Noteworthy:
NEWS (last updated: 27/09/2017): Warning: I update this webpage rather sporadically.
I am professor at Queen Mary University of London and a research associate at the University of Adelaide. If you want to chat with me, feel free to contact me at lrenou.econ(guess what) gmail(dot)com. I am also a keen runner with a particular fondness for the marathon (PB: 2.29.32, Berlin Marathon, 2016; pleased to finally break the 2:30 mark!!). I am always happy to chat about running, training and sports in general.
I also enjoy food, wines and beers.
RESEARCH
Published or forthcoming papers  "Bilateral Trading in Networks,'' (with D. Condorelli and A. Galeotti), 2017, Review of Economic Studies, 84, pp. 82105.
 "Repeated Nash Implementation,'' (with C. Mezzetti), 2017, Theoretical Economics, 12, pp.249285.
 "Afriat's Theorem and Samuelson's `Eternal Darkness','' (with M. Polisson), 2016, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 65, pp. 3640.
 "Logical Abilities and Behavior in Strategicform Games'' (with R. C. Bayer), 2016, Journal of Economic Psychology, 56, pp. 3959.
 "Logical Omniscience at the Laboratory,'' (with R. C. Bayer), 2016, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 64, pp. 4149.
 "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments,'' (with T. Tomala), 2015, Journal of Economic Theory,159, pp. 401442.
 "Ordients: Optimization and Comparative Statics Without Utility Functions,'' (with K.H. Schlag), 2014, Journal of Economic Theory, 154, pp. 612632.
 "Mechanism Design with Ambiguous Communication Devices," (with Subir Bose), 2014, Econometrica, 82, pp 18531872. An antique version is available here.
 "Secure Message Transmission on Directed Networks," (with Tristan Tomala and Jerome Renault), 2014, to appear in Games and Economic Behavior. An old version is available here.
 "Mixed Nash Implementation," (with C. Mezzetti), 2012, Journal of Economic Theory, 147, pp. 23572375.
 "Mechanism design and communication networks," (with T. Tomala), Theoretical Economics, 7, pp 489533.
 "Group formation and governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory,
2011, 13, pp. 595630.
 "Minimax regret implementation," (with K.H Schlag),
Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71, pp. 527533.
 "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," (with K. H. Schlag), Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 145, pp. 264286.
 "Bilateral Commitment," (with Sophie Bade and Guillaume Haeringer), Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, pp. 18171831.
 "Secure
communication: a mechanism design approach," (with T. Tomala),
Proceedings of IEEE conference GameNets, 2009, pp. 295298.
 "Measuring the depth of iteration in humans"
(joint with R.C Bayer) in
L. Oxley and D. Kulasiri (Eds.), Proceedings of MODSIM 2007 International Congress on Modelling and Simulation, pp. 379385.
 "Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 66, No 1, May 2009.
 "Multilender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Vol. 36, No 3, September, 2008.
 "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," (with Sophie Bade and Guillaume Haeringer),
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 135, No 1, July 2007.
 "Debt contracts with exante and expost asymmetric information:
an example," (joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economic Theory, 28 (2), June, 2006.
 "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions,"
(joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economic Theory, 2005, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 497504.
 "A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts,"
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2003, vol.2, no.3, pp. 245261.
 "Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in CSV models,"
(joint with Guillaume Carlier), Economics Bulletin, 2003, Vol. 7, No. 5, pp. 19.
(Please, note an unfortunate mistake. On page 2, you have to read "integral of u(w)mu(w)dw > u(0)")
Current projects
NB: As a rule of thumb, I only post links to "nearly submittable" papers. However, you can get an idea on some of the projects I am
currently working on by having a look at the titles below. (I am mainly
working on implementation issues at the moment. In particular,
I am working towards a theory of behaviorproof mechanism design. Not
much success so far, I must say!!)
 "The value of commitment in repeated games with incomplete information," (with C. Mezzetti and T. Tomala), 2016to date. So far, we have a lot of conjectures and counterexamples!!!
 "Information design in multistage games,'' (with Miltos Makris), 2017. A draft is coming very soon.
 "Resale mechanisms on networks,'' (with Daniele Condorelli and Andrea Galeotti), 2017. A draft is coming very soon.
 "Revealed Preferences Tests Under Risk And Uncertainty," (with Matt Polisson and John Quah), 2016. Check John's webpage for the paper.
 "Ambiguity Revealed," (with Ralph Bayer, Subir Bose and Matt
Polisson), 2013. The paper is available here. We are currently rewriting the paper.
 "Mixed Nash Implementation and Finite Mechanisms," (with C. Mezzetti), 2012. The paper is available here.
 "Nash Implementation and Communication Networks," 2007. [I need to return to this paper at some stage. I should definitely do it.]
TEACHING
 Behavioral Economics (MSc and BSc/BA): 2015.
 Introduction to Microeconomics: 20152016
 Advanced Microeconomics: 2011, 20132014.
 Introduction to Game Theory: 20072011.
 Advanced Game Theory: 2007.
 Mathematical Economics, 20042005
MISCELLANY
The four axioms for a good collaboration of Hardy and Littelwood. (From "Littlewood's miscellany," edited by Bollobas)
 Axiom 1: When one author writes to a coauthor, it is completely indifferent whether he is right or wrong.
 Axiom 2: When one author receives a letter (email, nowadays) from a coauthor, he is under no obligation
whatsoever to read it, let alone to answer it.
 Axiom 3: It is preferable that each author works on different parts (aspects) of the research project.
 Axiom 4: It does not matter who contributes what.

