The monistic view that all empirical statements (such as the laws of physics) can be placed in a one to one correspondence with statements about only the phenomenal (i.e. mental appearances). See idealism, neutral monism, monism, phenomenological critique of representationalism.

A view held by A.J. Ayer which was shown by Roderick Chisholm to be untenable. Chisholm showed that would not be possible to translate physical statements into phenomenal statements because phenomenal statements are dependent on physical descriptions of the observation conditions and conditions of the perceiver.
The central idea of phenomenalism is well put in this passage from Poincare (with a dash of positivism) (1914, p. 14):
       [A] reality completely independent of the mind which conceives it, sees or feels it, is an
       impossibility. A world as exterior as that, even if it existed, would for us be forever
       inaccessible. But what we call objective reality is, in the last analysis, what is common to
       many thinking beings, and could be common to us all; this common part, we shall see, can
       only be the harmony expressed by mathematical laws. It is this harmony then which is the
       sole objective reality, the only truth we can obtain.

Chris Eliasmith