Welcome to my webpage!
Professor of Economics
Director of Graduate Studies
“Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect”, with Dino Gerardi. Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
“Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty”,with Braz Camargo and Dino Gerardi. Economic Journal, forthcoming.
“Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information”, with Daniel Garrett and Renato Gomes. Review of Economic Studies, , Vol. 86 , pp. 1590-1630, 2019.
“Optima Mirrleesian Taxation in Non-competitive Labor Markets”, with Carlos da Costa. Economic Theory, Vol 68, pp 845–886 , 2019.
“Dynamic Contracting under Adverse Selection and Renegotiation,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol 171, pp. 136-173, 2017.
“Experimentation and Project Selection: Screening and Learning,” with Renato Gomes and Daniel Gottlieb. Games and Economic Behavior, vol 96, pp. 145-169, 2016.
“The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade,” with Dino Gerardi and Johannes Hörner, Journal of Economic Theory, vol 154, pp. 578-603, 2014.
“The Efficiency of Bonus-or-Terminate Incentive Schemes under Subjective Evaluations,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol 87, pp. 412-418, 2014.
“Bonus Payments Versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations,” American Economic Journal: microeconomics vol. 4, pp. 34-56, 2012.
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing,” with Dino Gerardi, Theoretical Economics, vol. 7, pp. 425-463, 2012.
“The Risk Properties of Human Capital and the Design of Government Policies,” with Carlos Da Costa, European Economic Review, vol. 51, pp. 695-713, 2007.
“Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons,” with Dino Gerardi.
“Reputation and Screening in a Noisy Environment with Irreversible Actions”, (Online Supplement) with Mehmet Ekmekci.
“Redistribution with Labor Market Frictions ”, with Carlos da Costa and Marcelo Santos
“Oligopolistic Price Discrimination: Market Power and Dispersion of Offers”, with Renato Gomes and Jean-Marie Lozachmeur.
Work in Progress
“Costly Attention and Moral Hazard in Teams”, with Renato Gomes and Leandro Gorno.
“Relational Contracting and Attention Management”, with Renato Gomes and Leandro Gorno.