Ludovic Renou: Academic, Runner and Bon Vivant.


NEWS  (last updated: 27/09/2017):  Warning: I update this webpage rather sporadically. 

                               I am professor at Queen Mary University of London and a research associate at the University of Adelaide.  If you want to chat with me, feel free to contact me at lrenou.econ(guess what) gmail(dot)com.                                     
                               I am also a keen runner with a particular fondness for the marathon (PB: 2.29.32, Berlin Marathon, 2016; pleased to finally break the 2:30 mark!!). I am always happy to chat about running, training and sports in general. 

                               I also enjoy food, wines and beers. 


Published or forthcoming papers

  • "Bilateral Trading in Networks,'' (with D. Condorelli and A. Galeotti), 2017, Review of Economic Studies, 84, pp. 82-105.
  • "Repeated Nash Implementation,'' (with C. Mezzetti), 2017, Theoretical Economics, 12, pp.249-285.
  • "Afriat's Theorem and Samuelson's `Eternal Darkness','' (with M. Polisson), 2016, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 65, pp. 36-40.
  •  "Logical Abilities and Behavior in Strategic-form Games'' (with R. C. Bayer), 2016, Journal of Economic Psychology, 56, pp. 39-59.
  • "Logical Omniscience at the Laboratory,'' (with R. C. Bayer), 2016, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 64, pp. 41-49. 
  • "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments,'' (with T. Tomala),  2015, Journal of Economic Theory,159, pp. 401-442.
  • "Ordients: Optimization and Comparative Statics Without Utility Functions,'' (with K.H. Schlag), 2014, Journal of Economic Theory, 154, pp. 612-632. 
  • "Mechanism Design with Ambiguous Communication Devices," (with Subir Bose), 2014, Econometrica, 82, pp 1853-1872. An antique version is available here
  • "Secure Message Transmission on Directed Networks," (with Tristan Tomala and Jerome Renault), 2014, to appear in Games and Economic Behavior. An old version is available here
  • "Mixed Nash Implementation," (with C. Mezzetti), 2012, Journal of Economic Theory, 147, pp. 2357-2375.
  • "Mechanism design and communication networks," (with T. Tomala), Theoretical Economics, 7, pp 489-533.
  • "Group formation and governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2011, 13, pp. 595-630. 
  • "Minimax regret implementation," (with K.H Schlag), Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71, pp. 527-533. 
  • "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," (with K. H. Schlag), Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 145, pp. 264-286. 
  • "Bilateral Commitment," (with Sophie Bade and Guillaume Haeringer), Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, pp. 1817-1831. 
  • "Secure communication: a mechanism design approach," (with T. Tomala), Proceedings of IEEE conference GameNets, 2009, pp. 295-298.
  • "Measuring the depth of iteration in humans"  (joint with R.C Bayer) in L. Oxley and D. Kulasiri (Eds.), Proceedings of MODSIM 2007 International Congress on Modelling and Simulation, pp. 379-385. 
  • "Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 66, No 1, May 2009.
  • "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Vol. 36, No 3, September, 2008. 
  • "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," (with Sophie Bade and Guillaume Haeringer), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 135, No 1, July 2007.  
  • "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example," (joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economic Theory, 28 (2), June, 2006. 
  • "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions," (joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economic Theory, 2005, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 497-504.
  • "A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts," International Journal of Business and Economics, 2003, vol.2, no.3, pp. 245-261. 
  • "Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in CSV models," (joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economics Bulletin, 2003, Vol. 7, No. 5, pp. 1-9.  (Please, note an unfortunate mistake. On page 2, you have to read "integral of u(w)mu(w)dw > u(0)")

Current projects

NB: As a rule of thumb, I only post links to "nearly submittable" papers. However, you can get an idea on some of the projects I am currently working on by having a look at the titles below. (I am mainly working on implementation issues at the moment. In particular, I am working towards a theory of behavior-proof mechanism design. Not much success so far, I must say!!)

  • "The value of commitment in repeated games with incomplete information," (with C. Mezzetti and T. Tomala), 2016--to date. So far, we have a lot of conjectures and counter-examples!!! 
  • "Information design in multi-stage games,'' (with Miltos Makris), 2017. A draft is coming very soon.  
  • "Resale mechanisms on networks,'' (with Daniele Condorelli and Andrea Galeotti), 2017. A draft is coming very soon. 
  • "Revealed Preferences Tests Under Risk And Uncertainty," (with Matt Polisson and John Quah), 2016.  Check John's webpage for the paper. 
  •  "Ambiguity Revealed," (with Ralph Bayer, Subir Bose and Matt Polisson), 2013. The paper is available here.  We are currently rewriting the paper. 
  • "Mixed Nash Implementation and Finite Mechanisms," (with C. Mezzetti), 2012. The paper is available  here.
  • "Nash Implementation and Communication Networks," 2007. [I need to return to this paper at some stage. I should definitely do it.]


  • Behavioral Economics (MSc and BSc/BA): 2015-.
  • Introduction to Microeconomics: 2015-2016
  • Advanced Microeconomics: 2011, 2013-2014.
  • Introduction to Game Theory:  2007-2011.
  • Advanced Game Theory: 2007.
  • Mathematical Economics, 2004-2005


The four axioms for a good collaboration of Hardy and Littelwood. (From "Littlewood's miscellany," edited by Bollobas)
  • Axiom 1: When one author writes to a co-author, it is completely indifferent whether he is right or wrong.
  • Axiom 2: When one author receives a letter (e-mail, nowadays) from a co-author, he is under no obligation whatsoever to read it, let alone to answer it.
  • Axiom 3: It is preferable that each author works on different parts (aspects) of the research project.
  • Axiom 4: It does not matter who contributes what.