NEWS (13/09/2016): Warning: I update this webpage rather sporadically.
I have now joined Queen Mary University of London. If you want to chat with me, feel free to contact me at lrenou.econ(guess what) gmail(dot)com.
I am also a keen runner with a particular fondness for the marathon (PB: 2.29.32, Berlin Marathon, 2016; pleased to finally break the 2:30 mark!!). I am always looking for running buddies, while at conferences.
Published or forthcoming papers
- "Bilateral Trading in Networks,'' (with D. Condorelli and A. Galeotti), 2016, forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies.
- "Afriat's Theorem and Samuelson's `Eternal Darkness','' (with M. Polisson), 2016, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 65, pp. 36-40.
- "Logical Abilities and Behavior in Strategic-form Games'' (with R. C. Bayer), 2016, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Psychology.
- "Logical Omniscience at the Laboratory,'' (with R. C. Bayer), 2016, forthcoming in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics.
- "Repeated Nash Implementation,'' (with C. Mezzetti), 2016, forthcoming in Theoretical Economics.
- "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments,'' (with T. Tomala), 2015, Journal of Economic Theory,159, pp. 401-442.
- "Ordients: Optimization and Comparative Statics Without Utility Functions,'' (with K.H. Schlag), 2014, Journal of Economic Theory, 154, pp. 612-632.
- "Mechanism Design with Ambiguous Communication Devices," (with Subir Bose), 2014, Econometrica, 82, pp 1853-1872. An antique version is available here.
- "Secure Message Transmission on Directed Networks," (with Tristan Tomala and Jerome Renault), 2014, to appear in Games and Economic Behavior. An old version is available here.
- "Mixed Nash Implementation," (with C. Mezzetti), 2012, Journal of Economic Theory, 147, pp. 2357-2375.
- "Mechanism design and communication networks," (with T. Tomala), Theoretical Economics, 7, pp 489-533.
- "Group formation and governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory,
2011, 13, pp. 595-630.
- "Minimax regret implementation," (with K.H Schlag),
Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71, pp. 527-533.
- "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," (with K. H. Schlag), Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 145, pp. 264-286.
- "Bilateral Commitment," (with Sophie Bade and Guillaume Haeringer), Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, pp. 1817-1831.
communication: a mechanism design approach," (with T. Tomala),
Proceedings of IEEE conference GameNets, 2009, pp. 295-298.
- "Measuring the depth of iteration in humans"
(joint with R.C Bayer) in
L. Oxley and D. Kulasiri (Eds.), Proceedings of MODSIM 2007 International Congress on Modelling and Simulation, pp. 379-385.
- "Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 66, No 1, May 2009.
- "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Vol. 36, No 3, September, 2008.
- "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," (with Sophie Bade and Guillaume Haeringer),
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 135, No 1, July 2007.
- "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information:
an example," (joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economic Theory, 28 (2), June, 2006.
- "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions,"
(joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economic Theory, 2005, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 497-504.
- "A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts,"
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2003, vol.2, no.3, pp. 245-261.
- "Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in CSV models,"
(joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economics Bulletin, 2003, Vol. 7, No. 5, pp. 1-9.
(Please, note an unfortunate mistake. On page 2, you have to read "integral of u(w)mu(w)dw > u(0)")
NB: As a rule of thumb, I only post links to "nearly submittable" papers. However, you can get an idea on some of the projects I am
currently working on by having a look at the titles below. (I am mainly
working on implementation issues at the moment. In particular,
I am working towards a theory of behavior-proof mechanism design. Not
much success so far, I must say!!)
- "The value of commitment in repeated games with incomplete information," (with C. Mezzetti and T. Tomala), 2016. So far, we have a lot of conjectures and counter-examples!!!
- "The design of dynamic games,'' (with Miltos Makris), 2016.
- "Resale mechanisms on networks,'' (with Andrea Galeotti), 2016.
- "Revealed Preferences Tests Under Risk And Uncertainty," (with Matt Polisson and John Quah), 2016. Check John's webpage for the paper.
- "Ambiguity Revealed," (with Ralph Bayer, Subir Bose and Matt
Polisson), 2013. The paper is available here. We are currently rewriting the paper.
- "Mixed Nash Implementation and Finite Mechanisms," (with C. Mezzetti), 2012. The paper is available here.
- "Nash Implementation and Communication Networks," 2007. [I need to return to this paper at some stage. I should definitely do it.]
- Behavioral Economics (MSc and BSc/BA): 2015-.
- Introduction to Microeconomics: 2015-2016
- Advanced Microeconomics: 2011, 2013-2014.
- Introduction to Game Theory: 2007-2011.
- Advanced Game Theory: 2007.
- Mathematical Economics, 2004-2005
The four axioms for a good collaboration of Hardy and Littelwood. (From "Littlewood's miscellany," edited by Bollobas)
- Axiom 1: When one author writes to a co-author, it is completely indifferent whether he is right or wrong.
- Axiom 2: When one author receives a letter (e-mail, nowadays) from a co-author, he is under no obligation
whatsoever to read it, let alone to answer it.
- Axiom 3: It is preferable that each author works on different parts (aspects) of the research project.
- Axiom 4: It does not matter who contributes what.