R


Realism:
 
Briefly, a realist about x holds that x enjoys mind-independent existence, that is, x exists regardless of whether anyone thinks, hopes or fears that x exists.
 
<Details & References> Pete Mandik & Chris Eliasmith
 

realization:
 
A set of properties P realize a set of properties M just in case the instantiation of the properties in P is sufficient for the instantiation of the properties in M. See also physicalism, token identity theory, supervenience, and functionalism.
 
<Details> Pete Mandik
 

reasoning, practical:
 
Figuring out what to do; reasoning directed towards action (as contrasted with reasoning directed towards arriving at belief).
 
<Details & References> Elijah Millgram
 

Reference:
 
A property of a representation which denotes what the representation is about, or 'of'. See sense, intentionality.
 
Chris Eliasmith
 

referential opacity:
 
Two terms are referentially opaque if they cannot be substituted salva veritate (i.e. without changing the truth value of the statement).
 
<Details> Charles Wallis
 

representation:
 
That which stands for, refers to or denotes something or the relation between a thing and that which stands for or denotes it. See distributed representation, symbolicism, dynamic systems theory.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 

representation, distributed:
 
A distributed representation is one in which meaning is not captured by a single symbolic unit, but rather arises from the interaction of a set of units, normally in a network of some sort.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 

rule:
 
A theoretical device for the explanation of behavioral regularities and/or cognitive states.  Rules are generally, but not always, characterized in terms of causally-operative mental representations. See computation, symbolicism, connectionism.
 
<Details & References> Daniel Barbiero