M


materialism:
 
The view that everything that actually exists is material, or physical. Many philosophers and scientists now use the terms `material' and `physical' interchangeably (for a version of physicalism distinct from materialism, see physicalism). Characterized in this way, as a doctrine about what exists, materialism is an ontological, or a metaphysical, view; it is not just an epistemological view about how we know or just a semantic view about the meaning of terms.
 
<Details & References> J.D. Trout and Paul Moser
 

memory:
 
A general ability, or faculty, that enables us to interpret the perceptual world to help organize responses to changes that take place in the world. See also implicit, explicit, long term, short term memory
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 

memory, explicit:
 
Those memories which a subject is able to cite as being a memory of a particular event. See also implicit memory, memory.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 

memory, implicit:
 
Implicit memory is evident when the performance of a subject on a task is improved despite the inability of the subject to consciously recollect memories which facilitate to the task. See also explicit memory, memory.
 
<Details> Chris Eliasmith
 

memory, long term:
 
The permanent memory store accessed after a considerable gap between the presentation of a stimulus and its recall. See also short term memory, memory.
 
<Details> Chris Eliasmith
 

memory, short term:
 
The temporary memory store accessed after recent exposure to a stimulus to be recalled. See also long term memory, memory.
 
<Details> Chris Eliasmith
 

mental content:
 
As distinguished from vehicle, mental content is that aspect of mentality which, ideally, refers to an object, property or relation and specifies some properties of that item. See externalism, internalism, sense, reference.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 

mereology:
 
The study of part-whole relationships.
 
Chris Eliasmith
 

mind, philosophy of:
 
The branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of mental phenomena in general and the role of consciousness, sensation, perception, concepts, action, reasoning, intention, belief, memory, etc. in particular. Standard problems include those of free will, personal identity, mind-body problem, other minds, computationalism, etc.
 
<Details> Chris Eliasmith
 

mind-body problem:
 
Most generally, the problem of describing the relationship between the mind and body (or brain). First explicitly raised by Descartes, it is, perhaps, the best know problem in the philosophy of mind. See dualism, epiphenomenalism, monism, and materialism.
 
<Details> Chris Eliasmith
 

monism:
 
The thesis that all of reality is of one kind. See materialism, idealism, neutral monism, anomalous monism, dualism.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 

multiple realizability:
 
The thesis that a mental state is the type it is independent of the physical realization of that mental state. See functionalism.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith & Pete Mandik