be substituted salva veritate (i.e. without changing the truth value of the statement).
<Details> Charles Wallis

That which stands for, refers to or denotes something or the relation between a thing and that which stands for or denotes it. See distributed representation, symbolicism, dynamic systems theory.
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith

representation, distributed:
A distributed representation is one in which meaning is not captured by a single symbolic unit, but rather arises from the interaction of a set of units, normally in a network of some sort.
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith

A theoretical device for the explanation of behavioral regularities and/or cognitive states.  Rules are generally, but not always, characterized in terms of causally-operative mental representations. See computation, symbolicism, connectionism.
<Details & References> Daniel Barbiero