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SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, June, 1960, Volume 202 Number 6, pages 53 - 63
Loglan
This logical language is now being synthesized on modern linguistic principles, largely to examine the hypothesis that the world view of the members of a culture is determined by the structure of their language.
by James Cooke Brown
In the closing decades of the 17th century the philosopher-mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz proposed the development of a "universal symbolism" that would speed the growth of scientific thought in the same dramatic way that the development of mathematics was then advancing the art of scientific computation. As a mathematician, Leibniz was doubtless aware that mathematical methods are limited to tracing the deductive consequences of quantitatively stated premises. As a philosopher, he was certainly aware that scientific thinking consists of more than deduction alone. He knew that inductive, or generalizing, operations are also involved, and he would have argued that hypothesis formation, or "creative imagination," is decisive in the development of science. Thus Leibniz intended his universal symbolism to embrace mathematics and imitate its "ratiocinative power," but he meant it to go far beyond mathematics, to encompass the whole of scientific, indeed of all rational, thought. By this means, he predicted, the rational powers of man would be marvelously extended.
In the intervening centuries little progress has been made toward the realization of Leibniz's vision. It is true that the period has seen the development of modem logic, and the extension of mathematics itself in non-numerical domains. The theory of games and of statistical inference appear to have broadened the scope of formal reasoning in precisely the direction, anticipated by Leibniz's proposal. But the universal symbolism, in the sense of an all-encompassing scientific language, has yet to come. The Western scientist, like the man in the street, still does his reasoning largely in the familiar Indo-European languages, and so within the confines of the grammatical rules and metaphysical categories they carry over from the past. If ratiocinative power has increased, it has not been in the universal sense that Leibniz proposed.
The central notion underlying Leibniz's vision may be stated in a question. Is it true that the "rational power" of the human animal is in any significant measure determined by the formal properties of the linguistic game it has been taught to play? A whole school of anthropologically oriented linguists, following the late Benjamin Lee Whorf of Hartford, Conn., believe they have found compelling evidence that the answer to this question is yes. These investigators, arguing largely from the astonishing differences to be found among the grammars and lexicons of preliterate peoples, and between these languages and our own, believe that the structure of the language spoken by a people determines their world view; that is, it sets limits beyond which that world view cannot go. Thus the native speaker of any language is fated to see reality, and to think about it, exclusively on the terms and by the rules laid down for him by that language—unless he learns a new one.
Other linguists and psychologists have found reason to doubt the Whorfian thesis of linguistic determinism. They feel that, in principle at least, all languages are mutually intertranslatable; that they can all be most fruitfully regarded as dealing with the same "reality"; that "thought," scientific or otherwise, is somehow independent of the specific character of the linguistic machinery in which it is expressed. The biologically oriented psychologist would argue further that any such attribute as "intelligence," "rationality," "problem-solving ability"' and so on is a property of the behavior of the individual organism, resulting from its hereditary endowment on the one hand and its particular history of reinforcement on the other.
But Whorf's doctrine, that human thought is largely determined by the formal properties of the pre-existent social forms embedded in the structure of language, is slowly gaining experimental attention. Whorf does not explicitly embrace Leibniz's program of a universal symbolism. Yet implicit in his view of the nature of language is just this possibility. For if language is a human artifact, the power of the human mind need not be restrained by existing languages; the possibility that the inventive human animal will create still more powerful linguistic instruments is certainly
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