C

Cartesian interactionist dualism:
 
The view that: (1) the mental and the material comprise two different classes of substance and; (2) each can have causal effects on the other. See dualism.
 
<Details & References> Pete Mandik
 
Cartesian skepticism:
 
Any of a class of skeptical views against empirical knowledge based on the claim that claims to empirical knowledge are defeated by the possibility that we might be deceived insofar as we might be, for example, dreaming, hallucinating, deceived by demons, or brains in vats
 
<Details & References> Pete Mandik
 
causal functionalism:
 
The view that a physical system realizes a mental state not in virtue of the particular stuff it is made of but instead in virtue of the causal relations that parts of that system bear to each other. See functionalism(1), functionalism(2).
 
<Details & References> Pete Mandik
 
Chinese Room:
 
An argument forwarded by John Searle intended to show that the mind is not a computer and how the Turing Test is inadequate.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 
cognitive science:
 
Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary study which attempts to further our understanding of the nature of thought.
 
<Details & References> William Willaford
 
cognize:
 
To have access to knowledge that has the properties of knowledge in the ordinary sense, but is not necessarily accessible to consciousness or dependent on warrant or justification. Introduced in Chomsky (1980). See also knowledge, tacit knowledge, implicit memory, rules.
 
<Details & References> Daniel Barbiero
 
coherence:
 
A relation among a number of elements, such as propositions or concepts, that fit together well: consistency; cohesiveness. See practical reasoning for an example.
 
<Details & References> Paul Thagard
 
color, theories of:
 
Theories of color make proposals about the nature of the colors that we attribute to physical objects in visual perception. The most common proposals are that these colors are mental properties of perceptual states (subjectivism), they are physical properties of physical objects (physicalism), or they are dispositions of physical objects to produce perceptual states of color (dispositionalism). See theories of color perception.
 
 
color perception, theories of:
 
Theories of color perception propose to explain how it is that colors are perceived as properties of physical objects. What proposal one makes depends in turn on what proposal one makes about the nature of color. See theories of color.
 
 
compositionality:
 
Representations may be said to be compositional insofar as they retain the same meaning across diverse contexts. Thus, "kick" means the same thing in the context of "-the ball", "- a rock", and "- a dog", although it changes meaning in the context of "- the bucket". One might say that according to the principle of the compositionality of representations atomic representations make the same semantic contribution in every context in which they occur. See systematicity, productivity, symbolicism.
 
 
computation:
 
A series of rule governed state transitions whose rules can be altered.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 
computational architecture:
 
The structure and organization of a given computing device (the way in which it handles memory, the organization of date, the set of primitive instructions it executes, and the ordering of instruction application or execution) define a device's computational architecture. Computational architecture involves only the structure and organization relevant to computation; implementational details to not constitute computational architecture. See also computation, functionalism.
 
 
computational models:
 
Models based on the overarching hypothesis that the mind is a type of computer which can be described in algorithmic terms.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 
concept:
 
A semantically evaluable, redeployable constituent of thought, invoked to explain properties of intentional phenomena such as productivity and systematicity. Applied to an assortment of phenomena including mental representations, images, words, stereotypes, senses, properties, reasoning abilities, mathematical functions, etc. See nonconceptual content.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith & Pete Mandik
 
conceptual role semantics:
 
see semantics, functional role.
 
connectionism:
 
A computational approach to modeling the brain which relies on the interconnection of many simple units to produce complex behavior. See also history of connectionism, symbolicism, dynamical systems theory.
 
<Details & References> Chris Eliasmith
 
connectionism, history of:
 
Construed broadly, connectionism maintains that cognitive processes are (implemented in) processes taking place in networks of nerve cells. Thus construed, the history of connectionism spans a wide range of research in numerous disciplines over the course of centuries. See connectionism, symbolicism.
 
 
consciousness:
 
Self-awareness. Subjective experience. The way things seem to us. Immediate phenomenological properties. See access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness.
 
Chris Eliasmith
 
consciousness, phenomenal:
 
Phenomenal consciousness [p-consciousness] is just experience thus, p-conscious states are experiential states. The totality of the experiential properties of a state are p-consciousness, i.e. "what it is like" to have it.
 
<References> A. Khwaja
 
consciousness, access:
 
Access consciousness [a-consciousness] is a kind of direct control; a representation is access-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting and action.
 
<References> A. Khwaja
 
content, mental:
 
As distinguished from vehicle, mental content is that aspect of mentality which, ideally, refers to an object, property or relation and specifies some properties of that item. See externalism, internalism, sense, reference.
 
Chris Eliasmith
 
 
creativity:
 
Creativity is an acid test for AI and cognitive science. If computers cannot be creative, then (a) they cannot be intelligent, and (b) people are not machines. However, the standard arguments against machine intelligence are not convincing.
 
<Details & References> Terry Dartnall