Book chapters are divided by topic and then listed from the most recent to the oldest. Links are provided to open access publications.
On Belief and Delusion
E Vintiadis and L Bortolotti (forthcoming). The role of context in belief evaluation. In J Musolino et al. (eds.) The Science of Belief. Cambridge University Press.
L Bortolotti and S Stammers (2020). Philosophy as a means of empowerment. In E Vintiadis (ed.) Philosophy by Women: 22 Philosophers Reflect on Philosophy and Its Value. Routledge, chapter 1.
F Bongiorno and L Bortolotti (2019). The role of unconscious inference in models of delusion formation. In A Nes and T Chan (eds.) Inference and Consciousness. Routledge, chapter 3.
L Bortolotti, E Sullivan-Bissett and M Antrobus (2019). The epistemic innocence of optimistically biased beliefs. In M Balcerak Jackson and B Balcerak Jackson (eds.) Reasoning: Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press, chapter 12.
L Bortolotti and K Puddifoot (2019). Philosophy, bias, and stigma. In D Bubbio and J Malpas (eds.) Why Philosophy? De Gruyter, 51-64.
L Bortolotti (2018). Delusions and three myths of irrational belief. In L Bortolotti (ed.) Delusions in Context. Palgrave Pivot.
L Bortolotti (2018). Agency without Rationality. In A Coliva, P Leonardi, S Moruzzi (eds.) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Palgrave Macmillan, 265-280.
E Sullivan-Bissett and L Bortolotti (2017). Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief: reviving the teleologist’s dilemma. In E Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press, chapter 9.
L Bortolotti and R Gunn (2017). Delusion. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
L Bortolotti, R Gunn and E Sullivan-Bissett (2017). What makes a belief delusional? In I Mac Carthy, K Sellevold and O Smith (eds.) Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture. Legenda, chapter 3.
E Sullivan-Bissett, L Bortolotti, M Broome and M Mameli (2016). Moral and legal implications of the continuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefs. In G Keil, L Keuck and R Hauswald (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press, chapter 10.
K Miyazono, L Bortolotti and M Broome (2014). Prediction-error and two-factor theories of delusion formation: competitors or allies? In N Galbraith (ed.) Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning. Psychology Press, 34-54.
L Bortolotti, R Cox, M Broome and M Mameli (2012). Rationality and self-knowledge in delusions and confabulations: implications for autonomy as self-governance. In L Radoilska (ed.) Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press, chapter 5, 100-122.
L Bortolotti (2010). Double bookkeeping in delusions: explaining the gap between saying and doing. In K Frankish, A Buckareff and J Aguilar (eds.) New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave, chapter 11.
L Bortolotti (2009). Delusion. In E Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Revised and updated in September 2018.
L Bortolotti (2002). Marks of Irrationality. In T Lyons and S Clarke (eds.) Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science. Kluwer, 157-174.
L Bortolotti and S Stammers (2020). When the Personal Becomes Political: How Do We Fulfil Our Epistemic Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Public Debates? In S Stapleford and K McCain (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge, chapter 16.
On Issues in the Philosophy of Psychology and Psychiatry
A Polonioli and L Bortolotti (in press). Social and epistemic benefits of polite conversations. In Chaoqun Xie (ed.) The Philosophy of (Im)politeness. Springer.
J Craigie and L Bortolotti (2014). Rationality, Diagnosis, and Patient Autonomy in Psychiatry. In J Z Sadler, B Fulford, C W van Staden (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics, vol. 1. Oxford University Press.
N Sabbarton-Leary, L Bortolotti and M Broome (2014). Natural and Para-natural Kinds in Psychiatry. In P Zachar, DS Stoyanov, M Aragona, A Jablensky (eds.) Alternative Perspectives in Psychiatric Validation. Oxford University Press, 76-93.
L Bortolotti (2013). Rationality and Sanity: The role of rationality judgements in understanding psychiatric disorders (chapter 30). In B Fulford, M Davies, R Gipps, G Graham, J Sadler, G Stanghellini, T Thornton (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press, 480-496.
M Broome, J Dale, C Marriott, C Merino and L Bortolotti (2012). Neuroscience, continua and the prodromal phase of psychosis. In S Borgwardt, P Fusar-Poli and P McGuire (eds.) Vulnerability to Psychosis: From Neurosciences to Psychopathology. Psychology Press, 3-21. Draft.
L Bortolotti and M Broome (2009). The future of scientific psychiatry. In M Broome and L Bortolotti (eds.) Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 365-376.
M Broome and L Bortolotti (2009). Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: an overview. In M Broome and L Bortolotti (eds.) Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 1-12.
On Ethics, Bioethics, and Medical Ethics
L Bortolotti (2014). The vulnerability approach to animal ethics. In A Ferrari and K Petrus (eds.) Lexikon der Mensch/Tier-Beziehungen (Handbook of Humans-Animals Relationships). Transcript Verlag.
L Bortolotti, M Mameli and A Blasimme (2013). Sentience, Moral Relevance of. In H LaFollette (ed.) International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
A Blasimme, C Sandis and L Bortolotti (2013). Two approaches to animal ethics and the case of great apes. In K Petrus and M Wild (eds.) Animal Minds and Animal Ethics (chapter 11). Transcript Verlag.
L Bortolotti (2011). The concept of scientific research. In C Romeo Casabona (ed.) Los nuevos horizontes de la investigación genética. Comares, Bilbao-Granada, Spain.
L Bortolotti (2010). Can the subject-of-a-life criterion help grant rights to non-persons? In M Hayry, T Takala and P Herissone-Kelly (eds.) Argument and Analysis in Bioethics. Rodopi, 241-248.
L Bortolotti (2009). Do we have an obligation to make smarter babies? In T Takala, P Herrisone-Kelly, S Holm (eds.) Cutting through the Surface: Philosophical Approaches to Bioethics. Rodopi, 221-230.
L Bortolotti and J Harris (2006). Disability, enhancement and the harm-benefit continuum. In J Spencer and A Pedain (eds.) Freedom and Responsibility in Reproductive Choice. Hart Publisher, 31-49.