A brand of monism, first forwarded by Berkeley, in which everything is mental, as contrasted to materialism.
Chris Eliasmith

identity theory:
The identity theory (IT) of mind is standardly understood to be the claim that every mental property is identical with some physical property.
<Details & References> Gene Witmer

Traditionally, the mental capacity for experiencing, constructing, or manipulating 'mental imagery' (quasi-perceptual experience). Imagination is also regarded as responsible for fantasy, inventiveness, idiosyncrasy, and creative, original, and insightful thought in general, and, sometimes, for a much wider range of mental activities dealing with the non-actual, such as supposing, pretending, 'seeing as', thinking of possibilities, and even being mistaken. See representation.

<Details & References> Nigel J.T. Thomas

implicit memory:
See memory, implicit.

A method of reasoning by which one infers a generalization from a series of instances. See abduction, deduction.
<Details> Chris Eliasmith


See internalism.

intentional stance, the:
A strategy, proposed and defended by Daniel Dennett, for understanding an entity's behavior. When adopting the intentional stance towards an entity, we attempt to explain and predict its behavior by treating it as if it were a rational agent whose actions are governed by its beliefs and desires. The intentional stance contrasts with two other strategies, the physical stance and the design stance. See Dennett, Daniel, intentionality.

The thesis that all mental states are representational states. Specifically, raw feels and qualia, are said to have representational content.
<References> Pete Mandik

The property of the mind by which it is directed at, about, or 'of' objects and events in the world. Aboutness - in the manner of beliefs, fears, desires, etc.
Chris Eliasmith

intentionality, derived:
The power of a system (e.g. the mind) to be "about" something if that power is derived from that system's connection to another, already intentional system. Language's intentionality is said to be derived from that of the mind.
Alan J. Laser

intentional action:
People normally distinguish between behaviors that are performed ‘intentionally’ and those that are performed ‘unintentionally.’ But philosophers have found it quite difficult to explain precisely what the distinction amounts to. At first glance, it may appear that an action can only be performed intentionally if the agent had an intention to perform it, but even this seemingly trivial characterization has been remarkably controversial. See action; intention-in-action; prior intention.
<Details & References> Joshua M. Knobe

The intentional or mental component of an action. The intention in action causes, and is contemporaneous with, the agent's bodily movement or state that is its condition of satisfaction. Introduced in Searle 1983. See also intentionality, prior intention, Background, phenomenological critique of representationalism, the will.
<Details & References> Daniel Barbiero

intention, prior:
Intention formed prior to the action that is its condition of satisfaction. The prior intention represents the projected action as a unified whole. Introduced in Searle 1983. See also intentionality, intention-in-action.
<Details & References> Daniel Barbiero

See dualism.

Internalists hold that mental events supervene only on physical events internal to the body of the subject of those mental events. Also known as individualism. See also externalism.
P. Mandik